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Michalis P. Liberatos, Historical Time and the interpretations of the history of the Greek Civil War: the methodological problemsThe idea of historical time is crucial from a methodological point of view as far as the study of political and social history are concerned. Especially about the history of the Greek Civil War, a period that convulsed public opinion and caused scientific interpretations overwhelmed by ideological and epistemological «burdens». The most important of them is the idea of a time constant, continual, without turnovers and breaks, that is time in the «common sense». This «time», according to its origins, self-determines its evolution, its «determination» explains all of the aspects and the historical stages and facts. This is the traditional assumption that change has always to be explained in terms of something fixed and unchangeable. As for the policy of the Greek Communist Party this notion of time provokes some historians to an explanation that associates this policy with the origins of its philosophical program and not with the «real history». This approach avoids to enquiry into the adaptation of this program to the demands of political relations in time, to counter policies and as a specification of social representations. It is mainly an unaltered policy that arises as the outcome of an assemblage of antecedent events that compose a passage of identities. Because of this domination of this notion of the «continuity» of time, the study of Greek Civil War reproduced the ideological configurations of the past. Therefore it has degraded very important aspects of historical reality, without giving adequate answers about them. These are the question of the deepest tasks of KKE and its strategy, the causes of the unscheduled creation of Democratic Army (ΔΣΕ) in the mountains, the role of the rival political powers, the extent of the possibilities of a negotiation, the relation between Greeks and the Great Powers. As the recent historical enquiries has showed —the edition of a book of Ph. Iliou signalled a new era in the interpretation of this period— a different methodological attitude is perhaps primarily useful on account of the errors it enables one to avoid, in particular in constructing the historical object. This article presents the implication between the dominant notion of «time», the difficulties in explanations and with the ability to overcome the epistemological «burdens» if is to be called into question the idea of historical time. This is important in order to break away from some presuppositions that are tacitly accepted by some historians. This new notion of time sweeps away the naively idealistic view of continuity, that traditional approaches have raised. Because it is history and the internal dynamic which carries evolution and not the historical unchanged «purposes». ; Michalis P. Liberatos, Historical Time and the interpretations of the history of the Greek Civil War: the methodological problemsThe idea of historical time is crucial from a methodological point of view as far as the study of political and social history are concerned. Especially about the history of the Greek Civil War, a period that convulsed public opinion and caused scientific interpretations overwhelmed by ideological and epistemological «burdens». The most important of them is the idea of a time constant, continual, without turnovers and breaks, that is time in the «common sense». This «time», according to its origins, self-determines its evolution, its «determination» explains all of the aspects and the historical stages and facts. This is the traditional assumption that change has always to be explained in terms of something fixed and unchangeable. As for the policy of the Greek Communist Party this notion of time provokes some historians to an explanation that associates this policy with the origins of its philosophical program and not with the «real history». This approach avoids to enquiry into the adaptation of this program to the demands of political relations in time, to counter policies and as a specification of social representations. It is mainly an unaltered policy that arises as the outcome of an assemblage of antecedent events that compose a passage of identities. Because of this domination of this notion of the «continuity» of time, the study of Greek Civil War reproduced the ideological configurations of the past. Therefore it has degraded very important aspects of historical reality, without giving adequate answers about them. These are the question of the deepest tasks of KKE and its strategy, the causes of the unscheduled creation of Democratic Army (ΔΣΕ) in the mountains, the role of the rival political powers, the extent of the possibilities of a negotiation, the relation between Greeks and the Great Powers. As the recent historical enquiries has showed —the edition of a book of Ph. Iliou signalled a new era in the interpretation of this period— a different methodological attitude is perhaps primarily useful on account of the errors it enables one to avoid, in particular in constructing the historical object. This article presents the implication between the dominant notion of «time», the difficulties in explanations and with the ability to overcome the epistemological «burdens» if is to be called into question the idea of historical time. This is important in order to break away from some presuppositions that are tacitly accepted by some historians. This new notion of time sweeps away the naively idealistic view of continuity, that traditional approaches have raised. Because it is history and the internal dynamic which carries evolution and not the historical unchanged «purposes».

Δεν παρατίθεται περίληψη στα ελληνικά. ; The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of cultural propaganda in formulating and conducting foreign policy aiming at political supremacy and cultural penetration within the overall context of the ideological conflict between East and West during the Cold War era. Educational and cultural exchanges and other events of a nominali}'' nonpolitical nature are examined within their political context. In particular, the paper observes Anglo-Soviet relations over Greece. These relations turned increasingly hostile in mid-February 1945. Around that time a marked intensification of Soviet propaganda occurred. In July 1945, the Greek-Soviet League was established. It is interesting that, in response, the British Foreign Office concidered that the British Council in Athens should be reinforced and acquire a permanent representative. It was also decided to reopen the question of the Anglo-Greek Cultural Convention that was signed in 1940 but never ratified. This presentation seeks to examine the purpose of establishing these two cultural agencies, their staffing, the funding of their activities, the content of their cultural programmes, and the profile of their Greek supporters, both state officials and private individuals. How successful was the effort by the British Council and the Greek-Soviet League to promote their cultural programmes and what was the impact of these programmes on Greek public opinion? How did their cultural initiatives continue during the Greek Civil War? On the basis of the sources available, did each agency, and if so to what degree, enjoy the support of the country it represented? The comparative study of British and Soviet cultural propaganda in Greece will contribute to understanding the differences and similarities in the means used by each country to achieve its political ends in Greece.

Konstantinos Katsoudas, "A Dictatorship that is not a Dictatorship". Spanish Nationalists and the 4th of August The Spanish Civil War convulsed the international public opinion and prompted most foreign governments to take measures or even intervene in the conflict. Greek entanglement either in the form of smuggling war materiel or the participation of Greek volunteers in the International Brigades has already been investigated. However, little is known about a second dimension of this internationalization of the war: the peculiar forms that the antagonism between the two belligerent camps in foreign countries took. This paper, based mainly on Spanish archival sources, discusses some aspects of the activity developed in Greece by Franco's nationalists and the way Francoist diplomats and emissaries perceived the nature of an apparently similar regime, such as the dictatorship led by general Metaxas. The main objectives of the Francoist foreign policy were to avoid any escalation of the Spanish civil war into a world conflict, to secure international assistance for the right-wing forces and to undermine the legitimacy of the legal Republican government. In Greece, an informal diplomatic civil war broke out since Francoists occupied the Spanish Legation in Athens and Republicans took over the Consulate in Thessaloniki. The Francoists combined public and undercover activity: they worked hard to achieve an official recognition of their Estado Nuevo, while at the same time created rings of espionage and channels of anticommunist propaganda. The reason of their partial breakthroughs was that, contrary to their Republican enemies, the Nationalists enjoyed support by a significant part of the Greek political world, which was ideologically identified with their struggle. Francoist anti-communism had some interesting implications for Greek politics. An important issue was the Francoist effort to reveal a supposed Moscow-based conspiracy against Spain and Greece, both considered as hotbeds of revolution in the Mediterranean, in order to justify both Franco's extermination campaign and Metaxas' coup. Although this effort was based on fraudulent documents, forged by an anti-Bolshevik international organization, it became the cornerstone of Francoist and Metaxist propaganda. General Metaxas was the only European dictator to invoke the Spanish Civil War as a raison d'etre of his regime and often warned against the repetition of Spanish-like drama on Greek soil. Nevertheless he did not approve of Franco's methods and preferred Dr. Salazar's Portugal as an institutional model closer to his vision. For Spanish nationalist observers this was a sign of weakness. They interpreted events in Greece through the disfiguring mirror of their own historic experience: thus, although they never called in question Metaxas' authoritarian motives, the 4th of August regime was considered too mild and soft compared to Francoism (whose combativeness and fanaticism, as they suggested, the Greek General should have imitated); it reminded them the dictatorship founded in Spain by General Primo de Rivera in 1920s, whose inadequacy paved the way for the advent of the Republic and the emergence of sociopolitical radicalism. Incidents of the following years, as Greece moved towards a civil confrontation, seemed to strengthen their views. ; Konstantinos Katsoudas, "A Dictatorship that is not a Dictatorship". Spanish Nationalists and the 4th of AugustThe Spanish Civil War convulsed the international public opinion and prompted most foreign governments to take measures or even intervene in the conflict. Greek entanglement either in the form of smuggling war materiel or the participation of Greek volunteers in the International Brigades has already been investigated. However, little is known about a second dimension of this internationalization of the war: the peculiar forms that the antagonism between the two belligerent camps in foreign countries took. This paper, based mainly on Spanish archival sources, discusses some aspects of the activity developed in Greece by Franco's nationalists and the way Francoist diplomats and emissaries perceived the nature of an apparently similar regime, such as the dictatorship led by general Metaxas. The main objectives of the Francoist foreign policy were to avoid any escalation of the Spanish civil war into a world conflict, to secure international assistance for the right-wing forces and to undermine the legitimacy of the legal Republican government. In Greece, an informal diplomatic civil war broke out since Francoists occupied the Spanish Legation in Athens and Republicans took over the Consulate in Thessaloniki. The Francoists combined public and undercover activity: they worked hard to achieve an official recognition of their Estado Nuevo, while at the same time created rings of espionage and channels of anticommunist propaganda. The reason of their partial breakthroughs was that, contrary to their Republican enemies, the Nationalists enjoyed support by a significant part of the Greek political world, which was ideologically identified with their struggle. Francoist anti-communism had some interesting implications for Greek politics. An important issue was the Francoist effort to reveal a supposed Moscow-based conspiracy against Spain and Greece, both considered as hotbeds of revolution in the Mediterranean, in order to justify both Franco's extermination campaign and Metaxas' coup. Although this effort was based on fraudulent documents, forged by an anti-Bolshevik international organization, it became the cornerstone of Francoist and Metaxist propaganda. General Metaxas was the only European dictator to invoke the Spanish Civil War as a raison d'etre of his regime and often warned against the repetition of Spanish-like drama on Greek soil. Nevertheless he did not approve of Franco's methods and preferred Dr. Salazar's Portugal as an institutional model closer to his vision. For Spanish nationalist observers this was a sign of weakness. They interpreted events in Greece through the disfiguring mirror of their own historic experience: thus, although they never called in question Metaxas' authoritarian motives, the 4th of August regime was considered too mild and soft compared to Francoism (whose combativeness and fanaticism, as they suggested, the Greek General should have imitated); it reminded them the dictatorship founded in Spain by General Primo de Rivera in 1920s, whose inadequacy paved the way for the advent of the Republic and the emergence of sociopolitical radicalism. Incidents of the following years, as Greece moved towards a civil confrontation, seemed to strengthen their views.