The article deals with the problem of a rational consensus in contemporary political philosophy, arosed by postrnodern critique of modern Reason. In this context two important ideas - an "Overlapping consensus" of John Rawls and "the Diff erend" of Jean-Francois Lyotard - are discussed, compared and criticized. Paradoxical implications produced by a comrnon antifunamentist approach are pointed out. An attempt is made to show that in both cases consensus or disensus are allready presupposed in advance: the kind of the thesis depends upon suppositions about the nature of epistemic pluralism and its link with the political.
The article deals with the problem of a rational consensus in contemporary political philosophy, arosed by postrnodern critique of modern Reason. In this context two important ideas - an "Overlapping consensus" of John Rawls and "the Diff erend" of Jean-Francois Lyotard - are discussed, compared and criticized. Paradoxical implications produced by a comrnon antifunamentist approach are pointed out. An attempt is made to show that in both cases consensus or disensus are allready presupposed in advance: the kind of the thesis depends upon suppositions about the nature of epistemic pluralism and its link with the political.
The article deals with the problem of a rational consensus in contemporary political philosophy, arosed by postrnodern critique of modern Reason. In this context two important ideas - an "Overlapping consensus" of John Rawls and "the Diff erend" of Jean-Francois Lyotard - are discussed, compared and criticized. Paradoxical implications produced by a comrnon antifunamentist approach are pointed out. An attempt is made to show that in both cases consensus or disensus are allready presupposed in advance: the kind of the thesis depends upon suppositions about the nature of epistemic pluralism and its link with the political.
The article deals with the problem of a rational consensus in contemporary political philosophy, arosed by postrnodern critique of modern Reason. In this context two important ideas - an "Overlapping consensus" of John Rawls and "the Diff erend" of Jean-Francois Lyotard - are discussed, compared and criticized. Paradoxical implications produced by a comrnon antifunamentist approach are pointed out. An attempt is made to show that in both cases consensus or disensus are allready presupposed in advance: the kind of the thesis depends upon suppositions about the nature of epistemic pluralism and its link with the political.
The aim of the study was an analysis of two the conceptions of relationships between democracy and religion. One of these conceptions was created by Alexis de Tocqueville. He thought that democracy needs religion as an element that enriches it and helps in removing some negative tendencies inherent in this form of government. He understood that democracy was coalesced with the philosophies that were alien to religion, however, he demanded an alliance of democracy and religion. The other object of philosophical analysis is John Rawls. The theories of this author show an important change in the relationship of religion and democracy, which stems from the fact that he equates religion with philosophy. The political liberalism of Rawls helps us understand why democracy as a form of government has no need of religion. The political liberalism of Rawls reveals an important aspect of relationship between democracy and religion. He differs from Tocqueville by thinking that this form of government is not inherently merged with religion. Democratic state aspires to be neutral towards religion. Believers can be honest democrats, but this regime is indifferent in respect of religion. Democrats are on the side of worldly immanence, and believers side with religious transcendence. These two competing attitudes create a tension between religion and democracy. The solution of this tension, proposed by Rawls, consists in the equalization of philosophy and religion; it reveals that democracy is indifferent towards religion. The equalization of the status of philosophy and religion highlights the fact that this form of government is neutral in respect of the conception of God. This negates the Tocquevillian conception of the role of religion in democracy. Democracy can function without the support of traditions of religious thought.
The aim of the study was an analysis of two the conceptions of relationships between democracy and religion. One of these conceptions was created by Alexis de Tocqueville. He thought that democracy needs religion as an element that enriches it and helps in removing some negative tendencies inherent in this form of government. He understood that democracy was coalesced with the philosophies that were alien to religion, however, he demanded an alliance of democracy and religion. The other object of philosophical analysis is John Rawls. The theories of this author show an important change in the relationship of religion and democracy, which stems from the fact that he equates religion with philosophy. The political liberalism of Rawls helps us understand why democracy as a form of government has no need of religion. The political liberalism of Rawls reveals an important aspect of relationship between democracy and religion. He differs from Tocqueville by thinking that this form of government is not inherently merged with religion. Democratic state aspires to be neutral towards religion. Believers can be honest democrats, but this regime is indifferent in respect of religion. Democrats are on the side of worldly immanence, and believers side with religious transcendence. These two competing attitudes create a tension between religion and democracy. The solution of this tension, proposed by Rawls, consists in the equalization of philosophy and religion; it reveals that democracy is indifferent towards religion. The equalization of the status of philosophy and religion highlights the fact that this form of government is neutral in respect of the conception of God. This negates the Tocquevillian conception of the role of religion in democracy. Democracy can function without the support of traditions of religious thought.
The aim of the study was an analysis of two the conceptions of relationships between democracy and religion. One of these conceptions was created by Alexis de Tocqueville. He thought that democracy needs religion as an element that enriches it and helps in removing some negative tendencies inherent in this form of government. He understood that democracy was coalesced with the philosophies that were alien to religion, however, he demanded an alliance of democracy and religion. The other object of philosophical analysis is John Rawls. The theories of this author show an important change in the relationship of religion and democracy, which stems from the fact that he equates religion with philosophy. The political liberalism of Rawls helps us understand why democracy as a form of government has no need of religion. The political liberalism of Rawls reveals an important aspect of relationship between democracy and religion. He differs from Tocqueville by thinking that this form of government is not inherently merged with religion. Democratic state aspires to be neutral towards religion. Believers can be honest democrats, but this regime is indifferent in respect of religion. Democrats are on the side of worldly immanence, and believers side with religious transcendence. These two competing attitudes create a tension between religion and democracy. The solution of this tension, proposed by Rawls, consists in the equalization of philosophy and religion; it reveals that democracy is indifferent towards religion. The equalization of the status of philosophy and religion highlights the fact that this form of government is neutral in respect of the conception of God. This negates the Tocquevillian conception of the role of religion in democracy. Democracy can function without the support of traditions of religious thought.
The aim of the study was an analysis of two the conceptions of relationships between democracy and religion. One of these conceptions was created by Alexis de Tocqueville. He thought that democracy needs religion as an element that enriches it and helps in removing some negative tendencies inherent in this form of government. He understood that democracy was coalesced with the philosophies that were alien to religion, however, he demanded an alliance of democracy and religion. The other object of philosophical analysis is John Rawls. The theories of this author show an important change in the relationship of religion and democracy, which stems from the fact that he equates religion with philosophy. The political liberalism of Rawls helps us understand why democracy as a form of government has no need of religion. The political liberalism of Rawls reveals an important aspect of relationship between democracy and religion. He differs from Tocqueville by thinking that this form of government is not inherently merged with religion. Democratic state aspires to be neutral towards religion. Believers can be honest democrats, but this regime is indifferent in respect of religion. Democrats are on the side of worldly immanence, and believers side with religious transcendence. These two competing attitudes create a tension between religion and democracy. The solution of this tension, proposed by Rawls, consists in the equalization of philosophy and religion; it reveals that democracy is indifferent towards religion. The equalization of the status of philosophy and religion highlights the fact that this form of government is neutral in respect of the conception of God. This negates the Tocquevillian conception of the role of religion in democracy. Democracy can function without the support of traditions of religious thought.
John Rawls's famous "A Theory of Justice" firmly established itself as a classical work in the field of political philosophy. There is a huge mass of critical literature on it dealing with various details & aspects. Yet it seems nobody noticed some fatal internal inconsistency at the very basis of the project. That is, the fact that Rawlsian aim to make a theory of justice more geometrico diverges from his explicit belief in the unconditional value of justice & its conceptual independence of rationality. This belief is an essential part of the "Theory" no less than the attempts to ground it on reason. But to ground justice on reason means exactly to destroy its conceptual autonomy & unconditionality. That is the problem the article concentrates on. It shows that, firstly, Rawls makes not clear enough which ideal -- this of justice or that of rationality -- he takes as self-grounding & of the ultimate importance when compared with each other. On the one hand, the willingness to use the model of the original position stems from purely moral, that is, unreducible to utility maximizing calculations, state of consciousness, without which the persons cannot be persuaded to take part in the mental experiment & to perceive it as just. On the other hand, Rawls declares the need to ground the principles of justice & to prove that unjust behavior is also irrational, which means he questions the very belief in the binding power of Kantian morality together with his own quest for justice (If justice is nothing other than rationality, so why should we worry about it? Let's speak instead about rationality & utility alone). Secondly, we demonstrate that although a famous veil of ignorance needs because the persons under it are homini economici, that is, rational egoists without any moral sentiments, yet this veil is possible & useful only if the homini are supplied with a sense of justice, which means that the initial definition of the persons is destroyed. Moreover, in this case the veil is superfluous because the supposed sense of justice takes on the function of it. Thirdly, a contradiction in terms between two fundamental presuppositions of Rawls's theory -- Cartesian universal reason of solitary thinker on the one hand & contractarian conception of justice on the other -- is exposed: what becomes of the idea that justice is the result of a rational agreement, if each person finds the principles of justice individually & needs no communication? Fourthly, communitarian critique of Rawlsian claim to universality & impartiality is briefly presented & discussed in order to show that to be rational is not the same as to be neutral, fair & impartial. Moreover, no matter what we think about the possibility to be fair, at least the state of being both rational & fair (or just in Rawlsian sense) is unattainable. Adapted from the source document.
John Rawls's famous "A theory of justice" firmly established itself as a classical work in the field of political philosophy. There is a huge mass of critical literature on it dealing with various details and aspects. Yet it seems nobody noticed some fatal internal inconsistency at the very basis of the project. That is, the fact that Rawlsian aim to make a theory of justice more geometrico diverges from his explicit belief in the unconditional value of justice and its conceptual independence of rationality.
John Rawls's famous "A theory of justice" firmly established itself as a classical work in the field of political philosophy. There is a huge mass of critical literature on it dealing with various details and aspects. Yet it seems nobody noticed some fatal internal inconsistency at the very basis of the project. That is, the fact that Rawlsian aim to make a theory of justice more geometrico diverges from his explicit belief in the unconditional value of justice and its conceptual independence of rationality.
John Rawls's famous "A theory of justice" firmly established itself as a classical work in the field of political philosophy. There is a huge mass of critical literature on it dealing with various details and aspects. Yet it seems nobody noticed some fatal internal inconsistency at the very basis of the project. That is, the fact that Rawlsian aim to make a theory of justice more geometrico diverges from his explicit belief in the unconditional value of justice and its conceptual independence of rationality.
John Rawls's famous "A theory of justice" firmly established itself as a classical work in the field of political philosophy. There is a huge mass of critical literature on it dealing with various details and aspects. Yet it seems nobody noticed some fatal internal inconsistency at the very basis of the project. That is, the fact that Rawlsian aim to make a theory of justice more geometrico diverges from his explicit belief in the unconditional value of justice and its conceptual independence of rationality.
Straipsnio tikslas - irodyti, kad demokratijai kaip politinei santvarkai nereikia religijos, kaip ja papildancio veiksnio. Irodymas grindziamas lyginamaja Alexis'o de Tocqueville'io ir Johno Rawlso paziuru analize. Tocqueville'io nuomone, demokratijai reikia religijos, kaip ja papildan-ciu morales normu saltinio. Rawlsas demokratija suvokia kaip savaran-kiska politinio gyvenimo forma, nepriklausancia nuo religiniu isitikinimu. Tocqueville'io ir Rawlso paziuru lyginamoji analize leidzia paaiskinti itampa tarp demokratijos ir religijos. Net ir siekdamas kuo didesnio nesaliskumo, demokratinis rezimas yra saliskas tam tikroms filosofinems prielaidoms, ku-riu negali pripazinti tikintieji The aim of the study was an analysis of two the conceptions of relationships between democracy and religion. One of these conceptions was created by Alexis de Tocqueville. He thought that democracy needs religion as an element that enriches it and helps in removing some negative tendencies inherent in this form of government. He understood that democracy was coalesced with the philosophies that were alien to religion, however, he demanded an alliance of democracy and religion. The other object of philosophical analysis is John Rawls. The theories of this author show an important change in the relationship of religion and democracy, which stems from the fact that he equates religion with philosophy. The Political Liberalism of Rawls helps us understand why democracy as a form of government has no need of religion. Adapted from the source document.
The paper explores the paradoxes of the political philosophy of liberalism. Liberal conception of justice is incapable of providing grounds for an identity of liberalism. Liberals do not have a moral conception of their own. This is a source of a paradox. Political identity points to morality and moral identity points to politics. The aim of this paper is to clarify this paradox. Political liberalism is based on certain assumptions of a philosophy of culture. Liberals defend a conception of culture which justifies their inconsistencies. They lack any coherent conception of morality and politics. The article is an attempt to prove this by using the "final position" – an alternative to the Rawlsian "original position".
