This is a dataset on right-wing extremist demonstrations that took place in Germany between 2005 and 2020. We used the German federal government's answers to brief parliamentary questions (Kleine Anfragen) tabled by the opposition left-wing party Die Linke to create this dataset. The dataset consists of 3290 observations and includes information on the location, date, number of participants, organizing actors, and the mottos of the right-wing extremist demonstrations.
The article deals with three terrorist attacks of right-wing extremists: in Norway (2011), New Zealand (2019) and Germany (2019). First, the modus operandi of perpetrators was shown and the course of each attack was analyzed. It was indicated what tactics the attackers used and why it was or was not effective. Secondly, the ideological background and motivations of the perpetrators were shown. It was possible to analyze the manifestos that the perpetrators left, and thus their way of thinking, their ideologies, and the purposes of organizing the attacks. Thirdly, issues related to the publicizing of the attacks by the perpetrators were shown. The goal of the article is to show that radical ideology of right-wing extremists (expressed in manifestos) leads to tragedies. In analyzed cases radical appointment of the perpetrators caused three deadly attacks. The article shows that the radical actions are preceded by radical speech, expressions, manifestos. The second goal is to pay attention to hate speech (also expressed in manifestos), which is just as dangerous as bullets or improvised explosive devices. The third goal is to show how the attackers used acts of terror to spread the ideologies to which they were devoted.
Themen: 1.) In allen 5 Wellen wurden folgende Fragen wiederholt gestellt: Wichtigste Probleme und Beurteilung der Arbeit der Bundesregierung; Einschätzung der persönlichen sowie der allgemeinen wirtschaftlichen Lage und erwartete zukünftige Entwicklungen; wichtigste innenpolitische Probleme; Kritik an der Bundesregierung; Beurteilung der inneren Ordnung der BRD; Einstellung zu Ruhe und Ordnung und zu einer starken Staatsmacht (Skala).
2.) In nicht allen Wellen wurde gefragt: Präferierte Außenwirtschaftspolitik; wichtigste Determinanten der Wirtschaftsentwicklung; Beurteilung außenwirtschaftlicher Probleme sowie des Einmarschs der Russen in die CSSR; vermutetes Verhalten der USA in einem vergleichbaren Fall für die Bundesrepublik; präferierte und abgelehnte politische Persönlichkeiten; Einstellung zum Bundeskanzler Kiesinger; Einstellung zur NPD; Gründe für oder gegen eine Auflösung der NPD; Einstellung zu einer Neugründung der KPD; Einstellung zu einem NPD-Verbot; Parteipräferenz; Zukunftserwartungen und Einschätzung der wirtschaftlichen Situation (Skala); Vertrauen in die Zukunft und Wunsch nach staatlicher Ordnung (Skala); Einstellung zur NPD als Bundespartei; Einstellung zur Zeitungswerbung gegen die NPD; Einstellung zu Gewalt anwendenden NPD-Ordnungskräften auf Parteiveranstaltungen; vermuteter Ausgang der Bundestagswahl.
In der letzten Welle (nach der Bundestagswahl) wurde zusätzlich gefragt: Beurteilung des Wahlergebnisses; CDU/CSU als eine Partei; Kanzler aus einer Koalition oder aus der stärksten Partei; Beurteilung der SPD/FDP-Regierung und Einstellung zum neuen Bundeskanzler; Issue-Kompetenz der neuen Regierung sowie der alten CDU-Regierung; Vergleich von Brandt und Kiesinger; Beurteilung des Nichteinzugs der NPD in den Bundestag; Einstellung zu einem NPD-Verbot und vermutete Aktualität dieses Themas nach Mißerfolg bei der Bundestagswahl; Einschätzung der politischen Zukunft der NPD und vermutete Gründe für den Mißerfolg bei der Bundestagswahl.
3.) Sonstiges: Präferierte Tabakerzeugnisse und Zigarettenmarken; PKW-Besitz und Fahrzeugtyp; Wohnstatus.
AbstractWhat are the preconditions for right‐wing extremist violence among German youths? For several years, the rate of this violence has been increasing in Germany, and the same can be observed for right‐wing extremist orientations characterized by the coming together of ideologies of unequal worth and the acceptance of violence as a mode of action. And although it is emphasized that approval of and willingness to use violence do not automatically lead to actual acts of violence, this article suggests that the existence of these convictions in society helps to legitimize attitudes that become expressed in violence, in particular among youths.This article presents a five‐stage process model that portrays the underlying preconditions for acts of right‐wing extremist violence, the contexts in which such violence takes place, and the factors that cause it to escalate. This structural model is used to outline central empirical findings of recent German quantitative and especially qualitative studies about right‐wing extremist violent offenders. For analytical reasons, the basic elements of the process model (socialization, organization, legitimation, interaction, and escalation) are treated separately. The authors also examine right‐wing extremist violence from a disintegrative perspective. Given that intersubjective recognition is an existential human need, right‐wing extremist violence is understood as a "productive" way of dealing with individual recognition deficits. On the basis of the integration dimensions of social disintegration theory, three fundamental recognition needs are distinguished. Right‐wing extremist violence can best be explained as a consequence of recognition deficits in all three central integration dimensions.
This article analyses contemporary forms of extreme-right violence in Russia. The authors deal with the traditions and ideological background of the militant right-wing extremist scene as well as with its contemporary social and political background. The most important forms of right-wing extremist violence are identified as ad hoc hate crimes, local ethnically motivated conflicts, activities of organised gangs, the existence of paramilitary units and terrorist tendencies. Political reactions to this violence in Russia are described. The authors come to the conclusion that the threat of extreme-right violence will remain an important element of Russia's future security development. Adapted from the source document.
The article deals with three terrorist attacks of right-wing extremists: in Norway (2011), New Zealand (2019) and Germany (2019). First, the modus operandi of perpetrators was shown and the course of each attack was analyzed. It was indicated what tactics the attackers used and why it was or was not effective. Secondly, the ideological background and motivations of the perpetrators were shown. It was possible to analyze the manifestos that the perpetrators left, and thus their way of thinking, their ideologies, and the purposes of organizing the attacks. Thirdly, issues related to the publicizing of the attacks by the perpetrators were shown. The goal of the article is to show that radical ideology of right-wing extremists (expressed in manifestos) leads to tragedies. In analyzed cases radical appointment of the perpetrators caused three deadly attacks. The article shows that the radical actions are preceded by radical speech, expressions, manifestos. The second goal is to pay attention to hate speech (also expressed in manifestos), which is just as dangerous as bullets or improvised explosive devices. The third goal is to show how the attackers used acts of terror to spread the ideologies to which they were devoted.
This article investigates the linguistic-discursive construction of others in one international right-wing extremist online discussion forum. By means of a positioning analysis and an appraisal analysis, the article shows how reference to absent third parties is used to establish others as outgroups in forum posts aimed at an international audience. The analysis reveals an othering practice that links the online extremist discourse world with international and local as well as with political, social, and personal concerns, providing various opportunities for user affiliation. The results of this investigation contribute to understanding of the linguistic-discursive construction of online hate speech in multicultural virtual (rhetorical) communities; the study also highlights how social media and the use of English as a lingua franca combine to connect geographically and linguistically separate individuals and facilitate the globalization of extremist discourse through the construction of a shared discourse world online
Widening split in Israeli society and threat to the nature of Judaism as a result of the increasing political activity of right-wing Jews in Israel and the US. Some focus on alliance between the US religious Right and ultra-conservative Jews.
We investigate how right-wing extremists use, perceive, and try to provoke news media coverage. Findings from qualitative interviews with former leaders of right-wing extremist groups in Germany, who served as key informants, show that reports on right-wing extremism are used and trigger feelings of being personally affected. Consequently, right-wing extremists show hostile-media and third-person perceptions. These perceptions influence both emotions and behaviors among right-wing extremists, for example, they cause right-wing leaders to strategically monitor news media to exploit them for political goals. Our findings are presented along with a model and are accompanied by a discussion of the implications for responsible journalism.
West European right‐wing extremist parties have received a great deal of attention over the past two decades due to their electoral success. What has received less coverage, however, is the fact that these parties have not enjoyed a consistent level of electoral support across Western Europe during this period. This article puts forward an explanation of the variation in the right‐wing extremist party vote across Western Europe that incorporates a wider range of factors than have been considered previously. It begins by examining the impact of socio‐demographic variables on the right‐wing extremist party vote. Then, it turns its attention to a whole host of structural factors that may potentially affect the extreme right party vote, including institutional, party‐system and conjunctural variables. The article concludes with an assessment of which variables have the most power in explaining the uneven electoral success of right‐wing extremist parties across Western Europe. The findings go some way towards challenging the conventional wisdom as to how the advance of the parties of the extreme right may be halted.
