The essay analyzes & categorizes rhetorical methods in destructive communication. Journalistic destructive rhetoric is mostly evident in the yellow press & political communication. Such rhetoric avoids argumentation & focuses on the satanization of individuals, ideas, or things it wishes to discredit. According to the author, this type of rhetoric primarily ensues from the inability of a journalist to gain prominence in a more positive way, which represents a contemporary form of herostratism. Since contemporary media give journalists too much influence in society, some have tried to impose themselves in politics & society as the ultimate arbiters in deciding on what is right & what is not. The conclusion of this analysis is that this phenomenon ought to be studied by means of multilateral strategies; otherwise, the public cannot successfully cope with the negative consequences of this journalistic anomaly. 10 References. Adapted from the source document.
In this work, the author analyzes three basic requisites for the establishment of a comprehensive information system in Croatia: contemporary worldview, the latest state-of-the-art technology of the electronic media, & the new rhetoric of tele-dialogue/polilogue. The author claims that, regarding the implementation of the latest technology, Croatia is on a par with the world (since we have links with the satellite & optical system & the number of Internet subscribers is growing). However, the situation with the growth of political culture is not so rosy, since the media are still far from a constructive polilogue & mostly stoop to the ad hominem rhetoric. The bleakest situation is in the unpreparedness of journalists & citizens for active, participatory communication in powerful polilogist electronic media. That is why the author advocates a speedier progress in all subsystems, since only through the synergetic linking of the new communicational technology with the new rhetoric of the polilogue, as well as with the responsibility of all the participants in public communication, a comprehensive Croatian information system may be developed. 11 References. Adapted from the source document.
ATLASES: Poetics, Politics, and Performance is a web exhibition of atlases from the Special Collections and School of Geographical Sciences of the University of Bristol (http://uobatlases.net/). It includes atlases produced between 1570 to approximately 1970.The exhibition consists of four thematic parts. Renaissance Theatres contains famous and les famous atlases produced between the end of the 16th century to the middle of the 17th century, such as atlases by Ortelius (1574), Camden (1610), Speed (1611) and four atlas tomes by Blaeu (1645). Rhetoric of Truth contains geological and archaeological atlases from the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century. However, Rhetoric of Truth is not only limited to renaissance, but it also encompasses first computer generated atlases, e.g. Atlas of Breeding Birds in England and Ireland (1976) and others. The Colonial Gaze focuses on atlases applied in colonial projects and land exploitation in Africa and the Caribbean Islands, as well as in circulation of race theories in Europe and North America at the end of the 19th century. The last part, National Identities and Conflict explores the role of atlas as a powerful instrument for visualizing conflicts and shaping territorial-political ideas in the 20th century. ; ATLASES: Poetics, Politics, and Performance je izložba na mreži atlasa iz Specijalne zbirke i Škole geografskih znanosti (Special Collections and School of Geographical Sciences) Sveučilišta u Bristolu (http://uobatlases.net/). Uključeni su atlasi od 1570. do približno 1970. godine.Izložba obuhvaća četiri tematske cjeline. Renaissance Theatres sadrži slavne i manje poznate atlase od kraja 16. do sredine 17. stoljeća., među ostalim, Orteliusov atlas iz 1574., Camdenov iz 1610., Speedov iz 1611. i četiri toma Blaeuova atlasa iz 1645. Rhetoric of Truth sadrži geološke i arheološke atlase iz 18. i početka 19. stoljeća. Međutim, cjelina Rhetoric of Truth nije ograničena samo na stoljeća prosvjetiteljstva već prožima i prve računalno generirane atlase poput npr. Atlas of Breeding Birds in England and Ireland (1976) i neke druge. Treća cjelina The Colonial Gaze fokusirana je na atlase koji su primjenjivani u provedbi kolonijalnih projekata i eksploataciji zemljišta u Africi i na Karibima, ali i cirkulaciji rasnih teorija krajem 19. stoljeća u Europi i Sjevernoj Americi. Posljednji dio National Identities and Conflict istražuje ulogu atlasa kao moćnog instrumenta za vizualizaciju sukoba i oblikovanje teritorijalno-političkih ideja u 20. stoljeću.
U radu se ispituje razlika između filozofije i sofistike. Preciznije, raspravlja se o onome što razlikuje Sokrata od sofista svoga vremena te o onome što razlikuje Epikteta od sofista uopće. Dok su sofisti bili prvi profesionalni učitelji, Epiktet slovi za jednog od najvećih učitelja (stoičke) filozofije ikada, a Sokrat je, sudeći po Platonovim riječima, poricao da je uopće bio učitelj, unatoč velikom broju onih koji su smatrali suprotno. Nadaleko poznati po svojim besjedama, sofisti su ponajviše privlačili one koji su željeli biti uspješni političari. Sokrat i Epiktet također su bili izvrsni govornici koje su okruživali političari Atene, odnosno Rima. Ipak, to ih nije činilo sofistima. Ono čemu i Sokrat i Epiktet teže život je u skladu s vrlinom, tj. život u skladu s razumom i filozofijom. Retorika ima instrumentalnu vrijednost i njome se netko može potaknuti na bavljenje filozofijom, ali ona nije dobro po sebi. ; The paper discusses the difference between philosophy and sophistry. More precisely, it discusses the differences between Socrates and Sophists of the first generation, as well as the differences between Epictetus and Sophists of both first and second generation. While Sophists were the first professional teachers and Epictetus one of the greatest Stoic teachers of all times, Socrates, according to Plato, denied being a teacher by any means, despite many who thought otherwise. Sophists were known for their speeches that most attracted those with a wish to be successful politicians. Socrates and Epictetus were also excellent orators surrounded by Athenian and Roman politicians. However, that didn't make them Sophists. Socrates and Epictetus opted for a life in accordance with excellence (virtue) that could be achieved by philosophy rather than rhetoric. Rhetoric could only have instrumental value, not an intrinsic one.
The essay analyzes the feasible developments of radio in the 21st century. By the method of extrapolation of the latest technologies of electronic communication, the author claims that radio in the 21st century is to become a synergetic element of an integral medium, which means that radio as a separate institution will be transformed, but that it will remain in the audio sphere. Due to the possibilities of advanced electronic technologies, artificial phonic qualities are to be increasingly devised while the use of optic fibers in the transmission of sound will enable the dialogue/polylogue at a distance. Consequently, there will be changes in the field of radio rhetoric & the stature of radio journalists who, besides being disseminators, will increasingly become regulators, moderators, & animators of the entire public dialogue among citizens. 8 References. Adapted from the source document.
The essay analyzes the feasible developments of radio in the 21st century. By the method of extrapolation of the latest technologies of electronic communication, the author claims that radio in the 21st century is to become a synergetic element of an integral medium, which means that radio as a separate institution will be transformed, but that it will remain in the audio sphere. Due to the possibilities of advanced electronic technologies, artificial phonic qualities are to be increasingly devised while the use of optic fibers in the transmission of sound will enable the dialogue/polylogue at a distance. Consequently, there will be changes in the field of radio rhetoric & the stature of radio journalists who, besides being disseminators, will increasingly become regulators, moderators, & animators of the entire public dialogue among citizens. 8 References. Adapted from the source document.
The Kosovo crisis once again brought the powerful, unscrupulous, & destructive Milosevic media apparatus into the spotlight. This is nothing new or surprising for all those who have been covering his political ascent from the beginning, but this time he used his heaviest artillery, never mincing words nor flinching from using all possible means to achieve his ends: to justify the genocidal policy & rally Serbs once again around the well-known platform of national unity & the Greater Serbia rhetoric. On one side, he had a well-oiled media machine that mercilessly rolled over everything in its way, not respecting any basic journalistic principles, not to mention ethics. On the other side were the most powerful media in the world -- aggressive, assertive, & equipped with state-of-the-art technology, but with one major flaw: these are mass media, not propaganda machinery. Two completely different structures clashed head-on. Thus, the media in war turned into the war of the media, a totally unfair war between a small but powerful propaganda machine & the large but democratic media. 8 References. Adapted from the source document.
In this paper the author evaluates the level of visual literacy of Croatian politicians. Her evaluation is based on the analysis of visual material used by political parties in the pre-electoral campaign late in 2007. Assisted by students at the Academy of Visual Arts as politically independent visual experts/evaluators, she examines the visual quality of the political message, its symbolic & communicational, as well as aesthetic & ethical value, taking the examples of posters, advertisements, spot commercials & other products. Research results point to the conclusion that our political public recognizes the power of images mainly in the context of present-day visually oriented society, & that it attempts to use visual effects in communication with potential voters in order to influence their opinions. Unfortunately, the level of such communication is very low, & mostly boils down to negative comparative advertising, which, as proven in other countries, is counterproductive, because it fosters mistrust & doubt of the public regarding the politicians' opportunities & ability to solve social problems. The visual rhetoric in politics requires an art of discourse that has a specific effect on its target group, & this in turn presupposes a high level of visual literacy of both the politicians themselves & the professionals they rely upon. Adapted from the source document.
Considering the rise of euroscepticism in France, especially in the eve of key events for the EU integration process, the article identifies the key actors promoting euroscepticism & the motivation behind their political action. The article tries to show that the main eurosceptical actors are opposition & marginal political parties with either left or right political orientation, & that the main motives for their political behavior are not to be found in their ideology, nor in a rational political competition, & not even in the French political tradition (and that is the reason why euroscepticism is considered only as a phenomenon). The motives for euroscepticism are found in the actors' drive towards short-term political goals with a help of populist rhetoric in order to discredit the EU project, but without an intention to offer counter proposals & long term political projects. The article analyses the results of the EU Parliament elections, the referendum for the EU Constitutional contract & discusses the electoral attitudes of certain political parties regarding their ideological orientation. The concluding remarks offer & explanation of the political parties motives for euroscepticism, an explanation of the social context where euroscepticism is accepted & a general analysis of the phenomenon. Adapted from the source document.
Članak se bavi karakterom i zastupljenošću etničkoga diskursa u srbijanskim opozicijskim glasilima Demokratija i Srpska reč u periodu 1990./1991. Jedno od pitanja koje razmatra ovaj rad odnosi se na preispitivanje teze o nepostojanju relevantne političke alternative tzv. nacionalnom programu Slobodana Miloševića i njegove političke partije u Srbiji u predvečerje raspada Jugoslavije. ; A statistical analysis of the presence of ethnic discourse (ED) and its subcategory, discourse of ethnic intolerance (DEI), in the party organs Demokratija and Srpska reč shows the indisputably different political character and physiognomy of these two papers. Namely, the average presence of ED in the Srpska reč in the period from June 1990 to June 1991 was four times higher, and the prevalence of DEI ten times higher, than in the Demokratija. In addition to the varying prevalence and character of their ED content, these two organs were fundamentally different as regards the character of their remaining contents. In the Serbian Renewal Movement's organ, the predominant part of the remaining discourse consisted of revisionist serials and essays dedicated to promoting the Chetnik Movement. These texts made up as much as half of the contents of individual issues of the monthly Srpska reč. Putting together all the pro-Chetnik contents and the ED contents of the Srpska reč, we can conclude that, on average, over 60 percent of each issue's contents were exceptionally irrational, conservative, and nationalist. On the other hand, after its first few issues, the Demokratija preserved an ethic of responsibility and a critical stance towards the social reality and political situation in the country. After these first few issues, the ethnic discourse in this organ was present only as a precedent and derailment, and was not a commonplace of political rhetoric, unlike in the case of the Srpska reč. The leadership of the Democratic Party certainly played a role in setting up these standards of civil discourse in this organ but, paradoxically, it often also took responsibility for sharpening the 'national' line of reasoning within the frame of (forced) political pragmatism. Đinđić's or Mićunovićev's ethnic discourse from August 1990 and May 1991 was not supported by a corresponding change in the physiognomy of the paper, which remained predominantly rational, critically oriented, civil, and socially responsible. The analytical verification of facts in this paper certainly supports the thesis of Dubravka Stojanović from 1996 that there was no alternative to this programme in Serbia, at least not within the frame of these two most relevant opposition parties. Furthermore, this paper indicates that, in the summer and autumn of 1990 and in May 1991, the rhetoric of the party leaders of the Serbian Renewal Movement and Democratic Party attempted to be—and often was—more belligerent than Milošević's. As regards almost all questions of the internal order of Yugoslavia, and especially regarding the status of the autonomy of Kosovo and the regulation of the position of Serbian people outside Serbia, the solutions advocated by the opposition were more radical than the ones advocated by Slobodan Milošević's regime.
U članku nastojim detektirati Krležinu antitetičku vrtešku, da uporabim Lasićev termin, prema miru u Brest-Litovsku s obzirom na Krležin zapis, polemički disput Razgovor o Brest-Litovsku (1918). Naime, iz perspektive 1918. godine Krleža Brest-litovski mir (3. ožujka 1918.) određuje kao anticipaciju "internacionalističke solidarnosti proletarijata evropskog", kao politički manevar pro futuro (DD2, 180). Međutim, u podrupku teksta, pisanom iz perspektive 1967. godine, kao korekciju vlastite interastralne retorike upućuje kako su se već u veljači 1918. godine "sve moskovske iluzije o generalnim štrajkovima na terenu centralnih vlasti, a naročito u Berlinu" rasplinule pod "terorom soldateske", a "lenjinska koncepcija mira u Brest-Litovsku našla se u bezizlaznoj ulici" (DD2, 188). ; In the paper I shall endeavour to identify Krleža's antithetical carousel (to use Stanko Lasić's term), with regard to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in Krleža's written entries, specifically a polemical dispute titled Discussion on Brest-Litovsk (1918). In fact, from the perspective of 1918, Krleža defined the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 3, 1918) as the anticipation of "the international solidarity of the European proletariat", i.e. a political manoeuvre pro futuro (BD2, 180). However, in the footnote to the text, written from the perspective of 1967, Krleža suggests, as a correction of his own interastral rhetoric, that "any Moscow illusion about general strikes in the area of central government, particularly in Berlin" dissipated under the "terror sewing military hordes" in February 1918, and "the Leninist concept of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ended up in a cul-de-sac" (BD2, 188).
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has maintained control over the Chinese political system since the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949. Although the Chinese economic system has experienced a drastic change, passing from socialist to more market-oriented economy, the CCP maintained the communist rhetoric that has been adapted to a new reality. Though the political system suffered significant modifications, it never made a U-turn towards liberal democracy. Yet, the most important reform is the transition from a country ruled by a strong leader, to what has been called a collective leadership. Accordingly, the leadership transition has been somehow institutionalized and became a complex process, which is happening in a peaceful way, avoiding major political turbulences. Deng Xiaoping, even though he could be indicated as the last absolute leader of China, promoted the reforms that eventually led to creation of collective leadership and a peaceful leadership transition. The most important aspects were the implementation of the pension system for administration and the top leadership positions, and the establishment of a maximum of two terms in office for all major positions in the country. The collective leadership prevents the possibility of a one-man show and the creation of a dictatorship. Although the system has its discrepancies, it makes PR China a predictable power in which the consensus-based decision-making process is intended to avoid struggles among various fractions and leaders in the Party. Adapted from the source document.
Populizam je aktualan politički fenomen o kojem se mnogo raspravlja u posljednjih nekoliko desetljeća. Postavlja se pitanje kako se i zašto pojavljuje u nekim zemljama, dok u drugima ne. U radu nastojim putem višestruke studije slučaja objasniti kako se ključni politički lideri u Francuskoj, Turskoj i Kanadi koriste populističkim diskursom. Ono što im omogućuje artikuliranje populizma u govorima su različito pojmljene krize i politička kultura. U Francuskoj i Turskoj Marine Le Pen i Recep Tayyip Erdoğan u svojim kampanjskim videspotovima koriste se populističkom retorikom kako bi mobilizirali narod. Riječ je o populističkom konceptu naroda, a ne o cijelom narodu unutar njihovih zemalja. U Francuskoj Marine Le Pen zastupa protuimigracijsku politiku i nastoji stvoriti egzistencijalni strah, kriveći političke elite koje naziva oligarhijom za migrantsku krizu i podređivanje nacionalnih interesima onima Europske Unije. U Turskoj Erdoğan kritizira sekularizam, opoziciju, Zapad i Europsku Uniju, čime udara u temelje stupova demokracije republike Turske, stvarajući tako u zemlji krizu demokracije. U Kanadi se populizam veže za premijera Justina Trudeaua, no u ovom slučaju je riječ o "krnjem" populizmu u kojem nedostaje nužan koncept političkih elita i "opasnih drugih". U Kanadi do populizma kakav se pojavljuje u Francuskoj i Kanadi ne može doći zbog multikulturalizma koji je na snazi u ovoj federalnoj državi. ; Populism is an actual political phenomenon, about which there has been a lot of discussion during last few decades. The question is why does it appear in some states, and in some not. In my paper I am trying to explain, by using multiple case-study, how do key political leaders in France, Turkey and Canada use populist discourse. They are in possibility to use populism in their speeches because of different types of crisis in their states and also different political culture. In France and Turkey, Marine Le Pen and Recep Tayyip Erdogan are usinbg populist rhetoric in their campaign videospots to mobilize the ...
The text provides an overview and evaluation of the strategy and tactics of Croatian politics in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The analysis focuses on the historical Tenth Session of CK SKH (Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia) held in 1970, which defined Croatian politics with regard to economic and social reform, as well as to centralist unitarism and Croatian nationalism. The Tenth Session was conceived and held on the initiative of Vladimir Bakaric, a great figure and a veteran of Croatian politics, who was the uncontested master of Croatia from the end of the war to 1969. With the fall of Rankovic (1966), the symbol of "neo-Stalinist centralism, bureaucratism and Great-Serbian hegemonism", one of the principal obstacles to modernization and democratization of Yugoslav communism was removed. The finest advocates of economic and political liberalization of the regime, of decentralization and of a stronger position of the republics were Bakaric and his disciples, an intelligent and well-educated generation of communists (Tripalo, Dabcevic-Kucar, Pirker). They are the ones who would eventually become symbols of the struggle against the Party's dogmatic conservatism and Stalinist voluntarism. The author puts forward a series of elements which make it possible to understand how the political career of this generation of dynamic and popular politicians, recognized and successful representatives of socialist democracy and national equality, came to a tragic end marked by accusations of flirting with chauvinism, of using "neo-Stalinist" methods against opponents and colleagues, and of attempting to establish a quasi-fascist state, in which the dictatorial rule of the clique of (former?) communists and nationalists, in alliance with the new middle class of managers and "technocrats", would be masked by socialist rhetoric and pseudo-mobilization of the masses deluded by nationalism into believing that members of some other nation are to blame for all problems. Adapted from the source document.
