Suchergebnisse

In the article, the EU and Russia relations are analyzed as paying specific attention to the conceptual and practical weight provided for the conjunction "and" when EU–Russia relations are interpreted and practically constructed in the West. The answer which is in common use – these relations are intellectually based and practically shaped according the engagement doctrine – is known well. However, the common answer does not eliminate the problem why the perspective of the practical applicati­on of engagement toward Russia is still under dispute in the West? The article proceeds to revealing the specifics of the Western attitudes in regard to engagement with Russia and theirs correlation with the cultural-political identities of engagement's participants. The conjunction "and" emphasizing the EU–Russia relations is interpreted in three ways: optimistically, equably and skeptically. Optimists, moderates and skep­tics are more "ideal", resumptive entitlements characterizing the Western interpreters of engagement according theirs believe in the success of the practical implementation of the doctrine. Generalizing the optimists it is worth to note that they trust the strategy of enga­gement and believe that is possible to harmonize two-tracks policy (temptation and intimidation) toward Russia. Moderates believe in the future of engagement in long term perspective same as optimists. They link the success of engagement with the perspective of strategic consolidation of the EU directed by old-member states of the EU to the expense of the interests of the new-comers. Skeptics are inclined to emphasize the lack of values dimension in the EU–Rus­sia relations. According to skeptics, the lack creates the opportunity for the mutual cooperation and for power struggle seeking to overreach each other and to prevail over each other.The diversity of interpretations is stimulating by the nodus of factors (history, values, pragmatic interests) which is still affects the EU and Russia relations as well as different attitudes toward the perspectives of co-operation in the future. The very important source of the diversity is the difference in disparity of position regarding the geopolitical development of Eurasia. The article ends with the conclusion that the direction of the EU and Russia en­gagement will be strongly influenced by the reciprocal attempts to define theirs own cultural-political identities. ; Straipsnyje analizuojami Europos Sąjungos (ES) ir Rusijos santykiai aiš­kinantis, koks konceptualus ir praktinis krūvis Vakaruose suteikiamas jungtukui "ir" interpretuojant bei realiai konstruojant ES ir Rusijos santykius. Bendro po­būdžio atsakymas – šie santykiai intelektualiai paremti ir praktikoje yra mode­liuojami atsispiriant į vadinamąją "engagement'o" doktriną – neblogai žinomas. Tačiau bendro pobūdžio atsakymas nepašalina problemos, kodėl iki šiol Vaka­ruose ginčijamasi dėl "engagement'o" taikymo Rusijos atveju perspektyvos? Analizė atskleidžia ES (Vakarams) būdingų požiūrių į "engagement'o" dok­triną Rusijos atžvilgiu ypatumus ir jų koreliaciją su dabartiniais "engagement'o" dalyvių kultūriniais ir politiniais tapatumais. Vakaruose jungtuku "ir" pabrėžiamas Europos Sąjungos ir Rusijos san­tykis yra interpretuojamas trejopai. Aiškinimų įvairovę stimuliuoja sudėtinga istorinių, vertybinių ir pragmatiniais vadinamų veiksnių, iki šiol dariusių įta­ką Europos ir Rusijos santykių raidai, sąveika ir skirtingi požiūriai į bendra­darbiavimo perspektyvas ateityje. Svarbus aiškinimų įvairovės šaltinis yra ir skirtingos Eurazijos žemyno būsimos geopolitinės raidos vizijos. Akivaizdi ir dar viena aplinkybė, o būtent tai, kad analizuojamo ES ir Rusijos "engagement'o" kryptį labai stipriai paveiks jo dalyvių kultūrinio ir politinio tapatumo paieškos.

After the cold war, when the Eastern block collapsed, considerable changes were made in the world security architecture. Althought it seemed like a beginning of more certain and secure era, cold war ending didn't fulfill expectations neither the main actors in the cold war conflict, nor the expectations of the rest of the world. Besides, collapse of one block, didn't stop growth dynamic of new power centers. Tendencies for power are not new and unfamiliar to human. When bypolar system collapsed, other subjects started fighting for the positions. PRC role with her enormous people potential, growing economy and strengthened military is evident. Soviet Union, accordingly Russian Federation, believed that there was no more need for strenghtening the other block, especially when the opposite doesn't exist. But, former partners included the opposite side, and that made more tensions between Russia and United States. Rest of the world didn't get better chance to create own future. On the contrary, especially for the peripheral and semiperipheral countries, new threats appeared that destabilized individual and collective security. Efforts to make human community rational, were always idealism and those efforts were considered utopian, but under the given circumstances, for the international stability, the most accseptable model is model of global triangle - China, Russia, USA. Reason why this three countries is ther specific potention: USA is powerful technological, military and political center, RF is worlds warehouse' and China is the worlds manufacture. In the globalism domination over nationalism era that model could be the optimal 'braking and balance' system in the international relations- political ideal that all liberal schools wanted to acchievestarting Lock, Montesquieu, Rousseau till today. ; Raspad Istočnog bloka nije zaustavio dinamiku razvoja novih centara moći. Krah bipolarizma samo je razotkrio pozornicu na kojoj se odigrava bespoštedna borba različitih subjekata za jačanje sopstvenog uticaja u međunarodnim odnosima. U kontekstu regionalnih sila, u tom smislu je posebno izražen primer NR Kine koja ima ogroman potencijal u ljudstvu, industrija je u ekspanziji i ima vidno ojačanu vojnu efektivu. Nakon brzog pridruživanja bivših članica Varšavskog ugovora nekadašnjem protivničkom taboru, nastupile su nove tenzije na relaciji Rusija i SAD. Prestanak Hladnog rata doneo je i prestanak konfrontacija, ali se međunarodna zajednica suočila sa neophodnošću da preuredi odnose između subjekata i da stvori nove, univerzalnije i trajnije bezbednosne mehanizme. Čini se da je u realnim okolnostima, za stabilnost međunarodne zajednice, najprihvatljiviji model globalnog trougla čija bi temena predstavljali: SAD, RF i NR Kina. Razlozi njegovog postojanja proističu iz specifičnih potencijala koje poseduju ove države: SAD kao moćan tehnološki, vojni i politički centar; RF, kao svetsko skladište i NR Kina, kao svetska manufaktura. Uprkos činjenici da sve tri strane trougla imaju svoje specifične i, u mnogim elementima, suprotstavljene interese, to bi mogao da bude najoptimalniji sistem kočnica i ravnoteže u međunarodnim odnosima.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

The article raises two interconnected questions: first, what is the place of three Baltic States in Russia's security image, and second, how Baltic States cope with their own negative perception of Russia. The proposed idea is that the problems of mutual representation and interaction can be understood analysing the conceptualisations of space, which influences the way in which the closest environment, including the neighbours, is approached. This representation, together with historical narratives, formulates and justifies the comprehensive, consistent, and objectivised self and the other. Thus, the goal is to show how the tense relations between Russia and Baltic States, full of mistrust, can be explained as a clash between two conflicting geo-spatial views. This idea is developed, first, by presenting the theoretical assumptions on the relation among territory, identity, and borders and the principles of the neighbourhood analysis, and second, by demonstrating how the spatial representation by Russia and Baltic States is formulated and supported in their spatial identity and foreign policy practices. In the conclusions, the answer is given as to how this clash between the two different and competing understandings is reflected in the bilateral interactions and how these insights allow contributing to the analysis of the foreign policy of the states. ; Straipsnyje keliami du tarpusavyje susiję klausimai. Pirma, kokia yra Baltijos valstybių vieta Rusijos saugumo vaizdiniuose. Antra, kaip Baltijos valstybės susidoroja su neigiamu Rusijos suvokimu. Šiame straipsnyje teigiama, kad Rusijos ir trijų Baltijos valstybių abipusio reprezentavimo ir sąveikos problemas geriausiai galima suprasti atskleidžiant šių valstybių erdvės suvokimą, kuris visų pirma formuoja požiūrį į artimiausią aplinką, taigi ir savo kaimynus. Šis suvokimas, kylantis ir iš istorinių reprezentacijų, pagrindžia ir pateikia išsamų, objektyvizuotą savęs ir "kito" suvokimą. Taigi siekiama parodyti, kaip įtemptus ir nepasitikėjimo kupinus Rusijos ir trijų Baltijos valstybių santykius veikia susiduriantys ir konfliktuojantys savo vietos tarptautinėje politikoje apibūdinimai ir iš jų kylantys veiksmai. Ši idėja straipsnyje atskleidžiama, pirma, išplėtojant teorines prielaidas, kad yra teritorijos, tapatybės ir sienų ryšys, ir iš to kylančius kaimynystės analizės principus, antra, parodant, kaip Rusija ir trys Baltijos valstybės savo užsienio politika išreiškia, formuluoja ir dar kartą įtvirtina savo erdvinį tapatybinį pasaulėvaizdį. Išvadose parodoma, kaip skirtingų ir vienas kitą neutralizuoti bandančių pasaulėvaizdžių susidūrimas formuoja dvišales sąveikas ir kaip jie leidžia analizuoti kiekvieno veikėjo užsienio politiką.

During 2000 Finland and the USSR had special relations. Finland's foreign and defense policy was highly dependent on the USSR. Their cooperation went through four stages: starting from Finland being a part of Russian empire, to being one of the most important allies in the Western and Nordic Europe. The last period dates go back to the end of the Cold War. Finland come to conceive Russia not only as a threat to their homeland, but also as a possible partner and ally in helping to create secure community across the Baltic Sea region. The collapse of the former Soviet Union, the rise of new states in the neighborhood of Finland and the changed attitude of Russia towards Finland allowed Finns to adopt new defense and foreign policy. This allowed Finland to join the European Union and NATO program Partnership for Peace (PfP). Since 1991 Finns have paid a special attention towards the development of security in the Baltic Sea region, where the most important task was Russia's integration into European institutions and its democratization. Baltic Sea could become a bridge for achieving Russia's integration. Scandinavian countries, the Baltic States and Russia may turn the Baltic Sea region into a big economic and cultural network.[.].

During 2000 Finland and the USSR had special relations. Finland's foreign and defense policy was highly dependent on the USSR. Their cooperation went through four stages: starting from Finland being a part of Russian empire, to being one of the most important allies in the Western and Nordic Europe. The last period dates go back to the end of the Cold War. Finland come to conceive Russia not only as a threat to their homeland, but also as a possible partner and ally in helping to create secure community across the Baltic Sea region. The collapse of the former Soviet Union, the rise of new states in the neighborhood of Finland and the changed attitude of Russia towards Finland allowed Finns to adopt new defense and foreign policy. This allowed Finland to join the European Union and NATO program Partnership for Peace (PfP). Since 1991 Finns have paid a special attention towards the development of security in the Baltic Sea region, where the most important task was Russia's integration into European institutions and its democratization. Baltic Sea could become a bridge for achieving Russia's integration. Scandinavian countries, the Baltic States and Russia may turn the Baltic Sea region into a big economic and cultural network.[.].

During 2000 Finland and the USSR had special relations. Finland's foreign and defense policy was highly dependent on the USSR. Their cooperation went through four stages: starting from Finland being a part of Russian empire, to being one of the most important allies in the Western and Nordic Europe. The last period dates go back to the end of the Cold War. Finland come to conceive Russia not only as a threat to their homeland, but also as a possible partner and ally in helping to create secure community across the Baltic Sea region. The collapse of the former Soviet Union, the rise of new states in the neighborhood of Finland and the changed attitude of Russia towards Finland allowed Finns to adopt new defense and foreign policy. This allowed Finland to join the European Union and NATO program Partnership for Peace (PfP). Since 1991 Finns have paid a special attention towards the development of security in the Baltic Sea region, where the most important task was Russia's integration into European institutions and its democratization. Baltic Sea could become a bridge for achieving Russia's integration. Scandinavian countries, the Baltic States and Russia may turn the Baltic Sea region into a big economic and cultural network.[.].

Докторска дисертација «Русија на почетку XXI века – геополитичка анализа» је рад који се састоји из шест делова. У првом делу «Теоретско – методолошки увод» је постављена методолошко појмовна основа рада, извршен преглед досадашњих истраживања на ову тему и сабрани и анализирани потребни извори и литература. Други део «Физичко – географске одлике територије данашње Русије» се бави анализом и вредновањем рељефа и педолошког покривача, климе, хидрографског потенцијала, биљног и животињског света, те рудног и енергетског блага на подручју савремене Русије. Док су први и други део рада квантитативно невелики (слично петом и шестом делу), трећи и четврти део обухватају највећи део дисертације. Трећи део «Историјска анализа геополитичке позиције Русије» се бави територијалним развојем руске државе кроз историју, при чему су анализирани и остали геополитички значајни фактори генезе њеног историјског положаја. Посебно је посматран утицај који су на Русију кроз историју имали континенти на којима се распростире, а извршена је и анализа билатералних историјских односа са најзначајнијим суседима и светским силама, где су уочене и извесне геополитичке правилности (по историчару Броделу то би биле историјске појаве «средњег» и «дугог трајања»). Четврти део «Геополитичка позиција савремене Русије» анализира данашњу Русију са унутрашње и међународне позиције. У оквиру унутрашње позиције се анализира економија, демографија, социолошка структура, култура и унутрашњо – политичка позиција савремене руске државе. У односу на окружење се анализира укупна позиција Русије у свету и посебно у односу на суседе и поједине важне државе (са свим државама Европе и Азије и са најважнијим силама на другим континентима). Пети део «Перспективе Русије у следећим деценијама XXI века» садржи основне елементе предвиђања унутрашњег развоја земље, као и њену позицију у светским токовима. Шести део је прегледни «Закључак». ; Doktorska disertacija «Rusija na početku XXI veka – geopolitička analiza» je rad koji se sastoji iz šest delova. U prvom delu «Teoretsko – metodološki uvod» je postavljena metodološko pojmovna osnova rada, izvršen pregled dosadašnjih istraživanja na ovu temu i sabrani i analizirani potrebni izvori i literatura. Drugi deo «Fizičko – geografske odlike teritorije današnje Rusije» se bavi analizom i vrednovanjem reljefa i pedološkog pokrivača, klime, hidrografskog potencijala, biljnog i životinjskog sveta, te rudnog i energetskog blaga na području savremene Rusije. Dok su prvi i drugi deo rada kvantitativno neveliki (slično petom i šestom delu), treći i četvrti deo obuhvataju najveći deo disertacije. Treći deo «Istorijska analiza geopolitičke pozicije Rusije» se bavi teritorijalnim razvojem ruske države kroz istoriju, pri čemu su analizirani i ostali geopolitički značajni faktori geneze njenog istorijskog položaja. Posebno je posmatran uticaj koji su na Rusiju kroz istoriju imali kontinenti na kojima se rasprostire, a izvršena je i analiza bilateralnih istorijskih odnosa sa najznačajnijim susedima i svetskim silama, gde su uočene i izvesne geopolitičke pravilnosti (po istoričaru Brodelu to bi bile istorijske pojave «srednjeg» i «dugog trajanja»). Četvrti deo «Geopolitička pozicija savremene Rusije» analizira današnju Rusiju sa unutrašnje i međunarodne pozicije. U okviru unutrašnje pozicije se analizira ekonomija, demografija, sociološka struktura, kultura i unutrašnjo – politička pozicija savremene ruske države. U odnosu na okruženje se analizira ukupna pozicija Rusije u svetu i posebno u odnosu na susede i pojedine važne države (sa svim državama Evrope i Azije i sa najvažnijim silama na drugim kontinentima). Peti deo «Perspektive Rusije u sledećim decenijama XXI veka» sadrži osnovne elemente predviđanja unutrašnjeg razvoja zemlje, kao i njenu poziciju u svetskim tokovima. Šesti deo je pregledni «Zaključak». ; The doctor dissertation named "Russia in the beginning of the 21th century – geopolitical analyses" is the work which is consisting of the six parts. In the first part "Theoretical methodological introduction" is a setup of the methodologicaly conceptual basis of this work and noticed previous researches of this subject matter and summarized and analyzed the resources and literature. The second part of the work "Phiysical and geographical attributes of the nowdays Russian territory" engages in analyzing and valuing relief and soil cover, climate , hidrographycal potential, wildlife, mineral and energy resources of nowdays Russia. While the first and the second part of this work quantitative are a small (alike the fifth and the sixth parts of the work ) the third and the fourt parts borders is the largest part of dissertation . The third part of the work "An historical analyses geopolitical positions of Russia" engages in territorial development of the Russian Government trough its history whereat are analyzed another geopolitically important factors of genesis its historical position. Especially is observed influence to Russia by continents of its broadcasting and noticed some analyses of the bilateral historical attitudes to the most important neighbourhood and other major world powers , where is noticed some geopolitically regularities (accordin to a famous historian Brodel there are a historical apparations named a period of medium-sized duration and a period of long- sized duration) . The fourth part of the dissertation "Geopolitical position of modern Russia" analyzes nowdays Russia in domestic policy and international context .Within interior position is analysing economy, demography, social structures, culture, and domestic policy position of modern Russia. Concerning to surroundings is analysing position of Russia in wholle especially concerning to the neighbourhood and some important countries ( and all countries of Europe, Asia, and the most important powers of other continents). The fifth part "Perspective of Russia in the next decades of the 21 th century" conteins a basic elements of the anticipations of internal development and Russia's position in the world. The sixth part is a previewed "Epilogue".