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After roughly 15 years of merger control application in the Federal Republic of Germany a reassessment of the significance of this instrument of antitrust policy seems necessary. This is particularly so in view of the reorientation of merger control policy in the United States which has been - in its original version - the model for the German merger control system. Concerning merger control, the reorientation is characterized by the notion that the structure-conduct-performance paradigm which has dominated U.S. antitrust for a quarter of a century is imprecise or even incorrect and «that bigness in business does not necessarily mean badness.» This makes the fundamental question arise of whether the German merger control system is still up to date in terms of the underlying market theory and of whether the German Act Against Restraints of Competition needs a reorientation towards aspects of market conduct and performance instead of market structure by means of a Fifth Amendment.

Cover -- Introduction: Antitrust Economics, Policy, and Law at the Crossroads: A Reorientation -- I. The Context -- II. Developments in U.S. Antitrust Policy During the 1970s and 1980s -- 1. Antitrust Economics -- 2. Antitrust Enforcement -- a. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice -- b. The Federal Trade Commission -- 3. Antitrust Adjudication -- 4. Antitrust Legislation -- III. The Source of Reorientation: The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis -- 1. The Foundations -- 2. Chicago Antitrust Philosophy -- IV. Definition of the Field of Research and Course of Inquiry -- Part 1: Analytical Framework for the Evaluation of Restraints of Competition by Industrial Concentration -- I. Free Enterprise System. Competition, and Public Policy -- 1. Economic Order and Competition -- 2. Nature and Meaning of Competition -- 3. Competition and Public Policy -- II. Economic Evaluation of Industrial Concentration: Theoretical Approach and Public Policy -- 1. Antitrust Policy Objectives -- a. Objectives and Interrelations -- b. Conflicting Objectives -- 2. Elements of the Approach to an Evaluation of Industrial Concentration -- a. Models of Competition -- b. The Structure-, Conduct-, Performance-Paradigm, and the Competitive Process -- c. Effective Competition and Competition Impairment -- d. Intensity of Competition and the Adequate Test -- 3. The Treatment of Competition Impairment and Public Policy Alternatives -- a. Approaches -- b. Rules -- III. Competition and Industrial Concentration -- 1. Concentration and Economic Theory -- a. Nature and Meaning of Economic Concentration -- b. Economic Concentration and Power -- c. Features of Industrial Concentration -- aa. Significance -- bb. Causes -- cc. Effects -- d. Forms of Industrial Concentration -- aa. Internal Growth -- bb. External Growth -- (1) Horizontal Mergers -- (2) Vertical Mergers.

A.o. Goals of public competition policy -- premises and assumptions underlying the concept of competition -- the significance of barriers to new competition -- method of competition analysis -- horizontal concentration and collusion -- vertical integration and market foreclosure effects -- Chicago School theory and the Fifth Amendment to the ARC.

After roughly 15 years of merger control application in the Federal Republic of Germany a reassessment of the significance of this instrument of antitrust policy seems necessary. This is particularly so in view of the reorientation of merger control policy in the United States which has been - in its original version - the model for the German merger control system. Concerning merger control, the reorientation is characterized by the notion that the structure-conduct-performance paradigm which has dominated U.S. antitrust for a quarter of a century is imprecise or even incorrect and "that bigness in business does not necessarily mean badness." This makes the fundamental question arise of whether the German merger control system is still up to date in terms of the underlying market theory and of whether the German Act Against Restraints of Competition needs a reorientation towards aspects of market conduct and performance instead of market structure by means of a Fifth Amendment.

I. The Perception of Competition as a Dynamic Process -- II. Premises and Assumptions of the Chicago School's Concept of Competition -- 1. Rationality and Autonomy of Economic Agents -- 2. Perfectly Competitive Markets -- 3. Workability of the Market Mechanism -- 4. Lang-run Effectiveness of the Market Process (Time Horizon -- III. Antitrust Theory and Public Policy -- 1. Market Structure Interference -- 2. Market Behavior Interference -- IV. The Chicago School's Approach to Antitrust Theory -- 1. Method of Competition Analysis -- 2. Consumer Welfare as Chicago's Antitrust Goal -- V. Evaluating Concentration from the Chicago Point of View -- 1. Corporate Size and Industry Concentration as Evidence of Superior Efficiency -- 2. Causes of Monopoly Power -- 3. Measuring Monopoly Power -- 4. Determinants of Market Structure and the Effectiveness of Competition -- 5. The Economic Effects of Mergers -- 6. Anticoncentration Policy from the Chicago Point of View -- VI. The Evaluation of Anticompetitive Behavior -- 1. Explicit and Implicit Collusion -- 2. Exclusionary Practices -- 3. Tying Arrangements -- 4. Predatory Pricing -- 5. Resale Price Maintenance -- VII. A Critical Résumé of the Chicago Approach to Antitrust Policy -- 1. Underlying Assumptions and Methodology -- 2. The Goals of Antitrust Policy -- 3. The Role of Theory and Empirical Evidence -- 4. Policy Recommendations -- 5. The Chicago School Approach as a Basis for Antitrust Policy.

Ingo Schmidt/Jan B. Rittaler: Die Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis. Wettbewerbstheoretische und -politische Analyse eines Credos. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1986. 119 Seiten. 49 DM

INTRODUCTION: Disparities in health and healthcare access remain a major problem in the United States. The current study sought to investigate the relationship between patient insurance status and hospital selection for surgical care. METHODS: Patients who underwent liver or pancreatic resection for cancer between 2004 and 2014 were identified in the National Inpatient Sample. The association of insurance status and hospital type was examined. RESULTS: In total, 22,254 patients were included in the study. Compared with patients with private insurance, Medicaid patients were less likely to undergo surgery at urban non-teaching hospitals (OR=0.36, 95%CI 0.22–0.59) and urban teaching hospitals (OR=0.54, 95%CI 0.34–0.84) than rural hospitals. Medicaid patients were less likely to undergo surgery at private investor-owned hospitals (OR=0.53, 95%CI 0.38– 0.73) than private non-profit hospitals. In contrast, uninsured patients were 2.2-fold more likely to go to government funded hospitals rather than private non-profit hospitals (OR=2.19, 95%CI 1.76–2.71). CONCLUSION: Insurance status was strongly associated with the type of hospital in which patients underwent surgery for liver and pancreatic cancers. Addressing the reasons for inequitable access to different hospital settings relative to insurance status is essential to ensure that all patients undergoing pancreatic or liver surgery receive high quality surgical care.