Left, Right, and Center: Conflicting Forces in American Labor. Sidney Lens
In: Journal of political economy, Band 58, Heft 1, S. 77-78
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: Journal of political economy, Band 58, Heft 1, S. 77-78
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 153, Heft 1, S. 278-279
ISSN: 1552-3349
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 180, Heft 1, S. 248-248
ISSN: 1552-3349
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 265, Heft 1, S. 211-212
ISSN: 1552-3349
In: American political science review, Band 43, Heft 4, S. 831-833
ISSN: 1537-5943
In: The review of politics, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 99-119
ISSN: 1748-6858
The party structure in Belgium has always reflected not merely the graduation of opinions from the extreme right to the extreme left, but also the linguistic and religious differences of a nation divided into French and Flemish speaking people, and into Catholic believers and freethinkers. The latter distinction still remains the most important one. Thus, the parties continue, as during the nineteenth century, to be classified into "right" and "left" according to whether they have a religious or an agnostic character. The "right" is considered identical with the Catholic Party, and the "left" with the Liberal, Socialist, and Communist Parties. It is also true that the Catholic Party is considered politically conservative, and the "left," taken as a whole, progressive. And since the "right" has an absolute majority in Flanders and the "left" in Wallonia (the French speaking region), it can be said that, very broadly, the religious, political, and linguistic groupings tend to place Catholics, conservatives, and Flemings against freethinkers, progressives, and Walloons.
In: American political science review, Band 46, Heft 4, S. 1069-1078
ISSN: 1537-5943
To any observer the French party system is bewildering. On the one hand, he sees that ten parliamentary groups are officially established in the National Assembly (not including the Overseas Independents); and, at the same time, he notes that only five of them are really organized throughout the country, and so entitled to be considered "parties" in the true sense of the word: the RPF, the Radicals, the MRP, the Socialists, and the Communists. On the other hand, he observes that the ablest French specialists in electoral sociology—particularly André Siegfried and his disciple, François Goguel—consider that, behind the apparent profusion of political groups, two basic divisions are always found, the continuing opposition of which has supplied for more than a century the essential dynamics of French politics. These two divisions are, of course, the Right and the Left, traditionally called "Order" and "Movement." Nevertheless, the brief history of the Fourth Republic reveals an attempt to break down these two blocs, and to build a "Third Force" from smaller units. Under various names, such a Third Force has governed France from March, 1947, to March, 1952; and if our hypothetical observer will look back and analyze the political life of the Third Republic, he will find the same tendency there, not so marked and not so strong, but always present.
In: American political science review, Band 19, Heft 2, S. 362-370
ISSN: 1537-5943
Although two general elections were held in Germany during 1924, the political situation remained confused. The election of May resulted in gains for both the extreme right and the extreme left; the one of December registered a reaction against both extremes. However, neither of these contests was sufficiently conclusive to indicate clearly the direction in which the currents of public opinion were moving. The result has been a remarkable series of cabinet crises, the latest of which it took more than a month to settle.
In: American political science review, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 152-157
ISSN: 1537-5943
Losses by the Labor party—looked upon as one of the most radical of Western European labor parties—and gains by the non-socialist groups at the Storting elections on October 20, 1930, resulted in a notable, though not a decisive, move toward the right in Norwegian parliamentary politics. The move was a remarkable one in that the Labor party lost 12 of its 59 seats in the Storting; the Conservative party added 13 to the 31 seats it already held; and the Communists, who had held three seats, were unable to elect a single representative. The move lacked decisiveness, however, because the Laborites, in spite of their losses, still constitute the largest parliamentary party. At the same time, the popular vote registered for the party was the largest ever given to any Labor or Socialist group in the history of Norway. The Conservatives did not take over the government, and the Radical government under the premiership of Mowinckel continued. While the Radicals joined with the other non-socialist parties in the fight against Labor, it advocates, nevertheless, a progressive social program. Furthermore, the present move to the right is not nearly so marked as was the move to the left in the last triennial election in 1927. The new Storting remains farther to the left than was the Storting before the 1927 elections.The chief reason why this election deserves attention is that in it there were placed before a literate, alert, and intelligent electorate—representing a homogeneous people with a democratic background—vital issues involving the acceptance or rejection of an advanced socialistic program.
In: American political science review, Band 29, Heft 5, S. 821-830
ISSN: 1537-5943
Attention has been drawn recently to the possibility of a Fascist revolution in the United States—by the Dickstein Committee, by journalistic and cinematic exposés of Fascist tendencies, by the revival of the 1918–20 "Red-baiting" spirit and technique, and by the fervent and constant agitation of the League Against War and Fascism and related organizations. Little is said seriously in responsible circles of the possibility of a Communist revolution, that being so overworked a thesis that all are aware of whatever drift in that direction there may be. Hence the present discussion of Fascist tendencies must not be taken to imply the impossibility of a swing to the left, but rather simply to denote an interest in a more novel movement to the right.
In: McGraw-Hill publications in sociology
"The interest in social psychology has not been confined to any one section of social science. On the contrary, workers in sociology, psychology, economics, and political science, historians, psychiatrists, and even literary men have all written important and significant books which must be classified as directly bearing on this field. The attempt to understand social psychology is obviously greater every year, and the student who tries to avail himself of the heritage is confronted with a laborious and confusing body of reading which soon makes him aware of the need of some guiding clew. It is clear then that a historical guide like the present work ought to serve a very useful purpose, besides being of general interest to the intellectual reader. The author has chosen to use a sort of modified biographical treatment inherited from the tradition of histories of philosophy for this book, and by copious quotation and sympathetic condensation has set for herself the task of giving the reader the teachings of the various authors on the questions that interested them most. French, German, and English writers pass in review before the reader, for all these have left a tradition without which the views of the Americans could not be understood. Until the latter part of the work is reached the treatment of the Americans is roughly chronological, so that the development can be seen and the influences traced." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved)
In: American political science review, Band 31, Heft 4, S. 638-658
ISSN: 1537-5943
Some Illustrations of Militant Democracy. Before a more systematic account of anti-fascist legislation in Europe is undertaken, recent developments in several countries may be reviewed as illustrating what militant democracy can achieve against subversive extremism when the will to survive is coupled with appropriate measures for combatting fascist techniques.1. Finland: From the start, the Finnish Republic was particularly exposed to radicalism both from left and right. The newly established state was wholly devoid of previous experience in self-government, shaken by violent nationalism, bordered by bolshevik Russia, yet within the orbit of German imperialism; no other country seemed more predestined to go fascist. Yet Finland staved off fascism as well as bolshevism. At first, the political situation was not unlike that of the Weimar Republic in the years of disintegration. The Communist party, declared illegal by the High Tribunal as early as 1925, reconstituted itself and, in 1929, obtained a large representation in the Riksdag, thereby blocking any constitutional reform. Under the decidedly extra-constitutional pressure of the nationalist and semi-fascist movement of the Lapuans, the Communists were so intimidated that nationalists, and progressives (bourgeois liberals), against the opposition of the social Democrats, were able to carry the constitutional reforms which not only strengthened the position of the government but also eventually barred subversive parties—meaning, at that time, the Communists—from national and communal representation.
In: American political science review, Band 22, Heft 3, S. 698-705
ISSN: 1537-5943
The elections which were held throughout Germany on May 20, 1928, are of considerable interest and importance not only to Germany but also to the rest of the world. These elections, to be sure, did not have the dramatic interest which attended the Reichstag elections of December, 1924. But they deserve attention for a number of reasons: first, because they are the first elections to be held in the Reich under what may be called normal conditions; second, because elections for five Landtags and several city councils were held at the same time; and third, because the elections gave a further test, and supplied additional evidence of the operation, of the German system of proportional representation.Despite the intensive work of the political parties, the people were not aroused to much enthusiasm during the campaign. The old Reichstag was dissolved before Easter, but not until the last week of the campaign could one detect any excitement. Never before had the electors been bombarded with so much printed matter, posters, and, last but not least, loud-speakers and films. All the modern methods of appealing to the voters were tried by the numerous political parties. There were lacking, however, the overpowering issues and the battlecries which were so effective in 1924. Parades, demonstrations, meetings, and all the rest were carried through successfully on the whole, but they were quite dull and uninteresting. Only the two extreme parties, the National Socialists or Hitlerites on the right, and the Communists on the left, could appear enthusiastic. Nevertheless, the lack of what the Germans call a "grosse Parole" and the lack of excitement are not to be deplored; their absence probably indicates progress toward social and political consolidation.
In: The review of politics, Band 13, Heft 2, S. 191-210
ISSN: 1748-6858
National Bolshevism represents a chapter in German-Russian relations since the First World War. As a policy advocating an Eastern orientation for Germany it is a most puzzling and at this day a very acute phenomenon. To those educated to observe the spectrum of political opinions in terms of Right and Left, with the extreme Right at the opposite end from the extreme Left, National Bolshevism seems a paradox. It suggests the meeting of extremes. More concretely the term stands for a rapprochement between German nationalism and Russian Communism. The story of National Bolshevism is the story of two "strange bedfellows."In the effort to comprehend this upsetting pattern it might be recalled that modern psychology has in many ways succeeded in breaking down our traditional thinking about human relations. Love, for example, has lost its meaning apart from hate, which has become its alter ego. We might be tempted to translate this finding into political terms, and National Bolshevism would appear as an example of a political love-hate relationship. It might also be suggested that the further we get from the origins and die more insight we gain into die workings of die two twentieth century extremes — Fascism and Communism — the more we are struck by dieir affinities. We grant diat Fascism is nodiing more dian "doctrineless dynamism," whereas Communism goes back to die solid doctrinaire structure of Marxism. And even through European history since 1917 often threatened to lead up to an ultimate conflict between Fascism and Communism, die "transmutation" through which Marxism has gone in modern Russia has brought it ironically close to Fascism. It has become increasingly evident that die fight between die two was a mere sham battle.
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 25, Heft 2, S. 203-213
ISSN: 2161-7953
While I agree with the action taken by the Court and consider that, in view of the unsatisfactory and contradictory provisions of the special agreement by which the parties have submitted this case to the Court, it is perhaps the only course by which the Court could, under its Statute, aid the parties in arriving at a wholly satisfactory solution of their dispute, nevertheless, in view of certain language used in the order, which might be the source of doubt as to the limits of the jurisdiction of this Court and might serve as a basis of argument that it is within the competence of this Court, with the consent of the parties, to take jurisdiction of and decide purely political questions upon considerations of expediency without regard to the legal rights of the parties, I feel it incumbent upon me to make the following observations:In my opinion the question of the competence of this Court which has been raised by the present case and a direct decision of which the Court has avoided, for the moment at least, by the making of the present order, is, from the point of view of the future of this Court and the development of the judicial settlement of international disputes, by far the most important question which has ever been brought before the Permanent Court of International Justice. I feel, therefore, that I would be derelict in my duty if I allowed the question to be passed over in silence or left any doubt as to my opinion in regard thereto.