The pertinent question today is what kind of "politics of return" could grant Palestinians the right to self-determination and simultaneously counter the exclusionary politics towards Palestinian refugees of both Arab nation-states and of the Palestinian nationalist project? Palestinian refugees, and their camp/homes as social - historical sites giving new meanings to contemporary refugeehood - lie at the heart of a potential new political counter culture. At the core of this antagonistic politics should be the recognition that the refugee issue today is no longer solely about return, but also about rights writ-large, which involve a radical rethinking of citizenship and individual and collective self-determination in the region. The Palestinian refugee question, seen in this light, becomes a prism through which we can understand and critique long-term processes of national, sectarian and confessional boundary making in the Middle East. It therefore raises the question of how to radically reconfigure post-colonial national projects in Arab countries which have so far failed to meet aspirations for rights, democracy and pluralism for refugees and non refugees alike.
During times of turmoil and upheaval in the Arab world, the political vulnerability of Palestinian refugee communities is exacerbated in myriad ways. Precedents were set in Lebanon, Kuwait, Libya and Iraq, and the Arab uprisings have been no exception. The wars first in Libya and later in Syria have now opened new chapters for the Palestinian refugee communities in both countries. This podium discussion asked, where were the Arab uprisings after two years of revolutions, wars and ongoing upheaval? How have Palestinian refugees been impacted by these uprisings? Today, with approximately five million refugees registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Palestinian refugees comprise the world's largest refugee population. They continue to be unable to exercise the right – provided for in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 – to return to their homes and lands in the state of Israel. Most continue to live in Arab states or under Israeli occupation, while a small minority are internally displaced within the state of Israel. What is the future now for Palestinian refugees in view of the uprisings and the Palestinians' six-decade-old unresolved statelessness? ; What Future Now?: The Palestinian Refugees and the Arab Uprisings , discussion, ICI Berlin, 15 March 2013
In this paper, I first argue that, since the British mandate, citizenship regulations in Palestine contributed to dispossession of the rights of Palestinians, thus preparing for the Palestinian refugee problem and eventually its consolidation. I then argue that citizenship regulations in host countries were exclusionary towards refugees in general, and Palestinians in particular, making it impossible for Palestinians to integrate in host societies. The so-called "Arab Spring" did not bring about any change in that sense. Finally, I argue that the narrative of statehood, although often separated from that of the "right of return", constitutes but one narrative, and one at a completely different angle than the narrative of a "right of return", where the 'just solution' creates to the possibility of establishing a homeland for Palestinians where they, and in particular the stateless refugees, can be converted into full citizens. What was part of the problem for refugees is presented as part of the solution. This discussion is very important in today's Palestine that was just recently accepted at the UN General Assembly as a non-member observer state. The importance of that move is the official Palestinian insistence on the need of a state on the 1967 borders, and the willingness to accept the formula of a two state solution. Discussion related to citizenship and refugee status, and the right of return, are all back to the center of political and legal discussions.
SolLution of the Palestinian refugees (PR) is integral to the ongoing peace process between the Arab countries and Israel as well as the negotiations between Israel, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) . The refugee issue is politically significant because a majority of the Palestinians are classified as refugees . They f clrm large conglomerations in the host countries in which they reside and therefore can have a political impact if they were to participate in political activity. Furthermore, the Palestinians have become politically alert especially since the intifada and it would be unwise to ignore them in any solution to the Arab Israeli conflict that may be pursued. The refugee question, however, is important in economic and social respects as well. The Palestinian refugees embody a large stock of human capital which is underutilized primarily because of their political status in the countries of current residence and because of the ongoing conflict with Israel. Their mobility is restricted in most cases, their economic: decisions are not free and their opportunities are not based on merit. As a result their product is presumably
This discussion report is written in relation to the theme "Refugee children's opportunity to quality education" at Workshop 1: "Promoting the Well-being of the Palestine refugee child", at the UNRWA conference debating the future of humanitarian assistance for Palestine refugees, to be held in Geneva between 7-8 June 2004, where the overarching theme is 'Meeting the Humanitarian Needs of the Palestine Refugees in the Near East—Building Partnerships in Support of UNRWA.' The conference is hosted by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) on behalf of the Swiss government. Working Group 1 is chaired by Sweden and co-chaired by UNICEF. The present thematic report was written for—and with the assistance—of UNESCO, the official presenter for the sub-theme on quality education. It has benefited from the strong support of UNRWA, the Swedish Consulate/Jerusalem and from the dedicated workshop co-ordinator from the Olof Palme International Center in Stockholm. The author is responsible for the choice and the presentation of the facts contained in this documentation and for the opinions expressed therein, which are not necessarily those of UNESCO and do not commit the Organization. The paper sets out to examine the extent to which Palestine refugee children are receiving quality education in the schools managed by UNRWA in the five Fields in which it operates, namely the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. In so doing, it will identify the challenges that UNRWA has to face, provide an account of how such challenges are being addressed, and highlight what still needs to be done. First, however, it is essential to define what is being understood by 'quality education', as this will frame both the account of what was observed in the field, as well as the analysis and recommendations that follow. It is also important to provide a brief outline of the methodology used in the compilation of this study, in order to put the reader in a better position to evaluate the soundness of the data presented. ; peer-reviewed
Immediately following the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, the majority of Palestinians were expelled from Israel. They fled and settled as refugees in camps throughout the Middle East, including several in Lebanon. This event came to be known to them as al-nakba, or the catastrophe. Since then, many changes in leadership have plagued the Lebanese camps, each further institutionalizing the camps and services. These changes, combined with dwindling resources and discrimination by the Lebanese government, have created a hostile environment for the refugees. This institutionalization can be seen in several ways: via the establishment of aid organizations to control, monitor and provide services to the refugee population, the construction of hospitals, schools and homes, and the establishment of an educational system specifically devoted to the refugees. Despite this, the Palestinian refugees' status in Lebanon is simultaneously and counterintuitively impermanent. A notable lack of personal and community security has been created through discrimination in education and lawmaking against registered, unregistered and non-ID refugees, and inferior established services and education. These many issues, combined with the knowledge that they could be expelled from Lebanon at any moment, makes for a precarious situation. The very existence of such camps in resourcestarved nations, such as Lebanon, helps to exacerbate the alienation of refugees, as well as their dependence on foreign aid. It also increases tension between refugees and their host countries, which promotes an attitude of hostility that has often led to violence. The passing of power between the Lebanese government, the United Nations Refugee Works Association or UNRWA, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, or PLO, has destabilized the camps and caused confusion over responsibilities, which have resulted in many of the refugees' needs being neglected, as well as restriction of the upward mobility of refugees.
This paper, based on personal interviews, analysis of Egyptian administrative regulations, and observation of practice of international and regional agreements on refugees, considers the effects of displacement on the Palestinians' legal status and hence on the way they have conducted their livelihoods in Egypt. While Arab countries have offered to provide temporary protection to Palestinian refugees, as a result of political developments, including relations between the PLO and the host states, the rights afforded to Palestinians in Arab host states have varied greatly over time. Palestinians in Egypt, since 1978, do not receive assistance from the government of Egypt and do not have access to any of its public services. Palestinians also do not receive any assistance or protection from UN bodies in charge of refugee issues. Both regional and international pledges and agreements have not been respected. The ambiguous legal status of Palestinians has affected their livelihoods inmany ways. It has rendered their residence insecure and in many cases illegal. This has affected employment and education opportunities, as well as freedom of movement and association. The deprivation of rights and the unstable legal and economic conditions of Palestinians in Egypt has placed them in a state of "limbo." ; Cet article est fondé sur des interviews personnelles, sur une analyse des règlements administratives égyptiennes et sur une observation de la manière dont le droit international et les accords régionaux sur les réfugiés sont mis en pratique, et examine l'effet qu'a eu le déplacement sur le statut légal des Palestiniens et, par conséquent, sur la façon dont ils ont pu mener et gagner leur vie en Égypte. S'il est vrai que les pays arabes ont offert de fournir une protection temporaire aux réfugiés palestiniens, à cause des développements politiques, y compris les relations de l'OLP avec les pays d'accueil, les droits concédés aux Palestiniens dans les pays hôtes arabes ont varié grandement au cours des années. Depuis ...
Rouham,Yamout:American University of Beirut Rita,Giacaman:Community and Public Health ; With the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, about 700 000 Palestinians were dispossessed and dispersed, mostly to neighbouring countries. Roughly 100 000 Palestinians fled to Lebanon and now 400 000 are living there, most in refugee camps. Although tolerated by the Lebanese Government and population, with their basic needs supported by the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Palestinian refugees are subjected to regulations that hinder their opportunities to seek employment and ownership of property, thereby restricting their integration into society and compromising their wellbeing. In a study of the quality of life and wellbeing of Palestinians living in the occupied Palestinian territory, a team from Birzeit University, Ramallah, West Bank, investigated classic and war-related indicators of insecurity in the Gaza Strip 6 months after the Israeli war during the winter of 2008—09, using locally developed scales for the measurement of insecurity and individual distress. We assessed the relevance and validity of the two scales as measures of wellbeing for Palestinian refugees living in camps in Lebanon. Methods Researchers from Lebanon undertook six focus group discussions to investigate notions of relevance to the quality of life and wellbeing of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, and modified the questionnaire used in the Gaza Strip, without changing its psychometric properties and without modifying the questions in the scales to be studied. In this pilot study, households were selected from four Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon to represent the different areas—north, south, Beirut, and Dbayeh (only functional refugee camp hosting Christian Palestinians, whereas the refugees in the others are Sunni Muslim). Every other household was selected in Beddawi and one in every three households in Burj el-Barajneh and Ein el-Helweh, and all households were approached in Dbayeh. In the camps of Beddawi, Burj el-Barajneh, and Ein el-Helweh, the fieldworkers stopped gathering data when the sample size of 100 individuals was attained, whereas in Dbayeh this number could not be achieved. One adult respondent from every household was randomly selected according to Kish tables, with alternating of men and women—ie, the person answering the door was asked to list the male or female adult members of the household. Indicators of insecurity and individual distress were analysed after application of the cutoffs used in the Gaza Strip study. χ2 and logistic regression analyses were done to identify the association between the dependent variable—reports of high insecurity—with demographic, socioeconomic, and health factors, and with objective and subjective factors related to the political and legal conditions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. This study was approved by the Institute of Community and Public Health Ethical Review Committee, West Bank. Data gatherers obtained verbal informed consent from the household members selected before their participation in the study. Findings 356 (94%) of 378 adults who were approached by the fieldworkers responded—101 in Beddawi, 100 in Burj el-Barajneh, 100 in Ein el-Helweh, and 55 in Dbayeh. All the indictors of insecurity and distress were the same as in the study undertaken in the Gaza Strip, with Chronbach's α showing good internal consistency for the insecurity scale (0·84) and for the individual distress scale (0·86). 134 (38%) respondents reported moderate to high amounts of individual distress and 121 (34%) reported high intensity of insecurity. A first logistic model, including demographic and socioeconomic variables, showed that insecurity was associated with living at Burj el-Barajneh refugee camp (49 [49%] of 100 vs 72 [28%] of 256 living in the other three camps surveyed), displacement of the family from another refugee camp (28 [55%] of 51 vs 92 [30%] of 303 whose families had not been displaced), and the respondents thinking that the camp was overcrowded (86 [43%] of 202 vs 35 [24%] of 148 who did not have a problem with the camp crowding). The results of a second model of all the variables that were significant in the bivariate analysis and adjusted for age, sex, and employment, showed that the odds of individuals reporting high insecurity were significantly higher in Palestinians living in the refugee camp at Burj el-Barajneh than in those living at Dbayeh (49 [49%] of 100 vs eight [15%] of 55, respectively; odds ratio 5·95, 95% CI 2·05—17·29); in individuals whose families had been displaced from another refugee camp than in those who had not been displaced (28 [55%] of 51 vs 92 [30%] of 303, respectively; 5·62, 2·67—11·85); in Palestinians who felt deprived than in those who did not (50 [43%] of 115 vs 69 [29%] of 237, respectively; 2·18, 1·22—3·89); and in individuals who felt estranged from their homeland than in those who did not (95 [41%] of 234 vs 23 [21%] of 109, respectively; 2·41, 1·28—4·53) Interpretation The security and distress measures developed in the Gaza Strip showed good internal consistency when applied to Palestinians living in refugee camps in Lebanon. Furthermore, high intensities of insecurity and distress were noted in Palestinians living in refugee camps in Lebanon, raising questions about the legal, political, and social conditions imposed on these individuals as determinants of their insecurity, life quality, and wellbeing. The results encourage testing and validation of the security and distress scales in Palestinian refugees in other Arab countries, and in other migrants, refugees, and people living in zones affected by war and conflict. Funding Medical Aid for Palestinians. Contributors RY is the principal investigator and drafted the Abstract. SF did the data analysis. NMEAR and RG participated in the concept and design of the study and reviewed the data analysis and the drafts. DH reviewed the consecutive drafts of the Abstract. All authors have read and approved the final Abstract for publication. Conflicts of interest We declare that we have no conflicts of interest.
This paper will focus on Israel's system of government with specific attention to the idea of citizenship and to its Palestinian-Arab citizenry. It will begin with a historical and political background of Palestinian-Arab citizens, along with an examination of their paradoxical circumstances living as non-Jewish citizens in a "Jewish state." The multi-faceted discrimination faced by Palestinian-Arab citizens is laid out in an attempt to outline the apartheid state structure and system that constitutes the Israeli regime. The ethnicized nature and structure of Israeli citizenship will then be explained, and an analysis of the limited access of Palestinian-Arabs to Israeli citizenship through an illustration of the state's legal definition and political characterization as a "Jewish state" will follow. This paper will argue that Israel's (hardening) ethnic policies and practices, coupled with internal Palestinian political rifts and resistance, have resulted in a notable shrinking space of citizenship. Expanding on this analysis of Israeli citizenship and state structure, this paper will introduce the concept of statelessness and argue that self identification of the Israeli state as "Jewish" repudiates the citizenship of the Palestinian-Arab community, rendering this collective stateless. The paradoxical status of stateless citizenship will be explored to illustrate that this form of statelessness is not rooted in the absence of citizenship but rather in its presence, thus distinguishing between the statelessness of the Arab citizenry of Israel and the rest of the Palestinian nation. The paper will end with the application of Mark Salter's metaphor of the border, arguing that, as stateless-citizens, Palestinian-Arabs are in a permanent state of border exception, the effect of which makes their bodies into borders. ; Le présent article approfondit le système de gouvernement de l'État d'Israël en insistant particulièrement sur la notion de citoyenneté ainsi que sur ses citoyens arabo-palestiniens. L'auteure situe ...
In discussing final status issues, Palestinians and Israelis approach the question of the refugees and the right of return from radically different perspectives. The Palestinian narrative maintains that the Zionists forcibly expelled the Arab refugees in 1948. The Palestinians insist on the right of the refugees to return to their homes or, for those who choose not to do so, to accept compensation. And they demand that Israel unilaterally acknowledge its complete moral responsibility for the injustice of the refugees' expulsion. In contrast, the Israeli narrative rejects the refugees' right of return. Israel argues that it was the Arabs who caused the Palestinian refugee problem, by rejecting the creation of the State of Israel and declaring war upon it—a war which, like most wars, created refugee problems, including a Jewish one. Israel sees the return of Palestinian refugees as an existential threat, insofar as it would undermine the Jewish character and the viability of the state. The two sides' traditional solutions make no attempt to reconcile these opposing narratives. Yet such an attempt is vital if the issue is to be engaged. Hence the Joint Working Group on Israeli–Palestinian Relations developed two compromise solutions. They narrow the gap between the positions, but do not fully reconcile them. The compromise solution espoused by the Palestinian members of the Joint Working Group would insist that Israel acknowledge both its responsibility for creating the refugee problem and the individual moral right of Palestinian refugees to return. But it recognizes that, in view of the changed situation of the refugees over 50 years, and taking into account Israel's constraints, the return of only a limited number would be feasible. Israel would pay both individual and collective compensation. The Palestinians' case for an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders would be strengthened as a result of their willingness to absorb the refugees in the Palestinian state. Under the compromise solution proposed by the Israeli members of the Joint Working Group, Israel would acknowledge that it shares, with the other parties to the 1948 war, practical, but not moral, responsibility for the suffering of the refugees, and that rectification of their plight is a central goal of the peace process. Israel would accept repatriation of tens of thousands of refugees under its family reunification program. Israel would pay collective compensation to the Palestinian state, paralleled by Arab State compensation for Jewish refugees from 1948. In seeking to further reconcile these two compromise solutions, we note that they reflect a large measure of agreement between Palestinians and Israelis: that Israel had a historic role in the events that created the refugee issue; that a massive exercise of the right of return is unrealizable, and "return"/family reunification will be limited; that a larger number of Palestinians will "return" to the Palestinian state; that some resettlement will take place in host states, primarily Jordan; that Israel will pay some form of compensation; and that closing the file on the refugee issue means the dismantling of the entire international apparatus that has sustained the refugees—camps, UNRWA, etc. But there remain significant gaps between the two sides' compromise proposals as well. These concern the nature of Israeli acknowledgement of Palestinian suffering and the responsibility for it; the nature and number of "return"/family reunification; the nature and size of compensation, and its linkage to compensation for Jewish refugees from 1948; and the size of "return" to the Palestinian state. In order to negotiate an agreed solution that bridges these remaining gaps, Israelis and Palestinians will have to develop the mutual trust required to further accommodate each other's narratives. They will also, inevitably, have to factor the refugee/right of return issue into the broader fabric of tradeoffs and compromises that will characterize a comprehensive solution to the conflict. This will involve additional parties—primarily the refugee host countries—as well as related substantive issues, such as borders.
Palestiinalaispakolaiset ovat eläneet pakolaisleireillä jo seitsemän vuosikymmentä. Heidän pakolaisuutensa juontuu vuodesta 1948, jolloin Israelin valtion perustamisen yhteydessä enemmistö alueen palestiinalaisesta väestöstä joutui pakenemaan kotiseuduiltaan. Vuosikymmenten aikana pakolaisleirit ovat tulleet osaksi Lähi-idän maisemaa, ja niillä on kasvanut ja elänyt jo useita palestiinalaissukupolvia. Leirien pitkästä historiasta huolimatta niitä on kuitenkin pidetty väliaikaisina; määritelmällisesti leiri on aina olemassa vain rajatun ajanjakson ja palestiinalaisten kansallisissa narratiiveissa, jotka painottavat paluuta Palestiinaan, niitä ei ole ajateltu pysyvinä asuinpaikkoina. Käytännössä leirit kuitenkin muodostavat olosuhteet, joissa palestiinalaispakolaiset elävät arkeaan ja rakentavat tulevaisuuttaan. Pitkän historiansa, ainutlaatuisen institutionaalisen viitekehyksen sekä palestiinalaisten poliittiseen kamppailuun linkittyvien merkitysten takia leirit luovat omanlaisensa puitteet niillä asuvien pakolaisten elämälle. Tässä tutkimuksessa en silti tarkastele vain leirejä itsessään vaan lähestyn niiden kautta sitä, miten niillä asuvat palestiinalaiset neuvottelevat tulevaisuudentoiveitaan. Tämä etnografiaan pohjaava tutkimus on toteutettu Libanonissa, Jordaniassa ja Länsirannalla usealla eri pakolaisleirillä. Valitsin monikenttäisen lähestymistavan sillä lähtöoletuksella, että pakolaisuuden konteksti vaikuttaa merkittävästi siihen, miten tulevaisuuksia kuvitellaan. Palestiinalaispakolaisten asemamassa onkin merkittäviä eroja näillä kolmella alueella: Libanonissa he elävät ilman kansalaisuutta ja sen tuomia oikeuksia, Jordaniassa enemmistö pakolaisista on samanaikaisesti sekä maan kansalaisia että pakolaisia ja Länsirannalla palestiinalaispakolaiset joutuvat muiden länsirantalaisten tavoin kohtaamaan Israelin väkivaltaisen miehityspolitiikan. Näiden kontekstuaalisten erojen ja niiden vaikutusten ymmärtäminen on ollut tutkimuksen keskiössä. Tutkimuksen lähtöoletuksena on lisäksi ontologisen hermeneutiikan mukaisesti se, että tulevaisuuden tarkastelu ei ole mahdollista ilman, että ymmärtää menneen, nykyisyyden ja näiden välisen suhteen. Tästä syystä käyn läpi eri kentillä asuvien palestiinalaisten historiaa ja etenen leirien nykyolosuhteiden tarkasteluun. Nämä ajallisuudet luovat pohjan pakolaisten tulevaisuudentoiveiden ymmärtämiselle. Palestiinalaispakolaisten historia on täynnä väkivaltaa, pakenemista ja jatkuvaa epävarmuutta, ja pakolaisleirit ovat tilana tiivistäneet pakolaisuuteen liittyvät vaikeudet niin historiallisesti kuin nykyäänkin. Materiaaliset olosuhteet, ahtaus, suhde ympäröivään paikkaan ja yhteisöön sekä leirin identiteetilliset ja poliittiset konnotaatiot ovat kaikki vaikuttaneet siihen, miten tähän tutkimukseen osallistuneet palestiinalaispakolaiset kokivat elinolosuhteensa. Leirien ei koettu pystyvän tarjoamaan toivottua elintasoa, mutta samanaikaisesti ne muodostivat merkityksellisen yhteisön, johon liitettiin useita positiivisia ominaisuuksia. Leirit muodostivat myös osan pakolaisten poliittista identiteettiä: ne muistuttivat niillä asuvien pakolaisuudesta ja muodostivat linkin Palestiinaan ja siten ylläpitivät vaatimusta paluuoikeudesta. Kuitenkin, näistä positiivisista puolista huolimatta, elettyinä tiloina leirit eivät pystyneet luomaan toivottuja puitteita arjelle. Tässä tutkimuksessa painottuu myös se, että Libanonissa, Jordaniassa ja Länsirannalla tarjolla olleet mahdollisuudet eivät useinkaan riittäneet toivotun tulevaisuuden saavuttamiseen. Maastamuutto olikin monelle tapa kuvitella parempaa tulevaisuutta niin itselle kuin perheelle, erityisesti Libanonissa ja Länsirannalla. Parempaa tulevaisuutta neuvoteltiin useita eri reittejä, ja tässä tutkimuksessa keskityn erityisesti koulutuksen, työn ja naimisiinmenon tarjoamiin mahdollisuuksiin. Vaikka myös kansalliset tulevaisuudet, Palestiina ja paluuoikeuden toteutuminen nousivat esiin näissä neuvotteluissa, ilmenivät ne kuitenkin abstraktimmalla tasolla ja eri aikajanalla, kuin tulevaisuudet, joilla haettiin parempia mahdollisuuksia saavuttaa henkilökohtaiset elämäntavoitteet ja helpotusta arjessa kohdattuihin vaikeuksiin. Palestiinalaispakolaisten tulevaisuuskäsitysten erityisyys on juuri henkilökohtaisen ja kansallisen tulevaisuuden välille muodostuvassa ristivedossa. Kansallisen narratiivin mukaan pakolaisten (erityisesti leireillä asuvien) oletetaan sisukkaasti odottavan paluuta, kestävän pakolaisuuden haasteet ja taistelevan kansallisten tavoitteiden puolesta. Samanaikaisesti pakolaiset kuitenkin pyrkivät parantamaan arkeaan, elinolosuhteitaan ja mahdollisuuksiaan tarjolla olevin keinoin. Etnografiassani painottui erityisesti tämä henkilökohtainen puoli ja se, että kansallisten tavoitteiden saavuttamisen ei koettu pystyvän tarjoamaan parannusta pakolaisuuden historian muovaamiin nykyolosuhteisiin riittävän nopealla aikataululla. Väitänkin, että henkilökohtaisten tulevaisuuksien ensisijaisuus heijastaa leireillä asuvien palestiinalaisten kohtaamia vaikeuksia: heidän asemansa ja tulevaisuutensa ei ole tarpeeksi turvattu, jotta he voisivat odottaa ja keskittyä kansallisten tavoitteiden ajamiseen. Sen sijaan palestiinalaispakolaiset ovat pakotettuja tarttumaan tällä hetkellä tarjolla oleviin vaihtoehtoihin ja pyrkimään niihin suuntiin, joissa mahdollisuudet parempaan elämään ovat tarjolla. ; Palestinian refugee camps have been housing Palestinians for seven decades. They were formed after 1948, when in the process of establishing Israel as a Jewish state the majority of Palestinians living in Mandatory Palestine were dispossessed. Over these decades, the camps have become a durable part of the Middle Eastern landscape, and several generations of refugees have already been born, and are living, in them. Despite the fact that Palestinian camps have also been framed as temporary, not only by definition but also in the national narratives stressing the right to return to Palestine, in practice the camps have become sites where lives are lived and futures built. Due to their long history, unique institutional framework, and strong connotation as centers of Palestinian political struggle, Palestinian refugee camps have their own specificities that affect how they frame the life of their dwellers. Yet, this dissertation is not an ethnography of the camps per se; the aim is rather to look through them in order to explore the manifold futures that are negotiated by the Palestinian refugees dwelling in them, and especially by those just reaching adulthood. This ethnographic study has been conducted in several refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and the West Bank. A multi-sited approach was adopted with the presumption that the context of refugeeness affects the ways in which futures are imagined. Palestinian refugees have been positioned differently in these places: as stateless and excluded in Lebanon, as refugee-citizens in Jordan, and as being among their own people yet enduring the difficulties of the oppressive Israeli occupation in the West Bank. Understanding these contextual specificities in the different host sovereigns has hence been central to the aims of this work. In this dissertation I argue, in line with ontological hermeneutics, that it is not possible to explore the future without first addressing the differing pasts and present conditions of the refugees. Therefore, to understand these differing experiences of Palestinian refugees living under the three host sovereigns, I start by looking at the histories that form the present realities through which Palestinians look to, have hopes for, and plan for their futures. The histories of Palestinian refugeeness have witnessed violence, multiple displacements, and enduring uncertainty. In all the fields that were included in this research it was the camp that embodied the difficulties of being a refugee. The material living conditions, crowdedness, camp community, and relations with the surrounding area and society, as well as the identificational and political connotations, have all affected how the camps have been experienced as places of dwelling by my interlocutors. In many ways they were considered inadequate in terms of providing the hoped-for standards of living, yet simultaneously they formed a significant community that was viewed from a positive perspective, though more so in the West Bank and Jordan than in Lebanon. Nevertheless, while the camps functioned as a marker of Palestinian refugeeness, and were even equated with Palestine and the right of return, as everyday spatialities they left much to be desired. Similarly, this research shows that the possibilities available to the refugees under the host sovereigns were not usually enough for my interlocutors to achieve their aspirations. Hence many – especially in Lebanon and the West Bank, though for different reasons – have come to consider that emigration could fulfil their hopes and provide better conditions for them and their families. Better futures were negotiated via different routes – education, employment, and marriage being the ones explored here. While both return and the national future of Palestine also emerged in these negotiations, they were situated in a different, more abstract timeframe, not one that could provide better possibilities or enhancements in the deprived conditions faced in everyday life. The specificity of Palestinian refugees' negotiations on the future nevertheless emerges from this discrepancy between the national and the personal. On the level of national discourse, Palestinian refugees (especially those living in camps) are people steadfastly waiting for the return, enduring life in the camp and fighting for the national cause. However, on the level of the everyday, they are – as is anyone – aiming to improve their situation with the means available and, as became evident in my ethnography, in the present situation and in light of past experiences those means direct their attention somewhere other than to the political objectives they hold as Palestinian refugees. This, I claim, reflects the difficulties that Palestinian refugees living in the camps face: they are not in a secure enough position to have the luxury of "waiting out" or to concentrate on the political in its national manifestation. Rather, they are forced to negotiate the options at hand, to reach out in those directions where possibilities are available.
The current study sought to explore how Palestinian refugee women (PRW) perceive their identity and how it can be employed as a tool of reconciliation. Specifically, the research explored the political identity of Palestinian refugee women to understand how it influences their reconciliation process. Palestinians are a group of the Arab population who previously occupied the territory now owned by the Israeli State and were forced to flee and live as refugees after the 1948 conflict. The UNRWA was formed in 1949 to assist individuals displaced from the 1948 conflict who were mostly Palestinians. The research objective was explored by analyzing Palestinians cultural and psychosocial perspectives. Due to the complex nature of the study, a mixed research method was used in which both qualitative and quantitative data were gathered. The data was collected over three years, with the researcher engaging with Palestinian non- refugee women living in Hussan village as well as Palestinian refugee women from Dhiesheh camp. In the first part of the study, existing literature on the topic is extensively analyzed to define key terminologies such as the definition of Palestinian refugees as well as reconciliation to place into context the cultural and traditional viewpoints. The UNRWA defines Palestinian refugees as persons or descendants of people who lived in Palestine between June 1st 1946 to 15th May 1948 and who lost their means of livelihoods and homes due to the 1948 conflict and hence, eligible for UNRWA services.In the second part of the study, the findings from interviews conducted as well as quantitative data gathered from questionnaires are presented. Quantitative data in this study were gathered from 200 participants, involving 100 Palestinian women who were refugees and lived in Dhiesheh refugee camp and another group of 100 Palestinian women who lived in Hussan village. Women recruited in the two groups all resided in the Bethlehem-West Bank-Palestine region.
Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA and their housing conditions are officially characterized by a "temporary status", a situation which has lasted the past sixty years. This article explores this time-paradox by focusing on the host governments' and UNRWA's policies affecting the refugees' housing conditions. After having reviewed available literature, this contribution analyses the current housing situation. Drawing on data from a recent survey, the authors provide insights on areas where intervention is needed. In all UNRWA's fields of operation, overcrowding, lack of public spaces, humidity and structural defects are the main sources of housing discomfort that camp refugees endure. Host countries' restrictions as well as the incapacity or unwillingness of larger urban municipalities to incorporate refugee camps in their master plans are among the main obstacles to the refugees' housing development. Rehabilitation and self-help re-housing programs may offer substantial incentives for housing improvement. The success of such programs depends, among several factors, on the host governments' good will to provide UNRWA with authorizations, financial support, and land, as well as on the capacity of involving the refugee communities in projects' planning and implementation.
The authors argue for accommodating the interests of the Israeli-Arabs/Palestinians. Israel should strive to safeguard equal rights and liberties for all citizens notwithstanding religion, race, ethnicity, colour, gender, class or sexual orientation, and insisting that citizens have also duties to fulfil. Israel needs to strive for equality in housing, in municipal budgets, in allocation of resources; fight against racism, bigotry and discrimination, and introduce changes to accommodate interests of Israeli-Arabs/Palestinians so that citizens would " feel at home " in their own country. It is argued that delegates of the Arab/Palestinian minority should be represented, in accordance with their size in society, in the parliament and in the government. Symbols of the state should be accommodated to give expression to all citizens of Israel. Since Israel is defined as a Jewish and democratic state, there is a responsibility to embrace all Israeli citizens. In doing so, Israel does not negate the essence of its being Jewish. Furthermore, studies of all religions that exist in Israel should be made available.
For over last 70 years, the concept of "return" attained primary focus for the national narrative of Palestinian struggle against devastating conditions, categorized as (i) eviction from ancestral homeland, (ii) diffusion in all aspects and (iii) reconstitution of national unity. However, the very idea create fears among Israelis regarding their authority of whole Zionist enterprise, as well as demographic stability of Arab-Jewish ventures, with regards to the return of large number of Palestinians to their own places or any other part in Palestine. Discrimination in opposition to Palestinians is no longer perpetrated fully by Israeli state, but common to its society, as well. Our article is an answer to the complicated question: Can refugees along with other displaced victims ever claim their right in entering Israel and Palestine, since this State includes Gaza and West Bank territories? Various articles have made an attempt to clarify the matter through some internal laws and have also interpreted the rights mentioned in 'International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights', particularly while clarifying the idea evolved from the typical term: 'his own country'. The article focuses on the viable first point, specifically on the claim as a right of the Diasporas return to the formerly called 'Palestine'. Various resources are utilised for the purpose of the research. This includes books, scholarly researched articles and newspapers etc. The study is analytical in nature and based on qualitative research method. Most of the literature used for the article is Secondary. The conclusion drawn in precise manner is that the intentions are blended in repeated violations of human rights, along with ethnic and religious refining and various innumerable deficiencies, and try to become regularly involved in sensitive issues. This turned out to be disheartening for the people living there as no efforts are made for a truthful resolution.
