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"A humorous guide to help primary-age kids understand and follow the many rules in their lives. Readers will also find support for discussing/questioning rules that don't seem fair along with strategies for coming to terms with rules that won't change"--

Rules, Rules, Rules, Rules: Multilevel Regulatory Governance,
G. Bruce Doern and Robert Johnson, eds., Studies in Comparative Political
Economy and Public Policy; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006, xi,
372.The first stated purpose of this edited collection is to
"clarify conceptually the nature, causes, and dynamics of regulatory
governance in, or affecting, Canada" in a world where the
international, federal, provincial and local spheres are
"interacting, reinforcing and colliding." The second is to
"contribute practically to the debate on what kinds of principles
and institutional approaches and changes can lessen the problems of
multilevel regulatory governance" (3).

Rules, Rules, Rules, Rules considers various sectors where rule-making spans all or most of the four levels of jurisdiction - international, federal, provincial, and city or local - in areas such as food safety, investment and trade, forestry, drinking water, oil and gas, and emergency management

Clayton Gillette's In Partial Praise of Dillon's Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law? is an ambitious attempt to breathe new life into an old local government law chestnut through the analytical tools of modern political economy. Gillette asserts that because the Rule permits state judges to invalidate local legislation that results from "one-sided lobbying," Dillon's Rule increases the allocational efficiency of local decision making and reduces the deadweight losses attendant on special interest pursuit of rent-seeking ordinances. According to Gillette, Dillon's Rule checks the danger of special interest abuse of local politics by constraining local government actions in areas prone to special interest manipulation. He contends that local residents would have consented to Dillon's Rule if it had been presented to them; indeed, he suggests the existence of Dillon's Rule may contribute to the willingness of people to submit themselves to local governments. Thus, Gillette would have us believe that Dillion's Rule – which has so often been condemned by local government scholars as antithetical to local self-government – actually vindicates the interests of local majorities and sustains local autonomy itself. Gillette's is an ambitious thesis, appealing as much in its audacity and its analytical style as in its substantive project of finding legal rules that would promote public-regarding local self-government. Unfortunately, Gillette's effort fails. The base metal of arbitrary state judicial intervention in local decision making that is Dillon's Rule cannot be alchemically transmuted into a public interest-serving Golden Rule. To answer the question posed in his title, "public choice theory" cannot "justify" local government law – or at least Gillette's theory does not "justify" Dillon's Rule under his standard of promoting the local public interest.

Abstract Rules are central to the constitutional political economy (CPE) approach. On this approach, rules, of a variety of types and forms, are necessary for the emergence of a political and social order, so that all genuine political order is rule-based. The central role of rules within the CPE approach is examined starting from an explicit definitional discussion of the concept of a rule and including discussion of the nature of rule-following behavior, the supply of rules, and rule enforcement.

AbstractRules are central to the constitutional political economy (CPE) approach. On this approach, rules, of a variety of types and forms, are necessary for the emergence of a political and social order, so that all genuine political order is rule-based. The central role of rules within the CPE approach is examined starting from an explicit definitional discussion of the concept of a rule and including discussion of the nature of rule-following behavior, the supply of rules, and rule enforcement.

Numerous observers of modem civil practice, whose views range across a comparatively broad spectrum, consider the 1983 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 the most controversial revision since the United States Supreme Court promulgated the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.1 Counsel and litigants overused and abused the 1983 modification to Rule 11 by inappropriately stressing the compensatory goal of the proviso and improperly deemphasizing the stricture's deterrence objective. Many judges vigorously enforced Rule 11, often finding violations and imposing burdensome sanctions which frequently included large attorney's fees. This activity of lawyers and parties, as well as courts' implementation, was responsible for considerable unnecessary and expensive litigation that was unrelated to the substantive merits of disputes. The overuse, abuse and judicial application of the 1983 change had detrimental consequences for individuals and groups with relatively little time, money or power, such as those who pursue civil rights actions. These complications prompted the federal rule revision entities to formulate and propose significant amendments to the 1983 revision of Federal Rule 11. The Supreme Court accepted the recommendation tendered that the 1983 version be substantially amended and, thus, instituted a revision that became effective during 1993. Notwithstanding the unusually expeditious attempt to rectify or temper the difficulties created by the 1983 modification-a purpose which the 1993 alteration has seemingly realized-the experience with the 1983 amendment may have undermined confidence in the rule revision process of judges, counsel and litigants. Two critical examples illustrate this phenomenon. One is the increasing willingness of the ninety-four United States District Courts to prescribe and apply local practice requirements that depart from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Another is the growing amenability of the fifty states to promulgate and enforce strictures regulating civil practice within their jurisdictions which deviate from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. All of the propositions recounted above mean that the 1983 amendment to Rule 11, the version's deployment by attorneys and litigants, the revision's effectuation by courts, and its modification warrant scrutiny on the twentieth anniversary of the 1983 revision. The article undertakes that effort. This article first descriptively traces the background of the 1983 amendment to Rule 11. Part I emphasizes the difficulties accompanying the revision's invocation by lawyers and litigants, as well as judicial implementation, which made the proviso the most disputed alteration over the civil rules' five-decade history, and which eventually led to its fundamental reform. The article then surveys efforts to modify the controversial 1983 amendment only ten years after the Supreme Court prescribed it. The article next attempts to derive lessons from the experience with the 1983 version. The article concludes by offering numerous recommendations, a majority of which implicate the federal rule revision process.