Since the end of the last century Mexico has experienced a profound proces of political and electoral change which was reflected in its transition from a dominant party authoritarian regime to a competitive multiparty system. This paper has two parts and a concluding section. The first part focuses on major changes in a number of relevant dimensions of the Mexican party system, including electoral competitiveness, party fractionalisation, electoral volatility, nationalisation, and the aggregate distribution of partisan loyalties among the electorate (macropartisanship) over the last three decades. The analysis is based on aggregate electoral data at the national and the district level, as well as on data from surveys of public opinion. The paper shows important changes in the structure and behaviour of the Mexican electorate, such as increasing partisan de-alignment as well as growing competitiveness, fractionalisation, and nationalisation of the party system. The second part is a brief review of the factors driving the process of political and electoral change in Mexico.
Since the end of the last century Mexico has experienced a profound proces of political and electoral change which was reflected in its transition from a dominant party authoritarian regime to a competitive multiparty system. This paper has two parts and a concluding section. The first part focuses on major changes in a number of relevant dimensions of the Mexican party system, including electoral competitiveness, party fractionalisation, electoral volatility, nationalisation, and the aggregate distribution of partisan loyalties among the electorate (macropartisanship) over the last three decades. The analysis is based on aggregate electoral data at the national and the district level, as well as on data from surveys of public opinion. The paper shows important changes in the structure and behaviour of the Mexican electorate, such as increasing partisan de-alignment as well as growing competitiveness, fractionalisation, and nationalisation of the party system. The second part is a brief review of the factors driving the process of political and electoral change in Mexico.
The growing dependence of countries and societies on the use of space technologies results in the increasing activity in outer space of new actors, both state and non-state. It produces a number of adverse outcomes for the space environment, making it a less and less safe place (e.g. space debris). Emerging threats may affect national and international security on earth. As a result, an urgent need for a collective approach to the management of the use of outer space is emerging. The international legal regime for outer space that has been developing since the beginning of the space age is no longer sufficient, because it does not take into account many rapid changes. One of the attempts to overcome this problem is the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities drafted by the European Union in 2008. This paper discusses the reasons why, despite long-lasting efforts and intensifying problems, the Code has so far failed to win the approval of the powers which is requisite to constitute an important part of the international outer space regime. ; The growing dependence of countries and societies on the use of space technologies results in the increasing activity in outer space of new actors, both state and non-state. It produces a number of adverse outcomes for the space environment, making it a less and less safe place (e.g. space debris). Emerging threats may affect national and international security on earth. As a result, an urgent need for a collective approach to the management of the use of outer space is emerging. The international legal regime for outer space that has been developing since the beginning of the space age is no longer sufficient, because it does not take into account many rapid changes. One of the attempts to overcome this problem is the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities drafted by the European Union in 2008. This paper discusses the reasons why, despite long-lasting efforts and intensifying problems, the Code has so far failed to win the approval of the powers which is requisite to constitute an important part of the international outer space regime.
Rosnące uzależnienie państw i społeczeństw od wykorzystania technologii kosmicznych skutkuje nasilającą się aktywnością w przestrzeni kosmicznej prowadzoną też przez nowe podmioty, zarówno państwowe, jak i niepaństwowe. Generuje to wiele negatywnych skutków czyniących środowisko kosmiczne coraz mniej bezpiecznym miejscem (np. gruz kosmiczny). Pojawiające się zagrożenia mogą mieć wpływ na bezpieczeństwo narodowe i międzynarodowe na ziemi. W efekcie narasta pilna potrzeba kolektywnego podejścia do zarządzania korzystaniem z przestrzeni kosmicznej. Rozwijający się od początku ery kosmicznej międzynarodowy reżim prawny dotyczący tego środowiska nie jest już wystarczający, gdyż nie uwzględnia w wystarczającym stopniu szybko zachodzących zmian. Jedną z prób przezwyciężenia tego problemu jest przygotowany przez Unię Europejską w 2008 r. projekt międzynarodowego Kodeksu Postępowania dotyczący Działań w Przestrzeni Kosmicznej. Artykuł wskazuje ważniejsze przyczyny, dla których, mimo wieloletnich wysiłków i narastających problemów, nadal nie znalazł on akceptacji mocarstw niezbędnej, by stać się ważnym elementem międzynarodowego reżimu kosmicznego. ; The growing dependence of countries and societies on the use of space technologies results in the increasing activity in outer space of new actors, both state and non-state. It produces a number of adverse outcomes for the space environment, making it a less and less safe place (e.g. space debris). Emerging threats may affect national and international security on earth. As a result, an urgent need for a collective approach to the management of the use of outer space is emerging. The international legal regime for outer space that has been developing since the beginning of the space age is no longer sufficient, because it does not take into account many rapid changes. One of the attempts to overcome this problem is the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities drafted by the European Union in 2008. This paper discusses the reasons why, despite long-lasting efforts and intensifying problems, the Code has so far failed to win the approval of the powers which is requisite to constitute an important part of the international outer space regime.
Deterioration of Hungarian democracy has weakened the rule of law since 2010. The changes that favour the executive power at the expense of the legislative one are implemented by National Assembly. The paper analyses the formal and practical outcome of the functioning of the Hungarian parliament (2010–2022), which meets the criteria of novelty by referring to only one of the parts of the political system, while many other researchers focus on global regime changes. The research aims to analyze how the Hungarian parliament introduces illiberal legalism. The main question refers to the role and position of the National Assembly in the process of deterioration of Hungarian democracy. The research methods are the legal analysis, neo-institutional approach and comparative method.
Artykuł przedstawia zmiany systemowe wprowadzone w Polsce po 1989 r., które umożliwiły przejście z gospodarki centralnie sterowanej do wolnorynkowej. Podjęcie głębokich i szerokim reform o charakterze prawnym, gospodarczym i społecznym pozwoliło na ukształtowanie demokratycznego ustroju po wielu latach sprawowania władzy komunistycznej. Transformacja systemowa była możliwa dzięki znaczącym przemianom podstaw prawnych, począwszy od zmian w ustawie zasadniczej, określającej istotę prawa własności i obowiązek jego poszanowania, poprzez uchwalenie innych aktów prawnych koniecznych do zmiany stosunków własnościowych (takich jak ustawy o komercjalizacji i prywatyzacji przedsiębiorstw państwowych, prawa o działalności gospodarczej czy ustawy o gospodarowaniu nieruchomościami rolnymi). Równoległe reformy systemu bankowego oraz polityki pieniężno-kredytowej umożliwiły napływ kapitału zagranicznego i pozwoliły na rozwój prywatnej przedsiębiorczości. W wyniku przemian ustrojowych, jakie zaszły w ostatnich 25 latach, Polska jako demokratyczne państwo prawa jest członkiem Unii Europejskiej, a polska gospodarka rynkowa staje się coraz bardziej konkurencyjna. Niestety, mimo głębokich przekształceń w sferze własnościowej, Polska przez ostatnie ćwierćwiecze nie rozwiązała kwestii zwrotu prawowitym właścicielom własności przejętej bezprawnie przez władze komunistyczne. ; This paper presents structural changes that took place in Poland after 1989, and which enabled its transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. The deep and thorough legal, economic and social reforms undertaken in that period made it possible, after years of communist rule, to shape a new, democratic system. The systemic transformation was possibleowing to some basic amendments to the Constitution, including the articles defining the essence of ownership and the duty to respect it, as well as the adoption of other legal acts necessary to re-define ownership relationships (such as the law on commercialisation and privatisation of state-owned enterprises, or the law on the management of agricultural property). The concurrent reforms of the banking system and the monetary and credit policy enabled inflow of foreign capital and development of private entrepreneurship. As a result of the transformations of the past 25 years, Poland is now a democratic state and a member of the European Union, while Polish economy is getting increasingly competitive. Sadly enough, despite these substantial structural transformations in the ownership sphere, in the last quarter of the century Poland has continued to be unable to resolve the problem of returning to the lawful owners the property taken by the communist regime.
The end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011 in Arab countries marked its place in history as the Arab Spring or the Arab Awakening, since during this period mass social, political and economic protests could be observed in almost all the countries in the region. Due to the nature, dynamics and the issues underlying the Arab-Israeli conflict, each and every material change in Arab countries is and has to be important for Israel and the whole Middle East. Considering the phenomenon being analyzed from the perspective of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israel's external and internal situation, in my opinion it is particularly important to attempt to answer the following question: Has the Arab Spring changed Israel's strategic situation, and if so, to what extent? Looking at the ensuing situation from the perspective of Israel and also the Arab-Israeli conflict, at the very beginning we can have doubts or an opinion even less optimistic than in Europe about the nature of these changes. The Arab Spring may be regarded by Israel and also by the analysts related with the country as the beginning of the "era of uncertainty". This is mainly connected with the changes regarding political regimes and the possibility of coming to or sharing power with Islamic movements and parties hostile towards Israel. The collapse of political regimes was accompanied by failures of the ruling political parties connected with these regimes.The gap was filled by dozens of new parties, with religious and Islamic parties being particularly strong. Time will show its long-term consequences. Israel cannot afford unjustified optimism and false opinions, and that is why it has to be prepared for negative scenarios since both the country's elites and society are aware of that there may be no second chances in event of failure. ; The end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011 in Arab countries marked its place in history as the Arab Spring or the Arab Awakening, since during this period mass social, political and economic protests could be observed in almost all the countries in the region. Due to the nature, dynamics and the issues underlying the Arab-Israeli conflict, each and every material change in Arab countries is and has to be important for Israel and the whole Middle East. Considering the phenomenon being analyzed from the perspective of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israel's external and internal situation, in my opinion it is particularly important to attempt to answer the following question: Has the Arab Spring changed Israel's strategic situation, and if so, to what extent? Looking at the ensuing situation from the perspective of Israel and also the Arab-Israeli conflict, at the very beginning we can have doubts or an opinion even less optimistic than in Europe about the nature of these changes. The Arab Spring may be regarded by Israel and also by the analysts related with the country as the beginning of the "era of uncertainty". This is mainly connected with the changes regarding political regimes and the possibility of coming to or sharing power with Islamic movements and parties hostile towards Israel. The collapse of political regimes was accompanied by failures of the ruling political parties connected with these regimes.The gap was filled by dozens of new parties, with religious and Islamic parties being particularly strong. Time will show its long-term consequences. Israel cannot afford unjustified optimism and false opinions, and that is why it has to be prepared for negative scenarios since both the country's elites and society are aware of that there may be no second chances in event of failure.
Artykuł jest próbą pokazania ewolucji i stanu społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w Polsce w ćwierć wieku po transformacji ustrojowej na podstawie najważniejszych badań zastanych oraz badań i obserwacji własnych. Nawiązuje też do obecnej w polskim dyskursie od połowy XIX w. do dziś tezy o trudnościach w budowie polskiego społeczeństwa obywatelskiego. Z przeprowadzonej analizy wynika, że Polacy rzeczywiście rzadziej stowarzyszają się nie tylko w porównaniu z obywatelami Europy Zachodniej, ale nawet w porównaniu z obywatelami innych krajów postkomunistycznych. Polską specyfiką jest wreszcie z jednej strony wielość rozmaitych stowarzyszeń, w tym także reprezentujących tzw. nowe ruchy społeczne, z drugiej zaś – ich kadrowy charakter. Przynależność do stowarzyszeń nie jest w Polsce masowa, nie jest elementem kultury politycznej społeczeństwa, lecz ma charakter elitarny. Media społecznościowe mogą ułatwić komunikowanie się i współdziałanie w sprawach publicznych, ale na razie rolę tę pełnią w niewielkim stopniu. ; This paper is an attempt to present the evolution and the condition of the civil society in Poland 25 years after the transformation of the political regime. The analysis is based on the existing results of earlier research and on the author's own studies and observations. It also refers to the discourse that has been going on in Poland since the middle of the nineteenth century on the difficulties in building a Polish civil society. As the analysis shows, Poles do indeed, affiliate much less frequently than citizens in West European states, or, even in comparison with citizens of other post-communist states. Another Polish specificity is that although there is a variety of organisations and associations, also representing followers of new social movements, most of them are elite in character. Membership in organisations does not have a mass character in Poland, nor is an element of political culture. Social networks may, eventually, facilitate communication and collaboration in social matters. Their role today, however, is negligible.
In February 2011, inspired by the events in Tunisia and Egypt, Libyans started the revolt, which resulted in the overthrow of the regime of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. The revolt lasted eight months and was supported by the international military intervention, which was crucial to the success of the insurgents. However, the international support for the uprising would not have been possible without the diplomatic efforts of the quickly formed Libyan Transitional National Council, which represented the opposition forces against Col. Qaddafi. The consolidation of both the Libyan opposition and international military operation in Libya were the key factors of the socalled Libyan Arab Spring. The first chapter of the article presents the significant developments of the Libyan revolt from the beginning of the protests until the death of Col. Qaddafi and formation of a first government. The uprising and military intervention led to the change of the political system of the state. It has caused numerous damages and brought many challenges threats to the new Libyan authorities, not only economic, but also social, political and military. The second part of the article addresses these challenges and threats, as they have been determining the shape and structure of the new Libya. This section presents the relevant factors such as the tribal ties, the country's partition into the center and periphery, the role of religion in social and political life, which will have a huge impact on the Libyan society, the future structure of the state, the political scene of the country and relations with regional and global actors. The last part of the article analyses the Libyan uprising and the impact of international military intervention on the situation in Libya. It is an attempt to draw scenarios of the future of Libya and its impact on the security situation in the Mediterranean region, in Africa and in the Arab world. It shows both the possible advantages of the regime change in Libya and the threats for the stabilization of the country and neighbouring regions.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: The purpose of this article is to analyse the relationship between ideas of philosophical anthropology and the problem of intellectual legitimacy of democracy. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODS: In the article I am trying to answer the question, what is the relationship between views on human nature and attitude to democracy. I analyse this problem by interpreting classic works of political thought. THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: The starting point is the statement: aversion to democracy arose largely from misanthropy. Democracy was not considered as intellectually legitimate regime, because it was not believed in the rationality of an ordinary person and his ability to participate responsibly in public life. This situation changes during the Enlightenment, when anthropological pessimism was undermined, and the theories underlying the idea of the intellectual legitimacy of democracy were formulated. The later course of events largely questioned these theories, but nevertheless democracy in the West is considered as the only legitimate form of government. RESEARCH RESULTS: This leads me to a view on the paradoxical nature of modern democracy. On the one hand, there is a consensus regarding the intellectual legitimacy of democracy. On the other hand, in theory and practice, the ability of ordinary people to participate reasonably in public life is commonly questioned. CONCLUSIONS, INNOVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The results of the analysis should prompt the political scientist to change the way of understanding the nature of modern democracy. This system is called democracy, but it seems to have less and less to do with the hopes of those authors who formulated its intellectual assumptions. ; CEL NAUKOWY: Celem tego artykułu jest analiza związku między wy‑ obrażeniami z zakresu antropologii filozoficznej a problemem intelektualnej prawomocności demokracji. PROBLEM I METODY BADAWCZE: W artykule próbuję odpowiedzieć na pytanie, jaki jest związek między poglądami na temat natury ludzkiej a sto‑ sunkiem do demokracji. Analizuję ten problem interpretując klasyczne dzieła z zakresu myśli politycznej. PROCES WYWODU: Punktem wyjścia jest konstatacja: niechęć wobec demo‑ kracji wyrastała w dużej mierze z mizantropii. Demokracja nie była uznawana za ustrój godny poparcia, ponieważ nie wierzono w racjonalność zwykłego czło‑ wieka i jego zdolność do odpowiedzialnego uczestnictwa w życiu publicznym. Ta sytuacja zmienia się w epoce Oświecenia, kiedy to podważono pesymizm antropologiczny i sformułowane zostały teorie stanowiące podstawę dla idei intelektualnej prawomocności demokracji. Późniejszy bieg wypadków w du‑ żym stopniu te teorie zakwestionował, ale mimo to demokracja na Zachodzie uznawana jest za jedyną prawomocną formę rządu. WYNIKI ANALIZY NAUKOWEJ: Analiza prowadzi do sformułowania poglądu o paradoksalnym charakterze współczesnej demokracji. Z jednej stro‑ ny, istnieje konsensus co do intelektualnej prawomocności demokracji, z dru‑ giej – w teorii i praktyce powszechnie kwestionowana jest zdolność zwykłego człowieka do rozumnego uczestnictwa w życiu publicznym. WNIOSKI, INNOWACJE, REKOMENDACJE: Wyniki analizy powinny skłonić politologa do zmiany sposobu rozumienia charakteru współczesnej demo‑ kracji. Ustrój ten nosi nazwę demokracja, ale wydaje się mieć coraz mniej wspól‑ nego z nadziejami tych autorów, którzy sformułowali jej intelektualne założenia.
Analyzing the relationship between the legislative and executive power helps to understand that the modern democratic political regimes are usually described on the basis of three typical models: parliamentary, presidential and semipresidential. They are more or less differentiated internally, which naturally makes it difficult to conduct research. This is the effect of competition on the political institutions, which takes place between the political actors, seeking to create the most rational, from their perspective, institutional structure. As the result, these types of activeness are beginning to blur the boundaries between classical models of political regimes, and creates institutional arrangements eclectic, built on the basis of specific solutions for different models of democratic political regimes. Additionally we shouldn't remain indifferent to the changes in the sphere of noninstitutional determinants of the functioning of the various political regimes. The procedure of identifying general trends in the processes of governance in the modern world becomes possible to notify similarities in the functioning of the executive in the various models of democratic political regimes. The trend in strengthening the executive bodies, especially the bodies with single actors is against the traditional models of democratic political regimes. This also determines the subsequent changes, and one of the most important is the growing centralization of decision-making processes, coordinated and controlled by the chief executive.
This paper debates abusive constitutionalism and constitutionalism abused as ways to introduce a fundamental change of political system. Abusive constitutionalism consists in a change of a democratic regime in a less democratic one with the help of democratic means, i.e. democratically legitimized change of the existing constitution, or proclamation of a new constitution, as it recently happened in Hungary. An example of abused constitutionalism presents contemporary Poland. There the fundamental change of democratic regime happens notwithstanding the still binding constitution, as in an oblivion of it, by the means of ordinary laws proclaimed in a rush process by the ruling parliamentary majority. The whole process is steered in an informal way by the chairman of the ruling party. The important context of abusive constitutionalism, and of constitutionalism abused, as I am going to argue, presentst he crisis of liberal constitutionalism, the loss of its motivational force as a moral sign-post in the public sphere. Instead, one observes a retreat to some primordial and emotionally laden conceptualizations of a politically organized community (a Gemeinschaft) where emotions, primary bonds, foundational myths are more important than law and liberal constitution. Such a retreat results from the past but also presents a reaction to the growing complexity of the contemporary world, and involved risks.
This paper debates abusive constitutionalism and constitutionalism abused as ways to introduce a fundamental change of political system. Abusive constitutionalism consists in a change of a democratic regime in a less democratic one with the help of democratic means, i.e. democratically legitimized change of the existing constitution, or proclamation of a new constitution, as it recently happened in Hungary. An example of abused constitutionalism presents contemporary Poland. There the fundamental change of democratic regime happens notwithstanding the still binding constitution, as in an oblivion of it, by the means of ordinary laws proclaimed in a rush process by the ruling parliamentary majority. The whole process is steered in an informal way by the chairman of the ruling party. The important context of abusive constitutionalism, and of constitutionalism abused, as I am going to argue, presentst he crisis of liberal constitutionalism, the loss of its motivational force as a moral sign-post in the public sphere. Instead, one observes a retreat to some primordial and emotionally laden conceptualizations of a politically organized community (a Gemeinschaft) where emotions, primary bonds, foundational myths are more important than law and liberal constitution. Such a retreat results from the past but also presents a reaction to the growing complexity of the contemporary world, and involved risks.
The collapse of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia in 1989 required settlement with the past on many levels. This applies especially to settlements with communism. In the first years after change of the regime, many legal solutions were adopted to align accounts with the past, but in parallel the communist party was allowed to function. Only very few communist functionaries responsible for crimes were sentenced, however, many symbolic changes were carried out. It took more time to create the institutional framework - institutions dealing with the period 1948-1989 in Czech history. In recent years, the importance of this topic in Czech public life has increased again. The purpose of this article is to analyze legal, formal and institutional solutions and their functioning in the practice of the Czech Republic. The legal acts, institutions as well as the effects of their functioning and actions in the last 30 years have been examined.
The article aims to analyze changes in public (administrative) law, including the introduction of a new act of law (the so-called "Law 2.0") on higher education and science in 2018 in Poland. Together with the accompanying introductory law and executive acts, Law 2.0 established not only a new legal regime, but also forced institutional changes, that will be analysed in the second part of this article. In addition to the analysis, the article is also presents author's conclusions de lege lata and de lege ferenda.