Suchergebnisse

Der Aufsatz verfolgt die Entwicklung der Gerechtigkeitstheorie von Rawls von den Anfängen bis heute im Kontext der prominenten Kritiken. Zunächst wird die Theorie der Gerechtigkeit analysiert und zwischen einem politischen Kern (Gerechtigkeit als Fairneß) und philosophischen Begründungsstrategien unterschieden. Im dritten Teil werden die konzeptionellen Änderungen untersucht, die Rawls seit den achtziger Jahren an seiner Theorie vornahm, und als Antwort auf die Kritiken verstanden. Es zeigt sich, daß Rawls den politischen Kern der Gerechtigkeitsprinzipien unangetastet läßt, die philosophischen Begründungen aber zunehmend ausdünnt und in der Konzeption des overlapping consensus sogar bereit ist, auf eine Begründung des Neuen Liberalismus zu verzichten. Die Tragfähigkeit dieser bisher letzten Position wird bezweifelt. (Zeitschrift für Politik / FUB)

The reception of Rawls in France has been an extremely complex story where forces of innovation have been, in the end, overwhelmed by the resistance of 'philosophical nationalism'. This is surprising as, in many ways, France was going through tremendous changes & modernization at the time of the translation of A Theory of Justice in 1987. In that context, Rawls's project seemed to have something useful & suggestive to offer: bridging the gap between freedom & equality in a new version of social democracy, combining social justice & market efficiency, respecting the plurality of values within civil society & creating a consensus on democratic legitimacy. But the intellectual obstacles, represented mostly by the French idiosyncratic brand of republicanism, were to prove too strong to allow for a true 'liberalization' of French intellectual & political life. Whereas a number of lawyers, economists & political scientists as well as proportion of the French civil service saw all the benefits of a rigorous engagement with Rawls, philosophers & the intelligentsia on the whole, with the exception of Paul Ricoeur, reacted negatively to Rawls. 1 Appendix. [Copyright 2002 Sage Publications Ltd.]

The author describes the spiritual climate at the time of the publication of Rawis' A Theory of Justice (1971) & describes its huge impact on the political philosophy of the 20th century. Then he analyses Rawls' acknowledgement of Kant. First he depicts Rawls' formulation of his original position along the lines of Kant's idea of the autonomy of the individual & the categorical imperative. There might be some problems with the possible convergence of Rawls' economism & Kant's moral position. According to Rawis, the original position parties may express their nature, but at the same time they belong to the intelligible world. Raws has tried to overcome this divergence from Kant's concept in his paper Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory by means of distinguishing between the rational & the full autonomy, from which the author concludes that Rawis was inclined to adopt a certain version of utilitarianism. According to the author, Rawis' attempt to bridge Kant's rigorous distinction between the law & the morality by means of his sense of justice is entirely alien to Kant. Hence there is an unbridgable chasm between Kant & Rawis, which does not mean that Rawis' attempt at using Kant's categories in the design of democratic societies is insufficiently legitimate. 71 References. Adapted from the source document.

Rawls, John: Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit. - Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1975

The article has three parts. The first is devoted to the analysis of some features of Italian philosophy that might be used to explain why analytic philosophy of politics, & analytic philosophy in general, has few practitioners. The second part gives an explanation of the relatively small audience Rawls has among liberals in Italy. Some features of the Italian liberal tradition might be helpful in explaining this fact; hence a short presentation of these features (as exemplified by Croce) is outlined. The third part deals with the reception of Rawls's ideas among the small group of analytic political philosophers in Italy. 1 Appendix. [Copyright 2002 Sage Publications Ltd.]

Rawls' Theorie der Gerechtigkeit bezieht sich auf eine "geschlossene" Gesellschaft. Seine Theorie wird unter Berücksichtigung der Rahmenbedingungen der Globalisierung diskutiert, die die Weltgesellschaft als einzig sinnvollen Gehalt des Begriffs "geschlossene Gesellschaft" erscheinen lassen. Da Gesellschaften jedoch in unterschiedlichen Staaten organisiert sind, müssen auch die Bedürfnisse von "Externen" berücksichtigt werden, wenn ein Minimum an Gerechtigkeit praktiziert werden soll. (ICEÜbers)

This article analyses the reception of John Rawls's thought by Otfried Hoffe, Jurgen Habermas & other political theorists on the German liberal left. It argues that, ironically, as Rawls's theory has become more historically self-conscious & sociologically oriented since A Theory of Justice, Habermas, while denying any fundamental difference between him & Rawls in this 'neo-Kantian family quarrel', has moved in the opposite direction. One might even say that there has been some mid-Atlantic convergence in political theory. Nevertheless, there remain peculiarities of German political thought, in particular its more sociological bent, a (positive or negative) fixation on the state, & the persistently felt need finally to reconcile a perceived conflict between liberalism & democracy. 1 Appendix. [Copyright 2002 Sage Publications Ltd.]

The opening, in 2004, of John Rawls's personal archive prompted a new wave of Rawls scholarship. This work has deepened our understanding of the development and impact of Rawls's ideas and of the broader contours of twentieth-century analytical political philosophy. This article places these recent archival histories, for the first time, in the context of the longer history of attempts to historicize Rawls, beginning with the publication ofA Theory of Justicefifty years ago. Doing so does three things. First, it shows that early readers were more interested in how to think historically about Rawls than is sometimes assumed. Second, it reveals that partisan accounts of Rawls's place in history, popularized by those close to him, have sometimes made their way into the archival studies. Third and finally, it offers an opportunity to rethink how the twentieth-century history of political philosophy and political theory is often told.

The reception of Rawls in France has been an extremely complex story where forces of innovation have been, in the end, overwhelmed by the resistance of `philosophical nationalism'. This is surprising as, in many ways, France was going through tremendous changes and modernization at the time of the translation of A Theory of Justice in 1987. In that context, Rawls's project seemed to have something useful and suggestive to offer: bridging the gap between freedom and equality in a new version of social democracy, combining social justice and market efficiency, respecting the plurality of values within civil society and creating a consensus on democratic legitimacy. But the intellectual obstacles, represented mostly by the French idiosyncratic brand of republicanism, were to prove too strong to allow for a true `liberalization' of French intellectual and political life. Whereas a number of lawyers, economists and political scientists as well as proportion of the French civil service saw all the benefits of a rigorous engagement with Rawls, philosophers and the intelligentsia on the whole, with the exception of Paul Ricoeur, reacted negatively to Rawls.