The Rose Revolution represented a victory not only for the Georgian people but for democracy globally. [It] & demonstrated that, by aggressively contesting elections, exercising basic freedoms of speech and assembly, and applying smart strategic thinking, a democratic opposition can defeat a weak semi-democratic kleptocracy.
The reign of strongman presidents and the routine use of electoral fraud and manipulation have produced widespread apathy, resignation, and cynicism about the prospects for democracy in the Caucasus. In the fall of 2003, these trends dominated the presidential elections in Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the parliamentary elections in Georgia. But shortly after the elections, a brief and nonviolent series of mass protests in Tbilisi—the so-called Revolution of the Roses—forced Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze and his Citizens' Union of Georgia (CUG) to resign, and paved the way for democratic reform under Mikhail Saakashvili of the New National Movement. The inspiring events in Georgia hold a number of lessons for students of democratization and prodemocracy activists alike, and should make us reconsider the methods by which fragile openings to democracy may be sustained and widened.
The article is devoted to the study of Russia's policy towards the Rose revolution, which took place in November 2003 in Georgia. It became the first color revolution in the post-Soviet space, during which a complex of technologies for changing political regimes, tested in Serbia three years earlier, again demonstrated its eff ectiveness. Despite the fact that many aspects of this color revolution have received decent coverage in the scientifi c literature to date, the position and policy of the Russian state in relation to this coup d'etat still remain virtually unexplored. The article provides an overview of Russian-Georgian relations in the post-Soviet period, analyzes the reaction of the Russian authorities to the parliamentary elections held on November 2, 2003 in Georgia, evaluates and systematizes the statements and concrete steps of Russian politicians and diplomats during the implementation of the Rose revolution. The authors used documents from the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, many of which are being introduced into scientifi c circulation for the fi rst time, electronic resources of Russian state authorities, materials from leading Russian and foreign media. It is concluded that in order to preserve political stability in Georgia, Moscow took a neutral position and even contributed to the settlement of the internal crisis in the country, but as a result of the color revolution anti-Russian forces came to power in Tbilisi, whose policy subsequently led to a significant deterioration of Russian-Georgian relations and to an aggravation of the situation in the South Caucasus region as a whole.