Suchergebnisse

Głównym tematem artykułu jest analiza prawicowo-ekstremistycznych nastrojów w społeczeństwie niemieckim, których rzecznikiem stają się coraz częściej przedstawiciele klasy średniej. Nieudany projekt wielokulturowości niemieckiej, długotrwały kryzys gospodarczy w Europie, zjawisko terroryzmu islamskiego i fala uchodźców stworzyły atmosferę ksenofobizmu i rasizmu. W efekcie tworzone są partie oraz nieformalne ugrupowania, które oczekują od państwa zmian w polityce azylowej i artykułują potrzebę utrwalania tożsamości narodowej. Tworzące się ad hoc ruchy społeczne odnoszą się krytycznie do niemieckiego systemu politycznego gromadząc określoną część elektoratu. Jeden z ruchów obywatelskich pod nazwą Pegida demonstruje nie tylko przeciwko radykałom muzułmańskim, a islamowi w ogóle. Organizatorzy i zwolennicy Pegidy dystansują się publicznie od ekstremistów prawicowych, ale wykorzystują lęki przed islamskim terrorem i szerzą nastroje niechęci wobec uchodźców i obcych. Pytanie badawcze dotyczy perspektyw utrwalania demokratycznych standardów w pozjednoczeniowym społeczeństwie niemieckim przez klasę średnią, która może stać się najważniejszym elementem wpływającym na opinię publiczną. Renesans ideologii faszystowskiej wymusił konieczność wykreowania nowego modelu komunikowania społecznego pomiędzy klasami. Percepcja tej ideologii jest przedmiotem badawczym sfery aksjologicznej. ; The main topic of this paper is the analysis of right-wing extremist sentiments in German society. Representatives of the middle-class are mostly identified with these political tendencies. The unsuccessful multicultural project in the Federal Republic of Germany, long-lasting economic crisis in Europe, Islamic terrorism and the wave of immigrants have led to the spread of xenophobia and racism. Thus, many new parties and various informal groups are being formed that expect the government to change the asylum policy of the state and which express their need to consolidate national identity. These social groups demonstrate a critical attitude to the German political system, attracting a certain portion of the protesting electorate. One of the citizens' movements, named Pegida, is demonstrating against not only radical Muslims but Islam as a whole. The organizers and supporters of Pegida publicly distance themselves from right-wing extremists, but use the fears of Islamic terror to spread general negative sentiments towards refugees and foreigners. The research question refers to the prospects of instilling democratic standards in the middle class of German society after the post-unification period. This social class may be the most important factor influencing public opinion. The renaissance of fascist ideology has forced the creation of a new model of communication between social classes. The perception of right-wing ideology is the object of research in the axiological sphere.

Głównym tematem artykułu jest analiza prawicowo-ekstremistycznych nastrojów w społeczeństwie niemieckim, których rzecznikiem stają się coraz częściej przedstawiciele klasy średniej. Nieudany projekt wielokulturowości niemieckiej, długotrwały kryzys gospodarczy w Europie, zjawisko terroryzmu islamskiego i fala uchodźców stworzyły atmosferę ksenofobizmu i rasizmu. W efekcie tworzone są partie oraz nieformalne ugrupowania, które oczekują od państwa zmian w polityce azylowej i artykułują potrzebę utrwalania tożsamości narodowej. Tworzące się ad hoc ruchy społeczne odnoszą się krytycznie do niemieckiego systemu politycznego gromadząc określoną część elektoratu. Jeden z ruchów obywatelskich pod nazwą Pegida demonstruje nie tylko przeciwko radykałom muzułmańskim, a islamowi w ogóle. Organizatorzy i zwolennicy Pegidy dystansują się publicznie od ekstremistów prawicowych, ale wykorzystują lęki przed islamskim terrorem i szerzą nastroje niechęci wobec uchodźców i obcych. Pytanie badawcze dotyczy perspektyw utrwalania demokratycznych standardów w pozjednoczeniowym społeczeństwie niemieckim przez klasę średnią, która może stać się najważniejszym elementem wpływającym na opinię publiczną. Renesans ideologii faszystowskiej wymusił konieczność wykreowania nowego modelu komunikowania społecznego pomiędzy klasami. Percepcja tej ideologii jest przedmiotem badawczym sfery aksjologicznej. ; The main topic of this paper is the analysis of right-wing extremist sentiments in German society. Representatives of the middle-class are mostly identified with these political tendencies. The unsuccessful multicultural project in the Federal Republic of Germany, long-lasting economic crisis in Europe, Islamic terrorism and the wave of immigrants have led to the spread of xenophobia and racism. Thus, many new parties and various informal groups are being formed that expect the government to change the asylum policy of the state and which express their need to consolidate national identity. These social groups demonstrate a critical attitude to the German political system, attracting a certain portion of the protesting electorate. One of the citizens' movements, named Pegida, is demonstrating against not only radical Muslims but Islam as a whole. The organizers and supporters of Pegida publicly distance themselves from right-wing extremists, but use the fears of Islamic terror to spread general negative sentiments towards refugees and foreigners. The research question refers to the prospects of instilling democratic standards in the middle class of German society after the post-unification period. This social class may be the most important factor influencing public opinion. The renaissance of fascist ideology has forced the creation of a new model of communication between social classes. The perception of right-wing ideology is the object of research in the axiological sphere.

The article analyses two dramas by Jarosław Jakubowski: Dożynki and Nowy Legion (New legion), which their author designed as attempts at updating the political frame of Mickiewicz's Dziady (Forefathers' Eve), (especially 'Warsaw salon'), read in the context of the 'Smoleńsk romanticism.' The right-wing approach to Mickiewicz's archdrama offers a diagnosis of the social and political divide ('two Poland') in the aspect of the clash between two worldviews: left-wing and liberal versus right-wing. Mickiewicz's authority is supposed to strengthen the right-wing diagnoses, hence it is easy to spot the numerous attempts at instrumental and anachronic reading of the romantic legacy. At the same time, the analysed dramas show the importance and the textual and ideological productivity of the romantic paradigm. ; The article analyses two dramas by Jarosław Jakubowski: Dożynki and Nowy Legion (New legion), which their author designed as attempts at updating the political frame of Mickiewicz's Dziady (Forefathers' Eve), (especially 'Warsaw salon'), read in the context of the 'Smoleńsk romanticism.' The right-wing approach to Mickiewicz's archdrama offers a diagnosis of the social and political divide ('two Poland') in the aspect of the clash between two worldviews: left-wing and liberal versus right-wing. Mickiewicz's authority is supposed to strengthen the right-wing diagnoses, hence it is easy to spot the numerous attempts at instrumental and anachronic reading of the romantic legacy. At the same time, the analysed dramas show the importance and the textual and ideological productivity of the romantic paradigm.

The research objective of this paper is to analyse European programmes of the right wing, populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the left wing, populist German Left Party (Die Linke), to present their 2014 election campaigns for the European Parliament, and also to assess the activities undertaken by Members of the European Parliament of these political groups on the forum of the eighth EP. The reflections presented in this work were divided into four parts. First, the analysis of a large body of literature referring to populism is made and selected concepts for indicating the characteristic features of populist groups are proposed. Next, the European programmes of the Freedom Party of Austria and the German Left party are analysed. Then, the main subjects around which the political campaign to the EP of right- and left-wing populists was concentrated are indicated. In the third part, the analysis covers the EP election results and the voter support gained by the respective groups in relation to previous European elections in which both populist groups participated. Finally, the fourth part of the paper lists the areas of ac- tivities and the tools for parliamentary work used by the MEPs from FPÖ and the Left Party, including an assessment of their influence on the policy of the current EP. ; The research objective of this paper is to analyse European programmes of the right wing, populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the left wing, populist German Left Party (Die Linke), to present their 2014 election campaigns for the European Parliament, and also to assess the activities undertaken by Members of the European Parliament of these political groups on the forum of the eighth EP. The reflections presented in this work were divided into four parts. First, the analysis of a large body of literature referring to populism is made and selected concepts for indicating the characteristic features of populist groups are proposed. Next, the European programmes of the Freedom Party of Austria and the German Left party are analysed. Then, the main subjects around which the political campaign to the EP of right- and left-wing populists was concentrated are indicated. In the third part, the analysis covers the EP election results and the voter support gained by the respective groups in relation to previous European elections in which both populist groups participated. Finally, the fourth part of the paper lists the areas of ac- tivities and the tools for parliamentary work used by the MEPs from FPÖ and the Left Party, including an assessment of their influence on the policy of the current EP.

Po I wojnie światowej zaszły duże zmiany we wszystkich dziedzinach życia społeczeństwa: gospodarce, stosunkach politycznych, ideologii, kulturze. Różniły się w różnych państwach, ale miały wspólną cechę: jak najszybsze osiągnięcie stabilności. Demoliberalne metody rządów państw okazały się nieskuteczne, co powodowało nastroje totalitarne i autorytarne. Poszukiwano nowych koncepcji ustrojów państwowych, które miałyby zapewnić przeprowadzenie reform i zabezpieczyć sprawne funkcjonowanie aparatu państwowego. Predestynowane do takich zachowań były państwa – zwycięzcy lub niemogące pokonać kryzysu. Ukraina, która odzyskała niepodległość, w latach 1917–1920 ją straciła. W środowiskach elit politycznych poszukiwano winnych. Przede wszystkim ostrą krytykę skierowano w stronę byłych przywódców Ukraińskiej Republiki Ludowej ze środowisk prawicowych. Zarzucano im, że powołany przez nich model państwa w kształcie demokratycznej republiki okazał się niewitalny i przyczynił się do utraty niepodległości narodowej. Jako alternatywę podawano wizję przyszłego państwa ukraińskiego wzorowaną na totalitarnych lub autorytarnych modelach ustrojów państwowych, które ugruntowały się w poszczególnych krajach europejskich i ujawniły swoją efektywność w neutralizacji ruchu komunistycznego, umocnieniu pozycji aparatu państwowego i jego arbitralności. Teoretyczne uzasadnienie tej koncepcji znaleziono w opracowaniach polityków prawicoworadykalnych i konserwatywnych – D. Doncowa, M. Sciborskiego, W. Lipińskiego, W. Kuczabskiego, O. Nazaruka i innych. Model państwa ukraińskiego w ujęciu prawicowych środowisk politycznych okresu międzywojennego generalnie dążył w kierunku ówczesnej europejskiej myśli politycznej, z tą jednak różnicą, że priorytetem była kwestia restytucji niepodległości. ; The changes that took place at the end of the First World War significantly affected all spheres of society: economic, political relations, ideology, and culture. They took place in almost every state and, despite the differences in their course, had one thing ...

Celem badawczym artykułu jest analiza programów europejskich populistycznej prawicowo-radykalnej Wolnościowej Partii Austrii (FPO) oraz populistycznej lewicowo-radykalnej Partii Lewicy (Die Linke), ukazanie ich kampanii wyborczej do Parlamentu Europejskiego z 2014 roku, a także ocena form aktywności eurodeputowanych z tych ugrupowań na forum PE VIII kadencji. Podejmowane w pracy rozważania podzielono na cztery części, w pierwszej kolejności dokonano analizy bogatej literatury przedmiotu dotyczącej populizmu oraz zaproponowano wykorzystanie wybranych koncepcji do wskazania cech charakterystycznych dla ugrupowań populistycznych. Następnie przeanalizowano aktualne programy europejskie Wolnościowej Partii Austrii i Partii Lewicy oraz wskazano główne tematy, wokół których koncentrowała się kampania wyborcza do PE prawicowych i lewicowych populistów. W trzeciej części analiza objęła wyniki wyborów do PE oraz uzyskane przez ugrupowania poparcie, w odniesieniu do wcześniejszych europejskich elekcji, w których uczestniczyły obie badane partie populistyczne. W ostatniej czwartej części artykułu przedstawione zostały dziedziny aktywności oraz narzędzia pracy parlamentarnej, z których korzystają eurodeputowani z FPO i Partii Lewicy wraz z oceną wpływu na politykę Parlamentu Europejskiego VIII kadencji. ; The research objective of this paper is to analyse European programmes of the right wing, populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) and the left wing, populist German Left Party (Die Linke), to present their 2014 election campaigns for the European Parliament, and also to assess the activities undertaken by Members of the European Parliament of these political groups on the forum of the eighth EP. The reflections presented in this work were divided into four parts. First, the analysis of a large body of literature referring to populism is made and selected concepts for indicating the characteristic features of populist groups are proposed. Next, the European programmes of the Freedom Party of Austria and the German Left party are analysed. Then, the main subjects around which the political campaign to the EP of right and left-wing populists was concentrated are indicated. In the third part, the analysis covers the EP election results and the voter support gained by the respective groups in relation to previous European elections in which both populist groups participated. Finally, the fourth part of the paper lists the areas of activities and the tools for parliamentary work used by the MEPs from FPO and the Left Party, including an assessment of their influence on the policy of the current EP.

One of the main challenges European democracy has faced recently is growing political radicalism, and primarily the increasing importance of populist parties originating from both left and right sides of the political arena. This paper refers to the theoretical assumptions concerning this phenomenon to analyze the operations of the 'Die Linke' party in the German party system. This party is an excellent example of taking skillful advantage of the circumstances favoring the development of the populist tendencies that have emerged following the recent, radical, social, and political changes in the Federal Republic of Germany. Against the background of European extremist left-wing parties, the paper presents the influence this Left-Wing Party exerts on the changing balance of power on the German political arena on a regional and national level, the ideological profile and party platform, and the changing structure of both its members and voters.

One of the main challenges European democracy has faced recently is growing political radicalism, and primarily the increasing importance of populist parties originating from both left and right sides of the political arena. This paper refers to the theoretical assumptions concerning this phenomenon to analyze the operations of the 'Die Linke' party in the German party system. This party is an excellent example of taking skillful advantage of the circumstances favoring the development of the populist tendencies that have emerged following the recent, radical, social, and political changes in the Federal Republic of Germany. Against the background of European extremist left-wing parties, the paper presents the influence this Left-Wing Party exerts on the changing balance of power on the German political arena on a regional and national level, the ideological profile and party platform, and the changing structure of both its members and voters.

The Treaty of Lisbon, which became effective on December 1 2009, provides for the transformation of the European Union into a more democratic, efficient and united community. This paper attempts to assess to what extent its provisions are reflected in the current reality of a united Europe. On the one hand, democratic legitimization of the EU is growing as a result of increasing competencies of the European Parliament, the rights of national parliaments, and so-called citizens' initiatives. However, the turnout in the last European elections, the increasing popularity of extremist right-wing parties, the work of the European Convention and restrictions imposed on the free movement of persons show that EU practice is far from the complete implementation of democratic values. Secondly, the Lisbon Treaty provides for higher EU efficiency in the international arena. This cannot be achieved, though, by electing people devoid of charisma, experience and a vision of a united Europe to the highest positions, such as EU president or chief of diplomacy. Last but not least, the new treaty provides for energy solidarity. Yet the work of the European Parliament, which is expected to translate these words into practice, is burdened by an increasing number of doubts and difficulties.

The Treaty of Lisbon, which became effective on December 1 2009, provides for the transformation of the European Union into a more democratic, efficient and united community. This paper attempts to assess to what extent its provisions are reflected in the current reality of a united Europe. On the one hand, democratic legitimization of the EU is growing as a result of increasing competencies of the European Parliament, the rights of national parliaments, and so-called citizens' initiatives. However, the turnout in the last European elections, the increasing popularity of extremist right-wing parties, the work of the European Convention and restrictions imposed on the free movement of persons show that EU practice is far from the complete implementation of democratic values. Secondly, the Lisbon Treaty provides for higher EU efficiency in the international arena. This cannot be achieved, though, by electing people devoid of charisma, experience and a vision of a united Europe to the highest positions, such as EU president or chief of diplomacy. Last but not least, the new treaty provides for energy solidarity. Yet the work of the European Parliament, which is expected to translate these words into practice, is burdened by an increasing number of doubts and difficulties.

Although the Solidarity Election Action (AWS) had been the first impressive attempt to unite right-wing groupings after 1989 which was effected in practice, it failed to develop a united, coherent image for the purpose of contacts with the media throughout the whole period it was in power. Reality showed that right-wing politicians failed to take advantage of the assets of the new grouping. Incompetence of its leaders and absence of a coherent policy quickly overshadowed the success of the Solidarity Election Action. As a consequence, Solidarity Election Action has wasted an enormous chance and failed to become a united group of the Polish right wing. Leaders of individual organizations composing the AWS did not give up their leaders' ambitions, which became particularly significant towards the end of theAWS-UW(Solidarity Election Action – Liberty Union) coalition, when the right-wing block was eroding rapidly.

Although the Solidarity Election Action (AWS) had been the first impressive attempt to unite right-wing groupings after 1989 which was effected in practice, it failed to develop a united, coherent image for the purpose of contacts with the media throughout the whole period it was in power. Reality showed that right-wing politi- cians failed to take advantage of the assets of the new grouping. Incompetence of its leaders and absence of a coherent policy quickly overshadowed the success of the Soli- darity Election Action. As a consequence, Solidarity Election Action has wasted an enormous chance and failed to become a united group of the Polish right wing. Leaders of individual organizations composing the AWS did not give up their leaders' ambitions, which became particularly significant towards the end of the AWS-UW (Solidarity Election Action – Liberty Union) coalition, when the right-wing block was eroding rapidly.

In his well known essay "Left-wing" communism: an infan-tile disorder Lenin used the Russian term "levizna" to name a naïve strategy of West European communist parties. This term is usually translated as "Left-Wing" but it does not show its disregarding to West communist politics in Lenin's eyes. In Polish there is anther tradition, used by commu-nist nomenclature, to ridicule left wing movement (e.g. in 1968), and it is translated as "lewactwo" (translations such as"lefty", "leftie" do not fit due to historical context and the Russian grammar). Nowadays the term is used by right-wing movements and politicians to humiliate each left-wing idea as childish (opposed to "adult" right-wing). In my article, I intend to show how this "lewactwo" notion works as a barrier of national identity, as well as a screen of phantasy. The em-pirical part of my work was based on Internet folklore, such as mems, commentaries, short YouTube films and also on offers of shops with patriotic clothes and gadgets (because their offer is rooted in this folklore, and they first make some "patriotic context," e.g. something interesting in history, and then offer clothes etc. in relation to this. So their merchandise is strictly based on Internet folklore and work as "barometer" for it). My analysis shows how the notion "lewactwo" works as an ideological and phantasmatic barrier for national identity. This barrier shows how all these right-wing movements construct positive set of the "nation." This set contains positive as well as negative (put together with "lewactwo") elements, like notions, ideas and signs with which they must be contiguous to be part of the nation (e.g., in an anthropological notion of magic based on contagion and similarity). The term "lewactwo" is also used as a screen of phantasy, where you are projecting all features which exclude you from the community and your positive "national identity."

Despite a certain degree of chaos characterizing the Polish political arena, Polish society can be said to be capable of relatively accurate categorization of political parties with respect to their position in the left – right spectrum; two thirds of society are also able to identify their own views in this respect. What differentiates Polish society from Western European societies, though, is the lack of correlation between ones'position in the social structure and ideology, as well as the negligible importance of economic matters in one's identification as a left – right winger. The emergence of two strong political parties referring to themselves as right-wing (Civic Platform – PO and Law and Justice – PiS), accompanied by the weakening of the left of the political arena in Poland has resulted in this tendency becoming even stronger. ; Despite a certain degree of chaos characterizing the Polish political arena, Polish society can be said to be capable of relatively accurate categorization of political parties with respect to their position in the left – right spectrum; two thirds of society are also able to identify their own views in this respect. What differentiates Polish society from Western European societies, though, is the lack of correlation between ones'position in the social structure and ideology, as well as the negligible importance of economic matters in one's identification as a left – right winger. The emergence of two strong political parties referring to themselves as right-wing (Civic Platform – PO and Law and Justice – PiS), accompanied by the weakening of the left of the political arena in Poland has resulted in this tendency becoming even stronger.