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Stuart Mill in considered as one of the fathers of proportional representation. His book Considerations on Representative Government, from 1861, is cited as the source of the main normative justifications of proportionality. This paper intends to contest that statement &, at the same time, to reveal the influence of that assumption on the interpretation of Mill's political thought. References. Adapted from the source document.

This article reconsiders the historical and theoretical process that led to the configuration of the proportional representation paradigm. Opposed to traditional approaches, two different trends are distinguished as the main authors' contributions are analysed. On the one hand, personal representation; on the other hand, party representation. Thus, certain relevant conclusions for the history of ideas rise (for example, the father of proportionally title has to be given to Considerant, an unfairly forgotten author). In addition, it is alleged that such terminological and legal confusion is still at work today, in the dispute about anti-defection laws. Adapted from the source document.

¿Cómo medir la proporcionalidad de los sistemas de representación proporcional (RP)? Esta cuestión se ha confundido con la de los denominados «umbrales de representación». En el artículo se repasa la historia del descubrimiento de los umbrales por parte de la Ciencia Política, intentando aclarar el fundamento conceptual de los mismos y las confusiones que los rodean. A continuación se desecha su uso como medida de proporcionalidad de los sistemas electorales y se propone para ello la idea de finura (medida por Droop). Por último, las posibles aportaciones conceptuales se recogen en una propuesta terminológica. ; How can the proportionality of proportional representation (PR) systems be measured? This question has been confused with the question of the so-called «thresholds of representation». This article reviews the history of the discovery of thresholds by political science, attempting to clarify their conceptual foundation and the misapprehensions surrounding them. Their valid use as an electoral system proportionality measure is ruled out, and the notion of thinness (measured by Droop) is proposed for replacing them. The article concludes with possible conceptual contributions that are brought together in a terminological proposal.

ResumenEl trabajo tiene por objeto analizar cómo el régimen chavista ha articulado una estrategia dirigida a debilitarla representación proporcional de las minorías. La investigación toma como antecedentes las eleccionesde la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente de 1999 y las elecciones parlamentarias de 2005, paraposteriormente analizar en profundidad las elecciones parlamentarias de 2010, realizadas en el marcode una nueva ley electoral, que consagra el sistema mixto mayoritario o segmentado (Nohlen, 2007) y legaliza irregularidades que afectan la expresión legítima de la voluntad popular como el gerrymanderingy el malapportionement. La conclusión del trabajo es terminante: La paulatina sustitucióndel principio de representación proporcional por un sistema mixto mayoritario o segmentado en laelección de los cuerpos deliberantes, obedece a una estratagema gubernamental destinada a consolidarun proyecto personalista, enmarcado dentro de lo que Schedler (2004) denomina "autoritarismoelectoral", siendo este un tipo de régimen en el cual los gobiernos autoritarios permiten la realizaciónde elecciones "controladas" para no arriesgarse a perder el poder.Weakening the Venezuelan proportional representation system: Two coins of the same tokenAbstractThe work aims to analyze how Chavez´s regime has been articulating a strategy aimed at weakeningthe proportional representation of minorities. In this research, I take as background the elections for the Constituent National Assembly of 1999 and the parliamentary elections of 2005, to then analyze in depththe parliamentary elections of 2010, carried out within the framework of a new electoral law, whichsets forth the majority or segmented mixed system (Nohlen, 2007) and legalizes irregularities affectingthe legitimate expression of the will of the people such as "gerrymandering" and "malapportionment."The conclusion of this work is unequivocal: the gradual substitution of the principle of proportional representation for a majority or segmented mixed system regarding the election of deliberative bodiesis due to a Government ploy aimed at consolidating a personalist project, framed within what Schedler (2004) calls "electoral authoritarianism", and this is an authoritarian regime intending to "fix elections"not to risk losing power.

El artículo parte de la consideración de que la Ciencia Política no ha resuelto satisfactoriamente la cuestión de la medición de la desproporcionalidad. A partir de tal impresión, se pasa revista a las diferentes alternativas presentadas, se defiende la pertinencia del índice más sencillo e intuitivo de todos y se critica cierto abuso vacío y contraproducente de las ciencias matemáticas ; This article is based on the assumption that political science has never satisfactory resolved the question of how disproportionality should be measured. Different alternatives are reviewed, the use of the simplest and most intuitive index of all is proposed, and a certain empty and counterproductive abuse of mathematical science is criticized

Democracy comes as the ideal regime of popular representation, thus the legislature is constituted as a suitable mechanism to reflect the popular will. Therefore, since this is a multi-person power, it allows the representation of minority power groups through debate and discussion, in which various social interests are reflected. However, in the presence of an absolute majority in the Assembly, the possibility of discussion is reduced and generates the inability of parliamentary minorities to be effectively represented. In this sense, it is important to question until what extent the legislature fulfills its primary function of popular representation, when there exists an absolute majority in the Assembly. To answer this question, first it will be discussed the nature of the legislative function within a democratic system; then the existence of a link between the system of proportional representation and the results obtained; and finally it will be study the consequences of the presence of an absolute majority in the representativeness of the Assembly. ; La democracia se presenta como el régimen de representación popular por excelencia, constituyéndose de este modo el órgano Legislativo como un mecanismo idóneo para plasmar la voluntad popular; de suerte que la Asamblea Nacional logre perfilarse como un espacio de debate y discusión, en el cual diversos intereses sociales se encuentren plasmados. Sin embargo, para alcanzar dicha representación total, resulta indispensable que en este órgano se vean reflejados los intereses de los distintos grupos sociales, ya sean estos mayoritarios o no. No obstante, ante la presencia de una mayoría calificada en el Legislativo, la posibilidad de debate se ve reducida y aquello genera la imposibilidad de que las minorías parlamentarias sean efectivamente representadas. Es indudable que en la realidad nacional el asunto de la efectiva representatividad en el Legislativo se configura como un inconveniente de suprema importancia. Por lo tanto, conviene cuestionarnos, ¿hasta qué punto el poder Legislativo cumple su primordial función de órgano de representación popular ante la existencia de una mayoría absoluta en la Asamblea Nacional? Para responder a aquella interrogante, se analizará en primer lugar la naturaleza de la función legislativa dentro de un sistema democrático; posteriormente se examinará si es plausible atribuir a la instauración del método D'Hondt responsabilidad por los resultados obtenidos en la atribución de escaños en la última elección legislativa nacional, para finalmente estudiar las consecuencias de la presencia de una mayoría absoluta dentro de la representatividad del poder Legislativo.

The extant literature on the Mexican political system is often interested in analyzing the effect of electoral reforms, or some other contextual factor, on the political configuration of the Chamber of Deputies. From an empirical point of view, statistical estimation of such effects is a cumbersome task that requires some programming skills. In this research note we seek to contribute to the study of the Mexican electoral system & the Congress in two ways. First, we introduce a statistical model to analyze the composition of seats of the Mexican Chamber. Second, we facilitate the implementation of this model with the software are camaradip, a Stata module developed by the authors that allows for the estimation of quantities of interest regarding the Chamber via Monte Carlo simulations. To illustrate the applicability of our model, we evaluate the hypothetical impact of two electoral reforms: the effect of making all local & federal elections concurrent, & the reduction of the number of proportional representation seats. Adapted from the source document.

La democracia representativa mexicana funcionaría mejor con un sistema proporcional puro. La transición a la democracia, que va de 1977 al año 2000, se logró que México por la vía de los votos y gracias, en buena medida, a que los partidos de oposición encontraron un foro institucional con la legalización de los diputados de partido en 1977. La representación proporcional permitió que los partidos se fortalecieran y le arrebataran al poder político el monopolio de la representación. Es relativamente clara la adscripción de este ensayo al enfoque neoinstitucional, el cual confía en las reglas como condicionantes del juego electoral, y en los actores como encargados de aplicarlas incidiendo en su fortalecimiento y, eventualmente, en su reforma. La idea, como sugiere Robert Putnam, consiste en descubrir si "las instituciones formales influyen en la práctica de la política y el gobierno" y si tras reformarlas seguirá su práctica.

This paper presents, discusses & tests the hypothesis that it is the number of parties that can explain the choice of electoral systems, rather than the other way round. Already existing political parties tend to choose electoral systems that, rather than generate new party systems by themselves, will crystallize, consolidate or reinforce previously existing party configurations. A general model develops the argument & presents the concept of "behavioral-institutional equilibrium" to account for the relation between electoral systems & party systems, The most comprehensive dataset & test of these notions to date, encompassing 219 elections in 87 countries since the 19th century, is presented. The analysis gives strong support to the hypotheses that political party configurations dominated by a few parties tend to establish majority rule electoral systems, while multiparty systems already existed before the introduction of proportional representation. It also offers the new theoretical proposition that strategic party choice of electoral systems leads to a general trend toward proportional representation over time. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.

In the city of Ushuaia there were several intents to change or to eliminate the method of preferences for the legislators in order to guarantee gender equality among the representatives. It has been said that, erasing this method or changing it would be a good measure in order to concrete gender equality in the legislature. We aim to present here an historical evolution of the voting system to see if it is true or if, on the contrary, due to other causes, there should be other issues to think about. ; Los intentos de modificar o eliminar el método de preferencias para los concejales de la Ciudad de Ushuaia a fin de garantizar la paridad de géneros en la representación produjeron un debate que debe atenderse. Se postuló que, suprimiendo ese método o incluso modificándolo para que respete la igualdad de géneros en el actual contexto de régimen electoral se garantizará la paridad de género en ese órgano legislativo municipal. Un estudio de la evolución de su sistema electoral nos dirá si ello resulta factible o si por el contrario otras variables -especialmente la magnitud del distrito o la modificación del umbral electoral- deben ser tenidas en cuenta para aspirar al cumplimiento de ese objetivo. ; As tentativas de modificar ou eliminar o método de preferências dos conselheiros da cidade de Ushuaia, a fim de garantir a paridade de gênero na representação, produziram um debate que deve ser tratado. Postulou-se que, ao eliminar este método ou mesmo modificá-lo para que respeite a igualdade de gênero no atual contexto do regime eleitoral, a paridade de gênero será garantida neste órgão legislativo municipal. Um estudo da evolução de seu sistema eleitoral nos dirá se isso é viável ou se, por outro lado, outras variáveis - especialmente a magnitude do distrito ou a modificação do limiar eleitoral - devem ser levadas em consideração para aspirar à realização desse objetivo.