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Derived from the renowned multi-volume International Encyclopaedia of Laws, this convenient resource provides systematic information on how Australia deals with the role religion plays or can play in society, the legal status of religious communities and institutions, and the legal interaction among religion, culture, education, and media. After a general introduction describing the social and historical background, the book goes on to explain the legal framework in which religion is approached. Coverage proceeds from the principle of religious freedom through the rights and contractual obligations of religious communities; international, transnational, and regional law effects; and the legal parameters affecting the influence of religion in politics and public life. Also covered are legal positions on religion in such specific fields as church financing, labour and employment, and matrimonial and family law. A clear and comprehensive overview of relevant legislation and legal doctrine make the book an invaluable reference source and very useful guide. Succinct and practical, this book will prove to be of great value to practitioners in the myriad instances where a law-related religious interest arises in Australia. Academics and researchers will appreciate its value as a thorough but concise treatment of the legal aspects of diversity and multiculturalism in which religion plays such an important part.

The approach of Critical Legal Studies that law is a cultural artefact that can be criticised is taken as point of departure in this paper. This insight is applied to food as a very important cultural artefact that permeates virtually every aspect of our personal and social lives. The paper then examines three types of restrictive diets, namely Kosher food production, halal food rules and vegetarianism. From this study it concludes that all three perform a vital social function of providing adherents with a unifying and identifying set of rules to foster social coherence. But it also provides adherents with a strong moral foundation that serves to justify a sense of moral superiority. Most importantly, all three these diets rest on a modernist view of morality in which absolute, unquestioning and universal truths are possible. It therefore serves to provide certainty in the postmodern condition of uncertainty and relativism. For that reason this study concludes that vegetarianism is the new religion – it provides people who no longer believe in traditional religions with a new certainty. ; https://doi.org/10.4102/td.v8i1.2

Added t.-p. and text in Hebrew. ; I. The existence of God.--II. The Mosaic law.--III. The improved law of Ezra.--IV. The Talmudic systems.--V. The social and political laws. ; Mode of access: Internet.

This article argues that international human rights law does not adequately respect people's plural religious and sexual identities and, moreover, is working to ignore the ways in which both governments and individuals are increasingly reconfiguring "sexual persecution" as "religious persecution." The article uses case-studies from both and to demonstrate not only how state persecution of gays, lesbians, and homosexuals is often steeped in claims of religiosity, but also how increasing numbers of people from around the world are challenging traditional religious practices which denigrate gayness and homosexuality. Thus, when such "homo-sectuals" - to use a neologism - are persecuted, they understand this persecution as religious persecution. Given this reality, the article argues that international human rights norms and practices could better respect persons' diverse self-identifications and self-understandings by more seriously deploying existing human rights protections concerning religious persecution.

There is a widespread tendency in modern, secular society to view law and religion as unrelated except insofar as they may, from time to time, come into conflict. However, intimate relations between the two have been constituted and constantly changed throughout history. Law and religion are two great interconnecting values and belief structures with their own normative, authoritative sources and mechanisms, as well as their own legislation and amendment processes and steps. However, at the practical level, the relationship between the two has not often been smooth sailing. This paper seeks to untangle the confusion, conflicts and complications that have arisen, especially in the Zimbabwean context, when legal statutes have appeared to be in opposition with religious beliefs and practices. The major question arising from such a scenario is: How are communities of faith across the religious divide supposed to react when laws demand that they act in ways that conflict with either their sacred text whether written or oral? The focus of this paper, therefore, is to simultaneously examine the place of religion in the public sphere as well as explore the impact of enacted laws on religion in Zimbabwe. This paper made use of public discourse, as presented in a WhatsApp group chat of a Bible Challenge Group which took place on 21 February 2021. Secondary sources were utilised in informing this paper's conceptualisation of religion and the law.

This article examines documents of the Sephardic Community of Livorno during the 17th century, with special attention to the escamot that refer to legal aspects of Jewish life in this port-city, in order to contribute to the study of the religious community experiences during political changes in Europe in the Early Modern Period. This enables analysis of how, and to what extent, the mechanisms of communal socialization and social control in the public and private spheres were related to the process in which the territorial authority and the political control of its borders were reinforced in Tuscany. It argues that Sephardic community legal decisions reinforced political processes in Livorno (and Tuscany), rather than merely been unconnected to them. This argument implies reconsidering not only the role of Diasporic religious communities in local political context, but also the role of local context in the tension between religion and law. From this perspective, it is possible to deepen our understanding of the experience of religious communities regarding the conception on Justice. ; Este artículo examina documentos de la Comunidad Sefardí de Livorno durante el siglo XVII, con especial atención a las escamot que se refieren a los aspectos jurídicos de la vida judía en esta ciudad-puerto, con el objetivo de contribuir al estudio de las experiencias de las comunidades religiosas frente a los cambios políticos en Europa durante la Edad Moderna. Esto permite analizar el alcance de los mecanismos de sociabilización comunitaria y de control social en las esferas pública y privada en relación con los procesos en donde se reforzó la autoridad territorial y el control político de las fronteras en Toscana. El argumento del artículo sostiene que las decisiones legales de la comunidad sefardí reforzaron los procesos políticos en Livorno (y en Toscana), en lugar de simplemente ser independiente de ellos. Este argumento implica reconsiderar no solo el papel de las comunidades religiosas diaspóricas en el contexto político local, sino también el rol del contexto local en la tensión entre la religión y el derecho. Desde esta perspectiva, es posible profundizar la comprensión de la experiencia de las comunidades religiosas respecto a la concepción de la Justicia. ; Ciencias Religiosas ; Derecho

Most histories of Early Modern English common law focus on a very specific set of individuals, namely Justices Edward Coke and Matthew Hale, Sir Francis Bacon, Sir Henry Finch, Sir John Doddridge, and-very recently-John Selden. The focus is partly explained by the immense influence most of these individuals exercised upon the study and practice of common law during the seventeenth century. Moreover, according to J.W. Tubbs, such a focus is unavoidable because a great majority of common lawyers left no record of their thoughts. It is my contention that Tubbs' view is unwarranted. Even if it is impossible to reconstruct the thoughts of a vast majority of common lawyers, there is no reason to limit our studies of common law to the aforementioned group of individuals. In fact, if we are to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the place of common law in political and intellectual culture of the seventeenth century, it is necessary to move beyond the limits to which current historiography has confined itself.

"Some Reflections on Multiculturalism, 'Equal Concern and Respect,' and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment" lecture given by Sanford Levinson, who occupies the W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr., Regents Chair in the Law at the University of Texas Law School. "Abraham, Isaac, and the State: Faith-healing and Legal Intervention" lecture given by Henry J. Abraham, who is the James Hart Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia. "Is the Idea of Human Rights Ineliminably Religious?" lecture given by Michael Perry who occupies the Howard J. Trienens Chair in Law at Northwestern University.

The freedom to receive and impart information, privacy and the freedom from discrimination on grounds of religious belief are universally recognised as fundamental human rights and, as such, also form part of the basic values of democratic societies. These rights have, in the main, only been adequately articulated and increasingly protected at the international level after the Second World War, relatively very late in more than seven thousand years of civilization In contrast, the values promoted by religions have often been recognised as such for millennia. Where do the values of privacy law and religions conflict and where do they converge, especially in a world where information technology is ubiquitous? The paper examines the debate over privacy from various perspectives, identifying those areas where religions appear to have confronted issues of human rights and where lawyers have been joined in the debate by philosophers within the rapidly developing field of information ethics. It concludes by listing a minimum ten areas where religions may possibly contribute to the intercultural debate on privacy in the Information Society. ; peer-reviewed

International audience ; Insérer les deux siècles d'histoire de la science des mœurs dans une histoire plus longue, qui s'attacherait à repérer la manière dont les questions économiques se sont articulées à celles relatives aux mœurs, conduit à en privilégier deux étapes anciennes, caractérisées l'une et l'autre par la conjonction d'une perspective normative (théologique pour la première, juridique pour la seconde) et de questions économiques qui lui sont subordonnées : les années 1268 à 1272 d'abord, lorsque Thomas d'Aquin, de retour à l'Université de Paris, rédige la secunda secundae de la Somme théologique et l'essentiel de ses Commentaires sur la philosophie morale et politique d'Aristote ; les années 1622 à 1625 ensuite, lorsque Hugo Grotius, réfugié en France, y publie le Droit de la Guerre et de la Paix. L'une et l'autre montrent, à partir d'une question économique singulière – celle du prêt à intérêt – comment un savoir économique a émergé de la perspective normative à laquelle elle était subordonnée. Une telle émergence s'est cependant réalisée de manières différentes : d'abord sur le mode de l'imbrication chez Thomas d'Aquin, où les questions économiques font l'objet d'un traitement systématique, mais sans pour autant qu'il soit possible de les restituer en évitant de revenir de façon récurrente à la perspective théologique dans laquelle elles s'intègrent ; puis, sur le mode de la séparation chez Hugo Grotius où, en dépit de leur insertion dans une perspective juridique, il devient possible d'en faire abstraction afin d'en rendre compte. C'est ce mouvement initial, de l'imbrication vers la séparation entre un savoir économique émergent et la perspective normative à laquelle il est associé, qui rendra possible à partir des Lumières la cristallisation de ce savoir économique en savoir autonome, redevable désormais aux sciences de la société plutôt qu'à une continuation, aussi élaborée soit-elle, de la religion et du droit.

International audience ; Insérer les deux siècles d'histoire de la science des mœurs dans une histoire plus longue, qui s'attacherait à repérer la manière dont les questions économiques se sont articulées à celles relatives aux mœurs, conduit à en privilégier deux étapes anciennes, caractérisées l'une et l'autre par la conjonction d'une perspective normative (théologique pour la première, juridique pour la seconde) et de questions économiques qui lui sont subordonnées : les années 1268 à 1272 d'abord, lorsque Thomas d'Aquin, de retour à l'Université de Paris, rédige la secunda secundae de la Somme théologique et l'essentiel de ses Commentaires sur la philosophie morale et politique d'Aristote ; les années 1622 à 1625 ensuite, lorsque Hugo Grotius, réfugié en France, y publie le Droit de la Guerre et de la Paix. L'une et l'autre montrent, à partir d'une question économique singulière – celle du prêt à intérêt – comment un savoir économique a émergé de la perspective normative à laquelle elle était subordonnée. Une telle émergence s'est cependant réalisée de manières différentes : d'abord sur le mode de l'imbrication chez Thomas d'Aquin, où les questions économiques font l'objet d'un traitement systématique, mais sans pour autant qu'il soit possible de les restituer en évitant de revenir de façon récurrente à la perspective théologique dans laquelle elles s'intègrent ; puis, sur le mode de la séparation chez Hugo Grotius où, en dépit de leur insertion dans une perspective juridique, il devient possible d'en faire abstraction afin d'en rendre compte. C'est ce mouvement initial, de l'imbrication vers la séparation entre un savoir économique émergent et la perspective normative à laquelle il est associé, qui rendra possible à partir des Lumières la cristallisation de ce savoir économique en savoir autonome, redevable désormais aux sciences de la société plutôt qu'à une continuation, aussi élaborée soit-elle, de la religion et du droit.

My dissertation, Mexican Religion on Trial: Race, Religion and the Law in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands, presents three critical junctures in United States history (between the nineteenth century and the present) to explore political and legal discourses surrounding Mexican Catholicism after the Mexican-American war. This research employs historical, archival, and ethnographic methods. My analysis of numerous legal case studies, law enforcement training manuals, oral histories, ethnographic methods, and archival documents reveal processes by which Mexican Catholic practices and performances become signifiers of illegality and criminality, used as evidence against the inclusion and extension of national and cultural citizenship. While the surveillance of Mexicans communities reflects increased anxiety and suspicion about immigrant communities and their religions in the 9/11 period, this history positions contemporary legal debates on Mexican religion within a larger history of anti-Mexican and anti-Catholic attitudes in the Southwest.

Government neutrality toward religion is based on familiar considerations: the importance of avoiding religious conflict, alienation of religious minorities, and the danger that religious considerations will introduce a dangerous irrational dogmatism into politics and make democratic compromise more difficult. This paper explores one consideration, prominent at the time of the framing, that is often overlooked: the idea that religion can be corrupted by state involvement with it. This idea is friendly to religion but, precisely for that reason, is determined to keep the state away from religion. If the religion-protective argument for disestablishment is to be useful today, it cannot be adopted in the form in which it was understood in the 17th and 18th centuries, because in that form it is loaded with assumptions rooted in a particular variety of Protestant Christianity. Nonetheless, suitably revised, it provides a powerful reason for government, as a general matter, to keep its hands off religious doctrine. It offers the best explanation for many otherwise mysterious rules of Establishment Clause law.

The process through which European States and institutions have responded to the social and cultural mutation in the European religious landscape has been met with increasing criticism. Depending upon the interests and the agendas at stake, European instances have been blamed for being too weak or too strong in their policies affecting religion, for being biased either in favor or against religion and ultimately for an insufficient commitment to worldwide religious liberty. This paper aims at responding to criticism through a three-step approach. First, it will highlight the peculiarity and salience of developments in European law and religion, based on the four projects that drove the interaction of law and religion in the European integration process: the human rights project, the single market project, the secular project and the religious project. In this part, I will suggest that, prior to any discussion on the direction that Europeans should take in the future, it is necessary to acknowledge Europe as an extraordinary laboratory of equality and diversity, allowing for an extremely dynamic interaction of law and religion to develop. Second, the paper will underline the concoction of human rights and single market in the making of European dynamic law and religion, and will study the implications thereof. Third, the paper will point at the emergence of a threefold pattern of clashing forces and ideas: the secular versus the religious; States versus Europe; and majorities versus minorities. I will observe that a defensive strategy has fuelled the threefold divisive pattern, consecrating a paradigm increasingly at odds with the dramatically changed picture of beliefs and convictions in Europe, I will argue that the disconnection between the old, dominant paradigm and the various European realities, means that a new paradigm is badly needed. I will conclude that Europe needs the courage to honor its inclination towards a dynamic, constantly evolving interaction of law and religion. This will imply acknowledging change as a key feature of the European experience with law and religion, and, once again, 'choosing change' in order to enhance religious pluralism, reassess the role of the State as the 'neutral and impartial organizer of the practising of the various religions, denominations and beliefs,' (European Court of Human Rights, 2001) assert the European Union as 'impartial' and 'not aligned with any specific religion or belief' (EU Guidelines on the protection and promotion of freedom of religion or belief, 2013), and encourage actors involved in religion and belief to reinvent structures and actions.

This paper explores the Naha Confucius Temple case, resolved by the Supreme Court in February 2021, in light of postwar decisions on Articles 20 and 89 of the Japanese constitution. Religion is a contested category in Japanese legislation, appearing both in the constitution and in laws regulating the freedoms and restrictions of legally registered religious organizations. While the organization behind the Confucius Temple in Naha was registered as a general corporate juridical person, the majority opinion sided with the plaintiffs' argument that the free lease granted to the temple by the municipality of Naha constituted a violence of the ban on public sponsorship of religious institutions and activities. In order to reach their decision, the Supreme Court and the lower courts not only had to decide on whether Confucianism was a religion or not, but also on whether the organization behind the temple—a group dedicated to the history and memory of the Chinese immigrant community in Naha—should in fact be considered a religious organization. The outcome of the case is a good example of religion-making in courts of law, with a central institution of power employing notions of sui generis religion to regulate and define civil actors.