After twenty five years since the introduction of the semi-presidential system in Serbia and in the region, this text attempt to reassess its performance, achievements and limits. It analyses the factors which the power of the directly elected president depends on (constitutional competences, manner of election, whether he is a party president, whether his party has majority in the parliament). The text explains the origin of the concept and institution, reasons for introduction, criteria for maximalist and minimalist understandings of semi-presidentialism. In new democracies the semi-presidential system faces additional challenges and temptations: 'the third mandate', absence of reelection-related incentives in the second mandate, manner of inclusion in/exclusion from the creation of politics and whether the directly elected president is in the same time the party president. Possible redesign of this political institution would require taking care that the manner of election is only one of the dimensions important for functioning of this system. The issue of the level of competences is of no less importance. The key is in the careful balance of power among the three branches of power, but above else between the president of the state and the prime minister.
American and international public looks up to American presidents as the chief creators of American foreign policy. A review of the contemporary history of US foreign policy is mostly a review of foreign policy platforms and initiatives of American presidents. Although fundamental prerequisites exist - constitutional powers, executive office of the President as support in the creation and implementation of certain decisions, the expectations of the Congress and the public that President should lead the nation in the foreign policy arena - not all American presidents have taken an equal interest in foreign policy decision-making and the creation of American foreign policy; this has depended on their personal interests and experiences. Despite significant constitutional restrictions of the president's autonomous action in foreign policy and occasionally successful attempts of the legislature to assume control over foreign policy, as well as frequent challenges to presidential powers and numerous actions by the public, we can conclude that American presidents are nevertheless dominant figures in the field of American foreign policy. (SOI : PM: S. 192)
The Croatian Constitutional Court by its decision of June 24, 1992 partly rejected a reqest to start proceedings, and partly terminated already started proceedings, to determine the constitutionality of some thirty emergency decrees passed by the President of the Croatian Republic during the undeclared war with Serbia and the Yugoslav People's Army in the second half of 1991. The Court backed its decision inter alia by the following arguments: the President has the power to pass emergency decrees without declaring first the state of emergency; presidential emergency decrees can be retroactive since Croatian Constitution does not forbid specifically their retroactivity. The Court's reasoning which endorses a permanent coup d'etat, is very probably a corollary of the idea, which is taken for granted by some Croatian constitutional lawyers, that the Croatian Constitution has been modelled on the Constitution of the French 5th Republic so that the sweeping powers of the French President belong also to his Croatian counterpart. The paper challenges the idea and discusses the relevance of comparative constitutional theory for Croatian constitutional practice. The first three sections demonstrate that, despite political similarities between the early years of the French 5th Republic and the Croatian Republic the two semi-presidential systems differ in several important constitutional and legal respects so that the powers - especially emergency powers - of the French President cannot be used as a persuasive authority to interpret powers of the Croatian President. Section four indicates that if anything in French law is authoritative in interpreting Croatian constitutional provisions on the state of emergency it is the effort of the French Conseil d'etat to control, even though in a very limited way, the legality of presidential emergency decrees. The last section points out that assumptions with which Croatian Constitutional Court interprets presidential powers are more in accord with the Weimar Constitution than with the Constitution of the 5th French Republic. The paper ends with the warning that the unrestrained exercise of presidential powers in Croatia may lead, as it did in Mussolinni's Italy and in the Weimar Republic, to a dictatorship. (SOI : PM: S. 165)
The relations with Russia rank among the most important and most complex issues in the US and UK foreign policy. The years after the Second World War have been marked by an exhausting arms race between the Western and Eastern bloc that ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the victory of the United States and its Western allies. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the relations between the US and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, during the mandate of President Trump and after Brexit and point to possible directions that these relations may take in the aftermath of Biden's victory in the 2020 US Presidential elections. The author proceeds from a hypothesis that the efforts of President Trump, who, contrary to his predecessors, felt that the relations with Russia should be based on interests rather than ideology, have failed. He has not been successful primarily due to the huge resistance mounted by the state structures, mainstream media and anti-Russian coalition forged by the Republican and Democratic parties. The relations between the UK and Russia remain cold after Brexit as well due to the severe problems between the two countries. The first part will deal with the strained relations between the United States and Russia following the West's victory in the Cold War, the efforts of President Trump to improve these relations and his failure to do so. The second part of the paper will address the relationship between the United Kingdom and Russia, which is in many respects even more complicated than that between Russia and the US. After Brexit, the relations between the two countries continue to be plagued by the activities of the Russian agents in Great Britain, the crisis in Ukraine and different views on the war in Syria. In the third part, the concluding part of the paper, the author tried to answer the question of how the relations between the US and Russia will develop after Joseph Biden won the 2020 US Presidential elections. According to him, the new President will continue to pursue the traditional policy towards Russia agreed upon by both US parties. It can be expected that Biden will, despite the policy of sanctions pursued by his predecessors, Obama and Trump, engage more in supporting the opposition and civilian sector in Russia. Given the cold and strained relations between these two states, it may be assumed that Great Britain will readily follow a new, tougher course of action pursued by President Biden towards Russia and Putin. It is especially important for UK politics that Biden returns to the ideas of liberalism because, as we have seen on previous pages, in London, in addition to the actions of Russian agents on the UK territory, Putin is most resented precisely for his activities to overthrow the ruling liberal order. Despite the good ties between Prime Minister Johnson and the former US President who supported Brexit, Biden's victory will bring relief to the UK because of his commitment, as opposed to Trump, to bring back America to the world political stage, where London is likely to expect to find space for its new global role after leaving the EU. On the other hand, Moscow will probably continue with its past foreign policy strategy in anticipation of the moves to be taken by the new US President without high expectations regarding the future relations between the two countries. Russia has even fewer expectations when it comes to relations with the UK, given the gravity of the problems that burden the relations between the two countries.
After the assassination of king Alexander (1934) the Kingdom of Yugoslavia witnessed a revival of the party and political life and confrontation between the regime and opposing forces. The new president of the government Milan Stojadinovic recognized again the existence of the Croatian question. At all political meetings the followers of Vladko Macek and of the Croatian Peasant Party all over Croatia asked the prince Pavle and the government to abolish the dictatorship. The same happened also at the meeting of Croatian Peasant Party in Sisak (1936), when one of the Party leaders, Ljudevit Tomasic, criticized the political situation in the country. Facing 12000 citizens of Sisak and peasants from the Sisak region, he asked for full sovereignty of Croatian people, Croatian Parliament in Zagreb, and said that Croats had never been nor would ever be Yugoslavs "because Yugoslavism is no nation at all". Because of this speech a criminal proceedings against Tomasic were instituted. It was a political process which included a series of state-run institutions. After the agreement between the new president of the government Dragisa Cvetkovic and Vladko Macek and after the establishment of Banovina Croatia, the procedure against Tomasic was stopped. (SOI : CSP: S. 296)
Based on the literature and the available sources, first of all contemporary press, the author reconstructs the attitude of the Croatian Popular Party on the events concerning the assassination on Stjepan Radic, the representative of the Croatian Peasant Party in the National Assembly of the Monarchy of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Special attention is paid to the entrance of S. Baric, president of the Croatian Popular Party, into the government of Anton Korosec, and reactions to this step. Disappearance of the Croatian Popular Party from the Croatian political scene was closely connected with the resistance (gemeint ist: lack of resistance, SOI, Clw) of its leaders to this extremely unpopular government. (SOI : CSP: S. 245)
Henry Kissinger is one of the most eminent and influential intellectuals in American foreign policy. His work and achievements may be divided into three phases of his participation in the creation of American foreign policy. In the first - scholarly - phase of his career, he criticized US foreign polic His works from that period clearly reflect his "realpolitik" outlook. Particularly important for his life and work is the second phase when he was able, as a national security adviser and later as Secretary of State for presidents Nixon and Ford, to use his remarkable intellectual capital and successfully practice realpolitik as the creator and proponent of American foreign policy. After his retirement from foreign policy administration, Kissinger did not cease to use his clout in the field of international relations and American foreign policy. He has been one of the most significant American intellectuals who have exerted an influence on American foreign policy. (SOI : SOEU: S. 133)
NATO's military action in Yugoslavia is a pivotal event that is going to leave an indelible impact on the further direction of international relations. The author first analyses the underlying causes of the campaign, among which were: the international community's resolve to finally punish Milosevic', be instrumental in eliminating his regime, drive out Russian interests from the Balkans, espouse a positive stance towards Muslim countries and, finally, the internal political American reason: the desire to strengthen President Clinton's position. This action has also had a manifold significance for the new world order since it poses the questions of the world order's content and nature, its leadership and norms in a new light. In the process of establishing of the new post-cold-war relations, various tendencies that will pave the way to the new millennium will clash. On the one hand, there will be the exclusive approach based on force and interests, and on the other, the desire to establish the relations in which human rights will be the fundamental criterion for assessing the suitability of a country for a full membership in the newly unified international community. (SOI : S. 24)
Crime and violence pose a serious challenge to Mexico. The problem appears to be growing worse, with 2011 on pace to become the most violent year on record. The rising violence in Mexico has resulted in a sharply heightened sense of fear among citizens, who now feel the presence of cartels in their every day lives. The use of extortion and kidnapping by cartels combined with a lack of trust in security forces terrorizes the population and makes them feel like they have no where to turn. Despite this fact, crime rates in Mexico remain lower than in other parts of Latin America. Venezuela, for example, has among the highest homicide rates in the world. Yet the pervasive infiltration of cartels into public life gives Mexicans a heightened sense of the severity of violent crime in their own country. Although accurate statistics are hard to come by, it is quite possible that 60,000 people have died in the last six-plus years as a result of armed conflict between the Mexican cartels and the Mexican government, amongst cartels fighting each other, and as a result of cartels targeting citizens. Mexico has been struggling with drug production and drug transit through its territory from South America to the U.S. for many decades, given the fact that it is the most important transit country for drug production originating from South America. In recent years, the escalating violence in Mexico has led to dramatic deterioration of the security situation. Recent wave of drug-war violence is associated with the beginning of the term of President Felipe Calderón in December 2006. The immediate implications of his assumption of the presidency and his hard-line policy, which he has applied against drug cartels and organized criminal groups across the country, were the deployment of Mexican army to fight cartels and the gradual weakening of the influence of local and state police at the expense of federal troops. This was done in order to combat corruption and collaboration of local law-enforcement institutions with drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). The consequence of such a policy, however, has been increased violence among rival cartels and between them and the federal police and military, resulting in a dramatic increase of the number of victims. The future of US-Mexican counter drug cooperation, as well as of the whole bilateral relation in the area of security, depends on the outcome of US presidential elections. As for Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto takes the office on December 1, 2012 that will mark a comeback of his party PRI after 12 years in opposition. As far as the security strategy of the future Mexican President is concerned, there are no significant changes to be expected. Peña Nieto seems to be aware of the current situation and its consequences as well as of the inevitability of an extremely close and dynamic mutual cooperation with the US.
Nothing is more prone to errors than newspapers. Croatian newspapers (dailies, magazines and a few journals) were studied during a several- month period in 1997. The review is not comprehensive, nor have all the pages been scanned, since this would require a sort of analysis for which there were no necessary funds nor researchers. Nevertheless, the picture of the typical newspaper errors is all-inclusive. The errors which are a result of haste, hard working conditions and obsolete technology are bearable and excusable. However, flagrant carelessness shows disrespect for readers and the profession. Even worse is ignorance. Journalism is advancing fast, but there are certain well-known basics which can be easily learned. There is no excuse for ignorance-based errors, as there is no justification for a surgeon who would - due to ignorance - amputate a healthy instead of a diseased leg. But, what to say about the intentional, deliberate distortion of facts? It is unforgivable not to inform the public about the opinions of the President or the Governor of National Bank or to give a true dimension to a crime. This side of journalism must be rectified by educated professionals who respect the rules of the profession and whose primary concern are not ideological connotations and drifts. (SOI : PM: S. 198)
An analysis of the US foreign policy strategy shows that a more intensive advocacy of human rights and democracy is us usually a characteristic for democratic American presidents and their administrations. The numerous challenges of the new world order which Bill Clinton was faced with, required the redefinition of the role, goals, and interests of the sole remaining superpower in the new international community. The promotion of democracy and liberal market values and the protection of universal human rights have been the guidelines for Clinton's administration's foreign policy during both of his mandates. Due to the specific features and intensity of geopolitical changes, which resulted in armed conflicts in the South-Eastern Europe, the consequence of the American policy towards the newly-created countries (the so-called young democracies on the Old Continent, including the new Russia) was that the first NATO's military "out of area" campaign on Kosovo was justified as an attempt to stem the flood of refugees and to make an end to the violation of ethnic and other human rights. Since the US have announced their intention to intervene when and if (and based on their interests), they deem that basic human rights and democratic values are violated, it can be said that a new pattern of behaviour has emerged which would have to be adopted by the other members of the new world order as well. (SOI : PM: S. 122)
Shanghai Cooperation Organization was founded in 2001 under a Declaration signed by the leaders of five independent states from the territory of former Soviet Union and the President of the People's Republic of China. The Charter, adopted by the organization's member states as their basic document, emphasizes their commitment to strengthen their mutual trust and good-neighborliness and friendly cooperation; to keep and maintain the peace, stability and security of the region; as well as to fight together against all forms of terrorism, separatism and extremism. Although there are significant differences between the member states in almost all matters of social and governmental organization, over its ten-year existence the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has proved its vitality and has become respectable entity not only of the regional but also of international cooperation on the whole. In recent years all main actors of contemporary international relations have tried to establish and develop the cooperation with this important intergovernmental association. What the further development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will be like and where the organization will be positioned within the future world order is difficult to be definitely determined. Apart from the role of the two leading states of this organization - Russia and China, its eventual position will be greatly influenced by other major international factors as well, which, in the era of unstable energy and other forms of security, find the area of Central Asia ever more significant and attractive.
More than a decade has passed since the momentous events of 1989 that changed the world order and redefined the geopolitics of Central Europe. This is just the right moment to assess the results of these changes and discuss the future of that region. Based on the past comparative studies or those currently going on, we may say that Central Europe differs from the post-communist East (the former Soviet Union) and the South-East (the former Yugoslavia with the exception of Slovenia) and Albania. First, Central-European states overthrew their communist regimes earlier and in a more decisive manner than the USSR; second, the economic transformation of Central Europe, though not completely smooth, is nevertheless much smoother than the transformation of the member countries of the CIS; third, the post-communist societies differ in the pattern by which their systems of social stratification have changed after the collapse of their communist regimes; fourth, there are big differences between the Central-European post-communist states, including the Baltic states on the one hand, and the CIS members and Serbia/Montenegro-Yugoslavia on the other regarding their international orientation. The author highlights three significant events that are going to leave their trace on the regional geostrategic situation: NATO's eastern expansion, NATO's campaign against SKY and the election of Vladimir Putin for president of Russia. The regional geopolitical picture may become more stable with closer ties between the states of Central Europe and Germany. (SOI : PM: S. 11)
Predmet rada su činioci i struktura političke kulture mladih u Srbiji. Politička kultura shvaćena je kao sveukupnost političkih i politički relevantnih orijentacija među pripadnicima jedne političke zajednice koja obuhvata nekoliko tipova orijentacije: kognitivne, afektivne, motivacione, vrednosne i ponašajne. ; The paper explores the factors and structure of youth political culture in Serbia. Political culture is defined as a comprehensive sum of political and politically relevant orientations of the members of a political community and comprises several types of orientations: cognitive, affective, motivational, evaluative and behavioural. Accordingly, five components of youth political culture were distinguished and operationalised by a large number of indicators. The empirical basis for the thesis is a survey conducted in 25 randomly selected secondary schools from the city of Belgrade. The total of 788 students from four different types of secondary school participated in the research: grammar schools (N=202), technical (N=207), economic (N=211) and medical (N=168). The sample was restricted to students of the final year (average age M=18.10, SD=.40). Three-quarters of students (75%) in the sample attend urban secondary schools and one quarter suburban (25%). There were more female participants (58%) than male (42%). Research results indicate that the level of youth political knowledge is low. The majority are not informed about topical social and political issues nor acquainted with certain basic rules regarding the functioning of the Serbian political system, such as the election threshold, government composition or the number of MPs. The prevailing feelings towards numerous analysed political objects are negative. Young people are highly dissatisfied with the current socioeconomic situation. The President, the Government, the Parliament, police, judiciary, the European Union or NATO, are not much trusted. Political cynicism is dominant, while for the majority politics is not the field of interest nor is considered important in life. Most students believe that they cannot influence political affairs (however, surprisingly, they are ready to vote in the following elections) while their opinions on social activism are divided. The attitude towards pro-system values is often ambiguous and vague. The attitude towards democracy is predominantly positive. However, the majority of students do not perceive favourably the newly established mechanisms and institutions of market economy and are hence more inclined towards the socialist than (pro-)market orientation. It can be said that they do not support the freedom of speech, multi-party system and rule of law.
Vanredno stanje predstavlja neredovnu, izuzetnu situaciju u kojoj se mogu naći i najdemokratskije države. U takvim okolnostima obično se poziva na staro pravilo da je spas naroda (države) najviši zakon. Ipak, s obzirom na to da je tada, zbog višeg razloga (opstanak države), neophodan izvestan stepen koncentracije vlasti u rukama egzekutive, što neminovno otvara mogućnost zloupotreba, ustavotvorci moraju biti vrlo pažljivi prilikom normiranja ovako osetljivog pitanja. Centralni deo rada ukazuje na prednosti i mane sadašnjeg ustavnog rešenja u Srbiji, prvenstveno u odnosu na način uvođenja vanrednog stanja postavljen u Ustavu Srbije iz 1990. godine. U nekadašnjem srpskom ustavu predsednik Republike je bio ovlašćen za donošenje odluke o vanrednom stanju, što je danas u nadležnosti Narodne skupštine, koja je nesumnjivo najpotpuniji i najbolji reprezent narodne volje. Međutim, pitanje efikasnosti odlučivanja i brzine reagovanja u toj delikatnoj stvari i dalje ostaje sporno. Pored izvesnih nedoslednosti, pa čak možda i omaški, postojeći Ustav Republike Srbije iz 2006. godine ipak u osnovi pokazuje demokratska nastojanja da se donošenje odluke o uvođenju vanrednog stanja višestruko osigura, a pogotovo da se u vreme važenja vanrednog stanja u potpunosti poštuju ljudska prava u skladu sa preuzetim međunarodnim obavezama. ; State of emergency marks an irregular, exceptional situation, which potentially may hit the most democratic countries as well. Since ancient times, under those circumstances, the rule salus populi suprema lex (safety of the people is supreme demand) is applied and used as an excuse. However, as under those circumstances a kind of concentration of power within the executive branch is unavoidable, there is a need to have very cautiously measured constitutional norms regulating that balance. The main goal of this paper is to examine advantages and shortcomings of the current regulation of that issue in Serbia according to the 2006 Constitution, particularly in connection with the previous, 1990 Constitution and the experience of introducing state of emergency in the country. According to the previous Serbian Constitution, President of the Republic was engaged to introduce the state of emergency, while according to the current one, that decision was moved into hands of the National Assembly – which is undeniably the best and the most prominent representative of the will of the people. However, the issue of efficiency and properly quick reaction is at stake. Although the existing 2006 Constitution has some inconsistencies, and even more some omissions, it basically reflects democratic tendencies to secure in many ways the decision on emergency state introduction, and particularly to ensure respect of the human rights during the state of emergency in compliance with the established international obligations.