RENT-SEEKING, RENT-DEFENDING, AND RENT DISSIPATION
In: Public choice, Band 71, Heft 1, S. 61-70
ISSN: 0048-5829
A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THE RESEARCH ON RENT-SEEKING ADDRESSES THE ISSUE OF RENT DISSIPATION. EARLY STUDIES SIMPLY ASSUMED DISSIPATION WOULD BE COMPLETE AND FISHER OBSERVED THE QUESTION OF DISSIPATION CAN BE ANSWERED ONLY FOR OVERTLY SPEICIFIED GAME STRUCTURES. A RENT-SEEKING GAME HAS BEEN INTRODUCED WHICH YIELDED INCOMPLETE DISSIPATION UNDER A WIDE VARIETY OF COST CONDITIONS. SEVERAL AUTHORS HAVE CONSIDERED NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR EXCESS DISSIPATION. WENDERS ADDRESSED THE SOCIAL COSTS OF RENT-SEEKING TO OBTAIN A MONOPOLY AND CONCLUDES THAT RECURRING OR SUNK EVEN THE LARGEST SPECIFICATION OF COSTS OF REGULATION MAY BE FAR SHORT OF THE ACTUAL WELFARE COSTS. THIS PAPER MORE FULLY DEVELOPS SOME OF THESE TOPICS AND PRESENTS CONCLUSIONS THAT HAVE NOT APPEARED IN THE LITERATURE.