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Must Privacy and Sexual Equality Conflict? ; Must Privacy and Sexual Equality Conflict?: A Philosophical Examination of Some Legal Evidence
Are rights to privacy consistent with sexual equality? In a brief, but influential, article Catherine MacKinnon trenchantly laid out feminist criticisms of the right to privacy. In "Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade" she linked familiar objections to the right to privacy and connected them to the fate of abortion rights in the U.S.A. (MacKinnon, 1983, 93-102). For many feminists, the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade (1973) had suggested that, notwithstanding a dubious past, legal rights to privacy might serve feminist objectives, and prove consistent with sexual equality. By arguing that Roe's privacy justification of abortion rights was directly responsible for the weakness and vulnerability of abortion rights in America, MacKinnon took aim at feminist hopes for the right to privacy at their strongest point. Maintaining that Roe's privacy justification of abortion is intimately, and not contingently, related to the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Harris v. McRae, (1980) MacKinnon concluded that privacy rights cannot be reconciled with the freedom and equality of women, and so can have no place in a democracy.In Harris, the Supreme Court held that the State need not provide Medicaid coverage for abortions that are necessary to preserve the health, but not the life, of a pregnant woman, effectively depriving poor women of almost all state aid for abortions.2 Moreover, the Court's subsequent decision in Bowers v . Hardwick (1986) appeared to confirm the truth of MacKinnon's observation – though this case concerned gay rights, rather than abortion rights, and occurred several years after MacKinnon's condemnation of Harris. [First paragraph]
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Must Privacy and Sexual Equality Conflict? ; Must Privacy and Sexual Equality Conflict?: A Philosophical Examination of Some Legal Evidence
Are rights to privacy consistent with sexual equality? In a brief, but influential, article Catherine MacKinnon trenchantly laid out feminist criticisms of the right to privacy. In "Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade" she linked familiar objections to the right to privacy and connected them to the fate of abortion rights in the U.S.A. (MacKinnon, 1983, 93-102). For many feminists, the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade (1973) had suggested that, notwithstanding a dubious past, legal rights to privacy might serve feminist objectives, and prove consistent with sexual equality. By arguing that Roe's privacy justification of abortion rights was directly responsible for the weakness and vulnerability of abortion rights in America, MacKinnon took aim at feminist hopes for the right to privacy at their strongest point. Maintaining that Roe's privacy justification of abortion is intimately, and not contingently, related to the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Harris v. McRae, (1980) MacKinnon concluded that privacy rights cannot be reconciled with the freedom and equality of women, and so can have no place in a democracy.In Harris, the Supreme Court held that the State need not provide Medicaid coverage for abortions that are necessary to preserve the health, but not the life, of a pregnant woman, effectively depriving poor women of almost all state aid for abortions.2 Moreover, the Court's subsequent decision in Bowers v . Hardwick (1986) appeared to confirm the truth of MacKinnon's observation – though this case concerned gay rights, rather than abortion rights, and occurred several years after MacKinnon's condemnation of Harris. [First paragraph]
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Ethical, Legal and Privacy Considerations for Adaptive Systems
In: Knockaert , M & De Vos , N 2019 , Ethical, Legal and Privacy Considerations for Adaptive Systems . Dans D Baneres , M E Rodriguez & A E Guerrero (eds) , Engineering Data-Driven Adaptive Trust-based e-Assessment Systems : Challenges and Infrastructure Solutions . Lecture Notes on Data Engineering and Communications Technologies , Springer , Cham , p. 267-296 .
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is the new EU legal framework for the processing of personal data. The use of any information related to an identified or identifiable person by a software will imply the compliance with this European legislation. The objective of this chapter is to focus on the processing of a specific category of personal data: sensitive data (mainly face recognition and voice recognition) to verify the user's identity. Indeed, the GDPR reinforces requirements for security measures to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of these personal data. We analyze three privacy aspects: the possibility to obtain a valid consent from the user, how to ensure the transparency principle and the implication of openness and the framework to implement in order to use the feedback given by the system to the user. From an ethical point of view, the request for consent is legitimized by the existence of a real assessment alternative left to the student. Then the different components of the right to transparency are illustrated by examples from the field. Finally, the question of feedback is expressed in the form of a dilemma highlighting the possible risks of poorly justified decisions due to the way feedback is exposed.
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