Suchergebnisse

The individual in international law — In general — Human rights and freedoms — Right to protection of marriage — Basic Law 1949, Article 6 — Alien seeking to avoid deportation — Whether danger to marriage justifies prohibition on deportation — Principle of proportionality — The law of the Federal Republic of GermanyThe individual in international law — Aliens — Expulsion of — Right of expulsion — Deportation — Convicted criminal — Right of asylum — Basic Law 1949, Article 16(2) — Restrictive interpretation by reference to legislative history — Public order and security — Protection of marriage under Article 6 of Basic Law — Principle of proportionality — The law of the Federal Republic of Germany

The individual in international law — Extradition — Conditions of — Double criminality — Non-expiry of period of limitation for prosecution — The law of SwitzerlandThe individual in international law — Extradition — Political crimes — Definition — Extradition of German SS Officer accused of war crimes — Whether mass executions of unarmed civilians constitute political crimes — The law of SwitzerlandWar and neutrality — War in general — Enforcement of the laws of war — Reprisals — Legitimate reprisals under international law Requirement of proportionality — Mass executions of unarmed civilians — The law of SwitzerlandWar and neutrality — War in general — Enforcement of the laws of war — Punishment of war crimes and crimes against humanity — Defence of superior orders — Extradition of German war criminal — The law of SwitzerlandThe individual in international law — Extradition — Procedure of — Role of courts in examining extradition request — Whether able to take account of defences or alibis of accused — Conditions of extradition — Double criminality — Non-expiry of period of limitation for prosecution — Extradition of German SS Officer accused of war crimes — Whether mass executions of unarmed civilians constitute political crimes — Whether permissible under international law as legitimate reprisals in wartime — Requirement of proportionality — Defence of superior orders — The law of Switzerland

The individual in international law — Extradition — Political crimes — Definition — Requirement of proportionality between crime and political objective — Subjective test — Assassination attempt on foreign Head of State — Necessity for assassination to be a "last resort" — Whether "last resort" where target is embodiment of State political system — The law of Switzerland

This Note addresses the ocean boundary delimitation conflict between Japan, China, Taiwan, and South Korea in the East China Sea. The author considers international law on boundary delimitation and concludes that the law is unclear on delimitations between states within four hundred nautical miles of one another. The International Court of Justice has held that equity is the norm to be applied to boundary delimitation disputes but it has not resolved the competition between the natural prolongation theory of delimitation and a theory based upon the Exclusive Economic Zone. The geology of the East China Sea brings this issue to the fore. The author concludes that regardless of how this conflict is resolved, equidistance, proportionality, and other equitable concerns will apply to any boundary delimitation. The Note accounts for the political situation in the East China Sea area and concludes that the possibility of reaching a solution is greater than it has been in the past. The author nevertheless argues that it will be necessary to look to alternatives to existing legal precedents to develop a solution to the dispute in the East China Sea. These alternatives include the creation of joint development zones, a compromise of the best legal position advanced by each side and an approach based on strict proportionality.

The individual in intemational law — Extradition — In general — European Convention on Extradition, 1957 — Effect on existingbilateral treaties and municipal law of Contracting States — The law of SwitzerlandThe individual in international law — Extradition — Conditions of — Extraditable crimes — European Convention on Extradition, 1957 — Compulsory extradition subject to double criminality and minimum period of imprisonment for offence — Article 2 (1) — so-called "accessory extradition" — Article 2 (2) — Right of Contracting State to exclude certain offences from extradition — Article 2 (3) and (4)Possible persecution for political opinions — Article 3 (2) — The law of Switzerland618The individual in international law — Extradition — Political crimes — Definition — European Convention on Extradition, 1957, Article 3 — Whether criteria left to municipal law — Requirement of proportionality between crime and political objective — Terrorist bomb attacks performed by anarchist without credible motive — Conditions of extradition and extraditable crimes under Convention — Compulsory extradition subject to double criminality and minimum period of imprisonment for offence — Article 2 (1) — So-called "accessory extradition" — Article 2 (2) — Right of Contracting State to exclude certain offences from extradition — Article 2 (3) and (4) — Possible persecution for political opinions — Article 3 (2) — Effect of Convention on existing bilateral treaties and municipal law of Contracting States — The law of Switzerland

The cube law was proposed around 1910 to express the conversion of a party's vote shares into its seat share in two-party plurality elections with single-seat districts. This article develops predictive seat-vote equations for a much wider range of elections, including those involving many parties, single- and multi-seat districts, and diverse seat allocation rules such as plurality and list proportional representation (PR). Without any statistical curve fitting based on the seat and vote shares themselves, the basic features of the conversion are predicted using exogenous parameters: magnitude and number of districts, number of parties, and total size of the electorate and of the assembly. The link between the proposed equations and the original cube law is explicated. Using an existing data base, the fit of the predictive model is examined. On balance, this model accounts well for the conversion of votes to seats, and for the deviation from proportionality in PR systems.

The cube law was proposed around 1910 to express the conversion of a party's vote shares into its seat share in two-party plurality elections with single-seat districts. This article develops predictive seat-vote equations for a much wider range of elections, including those involving many parties, single- and multi-seat districts, and diverse seat allocation rules such as plurality and list proportional representation (PR). Without any statistical curve fitting based on the seat and vote shares themselves, the basic features of the conversion are predicted using exogenous parameters: magnitude and number of districts, number of parties, and total size of the electorate and of the assembly. The link between the proposed equations and the original cube law is explicated. Using an existing data base, the fit of the predictive model is examined. On balance, this model accounts well for the conversion of votes to seats, and for the deviation from proportionality in PR systems. © 1986, American Political Science Association. All rights reserved.

238Sea — Maritime boundaries — Delimitation — Continental shelf — Customary international law principles regarding delimitation — Use of equitable principles in order to achieve an equitable solution — Opposite States — Relevant equitable considerations — Importance of natural prolongation — Relevance of rift zone between States — Proportionality between length of coastline and share of continental shelf — Islands — Island State with restricted coastline — Economic circumstances of States — Equidistance methods of delimitation — Whether relevant in contemporary law — Overlap between claims advanced by Parties and claims of third party StateSea — Continental shelf — Juridical nature of continental shelf — Whether rights of State to continental shelf dependent upon considerations of natural prolongation — Distance principle — Whether State entitled to continental shelf extending to distance of 200 miles from baselines irrespective of natural prolongation — Effects on delimitation — Relationship between continental shelf and exclusive economic zoneSea — Islands — Island State — Continental shelf — Whether island State to be treated differently from other States in respect of entitlement to continental shelf — Island State with small coastline — Offshore islands — Uninhabited islet — Whether to be taken into account in delimitation of continental shelf boundaryInternational Court of Justice — Jurisdiction — Special agreement — Continental shelf boundary dispute between two States referred to Court by special agreement — Claims advanced by Parties overlapping with claims made by third State — Whether Court possessing jurisdiction to determine principles or rules governing rights of third State — Whether Court required to confine itself to the delimitation of the continental shelf between the Parties in area where no third party claimsSources of international law — Customary international law — Relationship between customary international law and treaty — Convention adopted by large majority of States but not yet in force — Effect upon customary international law — Law of the Sea Convention, 1982 — Provisions regarding continental shelf delimitation — Concept of the exclusive economic zone

State responsibility — Nature and kinds of State responsibility — For wrongs unconnected with contractual obligations — Acts and omissions of State organs and officials — Connected with legislation — European Convention on Human Rights, 1950, Article 8 — Whether mere existence of legislation affected right to respect for private life — Whether absence of prosecutions meant law was a dead letterState responsibility — Damages — Award of damages in general — European Convention on Human Rights, 1950 — Article 50 — Just satisfaction in respect of established breach — Whether change in law in itself adequate satisfaction without financial compensationDisputes — Other international courts — European Court of Human Rights — Whether applicant a victim within meaning of Article 25 of European Convention on Human Rights, 1950 — Margin of appreciation — Article 50 — Just satisfaction — Order for declaration by respondent Government requested — Whether admissible395The individual in international law — In general — Human rights and freedoms — European Convention on Human Rights, 1950, Article 8 — Right to respect for private life — Whether including sexual life — Prohibition of homosexual acts between consenting adults in private — Law of Northern Ireland — Absence of similar prohibition in rest of United Kingdom — Whether mere existence of legislation affected private life — Absence of prosecutions — Whether law no longer enforced — Whether applicant a victim within meaning of Article 25 of Convention — Justifications for interference under Article 8(2) — Whether necessary in a democratic society — Margin of appreciation of national authorities — Whether more extensive for issues involving morals — European standard — Pressing social need — Requirement of proportionality — Whether necessary to examine complaint under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8Article 50 — Breach of right to respect for private life established — Just satisfaction — Whether change in law of Northern Ireland in itself adequate satisfaction — Need for financial compensation — Order for declaration by respondent Government requested — Whether admissible — Legal costs and other expenses referable to proceedings before Convention institutions — Whether actually, necessarily and reasonably incurred

This Article examines the growing controversy over the multi-billion dollar charitable tax exemption enjoyed by nonprofit hospitals. It begins by articulating four criteria for evaluating a rationale of the charitable exemption: deservedness, incorporating the elements of worth and need; proportionality; universality; and historical consistency. The Article then employs these criteria to refute three conventional explanations of why nonprofit hospitals are exempt: because health care is a per se charitable activity; because the treatment of indigent patients relieves a government burden; and because nonprofit hospitals provide community benefits. The Article also uses these criteria to refute two academic theories: Boris Bittker's income measurement rationale and Henry Hansmann's capital subsidy theory. This Article proposes a "donative theory" as an alternative rationale for the charitable exemption. The donative theory posits that "charity" describes an entity capable of attracting a substantial level of philanthropic support from the public at large. Donations exist where there is a combined failure of private markets and direct public funding to supply a shared public benefit at the optimally desired level. Donative institutions deserve a tax subsidy because the public's support signals their worth, and the free-rider tendency that affects all giving assures the need for an additional, shadow subsidy. The Article further demonstrates that the donative theory comports with the statutory scheme and the four centuries of legal history that shape the legal concept of charity. In particular, the donative theory provides the only explanation of the tax law's otherwise unjustifiable reliance on the law of charitable trusts.

State responsibility — Nature and kinds of — For breaches of treaty obligations — European Convention on Human Rights, 1950 — Lawyers' obligation to defend accused without payment — Whether constituting forced or compulsory labour — Whether discrimination compared to other professions — Deprivation of property rights — Whether applicable to remuneration of servicesTreaties — Interpretation of — Miscellaneous — European Convention on Human Rights, 1950 — Whether case raises serious questions of interpretation — Meaning of phrase "forced or compulsory labour" — Lack of definition in Convention — Interpretation in light of International Labour Organization ConventionsDisputes — Other international courts — European Court of Human Rights — Whether case raises serious questions affecting interpretation of European Convention on Human Rights, 1950 — Jurisdiction of Chamber of Court — Whether to be relinquished in favour of plenary Court459The individual in international law — In general — Human rights and freedoms — Lawyers' obligation to defend accused without payment — Whether constituting forced or compulsory labour — European Convention on Human Rights, 1950 — Article 4 — Meaning of phrase "forced or compulsory labour" — International Labour Organization conventions — Principle of proportionality — Balance between aim pursued and obligations undertaken to achieve it — Discrimination — Article 14 in conjunction with Article 4 — Obligations imposed on lawyers and members of other professions — Whether comparable — Property rights — Deprivation of — Article 1 of First Protocol — Whether applying to remuneration of services — Expenses not reimbursed — Whether constituting an interference with possessions — Whether case raises serious questions affecting interpretation of Convention — Jurisdiction of Chamber of European Court of Human Rights — Whether to be relinquished in favour of plenary Court

During the Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982, both Britain and Argentina defended their resort to military action on the basis of some sort of Just War principles. This article analyses the justifications given for the British resort to force. A summary of the history of the dispute and the legal arguments with regard to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands provides the context for this analysis. It is found that both Britain and Argentina have a strong, but not conclusive case. The rigorous application of Just War criteria shows that the British resort to force fails to satisfy each one. In particular, it is shown that British objectives went beyond possible just causes due to Argentine aggression. It is also argued that the British claim to have acted in the enforcement of international law is not tenable. An analysis of how the decision to send the Task Force to the South Atlantic was made, involving the Government, the Royal Navy and Parliament, reveals various extraneous factors and pressures. It is argued that the threat to the Government's survival as a result of the Argentine invasion was the main determining factor in the conduct of the conflict. The crucial turning-point was the week-end of the 1-2 May when the chances for a negotiated solution diminished after the sinking of the General Belgrano. Britain's military action also fails to satisfy the principle of proportionality. The main conclusions of this study are that Britain's resort to force did not satisfy Just War criteria, that a negotiated solution more just than the resort to force may have been possible, and that the Falklands conflict has not been successfully resolved despite Britain's military achievements.

This paper presents a survey of cáncer registries in Germany, their types, purposes and history, and discusses the problems of cáncer registration: medical confidentiality, data protection, extent of registration, effort-benefit ratio and legal regulation.

1International Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Provisional measures of protection — Circumstances in which Court will indicate provisional measures — Whether necessary to determine that prima facie basis for jurisdiction exists — Nature of provisional measures in case involving continuing armed conflictInternational Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Procedure — Removal of case from list — Circumstances in which request for removal will be granted — Necessary that there must be no prima facie basis for jurisdictionInternational Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Procedure — Intervention — Application by State to intervene to contest jurisdiction and admissibility — Whether any basis for such intervention in Statute — Whether appropriate to hold hearing — Refusal of request to intervene not a bar to intervention at merits phase of proceedingsInternational Court of Justice — Organization of the Court — Judges — Standards of behaviour — Press conference — Reference by State party to case to nationality of certain judges — Suggestion that secret information could not be disclosed to court containing judges from certain countriesInternational Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Competence — Optional Clause — Declaration of acceptance — Declarations made under Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice — When transferred to International Court of Justice — Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 36(5) — Whether necessary for declaration to have been binding in respect of Permanent Court in order to be transferred under Article 36(5) — Declaration made by Nicaragua on signing Protocol of Signature to the Statute of the Permanent Court — Never completed by ratification — Whether possessing any legal effect — Whether constituting a binding acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court by virtue of Article 36(5)International Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Competence — Optional Clause — State listed in Court publications as having accepted compulsory jurisdiction — Whether inclusion in list legally significant — Conduct of States — Whether capable of curing defect in State's acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction — Whether conduct must be consistent and unequivocal — Whether State's conduct amounting to an estoppel2International Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Competence — Optional Clause — Withdrawal or amendment of declaration accepting compulsory jurisdiction — Declaration stating that notice required — Whether States within Optional Clause system possessing extra-statutory right to withdraw declarations with immediate effect — State practice under Optional Clause — Reciprocity — Whether applicable to notice provisions of declarationsInternational Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Competence — Optional Clause — Reservations — Reservation excluding jurisdiction of the Court in relation to disputes arising under a multilateral treaty if the other parties to the treaty who would be affected by the decision not before the Court — Interpretation — Whether reservation capable of being applied in proceedings relating to jurisdiction — Whether more appropriate for application at merits phase — Reservation precluding Court from adjudicating upon claims based on treaty provisions on the use of force and intervention — Whether also precluding application of customary law principles with content similar or identical to treaty provisionsInternational Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Competence — Under bilateral treaty — Nicaragua-United States Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 1956 — Disputes regarding interpretation and application of Treaty — Extent of jurisdiction conferred upon CourtInternational Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Admissibility of application — Legal dispute — Definition — Whether excluding dispute involving continuing armed conflict — Whether such disputes reserved for Security Council — Whether State required to exhaust regional political machinery for settlement of disputes before referring matter to Court — Absence of other States involved in regional dispute — Whether international law includes indispensable parties rule — Whether admissibility to be considered at jurisdiction or merits phase of proceedingsInternational Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Procedure — Fact-finding — Rules of evidence — Procedure for determining facts — Relevant period — Press information and matters of public knowledge — Statements by representatives of States — Oral evidence of witnesses — Material not presented in accordance with Rules of CourtInternational Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Procedure — Absence of respondent State from part of proceedings — Statute of the International Court, Article 533International Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Power to award damages — Whether including power to make interim award of damagesSources of international law — Treaties — Customary international law — Relationship between treaties and custom — Development of customary international law through the conclusion of treaties — Whether treaty completely supplants identical rules of customary international law as between parties to the treaty — United Nations Charter — Charter of the Organization of American States — Provisions relating to intervention and the use of force — Whether codificatory of existing customary law at the date of their conclusion — Whether customary law has subsequently developed to take the same form as Charter provisionsSources of international law — Customary international law — Constituent elements — Practice — Whether absolute consistency required — Opinio iuris — Evidence of — Treaties as evidence of opinio iuris — Resolutions of international organizations as evidence of opinio iuris — Significance of concordant views of parties to case as evidence of content of customary lawState responsibility — For acts of armed groups supported by State — Rebel groups operating in one State financed and equipped by other State — Whether acts of rebel groups imputable to the State which supports them — Degree of control necessary for acts to be imputable to StateWar and armed conflict — Use of force — Definition — Whether supplying rebel groups operating in another State a use of force against that State — Whether an armed attack — Provision of funds and supply of arms — Logistical and organizational support — Training — Covert operations — Sending armed bands — Whether an armed attack — United Nations Charter, Articles 2(4) and 51 — Customary international lawWar and armed conflict — Use of force — Self-defence — Limitations on the right of self-defence — Requirement of an armed attack — Necessity and proportionality — Motive of State using force in alleged self-defence — Collective self-defence — Requirements — Whether State which has been the victim of an armed attack must request assistance — Whether third State coming to assistance of victim State must itself be under threat — Duty to report measures taken to Security Council under United Nations 4Charter, Article 51 — Whether also a requirement of customary international law — Evidential significance of failure to report measuresWar and armed conflict — Use of force — Self-defence — Whether State entitled to use force in response to unlawful intervention not amounting to an armed attackWar and armed conflict — Humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict — Geneva Conventions, 1949 — Whether an expression or a development of fundamental principles of humanity — Common Article 3 — Fundamental principles applicable to non-international conflicts — Minimum yardstick also applicable to international conflicts — Conflict in Nicaragua — Whether international — Common Article 1 — Duty to ensure respect for Conventions in all circumstances — Publication of manual advocating the commission of acts contrary to humanitarian law — Whether publication a violation of humanitarian lawWar and armed conflict — Humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict — Naval warfare — Mines — Hague Convention No. VIII, Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, 1907 — Duty to notify international shipping of the existence and location of minefieldsStates — Sovereignty — Duty of non-intervention — Scope and extent of duty at customary international law — Support for rebel groups in another State — Right of each State to determine political system and foreign policy for itself — Whether this freedom curtailed by announcement to regional organization of political programme — Whether announcement constituting binding undertaking — Regional organization and some States within region recognizing new government on strength of undertakingStates — Sovereignty — Mining approaches to State's ports — Unauthorized intrusion into State's airspace — Whether violations of State's sovereigntyGovernments — Recognition — Conditions of recognition — Nicaragua — Junta for National Reconstruction offering certain undertakings about future direction of Nicaragua — Organization of American States withdrawing recognition from previous "Somoza" Government — Whether undertakings binding5Governments — Succession — Successful rebellion — New government responsible for acts of rebelsHuman rights — Enforcement — Whether States have a right to use force against State which is violating human rights — Alleged violations of human rights in Nicaragua — Whether justifying use of force by the United StatesAir — Airspace — Unauthorized intrusion into State's airspace — Whether a violation of State sovereigntySea — Territorial Sea — Internal waters — Freedom of passage — Mines — State laying mines in territorial sea and internal waters of other State — Access to other State's ports impeded — Whether a violation of freedom of navigationEconomics, trade and finance — Economic sanctions — Trade embargo — State blocking loans in international organizations — United States sanctions against Nicaragua — Whether contrary to general international law — Whether contrary to Nicaragua-United States Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 1956 — Whether defeating object and purpose of treatyDamages — Basis for award of damages — Reparation for unlawful use of force and intervention — Declaration that Respondent State under a duty to make reparation — Form and amount of reparation to be settled in later proceedingsTreaties — Form — Informal undertakings — Plan for political development of State issued by government in exile to regional organization — Whether intended to have legal effect

[spa] El nacimiento del derecho disciplinario se produce claramente en la Baja Edad Media. Allí, la aparición de un aparato burocrático importante y la atribución a los funcionarios u oficiales de una esfera de competencia propia dejando de ser meros mandatarios reales provoca la aparición de una serie de instituciones que bajo el nombre de visita, juicio de residencia pesquisa o purga de Taula (Taula = mesa, lugar donde se desempeñaba el trabajo) persiguen un objetivo común (asegurar una administración leal, justa y eficaz) y recogen todos los rasgos primitivos de lo que hoy denominamos régimen disciplinario de las funcionarios públicos pues se tipifican usos ilícitos que pueden ser cometidos en el ejercicio del cargo y se prevén unos castigos a imponer, todo ello fruto de un procedimiento especial no judicializado.Esta interpretación, que sigue con matices la efectuada por el profesor Nieto y hasta hoy ha sido discutida por nadie, sitúa al derecho disciplinario como un derecho privado que pone en relación al Monarca con sus oficiales, claramente desgajado del derecho penal.Esta circunstancia, por otra parte común todas las instituciones que forman parte del universo que el derecho administrativo, nos sirve para constatar lo que en su origen fue el régimen disciplinario, pero poco más. Por tanto, en la actualidad hemos de partir del derecho positivo vigente para saber lo que es el derecho disciplinario de los funcionarios públicos.En concreto, el punto de partida de nuestro Estudio lo constituye el artículo 25.1 del Texto Constitucional, que como es sabido equipara delito, falta e infracción administrativa. Al respecto, la primera jurisprudencia del TC ya recordó que los principios inspiradores del orden penal son de aplicación, con ciertos matices, al derecho administrativo sancionador, dado que ambos son manifestaciones del ordenamiento punitivo del E. Por tanto, se reconoce una potestad sancionadora a la Administración por motivos de eficacia y de política legislativa, pero ésta no se distingue sustancialmente de la potestad punitiva ejercida por los Tribunales.Esa línea jurisprudencial es también la seguida por el TEDH entre otras en su sentencia OZTURK de 21 febrero 1984, en la que se declaraba la ilegalidad de una sanción de tráfico a un ciudadano turco en Alemania, castigo que había sido impuesto sin respetar el derecho a un intérprete.En ese marco nos debemos preguntar: ¿Cuál es la naturaleza jurídica del derecho disciplinario?En la actualidad, perviven dos grandes corrientes doctrinales que, amparándose en unas presuntas diferencias entre el derecho penal y el derecho disciplinario, concluyen justificando una aminoración de garantías a respetar en el seno de este último.Así, los defensores de la diferenciación cuantitativa, encabezados por el profesor CEREZO MIR consideran que al derecho disciplinario se le encomienda el conocimiento de las conductas más leves siendo las sanciones a imponer igualmente menores a las contempladas en el ámbito penal. Pues bien, de los Textos vigentes precisamente podemos deducir todo lo contrario. Citaré un único ejemplo para no hacer excesivamente plúmbea esta exposición. La sanción típica por excelencia en el derecho disciplinario es la separación del servicio, castigo de carácter perpetuo e irreversible y que no tiene parangón alguno con cualquiera de las penas previstas por el C.P. para los funcionarios públicos, todas ellas de duración temporal.Una segunda doctrina es la llamada teoría de la diferenciación cualitativa o en ocasiones dogma de las especiales relaciones de sujeción. La misma es seguida por casi toda la doctrina administrativa, aunque haciendo derivar diferentes consecuencias. Entre ellos destacaría a los profesores GARRIDO FALLA, GARCÍA DE ENTERRÍA, ENTRENA CUESTA, PARADA VÁZQUEZ o MONTORO PUERTO. En síntesis, sus partidarios consideran que el primero se aplica a la mejor organización del servicio público, mientras que el segundo considera la defensa del orden social general. Configurado de ese modo, el derecho disciplinario seria un derecho interno, doméstico, que únicamente trata de solventar las disputas que surgen en el seno de la Administración-Institución, por oposición a un derecho público, el penal, que defiende cualquier alteración de la convivencia social.De ahí, llegan a deducirse que los principios y garantías que deben ser respetados por uno y otros han de ser distintas.Considero que esa concepción debe ser matizada a la luz de varios argumentos que he recogido en la tesis de los cuales citaré algunos:a) En primer término la constatación que el artículo 25.1 CE no distingue entre distintos tipos de infracciones.b) El examen de los distintos ilícitos disciplinarios arroja el dato de la constante referencia a los conceptos "ciudadanos administrados" o "público" (por ejemplo se tipifica como ilícito la ligera incorrección con el público, la falta de consideración con los administrados, etc.) circunstancia que pone de relieve precisamente la preocupación social del derecho disciplinario y los contornos cada vez más difuminados que le separan del derecho penal.c) Asimismo, la cláusula del Estado Social de Derecho del art. 1.1 C.E. y la tarea constitucionalmente encomendada a la Administración (servir con objetividad los intereses generales) hace que no pueda mantenerse la concepción de la Administración como una caja cerrada aislada de la sociedad. Como dijo en un memorable aserto la doctrina, "los funcionarios no existen sólo porque trabajan para la Administración sino que existen porque trabajan para los ciudadanos a través de una organización (Administración); la Administración no es fin en si misma, sino medio hacia otro fin (servicio a los ciudadanos)". En conclusión, considero que pueden existir diferencias de tipo cualitativo en la concreta tipificación de algunos ilícitos, pero esa constatación no debe servir como excusa para aminorar o inaplicar el conjunto de garantías y principios cimentados en el derecho penal, aunque sí pueden ser adaptados, matizados o incluso modificados atendiendo a las peculiaridades propias del derecho disciplinario. A averiguar esas adaptaciones he dedicado el nudo gordiano de la Tesis.Así son analizados los principios de Reserva de Ley, tipicidad, irretroactividad, "non bis in idem", proporcionalidad, prescripción de faltas y sanciones, ejecutividad de las mismas y el procedimiento legalmente establecido a la luz del artículo 2.4. CE. ; [eng] The first problem that I will analyze is the question of the juridical nature of the law. Until now, two doctrines have been used: the first, called "The theory of quantitative differentiation" should be put aside because, for example, the typical sanction "par excellence" in the disciplinary law is the dismissal; this punishment is perpetual and irreversible and is not comparable into other penalties (which have time limits) in the Penal Code tor the public officials.The second doctrine is called the "theory of the qualitative differentiation" or, sometimes, the "dogma of special subjection relation". This theory is followed by practically all of the representatives of administrative (government) theory though they reach different conclusions; between them I would quote GARRIDO FALLA, GARCIA de ENTERRIA, ENTRENA CUESTA, PARADA VAZQUEZ, MONTORO PUERTO. In summing up, supporters of this theory consider that disciplinary law and criminal law seek different ends, diverse objectives. The former looks to obtain well-organised public service and the latter, to defend the general public social order.So configured, disciplinary law wouId be an internal, domestic law that only has to resolve the arguments that appear within the public administration (government), as opposed to a public law which defends against any sort of alteration of the social coexistence.From this we can inter that the principIes and guarantees which have to be respected in both situations must be different.I consider that this conception has to be slightly shaded by the arguments I put forth in my thesis. To quote some of them:a) First, we should observe that art. 25.1 Spanish Constitution does not distinguish between those infractions.b) The analysis of different disciplinary illicities shows a permanent reference to the concepts of "administrated citizens" or "public". (For example, the following behaviours are typified as "faults": a slight discourtesy to the public, incivility with the administered citizen, etc.) And this makes obvious precisely the social occupation of disciplinary law and the less and less defined frontier between this and penal law. c) In this way, the clause "The Social State", art. 1.1. S.C., and the mission constitutionally entrusted to the public administration (to serve objectively the general interest) do not allow us to maintain the conception of the public administration as a closed box, isolated from society. To quote a memorable saying: "public officials don't exist only because they work for the citizen by means of an organisation (the public administration); the public administration is not an end in itself, but rather a means to another service (service to the citizen)".In conclusion, I consider that some qualitative differences can exist within the concrete typify of some illicities, but this argument must not be used to look for excuses to decrease or not ascribe all the guarantees and principles offered by penal law, eventhough they can be adapted and shaded or even modified regarding the special idiosycrasies of disciplinary law. I have dedicated the centre of my thesis to looking for theses adaptations. To that end, I have analysed the principles of legal reserve, typicality, absence of retroactivity, "non bis in idem", proportionality, prescription of faults and sanctions, the execution of them, and the legal process established by the art. 24 S.C.