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Post-cold war concept of security is based on realistic postulates and emphasises a concept of state, forces,power and national interests. Military and political concept of security was dominant while the relations between the superpowers was based on the so called bipolar balance of power. Identity of states was realised by membership in military, political and economic organisations. The strategy of returning to the era of nuclear weapons reaches its full flowering. The crucial point of security after the end of Cold war consists of searching for giving answers to the threats coming from the outside and abilities of states to maintain their independent integrity against changed relations among the powers, which potentially may become enemies. Under such circumstances powers should not be ignored in any interpretation of any aspect of security, for realistic theories of international relations are still of great influence in the field of security. They will be modified in different conditions and will act in the sense of enlarged concept of security - instead of dominant concepts of political and military security typical for the Cold War era, economic, social and environmental factors will appear. Basic weakness of the realistic theories of security is in the lack of recognising the importance of cooperation between main factors in international community. This failure will be replaced neo realistic and liberal and institutional theories of security which emphasises the concept of cooperation in the first place. Concepts of power, forces and integral processes will be observed within the context of changes in the international relations.

As a peculiar bureaucracy whose actions and legislation influence European countries on a daily basis and in countless ways, the EU has gradually become a site within which the political and cultural content of Europe and its limits are constantly defined and reworked. In this chapter, we firstly discuss geopolitical dynamics in Europe with regard to the post-Cold War enlargement process of the EU in particular. Secondly, we focus on the explicit territorial construction of the EU itself in what we call the territory work of the EU. In order to authenticate this concept, the third section discusses the spatial imaginaries and practices of so-called European spatial planning. We introduce European spatial planning as disclosing the ways in which EU governance has gradually emerged as a set of spatial practices and strategies, and modes of spatial calculation that operate on something called EU territory. ; Peer reviewed

The 'greater Nordic space' between Great Britain, Germany and Russia has over time varied with the balance of power. The Baltic States e.g. have been in and out of the space, rejoining by regaining sovereignty after the end of the Cold War. Russia's actions in Ukraine and beyond during 2014 mark the end of the Post-Cold War period and its aspiration to peaceful integration. The small states of the greater Nordic space are now rediscovering their inescapable geopolitical nearness to Russia. Drawing on RSCT and Nordic-Baltic integration literature, the article contributes to understanding the Northern European part of the Euro-Russian Regional Security Complex. Theoretically, the article links RSCT and integration logics through the twin concepts of a 'security region' (given outside-in as one part of a negatively defined RSC), and a 'political region' (created inside-out under the shield provided by the security region). To link the two concepts, Heidegger's idea of Geworfenheit, or thrownness, is employed to capture how the states of the greater Nordic space are always already subject to the dynamics underlying that space and how this condition affects the states' interpretation of their changing surroundings, including translation into political regionality. Empirically, the article therefore argues that Russia's new foreign policy has created a greater Nordic space 'security region' – supported by the United States – that is paving the way for new integration initiatives to a strengthened 'political region' inside the space, possibly as a 'greater Nordic region'.

The end of the 20th century was marked by a rather unexpected opening as the long-enduring Cold War came to the end and the Soviet Union collapsed, allowing fifteen new republics to appear on the political scene. Beyond the optimistic expectations of democratization and the expansion of free-market capitalism through the newly independent republics, the collapse of the Soviet Union created serious challenges for the international community in terms of international law, politics, economy, and security. One problematic challenge, which remains an open issue today, is the painful process of disintegration of the multi-ethnic Soviet federal state. By evaluating the current state of affairs of the non-NATO member, Kremlin disloyal post-Soviet states located on the western frontier of the Russian Federation, we can see that they have become a "bone of contention" between the West and Russia. By presenting brand new evidence from the Gorbachev period, once top-secret meetings of the CPSU Politburo and other Soviet governmental institutions, this article critically evaluates issues such as Gorbachev's grand compromises in Central and Eastern Europe and the Russian problem in Ukraine and probable risks of its further aggravation, and tries to draw recommendations for solving current territorial problems in the region.

At a time when individual defense outlays are being significantly diminished, the national governments of Western Europe are confronted with the necessity of reforming and adapting their militaries to address new security concerns and undertake new missions. This study will examine multinational military integration as one possible approach whereby national governments can limit defense spending and still maintain military capabilities to meet the contemporary security threats faced by the nation states of the continent. The first three chapters of the work will explore the broad patterns of change in the international system which have propelled states to reexamine how they define the functions and interests of the nation state. The second group of three chapters will discuss the new security issues facing Europe. The final three chapters will present specific case studies which illustrate the trend toward integration. In the end, it can be demonstrated that the convergence of factors, the evolution of the nation state, the change in contemporary security perceptions, fiscal constraints and the established progress in multilateral military cooperation, will continue to propel European military integration.

"The United States is no longer the only global center of power as it was in the first years of post-Cold War era. Neither are there just two superpowers -- the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics -- that define the course of global events. The new multipolarity implies the presence of several centers of power that will provide the opportunity for small states, such as Belarus, to move from one center of power to the other and/or to engage in a sort of geopolitical gamesmanship. During the last 10 years or so, Belarus moved from Russia to the European Union and back, while at the same time engaging in relationships with Iran and China. While relationships with Russia and the European Union have not been stable, the story is different with China and Iran. Belarus has always maintained a good relationship with both countries, especially with China. This demonstrates the increasing role of Asia in the geopolitical arrangements now and certainly in the years to come."-- Publisher's website. ; "May 2012." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 66-79). ; The small player and the Cold War -- Russian direction : from "union state" to conflict -- Western direction : the first steps -- Baltic response -- Asian direction -- The Iranian equation -- China directions -- Conclusion. ; "The United States is no longer the only global center of power as it was in the first years of post-Cold War era. Neither are there just two superpowers -- the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics -- that define the course of global events. The new multipolarity implies the presence of several centers of power that will provide the opportunity for small states, such as Belarus, to move from one center of power to the other and/or to engage in a sort of geopolitical gamesmanship. During the last 10 years or so, Belarus moved from Russia to the European Union and back, while at the same time engaging in relationships with Iran and China. While relationships with Russia and the European Union have not been stable, the story is different with China and Iran. Belarus has always maintained a good relationship with both countries, especially with China. This demonstrates the increasing role of Asia in the geopolitical arrangements now and certainly in the years to come."-- Publisher's website. ; Mode of access: Internet.

ÖZETSOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI AVRUPA'DA GÜVENLİK: KOLEKTİF SAVUNMADAN KOLEKTİF GÜVENLİĞESoğuk Savaş'ın bitmesiyle Avrupa-Atlantik bölgesine yeni bir güvenlik yapısı ortaya çıkmış ve kuzey yarımkürede yeni anlayışlara neden olmuştur. Büyük ve hızlı değişimler Soğuk Savaş yıllarındaki hareketsizliğe son vermiş ve Avrupa'da güvenliğin daha geniş bir zemine kaymasına neden olmuştur. Güvenliğin kapsamı genişleyerek bir ülke ya da ittifakın toprak bütünlüğünden daha fazla anlam taşımaya başlamıştır. Artık ana amaç hukuk kuralları, özgürlük ve serbestlik gibi ortak ve kabul gören normların, değerlerin korunmasıdır. Soğuk Savaş sonrasında, tüm kurumlar yeni güvenlik ortamına uyumlarını sağlayabilmek için güvenlik stratejilerinin temel unsurlarını ve önceliklerini yeniden değerlendirmeye çalışmaktadırlar. Soğuk Savaş'ın bitişi ile, NATO kendisini kollektif savunma düzeninden kollektif güvenlik düzenine doğru dönüştürmüştür. Bu çerçevede Stratejik Konseptini yenilemiş, yapısını esnek CJTFler ile değiştirmiş, eski düşmanlarıyla işbirliğini arttırmaya çalışmış ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası ilk genişlemeyi gerçekleştirmiştir. Diğer taraftan, Maastricht Anlaşması'ndan beri, AB ülkeleri AB'nin gelişen entegrasyon sürecindeki eksiklikleri gidermek üzere ortak bir güvenlik ve savunma politikası oluşturmaya çalışmaktadırlar. NATO içerisinde kalarak "ayrılabilen fakat ayrı olmayan" bir Avrupa kuvveti oluşturmaya dönük başlangıç çabaları, AB çerçevesinde otonom bir "Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası" oluşturmanın yolunu açmıştır. Bununla birlikte atılan bu adımlara rağmen günümüzün karmaşık güvenlik ortamında yaşayabilir, muktedir ve otonom bir Avrupa güvenlik yapısı oluşturmak zordur.ABSTRACTPOST COLD WAR SECURITY IN EUROPE: FROM COLLECTIVE DEFENSE BACK TO COLLECTIVE SECURITYSince the end of the Cold War, new security environment emerged in Euro-Atlantic region and created new insights over the northern hemisphere. The dramatic, rapid and profound changes in the Europe put an end to Cold War deadlock and caused the security arrangements in Europe transformed into a broader domain. Security has become much broader in scope and comprises more than the territorial integrity of a nation, or an Alliance. Its main goal is to keep common and accepted norms and values, like the rule of law, freedom and liberty, undamaged.In the post-Cold War era, all institutions tried to reassess their priorities and the fundamental elements of their security strategies in order to adapt themselves to the new environment. With the end of Cold War, the NATO has transformed itself from a collective defense arrangement towards a collective security. It changed the its Strategic Concept, rearranged its structure with CJTFs, increased the cooperation with former allies through PfP and EPAC, and carried out the first enlargement round in the post-Cold War era.On the other hand, since the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union countries have been trying to form a common security and defense policy to fulfill the gaps in the evolutionary process of European Union unification. The initial efforts to create "separable but not separate" European forces within NATO have paved the way for creating an autonomous "European Security and Defense Policy" within the framework of the EU. However, despite these ambitious steps, it is very difficult to create a viable, capable and autonomous European security structure in today's complex security environment

This study aims at sorting out the differences between the Turkish and European conceptions of security in the post-Cold War era and the impact of these differences on Turkey's quest for membership in the European Union (EU). To realise this aim, the study is composed of one major argument and a set of supporting arguments. The major argument of this study is that security is crucial for any analysis on the issue of Turkey's accession to the EU; not in terms of what Turkey can offer with regard to military security to the Union but rather in terms of the logic of security which inherently involves the "breaking of the normal political rules of the game" (as suggested by the Copenhagen School) - i.e. limits on fundamental rights and freedoms as well as on pluralism and democracy. The first chapter sets the theoretical framework of this study; analysing the existing literature on the multidimensional concept of security (which attaches equal significance to non-military and military dimensions of security). The Copenhagen School's approach is emphasised in this chapter as it forms the point of departure of the study. In the second chapter, theories which are closely related to the multidimensional security concept; the two worlds view (zones of peace and conflict), democratic peace theory and the theory of security communities are scrutinized with a view to supporting the theoretical basis established in the first chapter. In the third and fourth chapters, the nature of the EU as a de-securitization process and a civilian power, and, Turkey's nature as an over-securitizing actor are all put forward respectively, in an effort to develop the major argument of this study. The fifth chapter consists of a comparative analysis of the security conceptions and perceptions of Turkey and the EU, in order to display the interplay of security identities between the two entities. This chapter lays down the areas of convergence and divergence between Turkey and the EU in this respect. The study reaches the conclusion that despite differences in their perception and conception of security; Turkey and the EU have also found grounds for convergence in this regard. Turkey has started a period of de-securitization in line with its quest for EU membership, whereas the EU has started re-securitization, especially after September 11. ÖZBu doktora çalışmasının amacı, Soğuk Savaş dönemi sonrasında Türkiye ve Avrupa'daki güvenlik kavramı farklılıklarını ortaya koymak ve söz konusu farklılıkların Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği (AB) üyesi olma hedefine etkilerini incelemektir. Çalışma, bir ana argüman ve destekleyici yan argümanlardan oluşmaktadır. Ana argüman; "güvenlik" kavramının, Türkiye'nin AB'ye girişi ile ilgili herhangi bir analiz için çok önemli olduğudur. Ancak bu önem, Türkiye'nin askeri güvenlik konusunda Birliğe olası katkısıdan çok, güvenliğin teorik tanımının içerdiği öğeler ile ilgilidir. Çünkü, "güvenlik", özünde (Kopenhag ekolü tarafından önerildiği üzere) "oyunun normal siyasi kurallarını bozan" - bir başka deyişle, çoğulculuk, demokrasi ve temel hak ve özgürlükleri kısıtlayıcı - öğeleri barındırır. Birinci bölüm, çok boyutlu güvenlik kavramı (bu kavram güvenliğin askeri ve askeri olmayan boyutlarına eşit önem verir) üzerinde yapılmış akademik çalışmaları inceleyerek, tezin teorik çerçevesini çizmektedir. Kopenhag ekolünün yaklaşımı, tezin hareket noktasını oluşturduğu için, bu bölümde yoğunlukla vurgulanmaktadır. İkinci bölümde, çok boyutlu güvenlik kavramı ile yakından ilgili teoriler; iki dünya görüşü (barış ve çatışma alanları), demokratik barış teorisi ve güvenlik toplumları teorisi, ilk bölümdeki teorik temeli pekiştirmek amacı ile incelenmektedir. Üçüncü ve dördüncü bölümlerde, sırasıyla, AB'nin bir "de-securitization" (meseleleri güvenlik alanından çıkarıp, normalleştirme) süreci ve sivil güç olarak yapısı ve Türkiye'nin fazla güvenlikleştirme (over-securitization) yapan bir aktör olarak doğası, bu tezin ana argümanını geliştirmek üzere ele alınmaktadır. Beşinci bölüm, Türkiye ve Avrupa'nın güvenlik kimliklerinin karşılıklı etkileşimlerini ortaya koymak amacı ile bu iki entitenin güvenlik anlayış ve algılayışlarını karşılaştıran bir analizden oluşmaktadır. Bu bölüm, söz konusu alanlarda Türkiye ve AB arasındaki ayrışma ve birleşme noktalarını tespit etmektedir. Çalışma, aralarındaki güvenlik anlayışı ve algılayışı farklılıklarına rağmen, Türkiye ve AB'nin bu konuda birleşme noktalarının da bulunduğu sonucuna varmaktadır. Türkiye, AB üyeliği hedefine uygun olarak bir "de-securitization" dönemine girmiş; AB ise, özellikle 11 Eylül sonrasında bir yeniden güvenlikleştirme (re-securitization) sürecine başlamıştır ve bu gelişmeler iki taraf arasındaki en onemli birleşme noktasını oluşturmaktadır.

The editors of the nation's two leading journals on foreign policy were asked to examine the nature of the post-cold war world and America's transitional role. These essays represent the views of Charles William Maynes, editor of Foreign Policy, and William G. Hyland, former editor of Foreign Affairs. Charles Maynes reviews the major transitions that marked 45 years of Soviet-American strategic confrontation. Predictably, the U.S. global role and defense resources are declining as old threats decrease and domestic problems move higher up on the policy agenda. Less predictably, the relative defense spending of small powers is likely to increase, adding to the potential for regional instability. These trends and the proliferation of weapons technology, including weapons of mass destruction, will drive the major powers toward their third attempt in this century to deal with global instability through collective security. Power will become more evenly distributed as America's military dominance recedes and others' economic power increases. Such trends, Mr. Maynes believes, should not be disturbing so long as prudent retrenchment does not become a foolish retreat from an American global role. William Hyland believes that no president since Calvin Coolidge has inherited an easier foreign policy agenda. Presidents from Truman through Bush did the cold war "heavy lifting," and the Clinton transitional era should mark the ascendancy of domestic over foreign policy issues. Economic power is essential to America's future and the country faces the difficult task of economic recovery while avoiding the political expedience of protectionism or other forms of belligerence toward our trading partners. This would accelerate international fragmentation, undermining the political trends toward a collective security regime that is vital to the new world order and is the best alternative to the extremes of U.S. isolationism or global policeman. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1280/thumbnail.jpg

Since the inauspicious events of 2013-2014, Ukraine is in domestic and international turmoil. The Russian annexation of the Crimea was the first major act of its kind since the Second World War. Likewise, the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 shocked the world. The political consequences remain to this day. In all convolutions, domestic and foreign politicians often appealed to history. Conflicting perceptions of history are an essential element of the so-called 'Ukraine Crisis'. This study demonstrates that political usage of history did not appear out of thin air. Ever since Ukraine became independent in 1991 politicians and historians sought to reinterpret the country's complicated past. Inspired by nationalist ideology they tried to give Ukraine a national 'European history'. To this, adherents of the old Soviet-style of Ukrainian history responded with vigour. Creating a tense political atmosphere wherein both sides polarized Ukrainian society around two extremes. Ukraine is not unique: since 1991, historians and politicians in Europe and Russia have also sought to redefine interpretations of history. While post-Communist Europe wanted to revaluate the meaning of communist and Nazi totalitarian rule, Western Europe sought to protect a narrative that sees Nazi crimes as the blackest page of history. On the other hand, Russia increasingly depends on presenting the Second World War as a great triumph. By contrasting the developments in Ukraine with other European and Russian experiences this study asks difficult but much-needed questions about what history means in our present.

"Featuring new evidence on: the end of the Cold War, 1989; the fall of the Wall; Sino-Soviet relations, 1958-59; Soviet missile deployments, 1959; the Iran Crisis, 1944-46; Tito and Khrushchev, 1954. ; "Fall/Winter 2001" ; Caption title. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; "Featuring new evidence on: the end of the Cold War, 1989; the fall of the Wall; Sino-Soviet relations, 1958-59; Soviet missile deployments, 1959; the Iran Crisis, 1944-46; Tito and Khrushchev, 1954. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The transition of Central and Eastern European post-communist countries followed different sets of reforms with different degrees of success which generated a monolithic debate attitude for decades. From shock-therapy and intermediary to gradualist approaches, I stress the superiority of Bing-Bang reforms to market-based economies from economic, political and social perspectives. In this paper, after identifying the structural reforms started after 1989, I emphasize several variables that demonstrates the superiority of shock-therapy reforms for 22 countries grouped in four specific categories. After the examination that leads to the result that the radicalists won the battle with the gradualists, from epistemological to "numerical" point of views, we tried to propose an explanation for this historical fact and we consider this is due to the superiority of the extended order over the holistic one. Future work is needed to analyse the role of geographical proximity with the Western world and of historical legacies in the advancement of the debate.

An analysis of the history of the Christian churches of Europe and North America during the Cold War, discussing the impact of dictatorship, geopolitical confrontation and nuclear politics, and also exploring social, cultural and intellectual developments across the churches in this period.

This study builds on previous research that examined U.S. media coverage of two airline disasters – KAL007 and IR655 – during the Cold War in the 1980s. It explores new Cold War frames in The New York Times and The Moscow Times' coverage of the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 in 2014. Additionally, U.S. and Russian official narratives of the incident were compared to the MH17 coverage by the two selected newspapers. Results reveal an absence of hostile Cold War assertions but indicate a link between media frames and the U.S. and Russian government positions. Additionally, findings shed light on the Moscow-Washington relations against the backdrop of intense confrontation between Russia and the West not witnessed since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Tracing Cold War in post-modern managerial science and ideology one encounters hot issues linking contemporary liberal dogmas and romanticized view of organizational leadership to the dismantling of a welfare state disguised as a liberation of an individual employee, empowerment of an individual consumer and a progressive, liberal and global development of a market/parliament mix. The concept of totalitarianism covers fearful symmetries between three modes of paying the bills for western modernization; liberal, communist and the emergent "egalibertarian"(1), while the ideologies of organisationalism and globalization testify to a search for a post-Cold War mission statement. Messiness of re-engineering the enlargement of the European Union testifies to the hidden injuries of Cold War, not all of them caused by a class and class struggle.