The subject matter of research in this paper is theoretical controversy related to the definition of right-wing extremism. Given the fact that extremism is a variable, amorphous and insufficiently researched phenomenon, largely conditioned by time, space, political and cultural differences, there is a great confusion in the field of political science when defining right-wing extremism. The problem of researching right-wing extremism is additionally complicated by various terms that are being used in the contemporary literature as its synonyms, such as right-wing radicalism, neo-Fascism, ultra-radicalism, etc. In order to provide the most valid theoretical determination of right-wing extremism, the author provides a detailed analysis of all the components constituting this phenomenon and examines their causality. In the political praxis, the term extremism is extensively abused, which additionally complicates its determination. Videlicet, politicians often use term 'extremist' in order to discredit their political opponents. While during the French revolution aristocracy saw the bourgeoisie as extremists, the members of the working class later stated that the bourgeoisie were extremists. The problem lies in the fact that, in politics, extremists are not only the ones who use violence as modus operandi; indeed, it is also used by political opponents who do not belong to the extreme political option. Another aggravating factor in defining right-wing extremism is that many administrative and academic definitions do not make a clear distinction between extremism and related phenomena, such as terrorism, radicalism and populism. Extremism is most often equaled with terrorism, which gives rise to another problem in defining this phenomenon. The relation between extremism and terrorism is the relation of general and specific. Namely, every act of terrorism is concurrently considered to be an act of extremism, but not vice versa, given the fact that every act of extremism does not lead towards a higher level of political violence (i.e. towards terrorism). Even in the terms of legal sanctioning, it is much easier to incriminate terrorism in comparison to extremism. The Serbian criminal legislation envisages relevant punishment for committing an act of terrorism, without even mentioning extremism, which implies that there is no penalty prescribed for committing an act of extremism. Despite numerous academic and administrative definitions on the concept of extremism, there is still a lack of a balanced approach to defining right-wing extremism, which is also largely conditioned by political definitions. The most prominent problem in addressing the social phenomena such as right-wing extremism lies in the fact that these social phenomena are dynamic and, in order to be analysed in a scientifically objective manner, they must be examined in the specific temporal, spatial and socio-political context.
The migrant crisis that Europe has been facing for many years has triggered an avalanche of xenophobia and the dispersion of anti-migrant sentiments that have become the reference matrix for populist discourse. Anti-migrant discourse emerges in parallel as a form of language use and a form of social and political interaction. The antagonistic stereotypical narrative of migrants begins with the thesis that they constitute a retrograde social group that poses an economic and security threat to the natives and which is not capable of culturally assimilating in the countries of transit and destination (dichotomy Us vs. Them). Spreading anti-migrant discourse becomes a strategy for winning the electorate and an important tool for mobilizing political support. The political engineering of European political parties shows that anti-migrant discourse is not the exclusivity of right-wing parties of the political spectrum (although they are the most closely related), but is becoming an increasingly important topic on the political agenda of left-wing populism. Anti-migrant discourse is reflected through a nationalist and hostile approach to immigration, the glorification of national and sovereign narratives, and hostility to neoliberalism. Anti-migrant narratives have found their footing in the political activities of many European parties that are largely sovereignly profiled. Such a political vault of reasoning transforms migrant into a foreigner and attest on the triumph of communitarianism in regards to cosmopolitanism, which makes the EU's slogan "in varietate concordia" (united in diversity) questionable and subject to deconstruction.
In his first interview to Croatian media after a long period of silence, in October 1989 the leader of the newly formed Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), Franjo Tudjman, described himself as 'a Croat man, Marxist, Revolutionary and Historian'. Why did he use concepts such as 'Marxist' and 'Revolutionary' at the time when elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe these concepts became politically incorrect and unpopular? In this article we argue that Tudjman's views on self-determination and secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia were driven by life-long commitment to Leninism and (especially when it comes to the 'national question') Stalinism. When he reappeared in Croatian politics in 1989, Tudjman used the Leninist - not Wilsonian - concept of 'self-determination', which in Lenin's and Stalin's interpretation includes the 'right to secession'. This position enabled him to form an unusual - but logical - coalition with former Communists who were at the same time also nationalists, as well as with anti-Communist separatists. The author analyses the link between Tudjman's politics in the 1990s and Leninist-Stalinist principles of the 'right to self-determination' and 'right to secession'. Adapted from the source document.
У овом раду дискутује се o позиционирању кључних друштвено-политичких актера у савременој Србији у контексту прихватања скупа симбола јавног наратива дефинисаног као "европске вредности". На примеру одржавања тзв. "Параде поноса", разматра се однос медија и елита према једном догађају који се перципира као суштински услов за "европске интеграције", али према коме истовремено постоји амбивалентан однос, проистекао из етаблираног традиционалистичког политичког дискурса, који подразумева отпор према прихватању сексуалних различитости. Циљ овог рада је да укаже на комплексну природу идентификовања основних симболичких вредности друштва у савременој Србији, која се испољава, пре свега, у виду хегемонијских борби које се воде на линији промоције конзервативних вредности, насупрот ономе што се доживљава као "опасни" уплив либералних "европских" идеја, попут промоције права сексуалних мањина. У раду се анализирају медијски наративи везани за одржавање "Параде поноса" 2010. и 2014. године, са циљем утврђивања промене наратива у склопу декларисаног "европског пута" Србије, и то, пре свега, кроз деловање и позиционирање кључних актера, од политичких елита до припадника екстремно десних организација и навијачких група. ; This paper discusses the position of the key social and political actors in contemporary Serbia, referring to the broadly accepted concept defined as "European values". The article focuses on the so-called "Belgrade Pride Parade", a highly contested event in the Serbian public, which is at the same time considered as the essential part of the EU accession process. Through the analysis of the media discourses related to the "Pride" events in 2010 and 2014, the paper shows the complex relation between the officially proclaimed politics of "European integration" and still very strong nationalist discourses, inherited from the 1990s. The aim of the article is to analyse the present hegemonic struggles between the political forces defending "traditional", conservative values and the political agents that promote "dangerous", liberal "European" ideas, such as protecting the rights of sexual minorities. The comparative analysis of the media representation of two events in 2010 and 2014 shows the changes in the public narrative. I argue that the violent clashes that occurred in 2010 Belgrade Pride Parade between the police and the members of right wing organisations were mostly the result of the lack of the political will among the Serbian elites, followed by ambivalent media representations, promoting at the same time the necessity of accepting "European values" and justification of violence. On the other hand, the absence of violent events in 2014 shows the will of the state apparatus to secure the "Pride". However, the media reports on the event, as well as the public statements made by Serbian officials, still remain ambivalent towards the very nature of the "Pride", justifying it only by the pressure made by the EU and the protection of constitutional rights. Moreover, the presence of new narratives in the media, discussing the high price of organizing such event, shows the shift in the public discourse from common nationalist arguments to the new, neoliberal rhetoric. This change doesn't indicate the radical shift of the social climate in Serbia from conservative to liberal, but, more likely, establishes Serbia as just one of the many states on the European periphery, operating within wider framework of neoliberal agendas. ; Тема броја – Конфликт и помирење на Балкану (ур. Александар Крел) / Topic of the Issue - Conflict and Reconciliation in the Balkans (ed. Aleksandar Krel)
Kako osmisliti i operativno organizovati sećanja levice u delatnom, a ne u muzejskom pravcu? Šta znači otvoreno se suočiti sa kulturom poraza levice? Razmotrene su dimenzije poraza levice, priroda linearnog i kontingentnog vremena, različita proživljavanja poraza kod fašizma i liberalizma i dijalektika nade i razočarenja. Ukazano je da treba odbaciti jezik psihoanalize (čežnja, nostalgija, žalost, melanholija) i teleološku viziju neoliberalnog pobednika, pa levicu i desnicu shvatiti u novim dimenzijama vremena, unutar novog odnosa Kairosa i Hronosa u digitalnom dobu. Treba se samorefleksivno osvrnuti na greške levice, a naročito na greške iz kojih se može učiti. Treba teorijski probuditi ambiciju. Višeslojnom sećanju levice škodi dominacija jedne vrste sećanja, potrebna je samokontrola i ravnoteža pamćenja nestale socijalne države i vlastitog nasilja. ; How could we rethink and organize memories of the Left in an operational and active way? How could one openly confront the Left-Wing culture of defeat? The paper considers some dimensions of the Left-Wing defeat after 1989, the nature of the linear and the contingent time, various defeat experiences of fascism and liberalism and the dialectic of hope and disappointment. One should reject the language of psychoanalysis (longing, nostalgia, sorrow, melancholy) and the teleological vision of the neoliberal winner. The Left Wing and Right Wing should be understood in new dimensions of time within a new relationship between Cairos and Chronos in the digital age. The Left needs self-reflective review of its own mistakes, if it wants to learn lessons for the future. Theory can awake practical ambition. A desirable multilayered Left-Wing memory has been damaged by dominance of one type of memory. The Left needs self-control and a balanced memory of both badly missing socialist welfare state and its own violence.
This work presents the results of empirical research of the relation among authoritarianism, political worldview, and party choice. Based on the existing research, the starting assumption is that authoritarianism is largely typical for the electoral body of the "right-wing" parties as well as for the conservative worldview. The specially designed scale for measuring authoritarian/conformist tendencies has shown a marked mono- dimensionality and inner consistency. The findings have confirmed the initial assumption; they have also shown a relatively regular correspondence between a party's p0sition on the "left-right" spectrum and the degree of authoritarianism of its electoral body. The sole exception is a higher degree of authoritarianism of HDZ's electoral body than that of HSP's, which may be explained by the fact that the applied scale has measured solely the attitude towards authority and conformity and not the attitude towards minority groups, which is a component of the famous "F" scale. Also, it has been shown that the voters of the so-called "modernist" worldviews (liberal, social-democratic) are significantly less authoritarian than the voters of the so-called "conservative" worldviews (democratic-Christian, Christian- socialist, traditional, or conservative). (SOI : PM: S. 209)
Konstantinos Katsoudas, "A Dictatorship that is not a Dictatorship". Spanish Nationalists and the 4th of August The Spanish Civil War convulsed the international public opinion and prompted most foreign governments to take measures or even intervene in the conflict. Greek entanglement either in the form of smuggling war materiel or the participation of Greek volunteers in the International Brigades has already been investigated. However, little is known about a second dimension of this internationalization of the war: the peculiar forms that the antagonism between the two belligerent camps in foreign countries took. This paper, based mainly on Spanish archival sources, discusses some aspects of the activity developed in Greece by Franco's nationalists and the way Francoist diplomats and emissaries perceived the nature of an apparently similar regime, such as the dictatorship led by general Metaxas. The main objectives of the Francoist foreign policy were to avoid any escalation of the Spanish civil war into a world conflict, to secure international assistance for the right-wing forces and to undermine the legitimacy of the legal Republican government. In Greece, an informal diplomatic civil war broke out since Francoists occupied the Spanish Legation in Athens and Republicans took over the Consulate in Thessaloniki. The Francoists combined public and undercover activity: they worked hard to achieve an official recognition of their Estado Nuevo, while at the same time created rings of espionage and channels of anticommunist propaganda. The reason of their partial breakthroughs was that, contrary to their Republican enemies, the Nationalists enjoyed support by a significant part of the Greek political world, which was ideologically identified with their struggle. Francoist anti-communism had some interesting implications for Greek politics. An important issue was the Francoist effort to reveal a supposed Moscow-based conspiracy against Spain and Greece, both considered as hotbeds of revolution in the Mediterranean, in order to justify both Franco's extermination campaign and Metaxas' coup. Although this effort was based on fraudulent documents, forged by an anti-Bolshevik international organization, it became the cornerstone of Francoist and Metaxist propaganda. General Metaxas was the only European dictator to invoke the Spanish Civil War as a raison d'etre of his regime and often warned against the repetition of Spanish-like drama on Greek soil. Nevertheless he did not approve of Franco's methods and preferred Dr. Salazar's Portugal as an institutional model closer to his vision. For Spanish nationalist observers this was a sign of weakness. They interpreted events in Greece through the disfiguring mirror of their own historic experience: thus, although they never called in question Metaxas' authoritarian motives, the 4th of August regime was considered too mild and soft compared to Francoism (whose combativeness and fanaticism, as they suggested, the Greek General should have imitated); it reminded them the dictatorship founded in Spain by General Primo de Rivera in 1920s, whose inadequacy paved the way for the advent of the Republic and the emergence of sociopolitical radicalism. Incidents of the following years, as Greece moved towards a civil confrontation, seemed to strengthen their views. ; Konstantinos Katsoudas, "A Dictatorship that is not a Dictatorship". Spanish Nationalists and the 4th of AugustThe Spanish Civil War convulsed the international public opinion and prompted most foreign governments to take measures or even intervene in the conflict. Greek entanglement either in the form of smuggling war materiel or the participation of Greek volunteers in the International Brigades has already been investigated. However, little is known about a second dimension of this internationalization of the war: the peculiar forms that the antagonism between the two belligerent camps in foreign countries took. This paper, based mainly on Spanish archival sources, discusses some aspects of the activity developed in Greece by Franco's nationalists and the way Francoist diplomats and emissaries perceived the nature of an apparently similar regime, such as the dictatorship led by general Metaxas. The main objectives of the Francoist foreign policy were to avoid any escalation of the Spanish civil war into a world conflict, to secure international assistance for the right-wing forces and to undermine the legitimacy of the legal Republican government. In Greece, an informal diplomatic civil war broke out since Francoists occupied the Spanish Legation in Athens and Republicans took over the Consulate in Thessaloniki. The Francoists combined public and undercover activity: they worked hard to achieve an official recognition of their Estado Nuevo, while at the same time created rings of espionage and channels of anticommunist propaganda. The reason of their partial breakthroughs was that, contrary to their Republican enemies, the Nationalists enjoyed support by a significant part of the Greek political world, which was ideologically identified with their struggle. Francoist anti-communism had some interesting implications for Greek politics. An important issue was the Francoist effort to reveal a supposed Moscow-based conspiracy against Spain and Greece, both considered as hotbeds of revolution in the Mediterranean, in order to justify both Franco's extermination campaign and Metaxas' coup. Although this effort was based on fraudulent documents, forged by an anti-Bolshevik international organization, it became the cornerstone of Francoist and Metaxist propaganda. General Metaxas was the only European dictator to invoke the Spanish Civil War as a raison d'etre of his regime and often warned against the repetition of Spanish-like drama on Greek soil. Nevertheless he did not approve of Franco's methods and preferred Dr. Salazar's Portugal as an institutional model closer to his vision. For Spanish nationalist observers this was a sign of weakness. They interpreted events in Greece through the disfiguring mirror of their own historic experience: thus, although they never called in question Metaxas' authoritarian motives, the 4th of August regime was considered too mild and soft compared to Francoism (whose combativeness and fanaticism, as they suggested, the Greek General should have imitated); it reminded them the dictatorship founded in Spain by General Primo de Rivera in 1920s, whose inadequacy paved the way for the advent of the Republic and the emergence of sociopolitical radicalism. Incidents of the following years, as Greece moved towards a civil confrontation, seemed to strengthen their views.
