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Proportional representation review
Includes supplements. ; Includes supplements. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Organ of the Proportional Representation League (called, 1914-1920, American Proportional Representation League). ; The Proportional representation review (v. 1-3) was issued in Chicago from Sept. 1893 to Mar. 1896, when it ceased. In Dec. 1901, it was revived as a department of the Direct legislation record with which it continued till Jan. 1906, when it became the Proportional representation department of the Equity series.
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The proportional representation review
Continued as a department of: Direct legislation record and the proportional representation review. ; "A quarterly magazine, devoted to the reformation of the method of electing representatives." ; Title from cover. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Revived and absorbed Dec. 1901 as part of: Direct legislation record and the proportional representation review.
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Strategic voting under proportional representation and coalition governments: a laboratory experiment
"We investigate whether the theory of strategic voting can explain voting behavior in a fairly common type of political system, multi-party systems with proportional representation, minimum vote thresholds, and coalition governments. In this paper, we develop a formal (computational) strategic voting game and show in a simulation that the model produces election scenarios and outcomes with desirable characteristics as well as different opportunities for strategic voting. We then test the decision-theoretic model in a laboratory experiment, taking into account both sophisticated and heuristic decision strategies. Participants with a purely instrumental (financial) motivation voted in a series of 25 independent elections. The availability of polls and coalition signals by parties was manipulated. The results show that voters are frequently able to make optimal or strategic vote decisions, but that voters also rely on simple decision heuristics and are highly susceptible to coalition signals by parties." (author's abstract)
Proportional representation
In: National municipal review, Band 33, S. 487-489
ISSN: 0190-3799
Proportional rankings
In: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:fb46bf84-902b-4a7b-a27b-4c54594078fe
In this paper we extend the principle of proportional representation to rankings. We consider the setting where alternatives need to be ranked based on approval preferences. In this setting, proportional representation requires that cohesive groups of voters are represented proportionally in each initial segment of the ranking. Proportional rankings are desirable in situations where initial segments of different lengths may be relevant, e.g., hiring decisions (if it is unclear how many positions are to be filled), the presentation of competing proposals on a liquid democracy platform (if it is unclear how many proposals participants are taking into consideration), or recommender systems (if a ranking has to accommodate different user types). We study the proportional representation provided by several ranking methods and prove theoretical guarantees. Furthermore, we experimentally evaluate these methods and present preliminary evidence as to which methods are most suitable for producing proportional rankings.
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Proportional Representation
This paper considers basic constitutional questions about how to elect a legislature. Electoral systems that require blocks of voters to coordinate their votes create a need for pre-election leadership and raise barriers to entry against new parties. Such barriers to entry can rigidity the political systems and decrease the incentives for established political leaders to serve the public honestly and effectively. So we consider an axiom of coalitional straightforwardness, which asserts that an electoral system should minimize the need for pre-election coordination of voters who share simple dichotomous preferences. Axioms of nondivisiveness, neutrality of party labels, responsiveness, and homogeneity (or coalitional autonomy) are also formulated. It is shown that only two kinds of electoral systems satisfy these axioms: winner-take-all approval-voting systems (AV), and single-divisible vote-proportional-representation systems (PR). Thus, AV and PR are seen to be uniquely compatible in terms of the incentives for party structure that they create, although AV and PR may differ in their incentives for party positioning in issue space. Possible use of AV and PR together in a bicameral legislature is discussed.
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Proportional representation
In: National civic review: promoting civic engagement and effective local governance for more than 100 years, Band 84, Heft 1, S. 62-66
ISSN: 1542-7811
Proportional representation
In: National civic review: promoting civic engagement and effective local governance for more than 100 years, Band 84, Heft 2, S. 159-166
ISSN: 1542-7811
Proportional representation
In: National civic review: promoting civic engagement and effective local governance for more than 100 years, Band 83, Heft 1, S. 78-85
ISSN: 1542-7811
Proportional representation
In: National civic review: promoting civic engagement and effective local governance for more than 100 years, Band 83, Heft 4, S. 492-495
ISSN: 1542-7811
Proportional representation
In: National civic review: promoting civic engagement and effective local governance for more than 100 years, Band 83, Heft 3, S. 359-362
ISSN: 1542-7811
Proportional representation
In: National civic review: promoting civic engagement and effective local governance for more than 100 years, Band 83, Heft 2, S. 211-216
ISSN: 1542-7811
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
In: Parliamentary affairs: a journal of comparative politics
ISSN: 1460-2482