The article analyzes the primary cognitive and behavioral indicators observable following the manifestation of the Islamic radicalization process, specifically the advanced stage of radicalization. The research scope is also related to identifying signals of Islamic radicalization by utilizing a methodology based on the analysis of cases of radicalization among Romanian citizens.As the research aims to analyze the main signals indicating the advanced stage of individual radicalization, these indicators are valuable for early warning, both from the perspective of practitioners and competent authorities in preventing and combating radicalization. They are also beneficial for civil society to increase awareness regarding the identification of radical discourse encountered in the online environment.
The purpose of this analysis is to locate radicalization – the process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs – in the broader context of strategic actors (e.g. states) competing for legitimacy in transnational public spheres. Radicalization is distinct from both terrorism and violent extremism, though it is often a precursor to the use of terrorist tactics and can be critical for creating broad support for extremist movements and behaviors. The primary concern here is not terrorism per se, but rather how strategic actors compete to radicalize communities against the established organs and apparatuses of a given society. Borrowing from Price's (1994) model of the market for loyalties, the author proposes that radicalization is best understood as within the context of the nation-state system, shaped by the existence of unsanctioned, typically foreign information flows. Governments are increasingly intervening into this space, both to shore up loyalty among their domestic citizenry and to engage foreign citizens in ways that weaken their allegiances to their own governments. Emerging media technologies provide new structures for ideological transfer, enabling states and non-state actors to compete for influence in a more balanced, transnational, ideational playing field. The stakes are significant, of course, with citizens clamoring for more transparent, fair and efficacious governance and increasingly threatening the legitimacy of states around the world.
This article explores the problem of Islamic fundamentalism in Tajikistan. The relevance of the topic is due to the fact that in this Republic there is the greatest activity of Islamist movements among all CIS countries. The potential destabilization of the situation in Tajikistan threatens the entire sub-region of Central Asia, and may also lead to the transit of instability to the Russian North Caucasus. In this paper, the author examines the influence of religious, socio-economic and other factors on the radicalization of Islam in this post-Soviet Republic, as well as the activities of fundamentalist groups with a focus on the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT).
AbstractThis paper focuses on radicalization from a parenting perspective; we propose an approach that sees radicalization as a possibility in adolescent development, and as part of the interaction with the adolescent's social environment and socialization. The aim of the study is to discover how parents react when their adolescent develops extreme ideals. Using 55 in‐depth interviews with young people who have extreme ideals and their parents, the parental reactions towards these ideals are explored. Subsequently, the reactions are categorized according to two dimensions (control and support). This study shows how parents struggle when confronted with radicalization and shift to less demanding responses due to powerlessness, dissociation and parental uncertainty.
Drawing largely on data obtained from a sample survey of Mc adolescents (N=389), the structural position of youth in modern industr society is discussed & inferences are drawn concerning the potential for alienation, radicalization, & subsequent soc action of this group. The relationship of youth to the adult-dominated instit's of society is virtually a feudal one, with young people constituting a subject "caste" that eventually must transcend its position. Young people are constrained to accept the dominant values of their culture, esp those relating to the benefits of educ as a key to upward mobility. As a result, nearly 50% of the R's studied plan to go to U (which plan varies directly by SC), & more than 50% in all SC's anticipate future professional & technical careers. However, because of econ changes taking place in advanced capitalist societies, young people are increasingly being exposed to unemployment & underemployment, frustration of career aspirations, & alienation. Some of these changes include the preferred status of blue-collar guilds, econ decline, inflation, the role of gov as a consumer, & the growth of multi-nat'l Corp's. The course which this radical potential may take is suggested by an analysis of the social forces operating within adolescent society itself. The young people studied are primarily left-liberal in their SP position, & are issue-oriented rather than concerned with abstract ideologies & philosophies. Their approach to issues is negativistic (ie, young people are clearer on what they are against than what they are for), & they display a strong nihilism in their att towards soc org's. Another element in the life-style of young people is hedonism, a value which is transmitted back to mainstream adolescents by those who have dropped out of the system. The soc action of youth is likely to be reformist & oriented to the redress of specific issues. "Dropping out," either to subsist in youth ghettoes or to become involved in alternative structures, is likely to increase. If young people develop a pol'al consciousness, it is likely to be anarchistic, although the elements of nihilism & soc consciousness may lead to involvement in "vanguard" activities directed towards the liberation of minority groups. AA.
