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The right-wing PVV and the left-wing SP are seen as populist parties who are fierce ideological adversaries in the Dutch political spectrum. We study the similarities and differences in municipal contexts that explain their electoral success. Results of the 2010 national elections at the municipality level are analyzed for nearly all (N=403) Dutch municipalities. Hypotheses are formulated based on integrated group threat theory and relative deprivation theory. Results indicate similarities but also clear differences in the contexts in which SP and PVV thrive. PVV is more successful in municipalities with more immigrants and a higher average perception of unsafety, SP thrives more under local socioeconomic deprivation.

In contrast to US voters, whose behavior is explained in terms of party identification, controversial issues, & degree of trust in public officials, the behavior of Dutch voters is best analyzed in terms of their position on a Left-Right ideological continuum. Analysis of election data from 1970 studied in C. P. Middendorp's Progressiveness and Conservatism: The Fundamental Dimensions of Ideological Controversy and Their Relationship to Social Class (The Hague/New York: Mouton, 1978), as well as data from 1975, 1980, & 1985, reveals a difference between the actual position on this continuum & voter self-identification, dependent on internally defined philosophical variables. The Left-Right continuum can be expressed along two axes: (1) socioeconomic equality/inequality, & (2) libertarianism/authoritarianism. 6 Tables, 3 Figures, 43 References. M. Meeks

In the public debate and amongst scientists anxiety prevails concerning the situation of modern parliamentary democracy regarding nearly all established of nearly democracies. The concern focuses on the electoral loss of middle parties and heavily fluctuating election results, and the rise of radical Left and Right, where words such as pallet democracy, crisis and Weimar republic are used. The author sketches the outlines of different research directions he studied regarding European politics: voter behavior; decreasing importance of the Left-Right antagonism; decreasing political faith; increasing numbers of extreme Right parties. This to study more closely the different aspects of the alleged crisis of European party democracies (do citizens have unrealistically high expectations of government; the evolution from cartel parties to campaign parties, including the growing importance of the media; lack of party representation for large groups of citizens). Foremost, the author mentions that neo-liberal economic policies of the European Union do not parallel public opinion of EU member states. Figures. O. van Zijl

'Polarization' has become a catchword in Dutch politics, denoting the emphasis on conflicting rather than mutual interests. It is assumed that the efforts made to 'polarize' the voter population are aimed at reducing the large reservoir of middle-of-the-roaders. In its weekly opinion survey, the Netherlands Institute of Public Opinion (NIPO) consistently finds about 30% of the Rs choosing the center of a left/right semantic differential scale with almost an equal number of Rs going to right & left positions. The almost Gaussian overall distribution is shown to be highly correlated with party choice & voting behavior. The frequency distributions along the left/right Osgood scale are highly skewed inside each separate political preference group. The results of a new additional question are reported. The question reads: "If you were not allowed or could not choose this position would you then go for the one adjoining to the right or to the left?" A very large proportion of Rs move over to the left or right even beyond the extremes of the seven-point scale, effectively extending it to a nine-point scale. The popular center position is then reduced to about 12%. Even more interesting are larger variations over time that are shown for an interesting period extending from late Sept to the end of Nov 1977, during which efforts to form a new socialist-dominated government failed. The extended scale is shown to be a more sensitive instrument than the seven-point semantic differential alone. 6 Tables. Modified HA.

Interview data identified 2 main ideological characteristics of 236 Belgian bureaucratic elites: (1) centrism (avoiding Right or Left extremes), especially on socioeconomic issues; & (2) inclination toward the center-Right. It is suggested that such centrism may be the result of intensive preoccupation with the recent Belgian federalization process. The profile of Left-oriented top bureaucrats suggests a less technocratic approach, less alienation from politics, & greater involvement in partisan politics. To change the centrist-technocratic character of Belgian civil service, a furthering of a more political style of administrative policy making is recommended. 13 Tables, 9 Graphs. Adapted from the source document.

An empirical test of hypotheses that explain Left/Right political preferences on the basis of economic self-interest or of status. The diagonal mobility models developed by Michael E. Sobel (see SA 30:3/82M2954) are applied to survey data from the Netherlands for 1970/71 & 1977. The hypothesis that yields the best fitting model is that based on the assumption that individuals behave according to economic self-interest, but with a time-lag before taking on the political preferences of a newly entered status category. Macro-effects on society can thus be expected to reflect net structural mobility rather than total mobility, as would be suggested by status hypotheses. 10 Tables, 30 References. Modified HA

This paper deals with the linkage between changes in the political culture & changes in class-party alignments. First, we investigate how the political culture in Western countries has changed over time. Three views are tested using data on party-manifestos. The first predicts that only new-leftist issues will increase in salience. The second predicts that both new-leftist & new-rightist issues will emerge at the same time. The third, which is empirically corroborated, predicts that first new-leftist issues will emerge followed by a rise in new rightist issues. Second, we investigate how the emergence of these new issues has affected the traditional class-party alignments. We show that the middle class increasingly votes left-wing as new-leftist issues become more important & that the working class increasingly votes rightwing as new-rightist issues become more important. The middle class also appears to alienate from the traditional party of their class as new-rightist issues rise in salience. Tables, Figures. Adapted from the source document.