The ame of this article -nvestigate the nature and results of electoral politics in Serbia during the period of the beginning of violent dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia and the first multiparty elections in 1990. Two levels of elections are taken into consideration: presidential and parliamentary. Oppositely to other Central and East European states, Serbia in the beginning of 1990s has not been involved into the process of political transformation from totalitarian one-party elections controlled system into democratic multi-party free elections model. "Transition without transition" was a formula implied by the ruling party to political life of Serbia during the process of Yugoslavia's dissolution. Political life has seen the adoption of some of the formal attributes of democracy, but without the stable institutional support to that system. The ruling Socialist Party of Serbia imposed its own rules and control over presidential and parliamentary elections in order to discredit the democratic values. As a result, authoritarian political system was thriven to serve the interests of the former ruling nomenclature rather than represent the majority of Serbia's citizens.
The ame of this article -nvestigate the nature and results of electoral politics in Serbia during the period of the beginning of violent dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia and the first multiparty elections in 1990. Two levels of elections are taken into consideration: presidential and parliamentary. Oppositely to other Central and East European states, Serbia in the beginning of 1990s has not been involved into the process of political transformation from totalitarian one-party elections controlled system into democratic multi-party free elections model. "Transition without transition" was a formula implied by the ruling party to political life of Serbia during the process of Yugoslavia's dissolution. Political life has seen the adoption of some of the formal attributes of democracy, but without the stable institutional support to that system. The ruling Socialist Party of Serbia imposed its own rules and control over presidential and parliamentary elections in order to discredit the democratic values. As a result, authoritarian political system was thriven to serve the interests of the former ruling nomenclature rather than represent the majority of Serbia's citizens.
The ame of this article -nvestigate the nature and results of electoral politics in Serbia during the period of the beginning of violent dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia and the first multiparty elections in 1990. Two levels of elections are taken into consideration: presidential and parliamentary. Oppositely to other Central and East European states, Serbia in the beginning of 1990s has not been involved into the process of political transformation from totalitarian one-party elections controlled system into democratic multi-party free elections model. "Transition without transition" was a formula implied by the ruling party to political life of Serbia during the process of Yugoslavia's dissolution. Political life has seen the adoption of some of the formal attributes of democracy, but without the stable institutional support to that system. The ruling Socialist Party of Serbia imposed its own rules and control over presidential and parliamentary elections in order to discredit the democratic values. As a result, authoritarian political system was thriven to serve the interests of the former ruling nomenclature rather than represent the majority of Serbia's citizens.
In the article, the EU and Russia relations are analyzed as paying specific attention to the conceptual and practical weight provided for the conjunction "and" when EU–Russia relations are interpreted and practically constructed in the West. The answer which is in common use – these relations are intellectually based and practically shaped according the engagement doctrine – is known well. However, the common answer does not eliminate the problem why the perspective of the practical application of engagement toward Russia is still under dispute in the West? The article proceeds to revealing the specifics of the Western attitudes in regard to engagement with Russia and theirs correlation with the cultural-political identities of engagement's participants. The conjunction "and" emphasizing the EU–Russia relations is interpreted in three ways: optimistically, equably and skeptically. Optimists, moderates and skeptics are more "ideal", resumptive entitlements characterizing the Western interpreters of engagement according theirs believe in the success of the practical implementation of the doctrine. Generalizing the optimists it is worth to note that they trust the strategy of engagement and believe that is possible to harmonize two-tracks policy (temptation and intimidation) toward Russia. Moderates believe in the future of engagement in long term perspective same as optimists. They link the success of engagement with the perspective of strategic consolidation of the EU directed by old-member states of the EU to the expense of the interests of the new-comers. Skeptics are inclined to emphasize the lack of values dimension in the EU–Russia relations. According to skeptics, the lack creates the opportunity for the mutual cooperation and for power struggle seeking to overreach each other and to prevail over each other.The diversity of interpretations is stimulating by the nodus of factors (history, values, pragmatic interests) which is still affects the EU and Russia relations as well as different attitudes toward the perspectives of co-operation in the future. The very important source of the diversity is the difference in disparity of position regarding the geopolitical development of Eurasia. The article ends with the conclusion that the direction of the EU and Russia engagement will be strongly influenced by the reciprocal attempts to define theirs own cultural-political identities. ; Straipsnyje analizuojami Europos Sąjungos (ES) ir Rusijos santykiai aiškinantis, koks konceptualus ir praktinis krūvis Vakaruose suteikiamas jungtukui "ir" interpretuojant bei realiai konstruojant ES ir Rusijos santykius. Bendro pobūdžio atsakymas – šie santykiai intelektualiai paremti ir praktikoje yra modeliuojami atsispiriant į vadinamąją "engagement'o" doktriną – neblogai žinomas. Tačiau bendro pobūdžio atsakymas nepašalina problemos, kodėl iki šiol Vakaruose ginčijamasi dėl "engagement'o" taikymo Rusijos atveju perspektyvos? Analizė atskleidžia ES (Vakarams) būdingų požiūrių į "engagement'o" doktriną Rusijos atžvilgiu ypatumus ir jų koreliaciją su dabartiniais "engagement'o" dalyvių kultūriniais ir politiniais tapatumais. Vakaruose jungtuku "ir" pabrėžiamas Europos Sąjungos ir Rusijos santykis yra interpretuojamas trejopai. Aiškinimų įvairovę stimuliuoja sudėtinga istorinių, vertybinių ir pragmatiniais vadinamų veiksnių, iki šiol dariusių įtaką Europos ir Rusijos santykių raidai, sąveika ir skirtingi požiūriai į bendradarbiavimo perspektyvas ateityje. Svarbus aiškinimų įvairovės šaltinis yra ir skirtingos Eurazijos žemyno būsimos geopolitinės raidos vizijos. Akivaizdi ir dar viena aplinkybė, o būtent tai, kad analizuojamo ES ir Rusijos "engagement'o" kryptį labai stipriai paveiks jo dalyvių kultūrinio ir politinio tapatumo paieškos.
Democracy has its old faces and today, at the end of the twentieth century, when Ukraine again manages to rise as an independent state, it can not embody its independence in that free form, it fought at the beginning of the century. Today, it develops a social, legal state, forms an open civil society, reforms economic relations in the direction of the market, creates a political nation. A unique role in this process is played by elections, which are a form of direct democracy. At the same time, during the elections, the political struggle, permanently and somewhat covertly, actually goes between the representatives of various social groups, spilling out. Our research applies the qualitative approach, following the case study method. As a method of collecting information, we chose an interview. For our interviews, eleven respondents were chosen randomly. In our research, we base only on the information provided by our respondents. According to them, we are able to finalize that not everyone was able to make an independent choice. Someone was influenced by the media, someone by pressure from other forces. People faced the problem of choice. The problem was a large number of presidential candidates. Also, the campaign of 2019 can be called the most populist in political struggles of all time. ; Demokratija turi senus veidus ir šiandien, XX a. pabaigoje, kai Ukraina vėl sugeba pakilti kaip savarankiška valstybė. Ji negali įkūnyti savo nepriklausomybės šioje laisvoje formoje, ji kovojo amžiaus pradžioje. Šiandien ji vysto socialinę, teisinę valstybę, sudaro atvirą pilietinę visuomenę, reformuoja ekonominius santykius rinkos kryptimi, kuria politinę tautą. Unikalus vaidmuo šiame procese atliekamas rinkimuose, kurie yra tiesioginės demokratijos forma. Tuo pačiu metu, rinkimų metu, nuolatinė ir šiek tiek slapta politinė kova vyksta tarp įvairių socialinių grupių atstovų. Mano tyrime vadovaujamasi kokybiniu požiūriu, atsižvelgiant į atvejo analizės metodą. Kaip informacijos rinkimo metodas pasirinkau interviu. Interviu metu vienuolika respondentų buvo atrinkti atsitiktinai. Tyrime remiamasi tik respondentų pateikta informacija. Pasak jų, galime užbaigti, kad ne kiekvienas galėtų savarankiškai pasirinkti. Kažką įtakojo žiniasklaida, kas nors iš kitų jėgų spaudimo. Žmonės susiduria su pasirinkta problema. Problema buvo daug prezidento kandidatų. Be to, 2019 m. kampanija gali būti vadinama populistine visų laikų politine kova. ; Politikos mokslų ir diplomatijos fakultetas ; Viešosios komunikacijos katedra
During the period of sixteen years when Lithuania enjoyed sovereign rights over the Memel Territory, the Chamber of Representatives, the territorial legislature, was elected six times. All elections were coupled with political intrigues and struggles. However, the most bitter elections of the Chamber of Representatives took place in 1935. This chaos was described: in the letters of the Governor of the Memel Territory to the central government; the press diaries of the State Security Department; the bulletins of the State Security Police district in the Memel Territory; the reports of the Commander of the Memel Territory Border Police; the district investigator's resolutions; the German and other states' mass media; the complaints and protests of the Memel Territory residents; the declarations of the members of the regional election commissions to the Memel District Electoral Commission. Moreover, about thirty foreign journalists from such newspapers as Times, Daily Express, Daily Mail, Morning Post, Daily Telegraph, etc., observed the election. The reasons for such interest could have been the amendments made by the Central Government of Lithuania to the Law on the Elections of the Chamber of Representatives of the Memel Territory in 1935, the growing role of Germany in Europe, etc.
During the period of sixteen years when Lithuania enjoyed sovereign rights over the Memel Territory, the Chamber of Representatives, the territorial legislature, was elected six times. All elections were coupled with political intrigues and struggles. However, the most bitter elections of the Chamber of Representatives took place in 1935. This chaos was described: in the letters of the Governor of the Memel Territory to the central government; the press diaries of the State Security Department; the bulletins of the State Security Police district in the Memel Territory; the reports of the Commander of the Memel Territory Border Police; the district investigator's resolutions; the German and other states' mass media; the complaints and protests of the Memel Territory residents; the declarations of the members of the regional election commissions to the Memel District Electoral Commission. Moreover, about thirty foreign journalists from such newspapers as Times, Daily Express, Daily Mail, Morning Post, Daily Telegraph, etc., observed the election. The reasons for such interest could have been the amendments made by the Central Government of Lithuania to the Law on the Elections of the Chamber of Representatives of the Memel Territory in 1935, the growing role of Germany in Europe, etc.
After the cold war, when the Eastern block collapsed, considerable changes were made in the world security architecture. Althought it seemed like a beginning of more certain and secure era, cold war ending didn't fulfill expectations neither the main actors in the cold war conflict, nor the expectations of the rest of the world. Besides, collapse of one block, didn't stop growth dynamic of new power centers. Tendencies for power are not new and unfamiliar to human. When bypolar system collapsed, other subjects started fighting for the positions. PRC role with her enormous people potential, growing economy and strengthened military is evident. Soviet Union, accordingly Russian Federation, believed that there was no more need for strenghtening the other block, especially when the opposite doesn't exist. But, former partners included the opposite side, and that made more tensions between Russia and United States. Rest of the world didn't get better chance to create own future. On the contrary, especially for the peripheral and semiperipheral countries, new threats appeared that destabilized individual and collective security. Efforts to make human community rational, were always idealism and those efforts were considered utopian, but under the given circumstances, for the international stability, the most accseptable model is model of global triangle - China, Russia, USA. Reason why this three countries is ther specific potention: USA is powerful technological, military and political center, RF is worlds warehouse' and China is the worlds manufacture. In the globalism domination over nationalism era that model could be the optimal 'braking and balance' system in the international relations- political ideal that all liberal schools wanted to acchievestarting Lock, Montesquieu, Rousseau till today. ; Raspad Istočnog bloka nije zaustavio dinamiku razvoja novih centara moći. Krah bipolarizma samo je razotkrio pozornicu na kojoj se odigrava bespoštedna borba različitih subjekata za jačanje sopstvenog uticaja u međunarodnim odnosima. U kontekstu regionalnih sila, u tom smislu je posebno izražen primer NR Kine koja ima ogroman potencijal u ljudstvu, industrija je u ekspanziji i ima vidno ojačanu vojnu efektivu. Nakon brzog pridruživanja bivših članica Varšavskog ugovora nekadašnjem protivničkom taboru, nastupile su nove tenzije na relaciji Rusija i SAD. Prestanak Hladnog rata doneo je i prestanak konfrontacija, ali se međunarodna zajednica suočila sa neophodnošću da preuredi odnose između subjekata i da stvori nove, univerzalnije i trajnije bezbednosne mehanizme. Čini se da je u realnim okolnostima, za stabilnost međunarodne zajednice, najprihvatljiviji model globalnog trougla čija bi temena predstavljali: SAD, RF i NR Kina. Razlozi njegovog postojanja proističu iz specifičnih potencijala koje poseduju ove države: SAD kao moćan tehnološki, vojni i politički centar; RF, kao svetsko skladište i NR Kina, kao svetska manufaktura. Uprkos činjenici da sve tri strane trougla imaju svoje specifične i, u mnogim elementima, suprotstavljene interese, to bi mogao da bude najoptimalniji sistem kočnica i ravnoteže u međunarodnim odnosima.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.
This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.