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Asserts that confronting violent & radical Muslim extremism requires breaking the connection between such movements & potential new recruits. At issue is ensuring that US public diplomacy targets the likeliest recruits, ie, disaffected youth & those who influence them. It is argued that winning hearts & minds, an idealistic goal, should not distract from the more immediate & realistic goal of distracting vulnerable population segments from the extremist recruitment process. This can be achieved, it is asserted, by providing locally driven & disseminated alternatives. Challenges include the fact that the US is late to arrive in a field well-represented by al Qaeda & other groups; however, digital technology, particularly the Internet, is seen to offer the US an opportunity to reach at-risk youth. It is contended US citizens must play a role in engaging with other populations, while credible local entities & individuals must be a key part in challenging extremism. How the US government can partner with the private sector to reach at-risk populations is explained. In closing, some thoughts are offered on how to proceed with initiatives & on seeing radicalization as more than simply an Islamist phenomenon. D. Edelman

In the months following the July 7, 2005, attack that killed 52
people and injured hundreds more, the British government was at
pains to deny allegations that Britain was targeted by homegrown,
al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorists because of its Middle East foreign
policy. Yet the government was privately aware by May 2004 that a
"particularly strong cause of disillusionment amongst Muslims … is a
perceived 'double standard' in the foreign policy of western
governments (and often those of Muslim governments), in particular
Britain and the U.S" (FCO/HO 2005).
Specific causes cited were bias towards Israel vis-à-vis
Palestinians; non-action on Kashmir and Chechnya; and "active
oppression" in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the wider "war on terror."
Other alleged causes included social and economic deprivation,
Islamophobia (particularly following 9/11), and intergenerational
clashes between first, second, and third generation Muslims. But
little attempt was made either before or after July 7, 2005, to
examine the interaction between these domestic and foreign sources
of radicalization. This paper attempts to do so by examining the
rhetoric and actions of a range of young British Muslims including:
examples of 48 persons convicted of, charged for, or killed by
violent jihad—evidence of young Muslim opinion on extremism and
causes of violent jihadi terror in Britain. The evidence from this
preliminary study, though not large enough to draw reliable
statistical inferences, does suggest that not only is British
foreign policy a significant source of alienation among young
British Muslims, but that attitudes towards British foreign policy
interact with and often reinforce domestic social, cultural, and
economic sources of discontent. As explained in the literature
review below, examining the links between perceptions of foreign
policy towards the wider Muslim Ummah and sources of domestic
discontent offers a more satisfying account of British Muslim
radicalization than those offered by the dominant structural (social
network theories) and "aggrieved actor" interpretations. I would like to thank Jonathan
Githens-Mazer for organizing the PSA panel at the 2007 APSA
Annual Meeting where I presented this paper. I would also like
to thank Shah Miah for allowing me to cite evidence from his BA
research project (Queen Mary, University of London); Emily
Mclean Inglis and Anthony de Silva for research assistance; and
Zamila Bunglawala for advice and data on British Muslims and the
labor market.

This paper situates the field of action known as "corporate social responsibility" within the theoretical context of global capitalism. I posit that corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a field of action that is shaped through the interplay of popular pressures and the response of corporations to such pressures thereof. Specifically, I analyze this field as consisting of a symbolic struggle over the meaning of the term "social responsibility." I analyze a set of corporate practices relating to CSR and show how they shape the notion of responsibility in ways that diffuse its radical transformative potential. In particular, I look at various corporate strategies designed to prevent the use of law as means for bringing about greater corporate accountability. I also discuss particular agents that mobilize the CSR field. Specifically, I discuss the establishment of corporate-sponsored and corporate-oriented NGOs and analyze the role they play in structuring the CSR field. I designate such organizations as MaNGOs (Market Non-Governmental Organizations) and suggest that such organizations shape notions such as "social responsibility" and "social change" in ways that are amenable to business and employers' concerns.

AbstractIn the early 1970s, overseas Chinese students in the United States protested against Japan's claim to the Diaoyutai Islands. Emerging at a time when the rivalry between the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland to represent China was at a critical juncture, the movement soon found itself caught up in the struggle between the two sides. It was out of the Protect Diaoyutai Movement that a new ideological constituent of overseas Chinese nationalism came to light, looking to the PRC as the hope for a sovereign China. It became a predominant force among overseas Chinese activists and the movement changed its direction from defending Diaoyutai to seeking Taiwan's reunification with the mainland. The paper discusses the factors that shaped and eventually radicalized the movement. It asserts that the event was a turning point in the evolution of overseas Chinese nationalism which transformed an undercurrent into a surging tide that gave rise to a new Chinese national identity among overseas Chinese in America.