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In this book, Natàlia Cantó Milà elaborates on Georg Simmel's relational approach to a theory of value, pointing at the heuristic possibilities that this approach offers to modern sociology and to a sociology of modernity. She does so by focusing on the theory of value Simmel developed in his »The Philosophy of Money«, delivering an alternative reading of this book that views its theory of value as its main axial point. Simmel's theory of value is depicted by Cantó Milà as including an intrinsically sociological aspect, since economic as well as moral, ethic and aesthetic values are conceived as resulting from human relations

AbstractIn this paper, I compare various theories of perception in relation to the question of the epistemological and ontological status of the qualities that appear in perceptual experience. I group these theories into two main views: quality externalism and quality internalism, and I highlight their contrasting problems in accounting for phenomena such as perceptual relativity, illusions and hallucinations (the "problem of perception"). Then, I propose an alternative view, which I call qualitative relationism and which conceives of the subject and the object of perceptual experience as essentially related to one another (hence relationism) in a process of co-constitution out of fundamental qualities (hence qualitative relationism). I lend support to this view by drawing on Husserl's genetic phenomenology, which I complement with a form of neutral monism. I argue that the investigation of the temporal structure of perceptual experience leads us to find at its heart a qualitative process that is more fundamental than the two relata of perception and that gives rise to them. Then, I extend this account of perception into a general theory of intentionality and experience and I develop its implications into a neutral monist metaphysics.

This paper aims to bring into the global ethics debate concrete alternative models of specific relational ethics developed in the context of Sinic traditions that have not yet been widely introduced into Western scholarship or integrated into the framework of global discourses on ethics and morality. Although much research has been done on certain elements and aspects of such ethical models, there have been no concrete attempts to incorporate them into a global axiological framework that could have helped humanity develop strategies for solving the current global crises we face.
The paper first provides a critical overview of the conceptual history, specific characteristics, and social relevance of relationism. It then addresses the question of how relational ethical models could be integrated into the value system of contemporary global ethics without reproducing the still dominant normativity of Western epistemology and its corresponding axiology. After highlighting some problems related to the methodology and structure of traditional models of comparative philosophy and ethics, the author suggests that this integration of relationism into the general framework of global ethics could be done by applying a new method, which can be tentatively called the method of transcultural philosophical sublation. Starting from different frames of reference that define the basic tenets of modern Western and traditional Chinese axiology, the author demonstrates the application of this method on the example of different conceptions of the human self.

Pierre Bourdieu's "epistemic reflexivity" is the cornerstone of his intellectual enterprise, underpinning his claims to provide distinctive and scientific knowledge of the social world. This article considers what this notion offers for research and how it needs to be developed further to underpin progress in social science. Many reflexive research practices are sociological, individualistic, and narcissistic, and the article contrasts this to Bourdieu's conception of reflexivity as epistemological, collective, and objective. The author then illustrates how, despite Bourdieu's intentions, this conception when enacted tends toward the very pitfalls it is intended to avoid. Building on a developing conceptualization of the relations of knowledge, the author identifies this problem as intrinsic to Bourdieu's framework, showing how it bypasses the significance of knowledge structures and so provides the social but not the epistemological conditions for social scientific knowledge. Bourdieu's reflexivity objectifies objectification but needs development to help achieve objective knowledge. The article concludes by introducing the notion of "epistemic capital" as a first step toward developing a properly epistemic reflexivity and so realizing the potential of Bourdieu's enterprise.

"Environmental disasters, unequal distribution of resources, viral pandemics, and other types of trans-national disasters, are global crises that cannot be solved within the narrow framework of individual nation-states. They must be addressed through global cooperation and solidarity. Such strategies require intercultural dialog that goes beyond fashionable slogans and can lead to a truly equal exchange of knowledge and ideas. Towards this endeavour, this book by Jana S. Rošker focuses on the traditional Confucian ethic of relationism, which historically spread throughout many regions of East Asia. She examines the specific features of relational ethics and explores its possible contribution to the new global ethics"--