The ame of this article -nvestigate the nature and results of electoral politics in Serbia during the period of the beginning of violent dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia and the first multiparty elections in 1990. Two levels of elections are taken into consideration: presidential and parliamentary. Oppositely to other Central and East European states, Serbia in the beginning of 1990s has not been involved into the process of political transformation from totalitarian one-party elections controlled system into democratic multi-party free elections model. "Transition without transition" was a formula implied by the ruling party to political life of Serbia during the process of Yugoslavia's dissolution. Political life has seen the adoption of some of the formal attributes of democracy, but without the stable institutional support to that system. The ruling Socialist Party of Serbia imposed its own rules and control over presidential and parliamentary elections in order to discredit the democratic values. As a result, authoritarian political system was thriven to serve the interests of the former ruling nomenclature rather than represent the majority of Serbia's citizens.
The ame of this article -nvestigate the nature and results of electoral politics in Serbia during the period of the beginning of violent dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia and the first multiparty elections in 1990. Two levels of elections are taken into consideration: presidential and parliamentary. Oppositely to other Central and East European states, Serbia in the beginning of 1990s has not been involved into the process of political transformation from totalitarian one-party elections controlled system into democratic multi-party free elections model. "Transition without transition" was a formula implied by the ruling party to political life of Serbia during the process of Yugoslavia's dissolution. Political life has seen the adoption of some of the formal attributes of democracy, but without the stable institutional support to that system. The ruling Socialist Party of Serbia imposed its own rules and control over presidential and parliamentary elections in order to discredit the democratic values. As a result, authoritarian political system was thriven to serve the interests of the former ruling nomenclature rather than represent the majority of Serbia's citizens.
The ame of this article -nvestigate the nature and results of electoral politics in Serbia during the period of the beginning of violent dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia and the first multiparty elections in 1990. Two levels of elections are taken into consideration: presidential and parliamentary. Oppositely to other Central and East European states, Serbia in the beginning of 1990s has not been involved into the process of political transformation from totalitarian one-party elections controlled system into democratic multi-party free elections model. "Transition without transition" was a formula implied by the ruling party to political life of Serbia during the process of Yugoslavia's dissolution. Political life has seen the adoption of some of the formal attributes of democracy, but without the stable institutional support to that system. The ruling Socialist Party of Serbia imposed its own rules and control over presidential and parliamentary elections in order to discredit the democratic values. As a result, authoritarian political system was thriven to serve the interests of the former ruling nomenclature rather than represent the majority of Serbia's citizens.
Democracy has its old faces and today, at the end of the twentieth century, when Ukraine again manages to rise as an independent state, it can not embody its independence in that free form, it fought at the beginning of the century. Today, it develops a social, legal state, forms an open civil society, reforms economic relations in the direction of the market, creates a political nation. A unique role in this process is played by elections, which are a form of direct democracy. At the same time, during the elections, the political struggle, permanently and somewhat covertly, actually goes between the representatives of various social groups, spilling out. Our research applies the qualitative approach, following the case study method. As a method of collecting information, we chose an interview. For our interviews, eleven respondents were chosen randomly. In our research, we base only on the information provided by our respondents. According to them, we are able to finalize that not everyone was able to make an independent choice. Someone was influenced by the media, someone by pressure from other forces. People faced the problem of choice. The problem was a large number of presidential candidates. Also, the campaign of 2019 can be called the most populist in political struggles of all time. ; Demokratija turi senus veidus ir šiandien, XX a. pabaigoje, kai Ukraina vėl sugeba pakilti kaip savarankiška valstybė. Ji negali įkūnyti savo nepriklausomybės šioje laisvoje formoje, ji kovojo amžiaus pradžioje. Šiandien ji vysto socialinę, teisinę valstybę, sudaro atvirą pilietinę visuomenę, reformuoja ekonominius santykius rinkos kryptimi, kuria politinę tautą. Unikalus vaidmuo šiame procese atliekamas rinkimuose, kurie yra tiesioginės demokratijos forma. Tuo pačiu metu, rinkimų metu, nuolatinė ir šiek tiek slapta politinė kova vyksta tarp įvairių socialinių grupių atstovų. Mano tyrime vadovaujamasi kokybiniu požiūriu, atsižvelgiant į atvejo analizės metodą. Kaip informacijos rinkimo metodas pasirinkau interviu. Interviu metu vienuolika respondentų buvo atrinkti atsitiktinai. Tyrime remiamasi tik respondentų pateikta informacija. Pasak jų, galime užbaigti, kad ne kiekvienas galėtų savarankiškai pasirinkti. Kažką įtakojo žiniasklaida, kas nors iš kitų jėgų spaudimo. Žmonės susiduria su pasirinkta problema. Problema buvo daug prezidento kandidatų. Be to, 2019 m. kampanija gali būti vadinama populistine visų laikų politine kova. ; Politikos mokslų ir diplomatijos fakultetas ; Viešosios komunikacijos katedra
During the period of sixteen years when Lithuania enjoyed sovereign rights over the Memel Territory, the Chamber of Representatives, the territorial legislature, was elected six times. All elections were coupled with political intrigues and struggles. However, the most bitter elections of the Chamber of Representatives took place in 1935. This chaos was described: in the letters of the Governor of the Memel Territory to the central government; the press diaries of the State Security Department; the bulletins of the State Security Police district in the Memel Territory; the reports of the Commander of the Memel Territory Border Police; the district investigator's resolutions; the German and other states' mass media; the complaints and protests of the Memel Territory residents; the declarations of the members of the regional election commissions to the Memel District Electoral Commission. Moreover, about thirty foreign journalists from such newspapers as Times, Daily Express, Daily Mail, Morning Post, Daily Telegraph, etc., observed the election. The reasons for such interest could have been the amendments made by the Central Government of Lithuania to the Law on the Elections of the Chamber of Representatives of the Memel Territory in 1935, the growing role of Germany in Europe, etc.
During the period of sixteen years when Lithuania enjoyed sovereign rights over the Memel Territory, the Chamber of Representatives, the territorial legislature, was elected six times. All elections were coupled with political intrigues and struggles. However, the most bitter elections of the Chamber of Representatives took place in 1935. This chaos was described: in the letters of the Governor of the Memel Territory to the central government; the press diaries of the State Security Department; the bulletins of the State Security Police district in the Memel Territory; the reports of the Commander of the Memel Territory Border Police; the district investigator's resolutions; the German and other states' mass media; the complaints and protests of the Memel Territory residents; the declarations of the members of the regional election commissions to the Memel District Electoral Commission. Moreover, about thirty foreign journalists from such newspapers as Times, Daily Express, Daily Mail, Morning Post, Daily Telegraph, etc., observed the election. The reasons for such interest could have been the amendments made by the Central Government of Lithuania to the Law on the Elections of the Chamber of Representatives of the Memel Territory in 1935, the growing role of Germany in Europe, etc.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
The article analyses the information that spreads in the media during the election campaign. It looks at the aspect of promises made by politicians through an academic lens. The definition of a political promise is explained; some insights are devoted to an analysis of the reasons why some promises are more commonly fulfilled. The paper mostly concentrates on the role of the media, combining ideas of media theorists with the investigation of pre-election TV debates "Lyderių forumas".
