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A series of critical developments in Turkish politics from 2007 has signalled a historic shift in the use of power in the country, long controlled by the staunch and virtually autonomous bureaucracy, both military and civilian, in the face of fragile civilian politics. A unique leverage used by civilian politics in bringing about the change has been the discourse of Europeanization. Originally a project that was part and parcel of the identity politics of the bureaucracy from the nineteenth century, the discourse seems to have been appropriated by forces defiant of the bureaucratic rule to reconfigure access to power. This shift in power may amount to nothing less than a regime change, completed and sealed in the last general election in June 2011, although it remains to be seen whether the new regime, as yet amorphous, will deliver the improved democracy it promises.

This paper analyzes to what extent changes in monetary policy regimes influence the business cycle in a small open economy and investigates the impact of policy breaks on the estimation procedure. We estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model on Swedish data, explicitly taking into account the monetary regime change in 1993, from exchange rate targeting to inflation targeting. The results suggest that monetary policy reacted strongly to exchange rate movements in the former, and mostly to inflation in the latter. The external sector plays an important role in the economy, and the international transmission mechanism is significantly affected by the choice of exchange rate regime. A counterfactual experiment that applies the inflation targeting policy rule on the disturbances from the exchange rate targeting period suggests that such a policy would have led to higher output and employment, but also to a depreciated currency, higher inflation, and a more volatile economy. We also present evidence that ignoring the break in the estimation leads to spurious results for both the parameters associated with monetary policy as well as those that are policy-independent.

This paper analyzes to what extent changes in monetary policy regimes influence the business cycle in a small open economy and investigates the impact of policy breaks on the estimation procedure. We estimate a DSGE model on Swedish data, explicitly taking into account the monetary regime change in 1993, from exchange rate targeting to inflation targeting. The results suggest that monetary policy reacted strongly to exchange rate movements in the former, and mostly to inflation in the latter. The external sector plays an important role in the economy and the international transmission mechanism is significantly affected by the choice of exchange rate regime. A counterfactual experiment that applies the inflation targeting policy rule on the disturbances from the exchange rate targeting period suggests that such a policy would have led to higher output and employment, but also to a depreciated currency, higher inflation and a more volatile economy. We also show evidence that ignoring the break in the estimation leads to spurious results for both the parameters associated with monetary policy as well as those that are policy-independent.

We develop a dynamic game to provide with a theory of Arab spring-type events. We consider two interacting groups, the elite vs the citizens, two political regimes, dictatorship vs a freer regime, the possibility to switch from the first to the second regime as a consequence of a revolution, and finally the opportunity, for the elite, to affect the citizens' decision through concession and/or repression strategies. In this framework, we provide a full characterization of the equilibrium of the political regime switching game. First, we emphasize the role of the direct switching cost of a revolution (for the citizens) and of the elite's self-preservation options. Under the concession strategy, when the switching cost is low, the elite can't avoid the political regime change. She optimally adapts to the overthrow of their political power by setting the rate of redistribution to the highest possible level, thereby extending the period during which she has full control on resources. This surprising result actually illustrates the role of the timing of events in these situations of interaction between the ruling elite and the people. When the direct switching is high, the elite can ultimately select the equilibrium outcome and adopts the opposite strategy, i.e. she chooses the lowest level of redistribution that allows her to stay in power forever. The same kind of results are obtained when the elite relies on repression to keep the citizens under control. Next, the equilibrium properties under a mix of repression and redistribution are analyzed. It is shown that in situations where neither repression (only) nor redistribution (only) protect the elite against the uprising of citizens, a subtle mixture of the two instruments is sufficient to make the dictatorship permanent. Based on our theoretical results, we finally examine the reason for such a large variety of decisions and outcomes during the Arab Spring events.

We develop a dynamic game to provide with a theory of Arab spring-type events. We consider two interacting groups, the elite vs the citizens, two political regimes, dictatorship vs a freer regime, the possibility to switch from the first to the second regime as a consequence of a revolution, and finally the opportunity, for the elite, to affect the citizens' decision through concession and/or repression strategies. In this framework, we provide a full characterization of the equilibrium of the political regime switching game. First, we emphasize the role of the direct switching cost of a revolution (for the citizens) and of the elite's self-preservation options. Under the concession strategy, when the switching cost is low, the elite can't avoid the political regime change. She optimally adapts to the overthrow of their political power by setting the rate of redistribution to the highest possible level, thereby extending the period during which she has full control on resources. This surprising result actually illustrates the role of the timing of events in these situations of interaction between the ruling elite and the people. When the direct switching is high, the elite can ultimately select the equilibrium outcome and adopts the opposite strategy, i.e. she chooses the lowest level of redistribution that allows her to stay in power forever. The same kind of results are obtained when the elite relies on repression to keep the citizens under control. Next, the equilibrium properties under a mix of repression and redistribution are analyzed. It is shown that in situations where neither repression (only) nor redistribution (only) protect the elite against the uprising of citizens, a subtle mixture of the two instruments is sufficient to make the dictatorship permanent. Based on our theoretical results, we finally examine the reason for such a large variety of decisions and outcomes during the Arab Spring events.

We develop a dynamic game to provide with a theory of Arab spring-type events. We consider two interacting groups, the elite vs the citizens, two political regimes, dictatorship vs a freer regime, the possibility to switch from the first to the second regime as a consequence of a revolution, and finally the opportunity, for the elite, to affect the citizens' decision through concession and/or repression strategies. In this framework, we provide a full characterization of the equilibrium of the political regime switching game. First, we emphasize the role of the direct switching cost of a revolution (for the citizens) and of the elite's self-preservation options. Under the concession strategy, when the switching cost is low, the elite can't avoid the political regime change. She optimally adapts to the overthrow of their political power by setting the rate of redistribution to the highest possible level, thereby extending the period during which she has full control on resources. This surprising result actually illustrates the role of the timing of events in these situations of interaction between the ruling elite and the people. When the direct switching is high, the elite can ultimately select the equilibrium outcome and adopts the opposite strategy, i.e. she chooses the lowest level of redistribution that allows her to stay in power forever. The same kind of results are obtained when the elite relies on repression to keep the citizens under control. Next, the equilibrium properties under a mix of repression and redistribution are analyzed. It is shown that in situations where neither repression (only) nor redistribution (only) protect the elite against the uprising of citizens, a subtle mixture of the two instruments is sufficient to make the dictatorship permanent. Based on our theoretical results, we finally examine the reason for such a large variety of decisions and outcomes during the Arab Spring events.

We develop a dynamic game to provide with a theory of Arab spring-type events. We consider two interacting groups, the elite vs the citizens, two political regimes, dictatorship vs a freer regime, the possibility to switch from the first to the second regime as a consequence of a revolution, and finally the opportunity, for the elite, to affect the citizens' decision through concession and/or repression strategies. In this framework, we provide a full characterization of the equilibrium of the political regime switching game. First, we emphasize the role of the direct switching cost of a revolution (for the citizens) and of the elite's self-preservation options. Under the concession strategy, when the switching cost is low, the elite can't avoid the political regime change. She optimally adapts to the overthrow of their political power by setting the rate of redistribution to the highest possible level, thereby extending the period during which she has full control on resources. This surprising result actually illustrates the role of the timing of events in these situations of interaction between the ruling elite and the people. When the direct switching is high, the elite can ultimately select the equilibrium outcome and adopts the opposite strategy, i.e. she chooses the lowest level of redistribution that allows her to stay in power forever. The same kind of results are obtained when the elite relies on repression to keep the citizens under control. Next, the equilibrium properties under a mix of repression and redistribution are analyzed. It is shown that in situations where neither repression (only) nor redistribution (only) protect the elite against the uprising of citizens, a subtle mixture of the two instruments is sufficient to make the dictatorship permanent. Based on our theoretical results, we finally examine the reason for such a large variety of decisions and outcomes during the Arab Spring events.

17 pages, 9 figures ; Recent studies have shown significant sea surface salinity (SSS) changes at scales ranging from regional to global. In this study, we estimate global salinity means and trends using historical (1950–2014) SSS data from the UK Met Office Hadley Centre objectively analyzed monthly fields and recent data from the SMOS satellite (2010–2014). We separate the different components (regimes) of the global surface salinity by fitting a Gaussian Mixture Model to the data and using expectation–maximization to distinguish the means and trends of the data. The procedure uses a non-subjective method (Bayesian information criterion) to extract the optimal number of means and trends. The results show the presence of three separate regimes: Regime A (1950–1990) is characterized by small trend magnitudes; Regime B (1990–2009) exhibited enhanced trends; and Regime C (2009–2014) with significantly larger trend magnitudes. The salinity differences between regime means were around 0.01. The trend acceleration could be related to an enhanced global hydrological cycle or to a change in the sampling methodology. Understanding past SSS changes can provide insight into future climate evolution by complementing the knowledge acquired in recent decades from long-term temperature record analyses ; This study has been funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy through the National R1D Plan by means of MIDAS-7 Project AYA2012˘39356−C05−03. [.] The SMOS data were produced by the Barcelona Expert Centre (www.smos-bec.icm.csic.es), a joint initiative of the Spanish Research Council (CSIC) and the Technical University of Catalonia (UPC), mainly funded by the Spanish National Program on Space. [.] A.L. Aretxabaleta was supported by a Juan de la Cierva grant from the Spanish Government during the early stages of the study. K.W. Smith was supported by his wages at Lowe Energy Design ; Peer Reviewed

We examine whether the type of political regime, regime changes, and economic liberalization are related to economic growth accelerations. Our results show that growth accelerations are preceded by economic liberalizations. We also find that growth accelerations are less likely to happen the longer a political regime-be it a democracy or an autocracy-has been in place, while (a move toward) more democracy according to the Polity IV dataset reduces the likelihood of growth accelerations.

Purpose of the study: This paper aims to explain social violence during the transition of three regimes in Indonesia, from the Old Order to the New Order and from the New Order to the Reformation. This paper also analyzes the motives behind the violence at each transition of the regimes. Methodology: The research was conducted through a literature study by examining media documents, magazines, research reports, scientific articles, and books on various social violence practices in every three regimes in Indonesia. Main Findings: The result of the study found that the social violence in Indonesia has occurred in various forms and motives. Five types of social violence have been identified, communal violence, separatist violence, state-community violence, industrial relations violence, and political violence. The social violence has used as a tool to silence the past and carry out political propaganda by elites and to gain the power by opposition. Thus, it argues that all social violence practices are constructed by various interests of the regimes and anti-regimes. Applications of this study: This study provides a mapping of violence in every political and regime transition in Indonesia. Thus, this study can be applied for two important issues. First, this study can be used as reference in anticipating political violence in the national and regional election process in Indonesia in particular, and other countries in general. Second, for developing countries, this study can be used as reference as reference in mapping and analyzing various social violence practices that accompany the transition process. Novelty/Originality of this study: The recent studies of violence in Indonesia covered the issues of religious, ethnic, economic and political violence. There are limited studies violence and democracy transition in Indonesia and it's relation to political regimes. This article focuses on violence and its relationship with the political regimes and regime's changes in Indonesia.

I construct a theory of foreign interventions in which the preferences of the foreign country over alternative local groups are determined by each group's international economic ties. In equilibrium, the foreign country supports the group with which it has the strongest ties, since this is most influenceable from the outside. However this is counterweighted by the tendency of the domestic political system to favour the least influenceable group. I allow for a noneconomic dimension of policy (geopolitics), and study how the saliency of this dimension may play in favor of the incumbent group. My results help interpret the economic rationale for many Western interventions in developing countries in the 20th century, and the role of economic nationalism in motivating the struggle for regime change. Furthermore, they help explain why the Cold War strengthened the West's preference for specific local groups. I provide detailed historical evidence in favor of my arguments.

I construct a theory of foreign interventions in which the political preferences of the foreign country are determined by its different economic ties with alternative local groups. Stronger economic ties make a group more influenceable from the outside, and thus more willing to grant economic and geopolitical concessions to the foreign country. In the model, foreign interventions in favor of the most influenceable group are counterweighted by a natural tendency of the home country's political system to bring to power the least influenceable group. While the foreign country can use its economic power to influence the geopolitical alignment of the home country, the outcome of this endeavor may be compromised by regime change. In particular, when concessions to the foreign country cannot be renegotiated efficiently (possibly because of reputational concerns in the foreign country), regime change may lead to a loss of geopolitical alignment, even if all groups are ex-ante identical in terms of their geopolitical preferences. These results may help interpret the pattern of Western interventions in the 20th century, as well as the role of economic nationalism in the political economy of regime change. In particular, they may help understand the role of the Cold War in strengthening the West's preference for the status quo in many countries. I provide historical evidence in favor of my arguments.

I construct a theory of foreign interventions in which a home country's main trade partner may influence the course of regime change. The foreign country intervenes in support of the group that draws the largest gains from trade, since such a group is willing to concede most in trade agreements. But interventions are more than offset by the domestic political system, which supports in power the group who concedes least (economic nationalism). I allow for geopolitical competition between the main trade partner and a second foreign country, as well as for domestic ideological preferences over the two, and look at how geopolitical competition interacts with the economic mechanism described above. My results help interpret some of the patterns of Western interventions in the 20th century, and the role of economic nationalism in regime change. Furthermore, they help explain why the Cold War strengthened the West's preference for incumbent elites, even when the oppositions did not have a strong communist ideology. I provide detailed historical evidence in favor of my arguments.

Introduction / Giacomo Luciani and Felix Neugart -- Pac Americana in the Middle East : promises and pitfalls / Michael C. Hudson -- After Iraq : prospects for democratization in the Middle East and North Africa / Giacomo Luciani -- After Iraq : is the Israeli-Arab conflict closer to resolution? / Henry Siegman -- The new Iraq : challenges for state-building / Ofra Bengio -- Iraq and the perils of regime change : from international pariah to a fulcrum of regional instability / Toby Dodge -- Iraq : future of the oil industry / Walid Khadduri -- Iran, the United States and the war on Baghdad / David Menashri -- Turkey, Europe and the Iraq War / Philip J. Robins -- Three years into Syria's presidential succession : Bashar al-Asad's agenda between domestic demands and regional risks / Volker Perthes -- Syria and the war on Iraq / Marius Deeb -- The EU's CFSP and the Middle East challenge / Steven Everts -- Thinking about the EU's future neighbourhood policy in the Middle East : from the Euro-Mediterranean partnership to "Barcelona Plus" / Felix Neugart and Tobias Schumacher

Using an improved definition and indicator of growth accelerations, we examine whether political regimes, regime changes, and economic reform are related to growth accelerations. Our results show that economic growth accelerations are preceded by economic reforms. Furthermore, we find that growth accelerations are more likely to happen after the start of a new political regime.