Suchergebnisse

From comparative research on the constitutional development in Central & Eastern Europe & also from the long-standing debate on whether parliamentarism or presidentialism best facilitates democracy, it is apparent that there has been & continues to be, a certain degree of confusion concerning the concepts of semi-presidentialism & presidentialism. Different scholars mean different things by the terms & therefore classify countries differently. In this article I argue that the conceptual dichotomy between pro-premiar (premier-presidentialism) & pro-president systems (president-parliamentary systems) provide the best solution to several of the problems related to categorizing constitutional types, most importantly perhaps to the presidential power dilemma. I, furthermore, employ these concepts on the post-communist constitutional systems & try to reveal patterns with regard to presidential power, geographical region & democratzsation. 6 Tables, 3 Figures, 51 References. Adapted from the source document.

Ukraine has repeatedly shifted between the two sub-types of semi-presidentialism, i.e. between premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism. The aim of this article is to discuss to what extent theoretical arguments against premier-presidential and president-parliamentary systems are relevant for understanding the shifting directions of the Ukrainian regime. As a point of departure, I formulate three main claims from the literature: 1) "President-parliamentarism is less conducive to democratization than premier-presidentialism."; 2) "Semi-presidentialism in both its variants have built-in incitements for intra-executive conflict between the president and the prime minister."; 3) "Semi-presidentialism in general, and president-parliamentarism in particular, encourages presidentialization of political parties." I conclude from the study's empirical overview that the president-parliamentary system– the constitutional arrangement with the most dismal record of democratization – has been instrumental in strengthening presidential dominance and authoritarian tendencies. The premier-presidential period 2006–2010 was by no means smooth and stable, but the presidential dominance weakened and the survival of the government was firmly anchored in the parliament. During this period, there were also indications of a gradual strengthening of institutional capacity among the main political parties and the parliament began to emerge as a significant political arena.

While authoritarian presidents prevail under heavily president-oriented constitutions throughout the post-Soviet region, democracy along parliamentary lines triumphs in Central Europe. This article discusses the constitutional pattern among the post-communist countries on the basis of two general questions: First, how can we explain why strong presidential constitutions dominate throughout the post-Soviet region whereas constrained presidencies and governments anchored in parliament have become the prevailing option in Central Europe? Second, and interlinked with the first question, why have so many post-communist countries (in the post-Soviet region as well as in Central Europe) chosen neither parliamentarism nor presidentialism, but instead semi-presidential arrangements whereby a directly elected president is provided with considerable powers and coexists with a prime minister? The analysis indicates that both historical-institutional and actor-oriented factors are relevant here. Key factors have been regime transition, pre-communist era constitutions and leaders, as well as short-term economic and political considerations. With differing strengths and in partly different ways, these factors seem to have affected the actors' preferences and final constitutional compromises.

A strategically weighed discussion on the reasoning, history and consequences of the Nordic balance. After the Second World War, large security and defense policy decisions were made that affected Scandinavia when the Soviet Union wanted a higher stake in Finland and Norway and Denmark sought to protect themselves against another occupation by joining NATO. In practice this came to mean that foreign policy in Finland was virtually dictated by the president, Sweden remained neutral but strongly defended, and the strategic importance of Denmark diminished. The balance remained functional as long as Norway kept permanent NATO bases and nuclear missiles outside its borders and Finland prepared a strong defense force against possible NATO and Soviet attacks. L. Pitkaniemi

This is a study of why a group of farmers in Swedish Ostrobothnia chose to sympathise with the Lapua Movement in the summer of 1930. The Lapua Movement, a right-wing movement, emerged in Lapua in Southern Ostrobothnia in November 1929. Initially, the only expressed aim of the movement was to achieve total prohibition of communism in the country through efficient legislation. The movement wanted Parliament to establish laws that banned all organised communist activities and propaganda and that limited communists' possibilities to enter candidates in public elections. In addition, the movement wanted expanded authority for the nation's President to, when needed, put a stop to organisations that were considered a threat to national security. The Lapua Movement used extra-parliamentary means of agitation to carry through their demands. The movement's biggest manifesto against communism was to become the so called Peasants' March (Sw. Bondetåget) to Helsinki on July 7, 1930.

Electoral autocracies have become the world's most common form of non-democratic rule. In hegemonic autocracies in particular, where the president, or his party, always wins by more than 70 percent of the vote, the electoral process comes across as mere window-dressing. Still, both the regime and the opposition take elections seriously. Why? What role do elections play? The article deals with this question while focusing on the Azerbaijani 2013 presidential election, and consists of three parts. The first is a theoretical introduction dedicated to electoral autocracies and authoritarian stability. The next summarizes the election, stressing its purpose for the opposition. The third part analyses whether and how the election contributed to strengthening the authoritarian regime. The study concludes that developments during and after the election year are an illustration of what in previous research is sometimes referred to as the politics of insecurity. Even though the opposition "lost", the relative success of their campaign indicated that change might, after all, be possible. The regime, depending on regular multi-party elections for its democratic alibi, did not appreciate the uncertainty and tried to minimize it by using the "three pillars" on which authoritarian states' stability can be said to rest: legitimacy, repression and cooptation.