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The recent book La meritocrazia by Salvatore Cingari is the most in-depth attempt so far, not only in Italy, to reconstruct the debate between supporters and critics – intellectuals and politicians – of the meritocracy. The countries most closely studied are Great Britain, United States, Italy and France. The book narrates that the word «meritocracy» was coined in England in the second half of the fifties with a meaning which is just the opposite of that implied by the common sense: pejorative, distopyc, satiric, antiegualitarian, sexist. Then the book narrates that the original meaning of the word has been completely reversed, first of all in the States of the sixties and seventies, and has become synonimous, at the same time, of efficiency, equality, justice. This reversed meaning of the common sense is paradoxical, because quite often those who invoke more meritocracy do not realise that they are not invoking more legality or honesty, but more inequality, maybe at one's own expense ; Il recente libro La meritocrazia di Salvatore Cingari è il tentativo finora più ampio, non solo in Italia, di ricostruire il dibattito fra sostenitori e critici – intellettuali e politici - della meritocrazia. I Paesi studiati più da vicino sono Gran Bretagna, Stati Uniti, Italia e Francia. Il libro racconta che la parola «meritocrazia» è stata coniata in Inghilterra nella seconda metà degli anni Cinquanta con un significato che è esattamente l'opposto di quello del senso comune: spregiativo, distopico, satirico, antiegualitario, sessista. Quindi il libro narra che il significato originario della parola è stato completamente ribaltato, prima di tutto negli Stati uniti degli anni Sessanta e Settanta, ed è divenuto sinonimo, allo stesso tempo, di efficienza, eguaglianza, giustizia. Questo significato rovesciato del senso comune è paradossale perché molto spesso coloro che invocano più meritocrazia non si rendono conto di invocare non più legalità o onestà, ma più diseguaglianza, magari a proprie spese.

The topic of this chapter is the political and cultural evolution of the Association de la Presse Latine (APL). Between 1923 and 1935 the APL organised 13 conferences both in Europe and in Central America, becoming a point of reference and a place to share ideas for right wings intellectuals across the Atlantic. Analysing the meetings' proceedings and the Association's monthly magazine, this chapter intends to shed a new light both on the study of the political project of pan-Latinism in a broader transnational perspective and on the reactionary intellectuals networks during the interwar period ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

By enabling greater freedom of expression to the soviet civil society, Gorbachev's perestrojka caused the re-emergence of radical nationalist movements among soviet nationalities. In Ukraine these radical movements, though born in a typically post soviet social and cultural environment, drew inspiration from movements and thinkers deeply influenced by European fascism and the right wing radicalism of the first half of the twentieth century. Radical right wing nationalism in post soviet Ukraine, a minority opposed to both pro-Russian and national-democratic currents of Ukrainian mainstream political life, played no role in national independence and in the events of the first two decades of independence, including the "Orange Revolution" of 2004. The bloody events of Euromajdan and the following war in Ukraine's Donbass between pro-Ukrainians and pro-Russian separatists created an opportunity for these radical movements to play a greater political and paramilitary role and to take advantage of the renewed patriotic spirit.

In this intervention the idea is submitted that the interim measures in the case Casapound v. Facebook, by means of which Fb Ireland was ordered by the Rome Tribunal (on December 12, 2019) to reactivate the profile of the extreme right wing political association Casapound - previously closed as a consequence of an alleged violation of fb standards concerning hate speech - can be criticized under international and european law. Such criticisms stem both from the overall picture of the international and european legal standards concerning hate speech (par. 2) and from the relevant case law of the European Court of Human rights (paras. 3 and 4).

This paper aims at discussing the macroeconomic effects of the option of leaving the euro on the part of Italy. This option is connected with the so-called sovereignism. It will be argued that the devaluation of the new Italian currency would (i) reduce real wages, worsening income distribution; (ii) would reduce the rate of growth of labour productivity and hence economic growth; (iii) would generate financial turmoils. On the political ground, sovereignism is in line with an right wing view, although it is supported by many Italian economists who define themselves leftist. Sovereignism; Euro; Productivity; Economic Growth.

The context of the Fifties is essential to focus on the construction of democracy in Italy and the process of legitimation of the right, which takes place in those years. The relationship with the United States is central to understand the delicate balance between democracy, anti-communism and anti-fascism. Among the issues raised, three are the main ones. First of all, we cannot consider the United States and right as monolithic blocks. Inside there are a number of differences in cultural background and political strategy in the fight against communism. In particular, there have been conflicts between Embassy and State Department: Clare Boothe Luce was very critical of the DC and, while agreeing with the criticism of the Right, never gave any support to MSI, PNM and other movements on the right. The anti-communism, therefore, has never prevailed over the anti-fascism. Likewise, the political right was very different from the "impolitical", deeply rooted in society and nostalgic of the past regime. The second point is the substantial mutual misunderstanding between Americans and the Right. The idea that the Embassy had, in addition to non-democratic nature of MSI, was that you could create a democratic right from the monarchists. The project, however, was rejected because Covelli and Lauro feared losing their electorate. They confirmed, in this way, the choice of non-democratic. On the other hand, the monarchists, neo-fascists, the cultural right (Montanelli, for example) and some rightist businessmen had a wrong idea about U.S. According to them, anti-communism had to prevail over democracy, but the various extremist proposals were consistently declined. In the background - third and last point - there is a country considered structurally undemocratic. Underlying this belief is certainly the weight of the fascist period, that still had a certain importance in the Fifties. But there are also many rather deep-seated prejudices about Italy and the "Latin countries" in general.

Since postwar, Italians are famous in Europe for their intense political and electoral participation. However, in the comparative survey we are reporting, as well as in all the recent local surveys, this legend is being strongly challenged. Other surprising result is that class consciousness is higher among those who vote for the right; left-wing voters are mainly composed by the medium and higher bourgeoisie; the apolitical, the right-wing voters and the "5 stelle" (a new party) by the small bourgeoisie, the workers and the employees. ; Desde el período de la posguerra, los italianos son famosos en Europa por su intensa participación política y electoral. En esta investigación comparativa, como en todas las investigaciones locales recientes, esta leyenda ha sido cuestionada. Otro resultado sorprendente es que la conciencia de clase es más alta entre los que votan por la derecha. Los votantes de izquierda están particularmente presentes en la burguesía media-alta; los apolíticos, los votantes de derecha y de los "5 estrellas" en la pequeña burguesía, entre los trabajadores y los empleados. ; Dal dopoguerra gli italiani sono famosi in Europa per la loro intensa partecipazione politica ed elettorale. In questa ricerca comparata, così come in tutte le recenti indagini locali, questa leggenda è stata messa in discussione. Un altro risultato sorprendente è che la coscienza di classe è più alta tra coloro che votano a destra. Gli elettori di sinistra sono principalmente presenti nella borghesia medio-alta; gli apolitici, gli elettori di destra e dei "5 stelle" nella piccola borghesia, fra i lavoratori e gli impiegati.

The center of attention of this thesis is the ideas of Guglielmo Giannini and the qualunquista movement, their conception of what was wrong, the changes they sought and the techniques they thought desirable. The movement was born in 1945 and grew popular during postwar years, although it quickly disappeared after 1948. This work of mine is divided in two parts. The first one reflects on the genesis of what we may call Qualunquismo storico (historical qualunquismo), a political movement which claimed to represent the middle class and a large penumbra of apolitical citizens not sufficiently dissatisfied to protest their conditions. Most of all, this is a study of political thinking and political moods, the kind of thinking that impinged most directly upon the ordinary citizen, the common man as it was defined by Guglielmo Giannini, father of Qualunquismo. In this part we consider the legacy of the Second World War and the sense of disillusion and disenchantment that it fostered, especially in right-wing thought and opinion.! The analysis revolves around the figure of Guglielmo Giannini and his thought as it was expressed through the newspaper L'Uomo Qualunque, which boasted a circulation of 800.000 and became a source of guidance and opinion for a certain kind of popular opinion. L'Uomo Qualunque claimed to represent the resentment and dreams of the meek little men in the middle, the figure for whom Giannini was particularly solicitous. These pages aim to study this particular movement as the harbinger of a rather broader frame of mind, therefore it considers right wing thought and opinion in postwar Italy and qualunquismo long-lasting legacy. The second part focuses on qualunquismo as a political party, studying it with a political science kind of approach. In this part I analyse the political party which was born from the newspaper L'Uomo Qualunque, named Fronte Liberale Democratico dell'Uomo Qualunque, using the Richard Katz and Peter Mair organisational tripartition: party in central office, party in public office and party on the ground. This part aims to provide a thorough analysis of the party form membership to leadership, paying particular attention to the qualunquisti member of parliament and their biographies.

Heroes and Traitors. Politics of History of Poland`s Law and Justice Party Since 2015 Poland has been governed by the right-wing populist Law and Justice party. So called politics of history has become one of the pillars of its ideology and politics. Its function is to define the crucial lines of contemporary conflicts, distinguish "true" Poles who support the ruling party from the opponents who are labeled as "not Polish enough" , and often as outright enemies of the nation or even traitors serving foreign interests. The key historical narrative of the Law and Justice presents the glorious image of the Poland`s past as being constantly jeopardized by manifold attempts, undertaken by its cosmopolitan and corrupt elites and by external enemies, undermining the Polish martyrdom and heroism throughout history, especially during WWII and the Holocaust. History is exploited also by other right wing nationalist and populist movements in Europe that tend to rely on nation`s historical victimhood and heroism, rejecting or silencing more controversial parts of the common past. Nevertheless, in Poland in history has been exploited as a political weapon in a more intense way than probably in any other European country. There may be at least two reasons for this. The first one is the Polish historical experience throughout the 18-20th centuries : the absence of the nation-state for an extended period of time (since 1795 when Poland was partitioned between its three neighbors until 1918 when the Polish state was resurrected), and foreign occupations or subservience to external powers (WW II and the Communist period) created conditions in which national identity was to a great extent based on history and tradition, and not on the identification with state institutions and procedures as in most countries of Western Europe. Hence the emotional power of history that can be used to shape contemporary political and ideological agendas and identities. The second fundamental reason may be a recent exposure to the supra-national structures (Poland joined the EU in 2004) with its political and cultural values which in many evoke incertitude and fears, prone to be exploited by anti-European and anti-modernist populists. In the time of rapid changes involving almost all aspects of life, the nation`s past is seen as the most solid bulwark.

The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) is a young German right-wing party, whose success at the last federal election 2017 was considered unexpected. One of the reasons for this result lies certainly in the language they resort to. Among the many linguistic studies about this party, no one seems to have focused on political talk shows, that is, "hybrid" situations, in which institutional and everyday elements merge and political actors "stage" their ideas and personal profiles for their positive self-presentation. There-fore, this article aims at analysing the language used by the two leading candidates of the party for the federal elections 2017, Gauland and Weidel, in political talk shows which took place between that and the previous year. Drawing mainly on the politlonguistic frame of analysis, combined with other tools derived from the Sprachkritik and the conversation analysis, this investigation sheds light on the main lexical-semantic, rhetorical-argumentative, pronominal and other strategies put into practice by the party in political televised debates.

In this paper I discuss some features of Italian political discourse after the ending of the so called 'berlusconismo' (that is, the specific communicative style of Silvio Berlusconi, the leader of Italian right wing for almost two decades). In particular, I display the figure of Matteo Renzi, the current Italian Prime Minister and Secretary of PD, the most important Italian political party. In my work, I try to pinpoint the peculiarity of Renzi's discourse strategies. In this vein, I suggest to use the notion of 'disphasic discourse', in order to underline the strong decrease of styles, genres and textual types variability characterizing his ways of communicating. I focus the attention on two aspects. The first issue concerns the places (no matter if real or virtual) Renzi elected as symbol of that change on behalf of which he has based his career: the social networks and Twitter in particular. The second aspect is the storytelling technique that Renzi uses in a strategic and explicit way.

Populism is among the most controversial and debated contemporary political issues. The definition of populism itself is inherently problematic because of its indeterminacy. Populism seems to be a contemporary phenomena, being strongly dependent from political propaganda and mass communication media. The question concerning the regressive nature of populism can thus be stated within the broader issue of the relation between populism and democracy. In fact, when populism is investigated, it appears necessary to consider its relation with those political forces that place themselves within the political project of representative government, as well as in relation with the theme of democracy itself. In our perspective, in order to define populism it is not sufficient to question its relation with leftist or right wing political parties, or with progressive and reactionary political forces: instead, we deem necessary to trace its inner links with democracy itself, i.e. with that historical political form characterizing, according to Tocqueville, western world from the American revolution onward.

Il surrealismo è sempre stato caratterizzato da una vocazione internazionalista, leggibile anche come reazione al nazionalismo antigermanico della destra francese. D'altra parte, soprattutto negli anni dell'occupazione nazista, non sono mancate rivendicazioni della tradizione francese, identificata con lo spirito della rivolta. Questo contributo intende indagare le posizioni contrastanti e sfumate che il surrealismo ha assunto nei confronti del canone nazionale francese, letterario o, più ampiamente, culturale, attraverso l'analisi di alcuni casi esemplari (Breton, Aragon, Desnos e Queneau). ; Surrealism has always been characterised by a tendency towards internationalism, which could be interpreted also as a reaction against the anti-Germanic nationalism of French right-wing politics. On the other hand, it has also appealed to those aspects of the French tradition that came to be identified with a sense of rebellion. The present contribution aims at investigating the contrasting, and subtly differentiated stances that Surrealism has taken towards the French national literary (or, more generally, cultural) canon, through the analysis of some emblematic cases (Breton, Aragon, Desnos, and Queneau).

This chapter aims at complexifying the migration debate in Italy by focusing on the conflict between, on one hand, the cities that expressed solidarity during the 2015-18 refugee reception crisis and, on the other hand, the Government in office in 2018-19. Significantly, port cities have particularly distinguished themselves as welcoming spaces, for the involvement of their civil society in reception support, and their political opposition to the Government's anti-migration stance. Our intention is therefore to identify and analyse the specificities of these places, their unique ethnocultural and political identity, which paved the way for local and more inclusive paradigms of reception. ; Peer reviewed

The interest on fascism in Scandinavia and Finland is due to the importance that Nazism gave to the 'nordic race', its mythology and its cultural heritage. Fascism did not become very popular in the Nordic countries and it did not achieve power anywhere (the only exception was the case of Vidkun Quisling). This study, focused on Italian and German cultural propaganda in the Nordic countries, could show us that fascism was a global and transnational doctrine with diverse reformulations or ramifications. Therefore, this research could also be useful to the analysis of Mussolini's struggle against Nazi political and cultural influence in the Nordic area. Organisations and associations like the Società Dante Alighieri (Dante Alighieri Society) and the Nordische Gesellschaft (Nordic Society), embodied the cultural comparison between the trope of Rome and the Germanic Weltanschauung. Moreover, the matter of race broke the network of the European right-wing groups and brought the failure of the 'Fascist International' dream. Consequently, the contradiction between the Latin and the Nordic interpretations of the world, made the Italo-German alliance fragile and inefficient.