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The migrant crisis that Europe has been facing for many years has triggered an avalanche of xenophobia and the dispersion of anti-migrant sentiments that have become the reference matrix for populist discourse. Anti-migrant discourse emerges in parallel as a form of language use and a form of social and political interaction. The antagonistic stereotypical narrative of migrants begins with the thesis that they constitute a retrograde social group that poses an economic and security threat to the natives and which is not capable of culturally assimilating in the countries of transit and destination (dichotomy Us vs. Them). Spreading anti-migrant discourse becomes a strategy for winning the electorate and an important tool for mobilizing political support. The political engineering of European political parties shows that anti-migrant discourse is not the exclusivity of right-wing parties of the political spectrum (although they are the most closely related), but is becoming an increasingly important topic on the political agenda of left-wing populism. Anti-migrant discourse is reflected through a nationalist and hostile approach to immigration, the glorification of national and sovereign narratives, and hostility to neoliberalism. Anti-migrant narratives have found their footing in the political activities of many European parties that are largely sovereignly profiled. Such a political vault of reasoning transforms migrant into a foreigner and attest on the triumph of communitarianism in regards to cosmopolitanism, which makes the EU's slogan "in varietate concordia" (united in diversity) questionable and subject to deconstruction.

Dоktоrskа disеrtаciја prаti rаzvој kоncеpаtа pоlitičkе lеvicе, pоlitičkе dеsnicе i pоlitičkоg cеntrа, оd njihоvоg nаstаnkа svе dо dаnаšnjih dаnа. Krоz gеnеrаlnо rаzmаtrаnjе оvih kоncеpаtа dоktоrskа disеrtаciја nudi i niz mini-biоgrаfskih pоrtrеtа znаčајnih tеоrеtičаrа i držаvnikа, kојi su оbеlеžili pоmеnutе pојmоvе u еvrоpskој pоlitičkој i intеlеktuаlnој istоriјi. Аutоr disеrtаciје, pоrеd disciplinоvаnоg iznоšеnjа nаučnih činjеnicа, nа litеrаlаn nаčin prеzеntuје intеrеsаntnu gеnеrаlnu fаbulu u kојој sе kао glаvni аktеri pојаvlјuјu vоdеćе ličnоsti mоdеrnе еvrоpskе istоriје. Disеrtаciја prikаzuје kаkо ćе, nеkаdа јеdinstvеni pоlitički prоstоri lеvicе i dеsnicе, u pоstmоdеrnоm vrеmеnu biti pоdеlјеni grаđаnskim i аntigrаđаnskim shvаtаnjеm pоlitikе, dоk ćе pоdеlа nа lеvicu i dеsnicu u njihоvim klаsičnim оblicimа biti јоš sаmо sеkundаrnа. Dоktоrskа disеrtаciја pоkаzuје dа nаs tо dоvоdi u јеdnu nоvu tеоriјsku i prаktičnu situаciјu, tе аutоr disеrtаciје u zаklјučnim nаpоmеnаmа rаdа zаklјučuје dа ćе zа stаbilnоst, dеlоtvоrnоst i lеgitimnоst pоlitičkih instituciја nа pоčеtku 21. vеkа biti pоtrеbnа јеdnа nоvа pоstidеоlоškа pоlitikа i pоstidеоlоškа pоlitičkа sоciоlоgiја. ; Doctoral dissertation follows the development of the concepts of the Political Left, the Political Right and the Political Center from the time of their creation to the present day. Through a general discussion of these concepts dissertation offers a series of mini - biographical portraits of important scholars and statesmen, who epitomized these concepts in European political and intellectual history. Author of dissertation, together with disciplined presentation of scientific facts, offers the interesting general story in which as the main actors appear leading figures of modern European history. The dissertation shows how, in the past a unique political space of the Left and the Right, in the postmodern period will be divided by civil and anti-civic understanding of politics, while the division between the Left and the Right in their classical forms remains only secondary. Doctoral dissertation finally demonstrates that previous happenings brings us into a new theoretical and practical situation, and the author of the thesis in the concluding remarks of work concludes that for stability, effectiveness and legitimacy of political institutions at the beginning of the 21st century we need a new post-ideological politics and post-ideological political sociology.

Despite the progress in all fields, modern society is facing the development of the means of political violence. Technological development also has its dangerous side. Many researches in the field of science are often carried out for the sake of military needs, and scientific researchers are often misused in military purpose. Political violence represents one of the greatest threats for the democratic development and human rights in contemporary society. The main goal of this paper is to analyze the position of political violence in contemporary society, particularly focusing on its covert use by the great powers, which is often justified by the struggle for democracy and achieving human rights. In that sense this paper is divided into two parts. The first part analyzes the globalization process, underling that this process has double face, whose negative side can significantly contribute to the spread of political violence. In the second part the author deals with the relations between policy and violence in contemporary society. The paper underlines the need for critical approach to political violence. This critical approach is crucial for understanding of political violence which is the first step in the fight against it. Political violence is not always negative and sometimes can have a positive role, especially when it comes to defensive war and combating terrorism. But the main problem here is that this can be misused to justify political violence in general. What is positive and what is the negative role of political violence often depends on the perspective of observation. Unfortunately, it seems that the privilege to enforce the standard today is reserved only for great powers, and they have become main judges who decide when political violence is to be approved of or not. This is the way in which a war becomes humanitarian interventions, protection of human rights, etc. That is why it is of great importance to encourage and initiate all actions in science which aim to understand and counter this complex phenomenon.

The notions of "right" and "left" are a fundamental semantic pattern within which voters construct their political perceptions and attitudes. Their universal meaning lies in a simple spatial approach to politics as conflict; functionally, "right" and "left" are "shortcuts" for political communication. In the empirically oriented political science, the left- right scale has become a standard variable in public opinion polls. After the initial pessimistic interpretations, in the last twenty years or so, this scale has increasingly demonstrated its validity and reliability. The sources of the right-left identification may be manifold, and not solely ideological. Also, the right-left scheme has demonstrated a remarkable potential to - in time - encompass new political contents and thus create a need for new cross-national and longitudinal studies. Voters - and not scientists - are those who define what is left and what is right. (SOI : PM: S. 168)

The subject matter of research in this paper is theoretical controversy related to the definition of right-wing extremism. Given the fact that extremism is a variable, amorphous and insufficiently researched phenomenon, largely conditioned by time, space, political and cultural differences, there is a great confusion in the field of political science when defining right-wing extremism. The problem of researching right-wing extremism is additionally complicated by various terms that are being used in the contemporary literature as its synonyms, such as right-wing radicalism, neo-Fascism, ultra-radicalism, etc. In order to provide the most valid theoretical determination of right-wing extremism, the author provides a detailed analysis of all the components constituting this phenomenon and examines their causality. In the political praxis, the term extremism is extensively abused, which additionally complicates its determination. Videlicet, politicians often use term 'extremist' in order to discredit their political opponents. While during the French revolution aristocracy saw the bourgeoisie as extremists, the members of the working class later stated that the bourgeoisie were extremists. The problem lies in the fact that, in politics, extremists are not only the ones who use violence as modus operandi; indeed, it is also used by political opponents who do not belong to the extreme political option. Another aggravating factor in defining right-wing extremism is that many administrative and academic definitions do not make a clear distinction between extremism and related phenomena, such as terrorism, radicalism and populism. Extremism is most often equaled with terrorism, which gives rise to another problem in defining this phenomenon. The relation between extremism and terrorism is the relation of general and specific. Namely, every act of terrorism is concurrently considered to be an act of extremism, but not vice versa, given the fact that every act of extremism does not lead towards a higher level of political violence (i.e. towards terrorism). Even in the terms of legal sanctioning, it is much easier to incriminate terrorism in comparison to extremism. The Serbian criminal legislation envisages relevant punishment for committing an act of terrorism, without even mentioning extremism, which implies that there is no penalty prescribed for committing an act of extremism. Despite numerous academic and administrative definitions on the concept of extremism, there is still a lack of a balanced approach to defining right-wing extremism, which is also largely conditioned by political definitions. The most prominent problem in addressing the social phenomena such as right-wing extremism lies in the fact that these social phenomena are dynamic and, in order to be analysed in a scientifically objective manner, they must be examined in the specific temporal, spatial and socio-political context.

The article presents a critical overview of underlying ideas, social context, and original teachings of two "mediating ideologies" (social democracy and conservatism) and two mass "political phenomena" (nationalism and populism). Each of them constitutes a form of more or less effective political compromise, which ought to neutralize constant tensions and clashes between the leading modern ideologies of freedom and equality, i.e. liberalism and communism. However, the clash of ideologies which were prominent in the 19th and 20th centuries has lost much of its intensity today, although the social causes that gave rise to them have remained unchanged: social inequalities, abuse of freedom, and uneven distribution of social power. At the same time, the main social forces and political organizations that had been the symbols and striking forces of freedom and equality in the preceding decades - the political parties of the "left " and "right", including the never clearly defined "political center" - also lost their identity and power. Th e then political mortal enemies look and behave today almost exactly as they did then: in the ideological sense, "everyone wants everything" (allegedly representing/ defending the interests of "all citizens"); in the organizational sense, there is almost no difference between them; whereas the difference in the manner they behave when in power is almost negligible.

This essay is an attempt to explore structural, value, ideological, and performance premises of partyism. It has been modelled after the methods and findings of eminent researchers (e.g. Inglehari, Klingemann, Knutesen, and others), who have devoted a major portion of their research to the relations among the mentioned concepts. The empirical research was conducted on a sample of Croatian students in 1998/99. By using complex analysis models of the mentioned variables we have showed that the ideological (left-right) orientation is more important for the electoral choice of Croatian students than the value orientations (religious/secular, left/righ materialism and materialism/postmaterialism). The author then shows why (in line with the results of European studies) the party orientation is more important than the values. What is most important here, however, is the finding that the two variables (the assessment of the democratic performance of the system and the ideological left/right orientation) are relatively the most significant variables for explaining the party identity and electoral choice of Croatian students. It has been shown that the leftist and the opposition parties in Croatia can count on the more left-oriented students and those who are dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy in Croatia, plus those more secularly and post-materialistically oriented. The used analytical methods can contribute to a more detailed elaboration of the theory of partyism (party identities and electoral choices) and to the model of political polarization in the society. And this is surely one of the central tasks of modern political science. (SOI : SOEU: S. 178)

The author's assumption is that a regular rotation of the left and the right in power has been a long-standing feature of stable European democracies. In most East European countries the collapse of communism was followed by the electoral defeat of leftist parties. However, in the last two years these regions have witnessed a return to power of more or less transformed leftist parties and leaders. This does not mark the return of communism, which has definitely become a thing of the past, though some of these leftist parties nurture certain revisionist traits. In less developed countries, former communist elites are being transformed into national political elites, while in more developed countries of Eastern Europe the transformation of leftist parties into social-democratic parties has been completed. The author underlines the prominence of the national element in the political programmes of leftist parties. He goes on to conclude that the main reason for the resurgence of the left in East European countries lies in the social repercussions of the transition and the fact that the right has been turning a blind eye to these problems. (SOI : PM: S 41)

Nowadays, there are divided opinions in Bosnia and Herzegovina when it comes to further mandate of the OHR and the institution of the High Representative. However, the e nd of the mandate of the High Representative is realistically expected in the near future. The need to abolish the office of the OHR and the institution of the High Representative has been mentioned increasingly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in the Republic of Srpska. The reasons for the abolition of the function of the High Representative are different between the entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as among its constitutive peoples. The authority of the High Representative has been increasingly questioned.It is on that basis that questions arise more frequently whether his (High Representative) legal acts will be valid, in particular individual decisions, such as deprivation of certain rights to citizens, the right to work, political action and passive right to vote. Representatives of the international community are worried that the interested domestic political circles could set a thesis (and be successful at it) that all acts of the High Representative will cease to apply at the moment when Annex X of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina is ended.A number of imposed laws not yet adopted by the local legislator himself, in the event of cancellation, would actually return BiH to the original competences under the Constitution BiH, as the legal consequence. The institution of the High Representative was set up by Annex X (Agreement on Civilian Implementation of the Peaceful Solution) of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.Simultaneously, bearing in mind these facts, legally speaking, Bosnia and Herzegovina can not be classified into any known form of international dependence, however, the objective situation is such that Bosnia and Herzegovina with the powers vested in the High Representative and the actions that he is taking, can be considered a state with a specific form of international dependence and a special form of guardianship.

Radom se želi prikazati kako je tekla borba Filis Šlafli i njenih saborkinja protiv usvajanja Amandmana o jednakim pravima u Ustav Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, kao i kako bi imenovani amandman, prvi put predstavljen američkoj javnosti čak davne 1923. godine, mogao da izmeni društveno—političke prilike u kojima žive američke žene. Velikim delom rad je nastao na osnovu izvora koje su iza sebe ostavile učesnice borbe za, odnosno protiv usvajanja Amandmana o jednakim pravima. Nakon uvodnog prikaza ranog istorijata odnosa javnosti prema amandmanu, našu pažnju ćemo usmeriti na jačanje vatrene opozicije amandmanu na čije čelo je stala Filis Šlafli. Takođe, ispitaćemo strukturu i razmere nasleđa ove konzervativne ikone koje nastavlja da igra značajnu ulogu na političkoj pozornici Amerike. The paper seeks to show how Phyllis Schlafly and her female comrades' struggled against ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as how the named Amendment, which was introduced to the American public back in 1923. for the first time, would change the socio-political circumstances in which contemporary American women live. For the big part, this work is based on the sources left by the participants in this fight for equal rights. After the introductory presentation of the early history of the Equal Rights Amendment, we will direct our attention to the making of the fiery opposition where Phyllis Schlafly stood as the official leader, and examine the structure and proportions of the legacy of this conservative icon which perpetuates to play a paramount role at the American political stage.

This work presents the results of empirical research of the relation among authoritarianism, political worldview, and party choice. Based on the existing research, the starting assumption is that authoritarianism is largely typical for the electoral body of the "right-wing" parties as well as for the conservative worldview. The specially designed scale for measuring authoritarian/conformist tendencies has shown a marked mono- dimensionality and inner consistency. The findings have confirmed the initial assumption; they have also shown a relatively regular correspondence between a party's p0sition on the "left-right" spectrum and the degree of authoritarianism of its electoral body. The sole exception is a higher degree of authoritarianism of HDZ's electoral body than that of HSP's, which may be explained by the fact that the applied scale has measured solely the attitude towards authority and conformity and not the attitude towards minority groups, which is a component of the famous "F" scale. Also, it has been shown that the voters of the so-called "modernist" worldviews (liberal, social-democratic) are significantly less authoritarian than the voters of the so-called "conservative" worldviews (democratic-Christian, Christian- socialist, traditional, or conservative). (SOI : PM: S. 209)

The collapse of the communist systems has brought about the crisis of identity and the political efficacy of the left not solely in Eastern Europe but in the West as well. Due to this situation, the author claims, all the elements of the traditional leftist identity have come under scrutiny. This applies both to the political ingredients common to all leftist parties (the primacy of economy, rejection of private ownership and market, egalitarianism, collectivism and the theory of progress) as well as the elements which instigated irreconcilable differentiations within the left (internationalism vs. nationalism, parliamentary democracy, the attitude towards violence, reform vs. revolution). The author concludes that due to the complex structure of the problems facing leftist parties and other political protagonists as well, there is little possibility for the emergence of an all-embracing leftist political programme; instead, partial programme variations should be expected. (SOI : PM: S. 21)

In his article Dr Pribicevic analyze relation between two largest political parties in Serbia: Democratic Party and Serbian Progressive Party and possibility of the creation of the so-called large coalition after the next parliamentarian elections scheduled for the beginning of the next year. Author explains the meaning of the conception of large coalition and pointed out its results in Germany where this idea of coalition between main parties of right and left was firstly implemented. Starting from the German experience of the large coalition between CDU and SPD Dr Pribicevic analyze the benefit and the damage such coalition might bring to its participants in Serbia. In spite of the fact that both Serbian parties reject such coalition and in spit of the fact that German experience shows that SPD and CDU lost a substantial number of votes after mutual government author concludes that voters in Serbia similar to German case in 2005 could create such option as a realistic one after next elections.

This work analyses the relation between democracy and political participation, the typology and model of political participation, the findings of the research of political participation in the world (S. Verba, N. H. Nie, 1972; S. H. Barnes, M. Kaase, 1 979; and others), and the research of the same phenomenon on a sample of Croatian students. This analysis has shown that today all the elements necessary for a more comprehensive theory of political participation are in place. This theory would enable a more systematic and standardized investigation of this phenomenon in the national and the international context. The article also shows how the non- conventional participation is gaining ground while the conventional is gradually levelling out. Significant are the results of the analysis of the etiology of political participation, particularly the relation between the standard SES model and the model of value orientations (left-right materialism, materialism-postrnaterialism, etc.). The analysis of the model of participation of Croatian students has shown that the model of protest behaviour/potential' has a more complex etiology than other models, such as conventional participation and voting in parliamentary elections. Thus, for the "protest potential" it is necessary to possess a developed civic competence, a critical attitude towards the government's performance, a liberal arts education, etc., while for the conventional participation it is central to have a higher level of political interest. Significant differences between the Croatian students and those from other European countries can be observed regarding the role of value orientations in explaining political participation. (SOI : PM: S. 140)

In his main oeuvre from the field of political philosophy ('Basic Traits of the Philosophy of Right'), Hegel wished to reconcile civil society with state. Civil society is for Hegel the way of abstract notion of property concretization. Subjective form of property is evolutioning into objective relationships among title holders. It is in the state where the will is set free from its particular interests and is becoming free in the widest sense of the word. Since civil society is established as per marketing principles, it is subject to inequalities. Since inequalities bear destructive effect on the life in community, civic particularism may be overcome only in institutional way. That institution is the state as the 'seriousness of the spirit', and the essence of civil society. Civil society is a liberal one, and the state is based on liberal principles. For Hegel, contrary to Hobbes and Locke, liberal society is not a social contract among individuals who possessed some natural rights (property), but reciproque and equal agreement among citizens and states which wish to recognize themselves mutually. It is not an own interest, but searching for rational recognition. The same as citizens, states also wish to reconcile themselves mutually, what in the situation in Kosovo and Metohia alike gets the original form.