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In Proportionality Principles in American Law, E. Thomas Sullivan and Richard S. Frase advance a general theory of proportionality for the American legal system. They argue that standards of review should be more clearly and precisely defined, and that in most circumstances every intrusive government measure which limits or threatens individual rights should undergo some degree of proportionality review. The authors identify three basic ways that government measures and private remedies have been found to be disproportionate and use this framework to examine contemporary and potential uses of proportionality principles in public law, civil liberties, and the criminal justice system, emphasizing their utility to guide judicial review of excessive government measures.

From the ancient origins of Just War doctrine to contemporary theories of punishment, concepts of proportionality have long been an instrumental part of the rule of law and an essential check on government power. Two renowned legal scholars seek to advance such a theory

Across a broad range of subjects, there is now wide agreement that the principle of proportionality governs the extent to which a provocation may lawfully be countered by what might otherwise be an unlawful response. That is the central role assigned to proportionality in international law and it is deeply rooted in the cultural history of societies. However, if the core institutions of a legal system are too weak to be relied upon to take remedial action against wrongdoers, then they must at least be authorized to license appropriate action by the wronged party and to insure that its response remains within prescribed parameters.The practice described in this essay demonstrates that a high degree of accord is emerging across a broad range of issues to the appropriate standards by which the proportionality of countermeasures can be assessed. The practice of various institutions authorized to render second opinions as to the compliance with those standards is gradually narrowing the range of indeterminacy inherent in the term proportionality. Some of this case law has been disappointingly episodic. The well-crafted second opinion, through its precision, its invocation of precedent, and its careful weighing of the probity of the facts presented to it, deepens and narrows the jurisprudential stream while strengthening its embankments.If applied in practice through second opinions rendered by legitimate institutions, proportionality is an example of an indeterminate principle becoming gradually empowered to provide persuasive answers to difficult questions and, thereby, case by case, building the objective determinacy of the principle.

In courts and tribunals, political arenas like the United Nations Security Council, and popular and scholarly journals, discursive recourse to the principle of proportionality has become frequent and vehement. It tends most audibly to arise in the midst of military conflicts pitting states against each other. But it also emerges in interstate trade disputes and when states, seeking to protect national security or public health, restrict internationally protected human rights.

AbstractThe principle of proportionality constitutes a complex principle that could be seen as the keystone of the general principles of Community law and ECHR. The aim of this article is to demonstrate the influence of European Community (EC) law and the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) on the definition and application of the principle of proportionality in Swedish public law from 1996 to 2006. The Supreme Administrative Court has given some indications as to the application of the principle of proportionality, notably as to the importance of the balancing of interests. Interestingly, this Court has also been proactive as to the application of the principle of proportionality in internal law, e.g. concerning environmental law, tax law, administrative licenses. Moreover, the principle has influenced national legislation in many fields. It is argued, finally, that these jurisprudential and legislative developments increase the judicial protection of the individual and also modifies the structure of traditional judicial review by attributing a new role to Swedish national courts.

AbstractThis article presents a functional explanation of why proportionality has become one of the most successful legal transplants in contemporary constitutional law. It argues that proportionality helps judges mitigate what Robert Cover called the 'inherent difficulty presented by the violence of the state's law acting upon the free interpretative process'. More than alternative methods, proportionality calibrates the violence that the justification of state coercion inflicts on private (non-official) jurisgenerative interpretative processes in constitutional cases. The first three sections show, through an analysis of different constitutional styles which I label Doric, Ionic and Corinthian, how proportionality seeks to place a non-deontological conception of rights within a categorical structure of formal legal analysis. This method aims to synthesize fidelity to form and institutional structure (thesis) with 'fact-sensitivity' to contexts in which specific controversies arise (antithesis). Proportionality positions judges vis-à-vis the parties and the parties in relation to one another differently from other constitutional methods. The next sections distinguish between constitutional perception and reality. While the normative appeal of proportionality can be traced to the perception of its integrative aims, in reality, judicial technique does not entirely live up to those aims. Proportionality succumbs to pressures from the centrifugal forces of universalism and particularism that it seeks to integrate. The final section draws on the works of Kant and Arendt and discusses the implications of an approach to constitutional method such as that reflected in the advent of proportionality for the project of constitutionalism more generally.