The Rose Revolution represented a victory not only for the Georgian people but for democracy globally. The revolution that took as its symbol a red rose demonstrated that, by aggressively contesting elections, exercising basic freedoms of speech and assembly, and applying smart strategic thinking, a democratic opposition can defeat a weak semi-democratic kleptocracy.
The Rose Revolution in November 2003 created a setting characterized by major new challenges as well as major new opportunities for Georgia. After presenting the forces that gave rise to the Rose Revolution (emerging civil society, vibrant free press, weak state authority, and national memory and unity), several issues that will shape the future of Georgia are examined. The first of these is economic growth, which provides some reason for optimism, though the picture remains tenuous. The second is the struggle over Georgia's territory, in particular the challenges facing the state when it comes to breakaway territories. Frustration on this front remains to the present time. The third is the development of a strong state, something that provides particular challenges in light of the failing state inherited by the Saakashvili government, but something that showed some promising signs in the wake of the Rose Revolution. After a promising start, the Saakashvili government has recently drifted in the direction of over-centralization of power in the president's office, and this is cause for concern as the government continues to struggle to find its way.
Introduction All revolutions-including those described by political scientists as Color Revolutions-share certain regularities and development cycles; all of them resolve contradictions in systems that have fallen behind the times; and all of them create new contradictions as the revolutionary wave moves onward. The Rose Revolution in Georgia was spearheaded against Eduard Shevardnadze's regime, which political scientists described as a "crossbreed of democratic bureaucracy and oligarchy." The system built by the "father of Georgian democracy" turned out to be the worst example of a Soviet successor state: it was ineffective, lacked self-sufficiency, and failed to meet the basic needs of post-Soviet society. Today the Rose Revolution, which ushered in an era of Color Revolutions across the post-Soviet expanse, has become a target of scholarly studies. It can be scrutinized from different angles; I have posed myself the task of identifying the crucial features that created the genotype of power obvious at a certain development stage. I have undertaken to outline the psychological field in which the Georgian power culture was born. Did the revolution reflect the cultural-political needs of Georgian society? Whose interests did it promote? What is preventing and what is assisting the achievement of a national consensus? The Rose Revolution carried out under the slogan "Georgia without Shevardnadze" was obviously staged to remove the architect of the defective system best described as a "failed state" from power. It was "the birds of Eduard's nest," the young reformers who for some time served the democratization façade, who finally brought down the system. They struggled against the "dual world outlook" and the "policy of double standards," while social contradictions became more deeply entrenched, ethnopolitical conflicts continued to smolder, and partocracy usurped power based on property. Their efforts rallied all those displeased with the regime in a united "national movement" driven by a slogan that served the image of the younger part of the political elite. The rising generation of politicians skillfully tapped popular discontent with the Shevardnadze regime and the unfolding systemic crisis to escalate them into a revolution. Not only did the government's weakness help to keep the revolution peaceful. The democratic reforms and the relatively free media had already created a suitable climate and enabled the opposition to make use of the Rustavi-2 TV channel and the press to discredit the regime. The democratic opposition leaders were trained in Belgrade, where the potential of velvet revolutions was first put to the test. The globalization ideologists used the foundations and NGOs they set up to channel money for financing the revolution, bribing officials, and bringing the government to its knees.
"July 2006." ; Caption title. ; Introduction -- Terminology: coup, "revolution," or revolution? -- Shevardnadze's civil society -- Driving forces of the revolution -- Kmara: breaking through political apathy -- Opposition groups -- The media -- Civil society and international actors -- Should the security forces defend the regime or the people? -- Conclusion. ; Mode of access: Internet.
The attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, enhanced the importance of both the Transcaucasus and Central Asia to American security. Overflight rights through the Caucasus to Central Asia and Afghanistan are vital components of the ongoing military effort there by both U.S. and NATO forces. But this region has multiple conflicts and fault-lines. As multiple recent crises show, Russo-Georgian tensions connected with South Ossetia and Abkhazia could erupt into open violence at any time. The author outlines the possibilities for conflict in this region and the qualities that make it strategically important, not only for Washington and Moscow, but also increasingly for Europe. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1687/thumbnail.jpg
This article examines the role of civic groups in Georgia's Rose Revolution using Larry Diamond's framework of the democratic functions of civil society. The author argues that the contribution of civil society to the peaceful transfer of power in 2003 is best understood by expanding the analytical focus out from the Kmara youth movement to include a larger set of organisations. Rather than focusing on the Kmara youth movement as the primary civil society actor in 2003, the author contends that Kmara was, in fact, a product of the coordinated involvement of a cohort of NGOs. The article stresses the highly interconnected nature of Georgian civic leaders and organisations, particularly regarding networks with other NGOs, opposition politicians, and journalists from the Rustavi 2 television station.
The formation of independent media is one of the main achievements of the many years of reform of the Georgian political system. Georgia's mass media is developing faster than other civil institutions. Despite the low level of election democracy, local self-government, and political parties, state-independent mass media organizations came into being after Georgia gained its independence. But-unfortunately there has to be a "but"-the mass media in Georgia have not only become the main lever in public opinion formation, but they are also a hefty weapon in the political struggle. Confirmation of this was the so-called Rose Revolution in November 2003, which not only raised the significance of the mass media, particularly television, but also revealed several shortcomings in their work. State-independent television played a very important, if not decisive, role both in forming public moods and in raising the wave of revolutionary protest. Until the parliamentary elections of 2003 (which escalated into the revolution), television companies could still deny their politicized nature and claim that they were trying to be objective; however, the revolution revealed and polarized their political views. The Rustavi-2 TV channel openly supported the revolution. Later, one of the popular anchorwomen on this television station admitted that the channel covered all the events of those days extremely tendentiously. So, Rustavi-2 turned out to be closely associated with the victorious political forces. It soon became obvious that the special role of the mass media in Georgia's political system not only stemmed from the fact that the state and other political entities can use them to inform the population about their policy and their aims and values, but also from the fact that the mass media themselves have become a very powerful tool in the purposeful elaboration of political procedures in Georgia. The mass media are still playing an extremely significant role in Georgia's present-day, post-revolutionary political system, but the quality and nature of their influence on the political processes currently depend on how strongly they themselves feel pressure from the government, particular political groups, or other interested entities. According to various international assessments, Georgia is still viewed as a country with a partially free press, which is primarily due to the government's increased pressure on the independent mass media.
The attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, enhanced the importance of both the Transcaucasus and Central Asia to American security. Overflight rights through the Caucasus to Central Asia and Afghanistan are vital components of the ongoing military effort there by both U.S. and NATO forces. But this region has multiple conflicts and fault-lines. As multiple recent crises show, Russo-Georgian tensions connected with South Ossetia and Abkhazia could erupt into open violence at any time. The author outlines the possibilities for conflict in this region and the qualities that make it strategically important, not only for Washington and Moscow, but also increasingly for Europe ; What is at stake in Georgia? -- U.S. interests in the South Caucasus -- Russian policies -- Independence and the Russian "reconquista" -- The slipping of the Caucasus, 1996-99 -- Implications for the West -- Implications ; Svante E. Cornell ; "February 2007." ; Parallel als Buch-Ausg. erschienen
The attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, enhanced the importance of both the Transcaucasus and Central Asia to American security. Overflight rights through the Caucasus to Central Asia and Afghanistan are vital components of the ongoing military effort there by both U.S. and NATO forces. But this region has multiple conflicts and fault-lines. As multiple recent crises show, Russo-Georgian tensions connected with South Ossetia and Abkhazia could erupt into open violence at any time. The author outlines the possibilities for conflict in this region and the qualities that make it strategically important, not only for Washington and Moscow, but also increasingly for Europe. ; "February 2007." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 39-41). ; What is at stake in Georgia? -- U.S. interests in the South Caucasus -- Russian policies -- Independence and the Russian "reconquista" -- The slipping of the Caucasus, 1996-99 -- Implications for the West -- Implications. ; The attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, enhanced the importance of both the Transcaucasus and Central Asia to American security. Overflight rights through the Caucasus to Central Asia and Afghanistan are vital components of the ongoing military effort there by both U.S. and NATO forces. But this region has multiple conflicts and fault-lines. As multiple recent crises show, Russo-Georgian tensions connected with South Ossetia and Abkhazia could erupt into open violence at any time. The author outlines the possibilities for conflict in this region and the qualities that make it strategically important, not only for Washington and Moscow, but also increasingly for Europe. ; Mode of access: Internet.
The article focuses on effectiveness of Investment climate in Georgia after transition period. Investment climate is the institutional, policy and regulatory environment in whichfirms operate - factors that influence the link from sowing to reaping and I can say that investment climate itself is the process from sowing to reaping because you will reap what you sew. Investment climate is the opportunity and incentive for firms to invest productively, create jobs and expand. One of the major determinations of country s economic developments and wellbeing are the indicators of investment structure and volume These indicators show attractiveness of economy for foreign investors and give clues for analyzing countries development process. Investment climate matters for the total factor productivity, average wage rates, the rate of return on fixed assets, growth rate of output, employment, corruption plus government regulations, taxes, political and economical stability, migration. A good investment climate is an essential pillar of a country s strategy to stimulate economic growth, which in turn generates opportunities for poor people to have more productive jobs term effect of foreign investment will increased in increased employment and household income, poverty will be decreased and Georgian economy will be developed. The paper also includes the results of a survey conducted to find out the changes of investment climate after Rose Revolution.
What are the political consequences of democratization assistance to regimes transitioning from authoritarian rule? By exploiting the downstream effects of a field experiment designed to encourage citizen monitoring of Georgia's 2008 parliamentary elections, we evaluate the political consequences of one type of democracy promotion aid. The intervention increased citizen activism, but it also had the unanticipated effect of suppressing overall voter turnout by approximately 5%. We hypothesize that the civic education campaign was interpreted as a sign of increased political attention to a selected voting precinct, which suppressed opposition turnout. Two additional experiments provide additional evidence for the hypothesis.
'A map on which you cannot find the land Utopia is not even worth looking at.' Ernst Bloch In the following article, I analyze sociopolitical and economic developments in post-Rose Revolution Georgia in the context of two theories: The first originates from the German school of memory studies and the other represents the most recent breakthrough in the Georgian school of social studies. The analysis of the transformations that followed the Revolution of Roses transgresses sociopolitical and economical dimensions and stretches into much larger extent that is time and historical age; that being the case, I will be also examining the altering understanding of time and history against the backdrop of Aleida Assmann's theory of the Time Regimes and Emzar Khvichia's theory of Relativistic-Quantum Noology.
In the days of the Soviet Union, Georgia was one of the most flourishing Soviet republics due to its protected tea and wine market and its attractive Black Sea resorts. The breakup of the U.S.S.R., the opening by the FSU republics of their borders to broad imports following the "parade of sovereignties," and wars within the country led to a sharp decline in Georgia's economic indicators, but in recent years the situation has begun to improve Nevertheless, living standards in Georgia remain low. Official unemployment is around 13% of the working age population. But independent experts believe that from 2003 to the beginning of 2005 unemployment rose by 20% to around 47% of the working age population. Most large industrial enterprises remain at a standstill or operate at less than full capacity. During the years of independence, over 1 million people -the most employable and active part of the population-have left the country. A significant proportion of Georgia's population subsists, for the most part, on remittances from relatives working abroad. Experts estimate the annual amount of remittances from Georgian "guest workers" living in Russia alone at $1-2 billion. According to an IMF analytical report on the economic prospects of the Middle East and Central Asia, remittances from abroad in 2005 accounted for over 5% of Georgian GDP. The country's Minister of State Kakha Bendukidze estimates this amount at 4% of GDP. In the opinion of analysts, the business environment in Georgia is not conducive to a reduction or elimination of existing investment risks, while the political situation impedes socioeconomic development. Thus, although small and medium enterprises make up 97% of all active companies, their share of Georgia's GNP is only around 10% (compared to 60% in EU countries). The government has taken some steps to improve the country's regulation and auditing systems: health inspectors no longer "cruise" around cafes and restaurants, and it is possible to start a business even without prior registration. Nevertheless, international standards are still a long way off, which is why small business is mostly concentrated in trade.
The initial excitement of the Rose Revolution has worn off. More than four years on, Georgia has made significant progress in reforming its laws, fighting corruption and in governance more generally, but it is now more clear than ever that democracy is one of the areas where the government still has some work to do.
Three revolutions, one after another, replaced the three post-communist leaders of Georgia: (1) the Round Table and Zviad Gamsakhurdia replaced the communists; (2) Gamsakhurdia's cabinet was replaced by Eduard Shevardnadze, and (3) Mikhail Saakashvili removed Shevardnadze from his post. Each of them changed the fortunes of the country and the nation, but only the last event was tagged as a "revolution." It is obviously viewed as the most important among the three and prompts us to ask whether it is absolutely correct to describe Saakashvili's coming to power as a revolution. Is it not a ploy designed to boost the importance of the regime change in the eyes of the world community and the local population? To answer these questions we should answer another, broader, question: Did the regime change that removed Eduard Shevardnadze and became known as the Rose Revolution have the characteristics of a revolution? By revolution we mean the very specific and profound impact a regime exerts on social order-it is much more than a conflict that replaces the government. A revolution brings about changes in the political, economic, spiritual, and social spheres of the nation's life, which take some time to become obvious and are never immediately manifest the very day after forces come to power which choose to call themselves "revolutionary." The events of November 2003 in Georgia were called a revolution immediately after the coup was completed. During the three years that separate us from that time enough material has been accumulated to assess the nature of the changes that have taken place and were brought about by Mikhail Saakashvili's coming to power. The Rose Revolution is a term prompted by the immediate impressions of the non-constitutional power change in Georgia. A revolution is not merely a particular method of regime change-it is an event of profound importance for the country's economic, social, and political life. Those Western authors who have devoted much time to the theory of revolution and who have written extensively on the subject 1 interpret it as a particular method of regime change that brings more radical results than other seemingly similar actions. A revolution means replacement of the top leaders accomplished by a mass illegitimate movement that results in deep-cutting changes.