This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
During 2000 Finland and the USSR had special relations. Finland's foreign and defense policy was highly dependent on the USSR. Their cooperation went through four stages: starting from Finland being a part of Russian empire, to being one of the most important allies in the Western and Nordic Europe. The last period dates go back to the end of the Cold War. Finland come to conceive Russia not only as a threat to their homeland, but also as a possible partner and ally in helping to create secure community across the Baltic Sea region. The collapse of the former Soviet Union, the rise of new states in the neighborhood of Finland and the changed attitude of Russia towards Finland allowed Finns to adopt new defense and foreign policy. This allowed Finland to join the European Union and NATO program Partnership for Peace (PfP). Since 1991 Finns have paid a special attention towards the development of security in the Baltic Sea region, where the most important task was Russia's integration into European institutions and its democratization. Baltic Sea could become a bridge for achieving Russia's integration. Scandinavian countries, the Baltic States and Russia may turn the Baltic Sea region into a big economic and cultural network.[.].
During 2000 Finland and the USSR had special relations. Finland's foreign and defense policy was highly dependent on the USSR. Their cooperation went through four stages: starting from Finland being a part of Russian empire, to being one of the most important allies in the Western and Nordic Europe. The last period dates go back to the end of the Cold War. Finland come to conceive Russia not only as a threat to their homeland, but also as a possible partner and ally in helping to create secure community across the Baltic Sea region. The collapse of the former Soviet Union, the rise of new states in the neighborhood of Finland and the changed attitude of Russia towards Finland allowed Finns to adopt new defense and foreign policy. This allowed Finland to join the European Union and NATO program Partnership for Peace (PfP). Since 1991 Finns have paid a special attention towards the development of security in the Baltic Sea region, where the most important task was Russia's integration into European institutions and its democratization. Baltic Sea could become a bridge for achieving Russia's integration. Scandinavian countries, the Baltic States and Russia may turn the Baltic Sea region into a big economic and cultural network.[.].
During 2000 Finland and the USSR had special relations. Finland's foreign and defense policy was highly dependent on the USSR. Their cooperation went through four stages: starting from Finland being a part of Russian empire, to being one of the most important allies in the Western and Nordic Europe. The last period dates go back to the end of the Cold War. Finland come to conceive Russia not only as a threat to their homeland, but also as a possible partner and ally in helping to create secure community across the Baltic Sea region. The collapse of the former Soviet Union, the rise of new states in the neighborhood of Finland and the changed attitude of Russia towards Finland allowed Finns to adopt new defense and foreign policy. This allowed Finland to join the European Union and NATO program Partnership for Peace (PfP). Since 1991 Finns have paid a special attention towards the development of security in the Baltic Sea region, where the most important task was Russia's integration into European institutions and its democratization. Baltic Sea could become a bridge for achieving Russia's integration. Scandinavian countries, the Baltic States and Russia may turn the Baltic Sea region into a big economic and cultural network.[.].
Ruski inozemni turizam poznat je na svjetskom turističkom tržištu. Izvoz turističkih usluga u Rusiju zabranjen je sankcijama za ekonomije mnogih zemalja. U današnje vrijeme prisutne su nove tendencije koje bi trebale radikalno promijeniti strukturu ruskog domaćeg turizma i utjecati na inozemni turizam. Za to postoje vanjski i unutarnji tržišni i politički razlozi. U Rusiji država potiče razvoj domaćeg turizma različitim programima i strategijom njegova razvoja. Poduzetničke aktivnosti, konkurencija, investicija u turizam i turistička infrastruktura također su u porastu. U današnjoj Rusiji vidljiva je promjena od "inozemnog turizma" prema "domaćem turizmu". Ovo posljednje donosi dodatne prihode ruskim regijama. Sadašnja ekonomska i politička situacija doprinosi tom procesu. Pad prihoda uzrokovan ekonomskom krizom prisiljava Ruse da manje putuju u inozemstvo, a raste broj putnika u domaće jeftinije destinacije. Suočena s ekonomskim sankcijama ruska državna tijela traže unutrašnje investicije i mogućnosti smanjenja troškova uvoza. Počeli su više pažnje posvećivati domaćem turizmu. Pod sloganom "supstitucija uvoza" i "protusankcije" neke restrikcije koje utječu na međunarodni turizam, preferencije prema domaćem turizmu i stimulacija potražnje elaborirane su u ovom radu. Također i restrikcije inozemnog turizma kao i zabrana stranim kompanijama da djeluju na ruskom turističkom tržištu postali su politički faktor. Pad ruskog inozemnog turizma jača konkurenciju među svojim destinacijama, a povezano je i s Republikom Hrvatskom. Broj ruskih turista u Hrvatskoj pada iz godine u godinu. S jedne strane to može imati negativan utjecaj na hrvatsko turističko tržište, a s druge strane može otvoriti nove mogućnosti za pronalaženje načina da se privuče više posjetitelja iz Hrvatske. Smatramo da to može biti u interesu Hrvatske. ; Russian outbound tourism is well noticed in the World Tourist Market. Exporting tourist services to Russia has been the boon for the economies of many countries. Nowadays new tendencies are being revealed which should radically change the structure of Russian national tourism and influence the International tourism. There are outer and inner, market and political reasons for that. In Russia the government supports the inner and inbound tourism by means of programs and the strategy of its development. Entrepreneurial activities, competition, investment in tourism and tourist infrastructure are growing as well. In nowadays Russia the shift from "The industry of outbound tourism" to "The industry of national tourism" is well seen. The latter brings additional revenues to Russian regions. Current economic and political situation is contributing to this process. The economic-crisis-related decline in incomes pushes Russians to travel abroad less and instead increases the number of travelers within the country to cheaper destinations. Facing economic sanctions Russian authorities search for inner investment and the possibilities to reduce the cost of import. They started paying more attention to inner tourism. Under the slogans of "import-substitution" and "counter-sanctions" some restrictions on outbound tourism, preferences for the national tourism industry, and stimulation of consumers' demand were elaborated in this paper. Also the outbound tourism restrictions, prohibition for some foreign companies to act on Russian tourist market became a political factor. The decline of Russian outbound tourism strengthens the competition among its destinations. It is related to Republic of Croatia. The number of Russian visitors to Croatia declines from year to year. On the one hand it may have negative influence on Croatian tourist market, on the other – it opens new possibilities to find ways to attract more visitors from Russia. We suppose that it may be in the interest of Croatia.
The paper integrates several theoretical and practical issues into the general context of the contemporary crisis of the bureaucratic state and a quest for new patterns of governance. Several subjects are considered: various aspects of the decline of public trust in government, including the civic "desacralisation" of the state, the paradox of the positive influence of social distrust on political development, and the dependence between trust and corruption. Noting the serious efforts undertaken in several leading countries during the last 30 years in order to overcome this crisis, and the recent changes in their public management as a kind of administrative response to the situation, the author concludes that most of these steps, because of their purely technological character, did not pose a real alternative and could not solve the problems in accordance with current public needs and expectations. The main part of the article is devoted to the case of Russia – a description and analysis of five rounds of unsuccessful efforts to create a genuine public service in post-Soviet Russia and an analysis of the reasons for failure. Despite some partial improvements, the general results are judged to be a dramatic failure, causing the appearance of fully-fledged bureaucratic state with all the inevitable negative consequences. The most malignant foes of reforms in Russia are not the people who failed during the first stages of changes but the "early-winners"; i.e., those who managed to acquire gains in the 90s and have tried to save their current privileged positions by any means, including the so-called "administrative resource" and other abuses of power. The Russian experience also seems quite interesting compared with all other post-socialist East European countries. The common denominator of the author's approach is an appraisal of the current condition of bureaucratic state institutions and personnel as unsuited to contemporary public expectations and demands, and a vital need to make them much more responsive and cooperative. Namely, it seems obvious that a new world is opening up with respect to the place and role of executive public officials. ; U radu se isprepleće nekoliko teorijskih i praktičnih pitanja, a sve unutar širega konteksta suvremene krize birokratske države i potrage za novim obrascima upravljanja. Razmatra se nekoliko tema: različiti aspekti pada povjerenja javnosti u državu, uključujući građansku »desakralizaciju" države, paradoks pozitivnog utjecaja nepovjerenja društva na politički razvoj, te povezanost povjerenja i korupcije. Mnoge su države tijekom posljednjih 30 godina poduzele ozbiljne napore kako bi riješile krizu i na nedavne se promjene u njihovu javnom upravljanju može gledati kao na svojevrstan administrativni odgovor. No autor ipak zaključuje da većina tih promjena, s obzirom na to da su bile isključivo tehničke prirode, nije predstavljala stvarnu alternativu te one nisu mogle riješiti probleme u skladu s očekivanjima i potrebama suvremenog društva. Glavnina je rada posvećena slučaju Rusije. Opisuje se i analizira pet krugova neuspješnih pokušaja da se nakon raspada Sovjetskoga Saveza u Rusiju uvede javna služba u pravom smislu riječi. Usprkos djelomičnom napretku, pokušaji su rezultirali značajnim neuspjehom te je došlo do razvoja birokratske države i neizbježnih popratnih posljedica. Najveći neprijatelji reformi u Rusiji nisu oni koji su se susreli s neuspjehom u prvim fazama promjene, već su to »rani pobjednici" – oni koji su 1990-ih stekli povlastice i potom ih nastojali zadržati na sve moguće načine, pa tako i zlouporabom moći. Ruska su iskustva također vrlo zanimljiva u usporedbi s iskustvima ostalih postsocijalističkih istočnoeuropskih zemalja. Autor ocjenjuje da sadašnje stanje birokratskih državnih institucija i njihovih zaposlenika ni u jednoj zemlji nije u skladu sa suvremenim očekivanjima i zahtjevima javnosti te drži da je potrebno znatno povećati razinu njihove odazivnosti i suradnje. Očito je da se uloga javnih službenika mijenja iz temelja.
