Suchergebnisse

Mit Urteil vom 3. Juli 2008 erteilte das Bundesverfassungsgericht dem Bundestag den Gesetzgebungsauftrag, die als grundgesetzwidrig erkannten negativen Stimmgewichte aus dem Bundeswahlgesetz zu entfernen. Der Aufsatz entwickelt eine neue Reparaturoption, die direktmandatsorientierte Proporzanpassung. Das Verfahren ist frei von den verfassungswidrigen negativen Stimmgewichten und erscheint als direkte Fortschreibung des alten Wahlsystems. Es ist eine mit der Personenwahl verbundene Verhältniswahl und es bewahrt das Zweistimmen-System. Es garantiert jedem Wahlkreissieger das Direktmandat und es gewährleistet einheitliche Erfolgswertgleichheit der Zweitstimmen im gesamten Wahlgebiet. ; In its decision of 3 July 2008 the German Federal Constitutional Court called upon the Bundestag to amend the Federal Election Act (Bundeswahlgesetz) in order to dispose of negative voting weights. The paper presents a novel repair option, the direct-seat oriented proportional fit. The procedure is devoid of negative voting weights and appears as a straightforward adaptation of the old electoral system. It is a proportional representation method combined with the election of persons and it retains the two-ballot system. It guarantees each plurality winner in a constituency a direct seat and it preserves equal success values of list votes (Zweitstimmen) throughout the whole electoral region.

Intro -- 1 Einleitung -- 1.1 Literaturüberblick -- 1.2 Ziel der Arbeit und Hauptresultate -- 1.3 Kapitelübersicht -- 2 IPF-Verfahren -- 2.1 Anpassungsproblem im Fall kontinuierlicher Maße -- 2.2 Anpassungsproblem im Fall diskreter Maße -- 2.3 IPF-Verfahren im Fall kontinuierlicher Maße -- 2.4 IPF-Verfahren im Fall diskreter Maße -- 2.5 Diskussion der Voraussetzungen -- 2.6 Schematische Veranschaulichung des IPF-Verfahrens -- 2.7 Beispiel mit Dichtefunktion -- 2.8 Beispiel ohne Dichtefunktion -- 3 Terminierung des IPF-Verfahrens im Fall kontinuierlicher Maße -- 4 Alternierende Minimierungen -- 4.1 f-Divergenz und f-Projektion -- 4.2 Alternierende Minimierungen -- 4.3 IPF-Verfahren als Spezialfall des Von-Neumann-Algorithmus -- 4.4 Drei Beispiele -- 5 Mehr-Punkte-Eigenschaften -- 5.1 I-Divergenz und I-Projektion -- 5.2 Mehr-Punkte-Eigenschaften -- 5.3 Geometrische Interpretation -- 6 Konvergenzverhalten der IPF-Folge im Fall kontinuierlicher Maße -- 6.1 Konvergenz der I-Divergenz zwischen Folgengliedern -- 6.2 Konvergenz der IPF-Folge im Fall kontinuierlicher Maße -- 7 Anwendung auf den Fall diskreter Maße -- 7.1 f-Divergenzen, f-Projektionen und ihre Anwendung auf das IPF-Verfahren -- 7.2 I-Divergenzen, I-Projektionen und ihre Anwendung auf das IPF-Verfahren -- 8 Konvergenzverhalten der IPF-Folge im Fall diskreter Maße -- 8.1 Häufungspunkte der IPF-Folge -- 8.2 Konvergenz der IPF-Folge und biproportionale Anpassungen -- 9 Charakterisierung der Häufungspunkte der IPF-Folge im Fall diskreter Maße -- 9.1 Skalierungsfaktoren -- 9.2 Trianguläre Gestalt -- 9.3 Charakterisierung der Häufungspunkte -- 9.4 Teilprobleme -- 10 Konvergenzstruktur der Häufungspunkte der IPF-Folge im Fall diskreter Maße -- 10.1 Maximierende Zeilenmengen des minimalen L1-Fehlers -- 10.2 Minimaler Schnitt zur Bestimmung des minimalen L1-Fehlers.

"Verzeichnis der benützen literatur": p. [361]-369. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Italian Governments are often instable and their acting capabilities are limited. One of the main reasons is to be seen in the electoral system. Reforms of this system should find a just balance between representation and stability. During the First Republic (1946-1994) a proportional system also offered small parties the possibility of parliamentary representation. As a consequence it was very difficult to form stable majorities and governments. During the severe crisis of the party system 1992/1994 it therefore was replaced by a mixed system of proportional representation and major. It favored the bipolarization and concentration of the party system during elections, but it did not create parliamentary and governmental stability. In 2005 the Berlusconi government III returned to the proportional system of the First Republic, but added a 4% barrage and a premium for the majority. So it had the effect of a majority system with the distribution of the seats of the winning coalition to its components. It produced large, but instable majorities and governments with limited acting capabilities. The discussion about the electoral system is therefore going on. Adapted from the source document.

Proportional representation rules occasionally allow list apparentments between parties. This means that the electoral lists of allied parties are considered as a single unit for the first division of mandates. As votes are summed up, the alliances are larger than each single party, and this bring along substantial advantages under the d'Hondt seat allocation rule. Switzerland practices list apparentments both in national elections and in a number of cantons. The main winners of such apparentments are the political left and green parties. The investigation of the usage and gains from list apparentments shows that the instrument fulfilled its main goal of reducing the partisan bias of the d'Hondt rule. Left-wing and green parties have been the main beneficiaries of list apparentments in these elections. However, this is only the case due to the allowance of sub-apparentments in the Swiss electoral system. Adapted from the source document.

The latest judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) on the Electoral Law is, in respect of Constitutional Law, only partially convincing. In contrast to the Court's view, the legislator has considerably reduced the likelihood that an inverse vote will occur. Therefore, the verdict of unconstitutionality was not compelling. By defining an acceptable maximum of surplus seats ("Uberhangmandate") without compensation the FCC infringed excessively on the Legislator's domain. Besides, the Court's treatment of surplus seats falls short of the Electoral Law's legislative concept of a combined system of proportional representation and majority vote. The only point of agreement with the FCC is its critique on how the newly created extra mandates are calculated, namely by only taking rounding losses into account. This leads to the fact that parties with particular fluctuations in positive leftover votes would be privileged illegitimately. Overall, it would have been perfectly arguable to leave political responsibility with the legislator and only declare those rules null and void that concern extra mandates. Adapted from the source document.

Lately, various authors have been discussing the replacement of the German 'personalisierte Verhaltniswahl' (system of personalized proportional representation) by a parallel voting system. In its ruling, the German Federal Constitutional Court called for a new electoral law excluding negative vote values while explicitly seeing a parallel voting system as an option. Given this ruling it needs to be discussed how well the personalisierte Verhaltniswahl is in sync with the electoral system's objectives and how a parallel voting system or a proportional representation system with a five percent threshold would fare in Germany. Indeed, the German electoral system succeeds in representing the voting population, but fails in concentrating the party system, although it includes majoritarian components. A proportional representation system should be able to fulfill these functions to the same degree as the personalisierte Verhaltniswahl, yet it is less complicated in its construction and easier to understand. Parallel voting systems are expected to better balance the representation and the concentration principle. Both alternatives solve the problem of negative vote values. Adapted from the source document.

Electoral systems transfer data of votes into parliamentary seats. This happens in a specific manner and in principle it can be distinguished between majority systems und proportional representation systems. The various systems have different effects on the composition of parliament and the opportunities of possible coalitions to govern. In the case of a majority system or a proportional system without a threshold the German Bundestag would have a different appearance than it does now. To demonstrate to which in part drastically different results the various systems would lead eleven model calculations are conducted with the results of the German National Election 2013. Adapted from the source document.