At the end of the 20th century, the territory of the countries that came into existence with the dissolution of former Yugoslavia became the grounds on which conflict of interest between global superpowers started to take place, particularly that between the USA and Russia. The manner in which the two rivaling giants attempt to secure their interests in the region differs immensely. On the one hand, the USA secured its involvement in the region by establishing itself as a mediator in ending the wars in the 90s (BiH, Kosovo) and this grip got even stronger with the help of the so-called Euro- Atlantic integrations and inclusion of the newly formed Balkan countries into NATO (Slovenia, Croatia, Albania). On the other hand, Putin's Russia pulls leverage through energetic projects in Serbia, Montenegro and BiH. The most obvious culmination of the Russo-American diplomatic conflict in the region occurred in Montenegro, which escaped the sphere of Russian influence following a series of affairs involving Russian secret agencies, much to the benefit of the USA. After the incident Russia started exert its corruptive influence and set boogey-traps for "Western" initiatives aimed at political stabilization at the region. This spoiling influence (BiH, Kosovo, Macedonia) has as its agenda the strengthening of Russian geopolitical influence in Europe, destabilized through the Ukranian crisis and the annexation of Crimea. ; Prostor na kojem se nalaze države nastale raspadom bivše Jugoslavije postao je krajem 20. stoljeća područjem sukoba velikih sila, posebice između SAD-a i Rusije. No, strategije kojima su dvije velike sile nastojale osigurati svoj utjecaj u regiji znatno se razlikuju. Dok su SAD svoj položaj osigurale zahvaljujući važnoj ulozi u okončanju rata u BiH i na Kosovu, te ga učvrstile koristeći euroatlantske integracije što je rezultiralo uključivanjem novonastalih država (Slovenija, Hrvatska, Albanija) u NATO, Rusija je dolaskom Putina na vlast kao svoju polugu utjecaja u regiji počela koristiti projekte u energetici, zauzevši s njima čvrsto uporište u Srbiji, Crnoj Gori te BiH. Eskalacija rusko-američkih tenzija u regiji kulminirala je u Crnoj Gori, čiji je bijeg iz sfere ruskog utjecaja, popraćen nizom špijunskih afera zajamčio veliku diplomatsku pobjedu interesima SAD-a. Nakon ovoga međunarodnog incidenta Rusija je regiju počela doživljavati kao poligon za ostvarivanje svojeg remetilačkog utjecaja, kojim minira "zapadne" inicijative za stabilizacijom prostora, (BiH, Kosovo i Makedonija) s ciljem osnaživanja ruskog geopolitičkog utjecaja u Europi, poljuljanog ukrajinskom krizom i aneksijom Krima.
Pravni nihilizam se u tekstu rada poima kao selektivna, proizvoljna i neformalna političko-komandna primena prava koja rezultira njegovom zloupotrebom. Kao pravni nihilisti detektuju se politički akteri, pravosudni funkcioneri i građani i sve njih karakteriše deficitarna pravna svest koja se ogleda u nepoštovanju ili relativizovanju pravnih normi i vrednosnih sudova inkorporisanih u njih. Nakon teorijskih promišljanja o pravnom nihilizmu kao pojavnoj manifestaciji nepravne svesti, u radu je portretisana praktična strana ovog fenomena primarno kroz ruski a sekundarno i kroz srpski arhetip. Zaključuje se da se pravni nihilizam javlja u ambijentima pravne nesigurnosti, autoritarnih tendencija i podaničke političkokulturne matrice. Kao paradigmatični primeri navode se Rusija i Srbija kao države u kojima nalog vladavine prava i etos građanske obligacije nikada nije istinski zaživeo.
Mirne pobune protiv sirijskog predsjednika koje su započele 2011. s vremenom su prerasle u oružani sukob, a zatim i u građanski rat koji do dana današnjeg ne jenjava. Vrlo brzo je privukao i brojne regionalne, ali i međunarodne aktere. Iako se na početku činilo kako će sirijski predsjednik vrlo brzo morati napustiti svoju funkciju, to se nije dogodilo. Zahvaljujući ruskoj vojnoj intervenciji 2015. vratio je kontrolu nad većinom sirijskog teritorija te na taj način osigurao svoju daljnju vlast. Cilj ovoga rada jest prikazati rusku intervenciju u Sirijskom građanskom ratu kao dio nove ruske vanjske politike, odnosno novoga ruskog intervencionizma. Politika koja je započeta intervencijom u Gruziji, a zatim nastavljena u Ukrajini činom aneksije Krima, svoj nastavak dobiva upravo na teritoriju Sirije. Kako ćemo vidjeti kroz rad upravo se ova politika pokazala ključnom za vraćanje Rusiji statusa globalne sile. ; Peaceful uprisings against the Syrian president that began in 2011., over the time escalated into an armed conflict, and then into a civil war that has not abated to this day. It quickly attracted numerous regional and international actors. Although at first it seemed that the Syrian president would have to leave his funcion very soon, this did not happen. Thanks to Russian military intervention in 2015, he regained majority control over Syrian territory and thus secured his further rule. The aim of this paper was to present Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war as a part of a new Russian foreign policy, the policy of interventionism. The policy, which began with the intervention in Georgia, and then continued in Ukraine and the act of annexation of Crimea, gets its continuation on the territory of Syria. As we will see further, it is precisely this policy that has proved crucial for restoring Russia's global power status.
It is no secret that the amount of accumulated waste in Russia today is about 90 billion tons. And the situation is that distinct economic incentives for integrated waste management just do not exist (http://kn51.ru/news/society/ecology/2013/5/02/ekologiya-kak-indikator-zrelosti-obshchestva.html). Many people believe that there are only two ways of development: go back to primitive society or go forward to the inevitable destruction of the environment. However, there is an alternative that combines the preservation of the environment and social well-being – it is the concept of sustainable development.
This paper tries to establish which circumstances have changed in Ukraine and led to the crisis in 2013 and armed conflict in 2014. The model for analysis is borrowed from Barry R. Posen's paper 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict' (1993). Posen uses the concept of security dilemma in order to explain why the ethnic conflict emerged between Serbs and Croats during the breakup of Yugoslavia and why there was no conflict between Russians and Ukrainians during the breakup of the USSR. The main task of this paper is to check if Posen's explanation still stands and to check if Posen's indicators could have signaled that the conflict in Ukraine in 2014 was imminent. ; U ovom radu pokušavam da ustanovim koje okolnosti u odnosima Rusa i Ukrajinaca u Ukrajini su se promenile i dovele do krize koja ja počela 2013, a eskalirala 2014. godine. Kao obrazac za analizu koristim tekst prof. Berija Pozena (Barry R. Posen) Bezbednosna dilema i entnički sukob (The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict) iz 1993. godine u kome uz pomoć koncepta bezbednosne dileme objašnjava zašto je došlo do entičkog sukoba između Srba i Hrvata posle raspada SFRJ, a istovremeno nije došlo do sukoba Rusa i Ukrajinaca posle raspada SSSR. Prema tome, glavni zadatak ovog rada je da pokaže da li Pozenovo objašnjenje još uvek stoji i da li je upravo promena faktora za koje je on smatrao da su bili ključni za održanje mira u Ukrajini sada dovela do kraha demokratije i sukoba u ovoj etnički složenoj Državi.
The article deals with the fundamentals of Lithuanian foreign policy. It is an attempt to evaluate its understructure, principles, advantages and shortcomings. Author's point of departure is a non-official paper "Lithuania's Foreign Policy Concept" prepared by the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1994. Strategic goals of the Lithuanian foreign policy laid down in that document were the basis of the Lithuanian foreign policy making until the country joined the EU and NATO in 2004. Having supposedly attained those goals Lithuania adopted and proceeded to implement hastily the so-called "new Lithuanian foreign policy". Yet the author has serious doubts that the strategic goals of the Lithuanian foreign policy as defined in 1994 were fully achieved in 2004. The goals were three: (1) EU, (2) NATO, (3) good relations with neighbors. Yet Lithuania still is not a full-fledged member of either the EU or NATO. It is a mere newcomer. And its relations with Russia got even worse than they were in the late nineties. The article proceeds to exploring a rather strenuous question: are the tensions between the two countries caused solely by the Russian misbehavior as Lithuanian politicians mostly claim or is the Lithuanian foreign policy also to blame. The relations with Russia are examined in the context of Lithuania's relations with the US and the EU. The crucial idea of the "new Lithuanian foreign policy", that of the center or leader of an unnamed and undefined region, presumably of the Eastern Europe or at least a part of it, is put under scrutiny. The author claims that (1) for a small country such a role is utterly unrealistic, (2) attempts to play that role have nothing to do with national interests the foreign policy has serve, (3) playing the chosen role complicates relations both with other EU countries and with Russia. The article ends with the conclusion that the foundation of the Lithuanian foreign policy must be its Western, not Eastern policy. ; Straipsnyje nagrinėjamos pamatinės Lietuvos užsienio politikos nuostatos siekiant kritiškai įvertinti jų pranašumas ir trūkumus. Išeities taškas yra 1994 metais parengta Lietuvos užsienio politikos koncepcija, kurioje suformuluotais strateginiais užsienio politikos tikslais ši politika buvo grindžiama iki 2004 metų, kai Lietuva tapo ES ir NATO nare. Nors 2004 metais buvo pradėta vykdyti vadinamoji naujoji Lietuvos užsienio politika, strateginiai užsienio politikos tikslai, užsibrėžti 1994 metais, autoriaus nuomone, nėra iki galo pasiekti. Lietuva iki šiol nėra visavertė ES ir NATO narė, o santykiai su tokia svarbia kaimyne kaip Rusija nėra geri.Straipsnyje bandoma aiškintis, ar jie yra įtempti tik dėl Rusijos, ar ir dėl Lietuvos užsienio politikos ypatumų. Santykiai su Rusija nagrinėjami Lietuvos santykių su JAV ir ES kontekste. Kritiškai vertinama kertinė naujosios Lietuvos užsienio politikos idėja – Lietuvos kaip regiono centro ar lyderio koncepcija. Teigiama, kad ji, pirma, yra nerealistiška, antra, nesusijusi su nacionaliniais Lietuvos interesais ir, trečia, komplikuoja tiek Lietuvos santykius su kitomis ES šalimis, tiek su Rusija. Straipsnis baigiamas išvada, kad Lietuvos užsienio politikos pagrindą turi sudaryti ne Rytų, o Vakarų politika.
U tekstu se pomoću teorije nacionalizma analiziraju temeljne ideje konzervativne revolucije. To se čini rekonstrukcijom osnovnih teza političke misli Thomasa Manna, Arthura Moellera van den Brucka, Ernsta Jüngera, Oswalda Spenglerai Carla Schmitta. Analizira se način na koji se tumačio odnos jezika i nacije, rata i nacije, liberalizma i nacije, te odnos nacije spram Zapada. Pokazalo se da se smatralo da se u jeziku zrcali duh nacije, da se rat smatrao temeljem nacionalnog identiteta, da se liberalizam smatrao glavnim idejnim neprijateljem njemačkog nacionalnog identiteta te da se odbacivao Zapad, a hvalili Rusija i Dostojevski. Zaključeno je da su osnovu ideologije konzervativne revolucije činili njemački nacionalizam i odbacivanje liberalizma. Istaknuto je da su konzervativni revolucionari zagovarali diktaturu, ali ne i povratak na stari režim monarhije, nego autoritarnu konzervativnu utopiju. Utopijske značajke konzervativne revolucije i danas čine njezine ideje privlačnima radikalnoj desnici.
JAV prezidento Woodrow Wilsono politinė filosofija, vadinamasis vilsonizmas, 1919 m. Europojebuvo regima kaip išeitis iš chaotiškos ir beveik beviltiškos 1918 m. rudens tarptautinių santykiųsituacijos. Ši filosofija įtvirtino naują tarptautinių santykių ideologiją, pagrįstą suvereniųvalstybių lygiateisiškumu, kolektyvinio saugumo doktrina ir taikos bei stabilumo išsaugojimu.Europos ir pasaulio politinėje istorijoje tai pradėjo geopolitinį eksperimentą, kuris didele dalimitebesitęsia iki šiol. Nauji tarptautinės politikos subjektai, tokie kaip 1918 m. paskelbta Lietuvosvalstybė, prie naujosios ideologijos irgi turėjo derintis. Straipsnyje apžvelgiama, kas skatinoir kas stabdė Lietuvą eiti tokiu užsienio politikos keliu laikotarpiu tarp dviejų pasaulinių karų.Remiantis Lietuvos ir Rusijos archyvuose saugomais šaltiniais, jau publikuotais dokumentaisbei istorikų tyrinėjimais, atskleidžiamos Lietuvos užsienio politikos sąsajos su kontroversiškuistoriniu paveldu, sudėtingais politiniais vidaus procesais ir bandymai spręsti savo problemasbendradarbiaujant su bolševikine Rusija (SSRS ).Pagrindiniai žodžiai: lietuvių nacionalizmas; Lietuvos ir Lenkijos santykiai; lietuvių-sovietųsantykiai; Vilniaus klausimas; kolektyvinis saugumas; Tautų Sąjunga.
Skadarski sandžak predstavljao je zasebnu administrativnu jedinicu u okviru Osmanskog carstva, u kojoj je sredinom XVIII veka uspela da se učvrsti na vlasti porodica Bušatlija. Vodeći se vlastitim interesima, Bušatlije su nastojale da se na najbolji način uklope u političke procese, koje je nametalo funkcionisanje osmansko-mletačke granice. Istraživanje razmatra prilike u tom sandžaku tokom poslednje dve decenije XVIII veka, analizirajući ih s aspekta krupnih političkih promena u Evropi i na istočnom Mediteranu, izazvanih dešavanjima u Francuskoj i nastojanjem Porte da očuva svoju vlast, ugroženu aspiracijama Rusije i Austrije. ; In the last decades of the eighteenth century, the Porte endeavoured to preserve the control over the territory endangered by the particularistic tendencies of the provincial administrators, which marked the period of Ottomans history known as period of ayans. Mahmud-pasha Bušatlija (1779-1796), who at certain moments managed to establish independent power in the Sanjak of Scutari, belonged to this milieu. The Venetian and French sources provide a new light in interpreting the position and behaviour of Sanjak-bey of Scutari Mahmud-pasha Bušatlija. Aware of the position in which the Ottoman state found itself, he subordinated the Sultan's interests to the regional, trying to establish an independent authority in the relation to the Porte in the area that was entrusted to him. In this, he was helped by the occurrence that was happening in Europe, in which relations were shaken by the consequences of the French revolution. In that period, the Ottoman state was confronted with the intentions of Austria and Russia to reduce its territory in the Balkans, but also by the rebellions in the eastern provinces, which was the by-product of the rise of the new ruling dynasty in Persia. However, the strengthening of the movement of Ali-pasha, another Albanian rebel, which, as time will show, was much more serious and with deeper consequences on the international plane, the hands of the Porte remained tied in the final settlement with the Scutari Sanjak-bey, which for the second time offered him forgiveness in 1795. The choice of the priorities that needed to be resolved certainly influenced the Porte's decision at a time when a much greater danger to the Ottoman state came from the surrounding of Edirne, where the Ali Pasha Tepeleni movement was strengthened, and also from Russia, which sought to obtain the epithet of the Mediterranean force by opening the Straits and through occupation of maritime bases in the Mediterranean.
Pogajanja so v življenju ljudi prisotna vsakodnevno, saj med seboj neprestano komuniciramo in izmenjujemo informacije. V sam proces pogajanj sta vključena vsaj dva udeleženca, ki lahko imata povsem različne ali pa skupne interese. Namen pogajanj je usklajevanje interesov za doseganje končnega sporazuma, ki naj bi bil koristen za obe strani. V svojem delu sem se osredotočila predvsem na medkulturna poslovna pogajanja, natančneje na poslovna pogajanja z ruskimi partnerji. V prvem delu naloge sem opredelila teoretični koncept pogajanj, nadaljevala z opredelitvijo poslovnih pogajanj na medkulturni ravni in se nato še natančneje osredotočila na specifični ruski pogajalski slog. Pri pogajanjih s tujimi poslovnimi partnerji velja biti pozoren na številne dejavnike, ki vplivajo na sam izid pogajanj. Potrebno je dobro poznavanje kulture države iz katere prihaja partner, prav tako je zelo priporočljivo vsaj temeljno poznavanje njihov običajev in jezika. V raziskovalnem delu naloge sem povzela izkušnje zaposlenih v izbranem podjetju, ki so se v preteklosti že pogajali z ruskimi poslovnimi partnerji. Za pridobivanje potrebnih informacij sem z zaposlenimi izvedla globinski intervju, ki bo obsegal 15 vprašanj. Na podlagi pridobljenih informacij sem oblikovala smernice za vse poslovneže, ki sodelujejo ali imajo v prihodnosti namen sodelovati z ruskimi poslovnimi partnerji. V sklepnem delu naloge sem povzela glavne ugotovitve in ugotovila, da k uspešnim pogajanjem z ruskimi poslovnimi partnerji v največji meri pripomore dobro poznavanje ruske kulture in njihovih običajev ter vzpostavitev pristnih odnosov, ki temeljijo na osebnem poznanstvu. Prav tako sem ugotovila, da se ruski pogajalski slog močno razlikuje od evropskega. ; Negotiations are present in people's lives every day as each other constantly communicate and exchange information. Negotiation is a process, which includes at least two parties, which may have a completely different or common interests. The purpose of negotiating is to coordinate the interests of achieving a final agreement, which should be beneficial for both sides. In the theoretical part I mainly focused on cross-cultural business negotiations, specifically on business negotiations with Russian partners. In the first part I defined the theoretical concept of negotiations continued with the definition of business negotiations on an intercultural level and then more specifically focused on specific Russian negotiating style. When negotiating with foreign business partners we have to pay attention to a number of factors that affect the outcome of the negotiations. It is very necessary to have a good knowledge about the culture of the country where the business partner comes from and it is also strongly recommended to have a basic knowledge of their customs and language. In the research part of the thesis I summarized the experience of employees in selected company, which negotiated with Russian business partners in the past. In order to get the necessary information from the employees I conducted in-depth interview, which consist of 15 questions. On the base of provided information I made guidance for all businessmen who are or are attempted to collaborate with Russian business partners in future. In the final part of the thesis I summarized the main findings and came to the conclusion that if yu want to be successful in negotiations with Russian business partners, you must have a good knowledge about Russian culture and their traditions. I also found that the Russian negotiating style very different from the European.
Magistrsko delo obravnava problematiko poslovnih pogajanj v podjetju Metal Ravne, d.o.o., natančneje pogajanja med domačimi in ruskimi poslovnimi partnerji. Pogajanja so pomembna sestavina poslovnega delovanja in posebna dejavnost menedžerjev v organizacijah. So večsmeren proces sporazumevanja za usklajevanje interesov, v katerem več udeležencev vpliva medsebojno pri nastajanju skupnih odločitev. Dobra pogajanja morajo usklajevati interese in hkrati obvladovati nasprotja med udeleženci organizacije, ki so lahko notranji ali zunanji. Nasprotja v pogajanjih so gonilo napredka, usklajeni interesi kot rezultat pogajanj pa pogoj za uspešnost organizacije. Nasprotno pa se neusklajeni interesi lahko izrodijo v škodljive spore, ki nikomur ne koristijo. Dober pogajalec se ne rodi, ampak so dosego stopnje dobrega pogajalca potrebne večletne izkušnje. Izkušenost pa posledično prinese tudi izkušnje v načinu priprave za pogajanje, načinu komuniciranja in v pripravi strategije. Vse to je potrebno, saj zaradi vedno večjega odpiranja tujim trgom in povezovanja držav, poslovna pogajanja potekajo med pogajalci iz različnih kulturnih okolij, s specifičnim sistemom vrednot in pričakovanj. Te razlike v stališčih, prepričanju in percepciji so skupaj z mnogimi drugimi značilnostmi kulture temeljnega pomena za dobra mednarodna pogajanja in imajo velik vpliv na sam potek pogajanj. Poznavanje kulture nasprotne strani pomeni določeno prednost v pogajanjih, saj se z dobro pripravo na sama pogajanja skrajša čas pogajanj in hkrati pripomore k sklenitvi sporazuma, ki je za obe pogajalski strani najbolj zaželjen. Priprave na pogajanja s tujimi poslovnimi partnerji igrajo pomembno vlogo, kajti pri sami pripravi pogajanj izkušen pogajalec dobro spozna kulturo pogajalskega partnerja, strategijo pozna, stil, nebesedno komunikacijo in ostale dejavnike, ki vplivajo na potek in rezultat pogajanj. Neizkušeni pogajalci pogosto delajo omenjene napake, popolnoma ignorirajo kulturne razlike nasprotne strani itn. V magistrski nalogi smo želeli na konkretnem primeru pokazati, kakšne so razlike med slovenskimi in ruskimi pogajalci, kakšna je razlika v pogajalskem stilu in slogu, pogajalski strategiji, poslovnih običajih in poslovnem bontonu. Leta 2007 je namreč rusko podjetje KOKS postalo večinski lastnik Metala Ravne kot tudi večinski lastnik Slovenske industrije jekla. Kot večinski lastniki podjetja Metal Rusi odločajo o vlaganju v investicije. In prav to področje je temeljno pri pogajalski dejavnosti podjetja. Ob obravnavi problematike v podjetju Metal smo ugotovili, da so pogajanja podjetja Metal z ruskimi partnerji še v povojih. ; Master's thesis deals with the issue of business negotiations in the company Metal Ravne, d.o.o., concentrating on negotiations between the Slovenian and Russian business partners. Negotiations are an important element of business activity and a specific activity of managers in organisations. They are a multi-way process of communication for a coordination of different interests, in which several participants interact in the formation of joint decisions. Successful negotiations coordinate interests and manage conflicts between participants, which may be internal or external. Conflicts in negotiations are the driving power of progress while adjusted interests as a result of negotiations are the precondition for a successful organisation. On the other side, unadjusted interests may deteriorate into detrimental misunderstandings and disputes which is of no use to anyone. A negotiator is not born. It takes many years of experience to develop the skills necessary to become a successful negotiator. This eventually also brings experience in the way how we prepare ourseself best for negotiations, in the way how we communicate and how we prepare our strategy. All this is necessary as - due to an increasing opening of foreign markets and bonding among countries - business negotiations run between negotiatiors from a different cultural background, each with a specific system of values and expectations. These differences in attitudes, beliefs and perceptions, along with many other characteristics of culture, are essential for successful international negotiations and they have a major influence on the negotiation process itself. Knowing the culture of the opposite negotiating partner represents a certain advantage since good preparations for the negotiation itself reduce the time of negotiations, simultaneously contributing to the conclusion of the agreement most desired by both negotiating partners. Preparations for negotiations with foreign business partners play an important role since – already before negotiations - an experienced negotiator learns the culture of the opposite negotiating partner, his strategy, style, non-verbal communication and other factors which have influence on the course and on the outcome of negotiations. Inexperienced negotiators often make mistakes, completely ignoring cultural differences of the opposite partner and similar. This Master's thesis concentrates on revealing differences between the Slovenian and Russian negotiators, on differences in their negotiation style, strategies, business practices and business etiquette. In 2007, the Russian company KOKS became the majority owner of Metal Ravne, d.o.o. and also the majority owner of the Slovenian Steel Group, d.d. In this capacity, the Russians now make decisions on investments. And this is exactly the area which is essential in the negotiatiation business of the company. When analysing this issue in the company Metal Ravne, d.o.o., it was established that negotiations between Metal Ravne, d.o.o. and the Russian partners are still in the early stages of development
The statement drafted by the Diplomatic Service of the USA on the 28th day of July 1922 specified in the concealed form temporariness of self-dependence of the state system of Lithuania and, at the same time, Latvia and Estonia, as long as the Bolshevist Russia exists, as well as conditionality of the states by acknowledging their governments only, and not the states themselves. In principle, it was in line with the vision favored by the westerners: the vision of national governments of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the composition of the democratic Russia. It was approved by governments of the USA, France, the Great Britain, and by leaders of the White Russians as well. The expression "complete recognition" contained in the statement of recognition meant de jure and de facto recognition that was not named directly by the Americans in the statement of recognition because of the planned in future relations with the future democratic Russia. Before the official, yet peculiar, diplomatic act, the Americans used to maintain informal relations with the Baltic States on the basis of indirect de facto recognition leaning upon the note of the 26th day of May 1919 addressed to admiral A. Kolchak, the official proclamation of which was avoided by the diplomacy of the USA (contrary to the grand states in Europe) until 1922. ; JAV diplomatinės tarnybos parengtas 1922 m. liepos 28 d. pareiškimas užslėpta forma fiksavo Lietuvos, kartu Latvijos ir Estijos, valstybingumo laikinumą – kol egzistuos bolševikinė Rusija, bei šių valstybių sąlyginumą pripažįstant tik jų vyriausybes, o ne valstybes. Iš principo tai atitiko vakariečių proteguojamą autonominės Lietuvos, Latvijos ir Estijos demokratinės Rusijos sudėtyje nacionalinių vyriausybių viziją. Tam pritarė ne tik JAV, Prancūzijos, Didžiosios Britanijos vyriausybės, bet ir baltųjų rusų vadovai. Pripažinimo pareiškime vartojama formuluotė "pilnas pripažinimas" reiškė pripažinimą de jure ir de facto. Amerikiečiai, numatydami savo santykius su būsima demokratine Rusija, šių sąvokų tiesiogiai pripažinimo dokumente neįvardijo. Iki oficialaus, tiesa, savotiško diplomatinio akto amerikiečiai su Baltijos valstybėmis palaikė neformalius santykius. Jų pagrindas buvo netiesioginis de facto pripažinimas, pagrįstas 1919 m. gegužės 26 d. nota admirolui A. Kolčakui. JAV, priešingai nei didžiosios Europos valstybės, iki 1922 m. jo oficialiai nepaskelbė.
Annotation. Based on archival documents and press information, an attempt is being made to fnd out whether in 1993 the DLPL government and President Algirdas M. Brazauskas legally recalled Ambassador Stasys Lozoraitis (Junior) from Washington and transferred him to a similar position in Rome. An attempt is made to evaluate the selected candidate for the Honorary Consul General of Lithuania in Los Angeles, Vytautas Čekanauskas, to temporarily lead the Lithuanian diplomatic mission in Washington. Although some Lithuanians in the United States supported Čekanauskas' candidacy, there was an outcry that Lozoraitis had been illegally withdrawn from the United States and treated with disrespect; Čekanauskas refused the proposed post. This may have been influenced by the vague prospects offered to him by the Lithuanian authorities, as there was no clear talk about the post of ambassador. At the same time, the governments of Latvia and Estonia appointed Latvian and Estonian representatives in the United States as their ambassadors in Washington. ; Anotacija. Remiantis archyviniais dokumentais ir spaudos informacija, bandoma išsiaiškinti, ar 1993 metais LDDP vyriausybė ir prezidentas Algirdas M. Brazauskas teisėtai atšaukė ambasadorių Stasį Lozoraitį (jaun.) iš Vašingtono ir perkėlė analogiškoms pareigoms į Romą. Bandoma įvertinti pasirinktą kandidatą Lietuvos garbės generalinį konsulą Los Andžele Vytautą Čekanauską laikinai vadovauti Lietuvos diplomatinei misijai Vašingtone. Nors dalis JAV lietuvių palaikė V. Čekanausko kandidatūrą, sukeltas triukšmas, kad S. Lozoraitis (jaun.) neteisėtai atšauktas iš JAV ir su juo pasielgta negarbingai, V. Čekanauskas atsisakė siūlomo posto. Tam įtakos galėjo turėti ir Lietuvos valdžios siūloma jam neaiški perspektyva, nes nebuvo aiškios kalbos apie ambasadoriaus postą. Tuo pat metu Latvijos ir Estijos vyriausybės savo ambasadoriais Vašingtone paskyrė JAV latvių ir estų atstovus.
This study recounts the experiences of Russian regional governments in dealing with fiscal stress during the 2008-2012 period, a period of the most severe global economic downturn of the last seventy years. Much of the disparity is driven by differential endowments of energy resources and this diversity translates into highly diverse fiscal capacities and need for government services. Although regions do have some independent revenue-raising authority, all taxes are administered by the National Ministry of Taxation and a sizable share (roughly 45%) of total national revenue is transferred to regional and local governments. The transfers, however, are not of equal importance to all regions. This research identifies what sorts of governments have faced the most fiscal stress, how shares of revenue from various sources shifted with the recession, and how the fiscal system responded to the recession. The following research questions are explored in the paper: (1) What sorts of governments have faced the most fiscal stress during the recession? What parts of the country have subnational governments in the greatest fiscal stress? Where was fiscal stress the greatest? (2) What factors have driven fiscal stress? (3) How have governments with the greatest stress dealt with fiscal stress? (4) How did revenue shares with the recession? Were certain sources more heavily impacted than others? (5) How did corporate income tax and personal income tax shares change with the recession? The intention of this paper is to expand knowledge of the attributes of the regional and local budgeting system in Russia and improve approaches for dealing with fiscal stress. ; Šis straipsnis atskleidžia Rusijos regionų valdžios patirtį sprendžiant fiskalinius sunkumus 2008–2012 metų laikotarpiu, kuris laikomas bene didžiausiu pasaulinės ekonomikos nuosmukiu per pastaruosius septyniasdešimt metų. Daug skirtumų tarp regionų atsiranda dėl nevienodų energijos išteklių ir ši įvairovė suponuoja nevienodus fiskalinius pajėgumus ir vyriausybės paslaugų poreikį. Nors regionai turi šiek tiek nepriklausomą pajamų didinimo galimybę, tačiau visi mokesčiai yra administruojami nacionalinės Mokesčių ministerijos ir nemaža dalis (maždaug 45 % procentų) visų nacionalinių pajamų yra pervedami regionų ir vietos valdžios institucijoms. Tačiau tokie pervedimai nėra vienodai svarbūs visuose regionuose. Šis tyrimas identifikuoja, kurių sričių valdžia susidūrė su didžiausiais fiskaliniais sunkumais, kaip pasikeitė pajamų, gaunamų iš skirtingų šaltinių, dalis nuosmukio metu ir kaip fiskalinės sistemos reagavo į nuosmukį. Straipsnyje yra išnagrinėti šie tyrimo uždaviniai: (1) Kokio lygio valdžia susidūrė su didžiausiais fiskaliniais sunkumais ekonominio nuosmukio metu? Kuriose šalies dalyse subnacionalinio lygmens valdžia patyrė didžiausius sunkumus fiskalinio nuosmukio metu? Kur buvo didžiausias fiskalinis sunkmetis? (2) Kokie veiksniai lėmė fiskalinius sunkumus? (3) Kaip vietinė valdžia sprendė fiskalinius sunkumus? (4) Koks buvo nuosmukio poveikis pajamoms? Ar tam tikri pajamų šaltiniai patyrė didesnę įtaką nei kiti? (5) Kaip pelno mokesčio ir gyventojų pajamų mokesčio dalys pakito nuosmukio laikotarpiu? Šio darbo tikslas yra plėsti žinias apie regioninių ir vietos biudžetų sistemas Rusijoje ir pagerinti fiskalinių sunkumų sprendimo būdus.
