Suchergebnisse

In the 1990s, American public diplomacy was built down & neglected following its merits during the Cold War. After September 11, (2001), this field has, however, had a renaissance. But at present, the Cold War situation is inverted. In the struggle against communism, the US typically faced hostile regimes with populations yearning for Western ideology & values. Today a heavy reliance on mechanisms of marketing seems to have deteriorated US public diplomacy, whereas the Arab world is far from fertile soil for US public diplomacy. America's current enemies tend to be sub-national actors with hostile perceptions of the US, & larger populations show strong anti-American sentiments. Most activities that are labeled public diplomacy also belong in the realm of propaganda, but so-called white propaganda -- ie, the sender is known. But can public diplomacy work unless the state it originates from combines it with a policy that is saleable to the target audience? 1 Figure, 51 References. Adapted from the source document.

The standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine has already obstructed cooperation across a range of issues. Could it also affect state interaction between Norway and Russia in the Arctic—an area and a relationship long characterized by a culture of compromise and/or cooperation? Here we start from the theoretical premise that states are not pre-constituted political entities, but are constantly in the making. How Russia views its own role and how it views other actors in the Arctic changes over time, calling for differing approaches. That holds true for Norway as well. To clarify the premises for interaction between Russia and Norway in the Arctic, we scrutinize changes in official discourse on Self and Other in the Arctic on both sides in the period 2012 to 2016, to establish what kind of policy mode—"realist," "institutionalist," or "diplomatic management"—has underlain the two countries' official discourse in that period. Has Norway continued to pursue "balancing" policies undertaken in the realist mode with those in the diplomatic management mode? Which modes have characterized Russia's approach toward Norway? Finding that realist-mode policies increasingly dominate on both sides, in the conclusion we discuss how the changing mode of the one state affects that of the other, and why a New Cold War is now spreading to the Arctic.

Since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, Northern Europe has increasingly aligned its national defence arrangements with the United States and NATO. This contrasts with the Cold War period, when Sweden and Finland were neutral, and Norway and Denmark put self-imposed restraints on their NATO memberships. Providing Northern Europe with a stable "buffer" between East and West, this so-called Nordic balance kept the United States and Soviet Union at an arm's length. Since 2014 however, Northern Europe has de facto slid from "buffer" to "springboard" for US forces. This slide may counter Russian assertiveness, but there is also reason to argue that it may increase regional tension and unpredictability. If so, this may leave the entire region with less rather than more security. Using the case of Norway, it is argued that too close an alignment with NATO may have accelerated Norway's role as a "springboard" for US forces. This is because cost-intensive reforms needed to accommodate US expectations abroad have also exacerbated critical vulnerabilities at home. Increased dependency on US forces thereby makes difficult the balance between deterrence and restraint vis-à-vis Russia.

This article presents the opinion that American exceptionalism has returned post 9/11. It is argued that Ronald Reagan's international relations during the cold war displayed the attitude that power is more important than intellectual, factual, historical, ideological, or moral obligations. The uses of power employed by Americans in international conflicts are compared to the uses of power employed by empires of the past. A historical exploration is included of the development of exceptionalist attitudes from the founding of the US in the 1700's, throughout the continual expansions of the 1800's and into the industrial and military power of the 1900's. It is further argued that American traditions during the early 1900's border on messianism, where the American people are the chosen people, and that Reaganism was a natural extension of these traditions, whereas post Reagan there was no need for American messianism or exceptionalism, and thus American Presidents sought a new world order where the US would participate in integrated global economics and politics in cooperation with other nations. George W. Bush's politics post 9/11 with its war on terror marked the return of American exceptionalism. E. Sundby