Religious issues permeate the whole Rawlsian work. The problem is to know how people with different religious understandings can come to overlapping consensus. The solution to the problem of how political legitimacy can be achieved, despite religious conflict, and how, between citizens of different faiths, political justification can be pursued without reference to religious conviction is related to the idea of public reason.
In this paper will investigate the criticisms presented by Gerald Allan Cohen of the difference principle asserted by the American philosopher John Rawls. Cohen claims that the difference principle allows for exorbitant inequalities and that these inequalities would undermine the ethos of solidarity assumed by Rawls. Against Cohen's criticisms, it will be emphasized the fact that the principles of justice as fairness must be read together (holistic reading), and therefore the inequalities allowed by the difference principle are much smaller than Cohen believed, since equal liberty, fair equality of opportunity, and the fair value of the equal political liberties must also be ensured. Thus, to ensure that the principles work together, it will be argued that the scope of the principle is much narrower than Cohen thought. It is emphasized that in Rawlsian thought there is no need for constant economic growth, and the principle of difference should not be seen as a market principle, on which its objective is not to be a mere principle of reparation, but a principle that affirms reciprocity between fellow citizens of a democratic society.
This text seeks to introduce the matter of global justice through an assessment of the conception of John Rawls, as advanced in The Law of Peoples. This work places us in the centre of the seemingly paradoxical character that shapes the attitude of the liberal-egalitarian thinking before the consideration of a model of international justice. The Rawlsian conception of international justice has been criticized as contradictory regarding his conception applied to the domestic sphere. We will seek not only to understand the axis of Rawls' theories in a continuity perspective, but also to assess the pertinence of the model exposed in The Law of Peoples through the duality between justice and humanity. Adapted from the source document.
ResumoO artigo investigou como o liberalismo político de John Rawls pode oferecer argumentos razoáveis para equacionar os dilemas políticos, econômicos e sociais ocasionados pela pandemia de COVID-19. Apesar de a teoria de Rawls aplicar-se, especificamente, para sociedades bem ordenadas quase-justas, nos §§ 10 e 11 da Conferência VIII do livro Liberalismo político, o filósofo discute a forma de se governar em ocasiões de emergência que afetam a estabilidade das instituições do Estado de direito. A partir da diferenciação entre os tipos de instabilidade institucional (crise e tensão), indicou-se que a situação gerada pela COVID-19 assemelha-se ao contexto de tensão. Utilizando o liberalismo político de John Rawls para esse contexto de tensão, é possível afirmar a razoabilidade do argumento favorável a restrições à liberdade de ir e vir e de empreender, em favor da não exposição das pessoas a riscos excessivos de morte.Palavras-chave: Justiça. Pandemia. Tensão. Liberalismo político.AbstractThe article investigated how the political liberalism of John Rawls can offer reasonable arguments to address the political, economic and social dilemmas caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Although Rawls' theory applies specifically to well-ordered societies, in §§ 10 and 11 of Conference VIII of Political Liberalism, the philosopher discusses how to govern in times of emergency that affect stability institutions of the rule of law. From the differentiation between the types of institutional instability (crisis and apprehension), it is indicated that the situation generated by COVID-19 is similar to the context of tension. Using John Rawls' political liberalism in this context of tension, it is possible to affirm the reasonableness of the argument in favor of restricting the freedom to go and the entrepreneur, in favor of not exposing people to excessive risks of death.Keywords: Justice. Pandemic. Apprehension. Political Liberalism.
Este presente artigo objetiva analisar a concepção de justiça nos termos do liberalismo igualitário concebido pelo filósofo inglês John Rawls (1921-2002) com a cidadania brasileira, identificando nesta uma estrutura procedimental não regular, que não obedece a ordem lexical de conquistas de direitos universais inspirados nos ideais liberais, principalmente por se tratar de um país que muito tardiamente abriu mão de uma economia escravocrata. Partindo deste fato, apresentamos duas situações de atuação política que atribuímos como parte do contexto dos problemas sociais no país e o exercício da cidadania: destacamos o movimento LGBT, uma população que demanda por reconhecimento e direitos sociais. Em seguida, chamamos a atenção para a tendência da renovação política, a partir da formação das organizações suprapartidárias nos últimos anos, com a intenção de oxigenar a atividade política, em um momento político no qual as instituições públicas perdem progressivamente a credibilidade e a confiança da população. ; Este artículo tiene como objetivo analizar la concepción de la justicia en términos de liberalismo igualitario concebido por el filósofo inglés John Rawls (1921-2002) con la ciudadanía brasileña, identificando en esto una estructura procesal no regular que no obedece el orden léxico de los logros de los derechos universales inspirado en los ideales liberales, principalmente porque es un país que muy tarde consoló una economía esclava. Partiendo de este hecho, presentamos dos situaciones de acción política que atribuimos como parte del contexto de los problemas sociales en el país y el ejercicio de la ciudadanía: destacamos el movimiento LGBT, una población que exige reconocimiento y derechos sociales. A continuación, llamamos la atención sobre la tendencia de la renovación política, desde la formación de organizaciones suprapartidistas en los últimos años, con la intención de oxigenar la actividad política, en un momento político en el que las instituciones públicas pierden credibilidad y confianza de la población. ; This article aims to analyze the concept of justice in terms of egalitarian liberalism conceived by the english philosopher John Rawls (1921-2002) with brazilian citizenship, identifying in it a non-regular procedural structure that does not obey the lexical order of conquests of universal rights inspired by liberal ideals, mainly because it is a country that very late gave up a slave-like economy. Based on this fact, we present two situations of political action that we attribute as part of the context of social problems in the country and the exercise of citizenship: we highlight the LGBT movement, a population that demands recognition and social rights. Next, we call attention to the trend of political renewal, based on the formation of supra-partisan organizations in recent years, with the intention of oxygenating political activity in a political moment in which public institutions progressively lose credibility and trust of the population.
In: Contexto internacional: revista semestral do Instituto de Relações Internacionais, IRI, Pontíficia Universidade Católica, PUC, Band 30, Heft 3, S. 571-614
Martha Nussbaum's latest works attempt to give a version of the capability approach that could be consistent with rawlsian political liberalism. The main purpose of this article is to show that this connection is flawed because, first, the deep moral disagreement among citizens are dissolved by a petitio principii and, in second term, because political stability is not enough sustained. Adapted from the source document.
O trabalho procura verificar se Schweickart está correto ao afirmar que o tipo de regime institucional por ele defendido, a "democracia econômica" (uma versão de socialismo de mercado), deveria ser também o preferido dos rawlsianos. Argumenta-se no sentido de que há razão para acreditar que, comparada a regimes capitalistas, a democracia econômica eleve as expectativas dos cidadãos em pior situação quanto a alguns bens primários presumivelmente sujeitos ao princípio da diferença de Rawls, como o emprego, o lazer, o trabalho significativo e a democracia no trabalho. Tendo em vista, no entanto, que a democracia econômica também parece propensa a reduzir expectativas no que toca à riqueza e à renda, uma conclusão peremptória acerca da superioridade de um dos tipos de regime não parece possível.
This paper aims to discuss the socio-economic regimes that allow the realization of justice as fairness, focusing in particular on the two regimes pointed out by Rawls as capable of constituting a well-ordered society, the property-owning democracy (POD) on the one hand and liberal socialism on the other. To this end, we will first consider Rawls' arguments regarding socio-economic regimes within A theory of justice. Then, based on Justice as fairness: a restatement, the arguments in favor of POD and liberal socialism and against the other three options: laissez-faire capitalism, one-party state socialism, and the welfare state will be discussed. Next, the arguments in favor of either POD or liberal socialism will be considered, largely seeking to draw what the distinctions between the two regimes are, from those authors who seek to go beyond Rawls. At the end, it is concluded that within the limits of a theory of justice Rawls is correct in not defining who is the winning regime, the POD or liberal socialism, but in the current advance of liberal capitalism and its movement away from liberal democracies it shows necessary to discuss which is the most adequate regime from the bases provided by justice as fairness.
In the current debate on human rights, the political conception is attractive in its ability to try to find solutions to the central questions and problems, which the orthodox conception has difficulties in solving, because of its own nature (the political formulation of human rights) it does not need a moral foundation that is independent of the recognition established by international law and practice. On the one hand, it is necessary to recognize that the current practice and the international doctrine consider human rights as tools addressed, mainly, to establish the limits of the legitimate sovereignty of the state, thus, recognizing the plausibility of the political conception. On the other hand, the article intends to show that this specific function, while important, should not exhaust all that human rights perform. Therefore, the political conception runs the serious risk of weakening the normative force of human rights and conflating two different agendas, that of human rights and that of global justice. To go through this argument, first of all, the article presents the contemporary genesis of the political conception of human rights based on the work of John Rawls. Secondly, it focuses on the reformulation given by Raz and Beitz's approaches. Finally, in the third section, I criticize three main assumptions which ground the current paradigm of political conception of human rights.
El debate alrededor de la justicia ha ganado espacio en la geografía, especialmente a partir de los 1970s, con atención a A theory of Justice (Rawls, 1971), en la Filosofía Política, y en la Geografía, Social Justice and the city (Harvey, 1973). A partir de ahí, y sin pretensión a la exhaustividad, se recorren los debates entre diversas teorías y/o principios de justicia. En la medida en que muchos procesos analizados en geografía – como la segregación, la marginalización, la diferenciación – revelan injusticias de expresión espacial, esta reflexión sobre la justicia ofrece herramientas teóricas pertinentes para los análisis geográficos. En otros términos, se establecen los contornos del debate, para contribuir a la comprensión de las implicaciones de la abertura de la geografía a preocupaciones filosófico-éticas. Así, se presenta una visión amplia de la justicia, articulada alrededor del trípode redistribución, reconocimiento y espacio, para finalmente hacer algunas consideraciones sobre el concepto de justicia espacial. ; O debate em torno da justiça vem ganhando lugar na Geografia, notadamente a partir dos anos 1970, com destaque para A Theory of Justice (Rawls, 1971), na Filosofia Política, e, na Geografia, para Social Justice and the City (Harvey, 1973). A partir desse momento, e sem pretender à exaustividade, propõe-se um recorrido através dos debates entre diversas teorias e/ou grandes princípios de justiça. Na medida em que muitos processos analisados em Geografia – como a segregação, a marginalização, a exclusão e a diferenciação – revelam injustiças de forte expressão espacial, esta reflexão sobre a justiça oferece ferramentas teóricas e analíticas relevantes para as análises geográficas. Em outros termos, trata-se de estabelecer os contornos desse debate, para contribuir ao entendimento da abertura da Geografia a preocupações filosófico-éticas. Nesse sentido, apresenta-se uma visão ampla da justiça, em torno do tripé redistribuição, reconhecimento e espaço, para terminar com considerações sobre o conceito de justiça espacial. ; The debate around justice has been gaining ground in Geography, especially from the 1970s, with two seminal works, A theory of justice (Rawls, 1971), in Political Philosophy, and, in geography, Social Justice and the City (Harvey, 1973). From this moment, and without pretension of exhaustivity, we propose a journey through the debates between several theories and principles of justice. As a lot of processes analyzed in Geography – such as segregation, marginalization, exclusion, differentiation – reveals injustices with a strong spatial expression, this reflection about justice offers theoretical and analytical tools for geographical analyses. In other terms, it is an intent to establish the outlines of this debate, to contribute to the understanding of the opening of geography to philosophical and ethics concerns. In that respect, we aim at presenting a large vision of justice, around the tripod redistribution, recognition, and space, to finish with considerations about the concept of spatial justice.
