Suchergebnisse

In the article, the EU and Russia relations are analyzed as paying specific attention to the conceptual and practical weight provided for the conjunction "and" when EU-Russia relations are interpreted and practically constructed in the West. The answer which is in common use -- these relations are intellectually based and practically shaped according the engagement doctrine -- is known well. However, the common answer does not eliminate the problem why the perspective of the practical application of engagement toward Russia is still under dispute in the West? The article proceeds to revealing the specifics of the Western attitudes in regard to engagement with Russia and their correlation with the cultural-political identities of engagement's participants. The conjunction "and" emphasizing the EU-Russia relations is interpreted in three ways: optimistically, equably and skeptically. The diversity of interpretations is stimulating by the nodus of factors (history, values and pragmatic interests) which is still affects the EU and Russia relations as well as different attitudes toward the perspectives of co-operation in the future. The very important source of the diversity is the difference in disparity of position regarding the geopolitical development of Eurasia. The article ends with the conclusion that the direction of the EU and Russia engagement will be strongly influenced by the reciprocal attempts to define their own cultural-political identities. Adapted from the source document.

Straipsnyje keliami du tarpusavyje susije klausimai. Pirma, kokia yra Baltijos valstybiu vieta Rusijos saugumo vaizdiniuose. Antra, kaip Balti-jos valstybes susidoroja su neigiamu Rusijos suvokimu. Siame straipsnyje teigiama, kad Rusijos ir triju Baltijos valstybiu abipusio reprezentavimo ir saveikos problemas geriausiai galima suprasti atskleidziant siu valstybiu erdves suvokima, kuris visu pirma formuoja poziuri i artimiausia aplinka, taigi ir savo kaimynus. Sis suvokimas, kylantis ir is istoriniu reprezentaci-ju, pagrindzia ir pateikia issamu, objektyvizuota saves ir 'kito' suvokima. Taigi siekiama parodyti, kaip itemptus ir nepasitikejimo kupinus Rusijos ir triju Baltijos valstybiu santykius veikia susiduriantys ir konfliktuojantys savo vietos tarptautineje politikoje apibudinimai ir is ju kylantys veiksmai. Si ide-ja straipsnyje atskleidziama, pirma, ispletojant teorines prielaidas, kad yra teritorijos, tapatybes ir sienu rysys, ir is to kylancius kaimynystes analizes principus, antra, parodant, kaip Rusija ir trys Baltijos valstybes savo uzsie-nio politika isreiskia, formuluoja ir dar karta itvirtina savo erdvini tapatybini pasaulevaizdi. Isvadose parodoma, kaip skirtingu ir vienas kita neutralizuoti bandanciu pasaulevaizdziu susidurimas formuoja dvisales The article raises two interconnected questions: first, what is the place of three Baltic States in Russia's security image, and second, how Baltic States cope with their own negative perception of Russia. The proposed idea is that the problems of mutual representation and interaction can be understood analysing the conceptualisations of space, which influences the way in which the closest environment, including the neighbours, is approached. This representation, together with historical narratives, formulates and justifies the comprehensive, consistent, and objectivised self and the other. Thus, the goal is to show how the tense relations between Russia and Baltic States, full of mistrust, can be explained as a clash between two conflicting geo-spatial views. This idea is developed, first, by presenting the theoretical assumptions on the relation among territory, identity, and borders and the principles of the neighbourhood analysis, and second, by demonstrating how the spatial representation by Russia and Baltic States is formulated and supported in their spatial identity and foreign policy practices. In the conclusions, the answer is given as to how this clash between the two different and competing understandings is reflected in the bilateral interactions and how these insights allow contributing to the analysis of the foreign policy of the states. Adapted from the source document.

The ame of this article -nvestigate the nature and results of electoral politics in Serbia during the period of the beginning of violent dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia and the first multiparty elections in 1990. Two levels of elections are taken into consideration: presidential and parliamentary. Oppositely to other Central and East European states, Serbia in the beginning of 1990s has not been involved into the process of political transformation from totalitarian one-party elections controlled system into democratic multi-party free elections model. "Transition without transition" was a formula implied by the ruling party to political life of Serbia during the process of Yugoslavia's dissolution. Political life has seen the adoption of some of the formal attributes of democracy, but without the stable institutional support to that system. The ruling Socialist Party of Serbia imposed its own rules and control over presidential and parliamentary elections in order to discredit the democratic values. As a result, authoritarian political system was thriven to serve the interests of the former ruling nomenclature rather than represent the majority of Serbia's citizens.

The ame of this article -nvestigate the nature and results of electoral politics in Serbia during the period of the beginning of violent dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia and the first multiparty elections in 1990. Two levels of elections are taken into consideration: presidential and parliamentary. Oppositely to other Central and East European states, Serbia in the beginning of 1990s has not been involved into the process of political transformation from totalitarian one-party elections controlled system into democratic multi-party free elections model. "Transition without transition" was a formula implied by the ruling party to political life of Serbia during the process of Yugoslavia's dissolution. Political life has seen the adoption of some of the formal attributes of democracy, but without the stable institutional support to that system. The ruling Socialist Party of Serbia imposed its own rules and control over presidential and parliamentary elections in order to discredit the democratic values. As a result, authoritarian political system was thriven to serve the interests of the former ruling nomenclature rather than represent the majority of Serbia's citizens.

The ame of this article -nvestigate the nature and results of electoral politics in Serbia during the period of the beginning of violent dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia and the first multiparty elections in 1990. Two levels of elections are taken into consideration: presidential and parliamentary. Oppositely to other Central and East European states, Serbia in the beginning of 1990s has not been involved into the process of political transformation from totalitarian one-party elections controlled system into democratic multi-party free elections model. "Transition without transition" was a formula implied by the ruling party to political life of Serbia during the process of Yugoslavia's dissolution. Political life has seen the adoption of some of the formal attributes of democracy, but without the stable institutional support to that system. The ruling Socialist Party of Serbia imposed its own rules and control over presidential and parliamentary elections in order to discredit the democratic values. As a result, authoritarian political system was thriven to serve the interests of the former ruling nomenclature rather than represent the majority of Serbia's citizens.

During the period of sixteen years when Lithuania enjoyed sovereign rights over the Memel Territory, the Chamber of Representatives, the territorial legislature, was elected six times. All elections were coupled with political intrigues and struggles. However, the most bitter elections of the Chamber of Representatives took place in 1935. This chaos was described: in the letters of the Governor of the Memel Territory to the central government; the press diaries of the State Security Department; the bulletins of the State Security Police district in the Memel Territory; the reports of the Commander of the Memel Territory Border Police; the district investigator's resolutions; the German and other states' mass media; the complaints and protests of the Memel Territory residents; the declarations of the members of the regional election commissions to the Memel District Electoral Commission. Moreover, about thirty foreign journalists from such newspapers as Times, Daily Express, Daily Mail, Morning Post, Daily Telegraph, etc., observed the election. The reasons for such interest could have been the amendments made by the Central Government of Lithuania to the Law on the Elections of the Chamber of Representatives of the Memel Territory in 1935, the growing role of Germany in Europe, etc.

During the period of sixteen years when Lithuania enjoyed sovereign rights over the Memel Territory, the Chamber of Representatives, the territorial legislature, was elected six times. All elections were coupled with political intrigues and struggles. However, the most bitter elections of the Chamber of Representatives took place in 1935. This chaos was described: in the letters of the Governor of the Memel Territory to the central government; the press diaries of the State Security Department; the bulletins of the State Security Police district in the Memel Territory; the reports of the Commander of the Memel Territory Border Police; the district investigator's resolutions; the German and other states' mass media; the complaints and protests of the Memel Territory residents; the declarations of the members of the regional election commissions to the Memel District Electoral Commission. Moreover, about thirty foreign journalists from such newspapers as Times, Daily Express, Daily Mail, Morning Post, Daily Telegraph, etc., observed the election. The reasons for such interest could have been the amendments made by the Central Government of Lithuania to the Law on the Elections of the Chamber of Representatives of the Memel Territory in 1935, the growing role of Germany in Europe, etc.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.