Russia and the Balkans: Foreign Policy from Yeltsin to Putin
In: Polemos: časopis za interdisciplinarna istraživanja rata i mira ; journal of interdisciplinary research on war and peace, Band 12, Heft 24, S. 97-99
ISSN: 1331-5595
In: Polemos: časopis za interdisciplinarna istraživanja rata i mira ; journal of interdisciplinary research on war and peace, Band 12, Heft 24, S. 97-99
ISSN: 1331-5595
Suradnja EU–a i Rusije pruža europskom kontinentu i šire mnoge prilike. Istočno partnerstvo predstavlja glavnu poveznicu ali i područje prepreka Rusije i EU–a jer dijele zajedničko susjedstvo sa zemljama koje nisu članice EU–a a niti žele biti pod kontinuiranim utjecajem Rusije. Za zemlje koje nisu članice EU–a, EU je razvila Europsku politiku susjedstva putem koje surađuje sa južnim i istočnim susjedima kako bi postigla blisku i stabilnu političku zajednicu i najviši mogući stupanj ekonomske integracije. Rusija nije članica ovog instrumenta već je s EU-om razvila četiri zajednička prostora, ekonomski prostor, prostor slobode, sigurnosti i pravde, prostor vanjske sigurnosti i prostor istraživanja i obrazovanja te kulturnih aspekata. Najvažnija područja suradnje EU–a i Rusije jesu ona u energetskom sektoru pri kojem ima usuglašen Akcijski plan do 2050. godine te suradnja u području znanosti, tehnologije i inovacija što je među glavnim prioritetima Europe 2020 te je Rusiji bitno i jačanje razvoja istraživačke infrastrukture. ; Cooperation between European Union and Russia offers plenty opportunities to European continent and beyond its boundaries. Eastern Partnership is the main connection but also a barrier of Russia and EU because of their common neighbourhood with countries which are not members of the EU, and also do not want to be under continuous Russian influence. For countries that are not members of the EU, European Union developed European Neighbourhood Policy which cooperates with South and East neighbours so it could achieve close and sustainable political community and the highest possible level of economic integration. Russia is not a member of this instrument but instead it developed four common spaces with EU, economic space, freedom, security and justice, external security and research and education, including cultural aspects. The most important areas of cooperation between the two sides are the one in energy sector with established Roadmap until 2050, cooperation in science, technology and innovation which is included as the main priority of Europe 2020 and it is also important the development of the research infrastructure in Russia.
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Suradnja EU–a i Rusije pruža europskom kontinentu i šire mnoge prilike. Istočno partnerstvo predstavlja glavnu poveznicu ali i područje prepreka Rusije i EU–a jer dijele zajedničko susjedstvo sa zemljama koje nisu članice EU–a a niti žele biti pod kontinuiranim utjecajem Rusije. Za zemlje koje nisu članice EU–a, EU je razvila Europsku politiku susjedstva putem koje surađuje sa južnim i istočnim susjedima kako bi postigla blisku i stabilnu političku zajednicu i najviši mogući stupanj ekonomske integracije. Rusija nije članica ovog instrumenta već je s EU-om razvila četiri zajednička prostora, ekonomski prostor, prostor slobode, sigurnosti i pravde, prostor vanjske sigurnosti i prostor istraživanja i obrazovanja te kulturnih aspekata. Najvažnija područja suradnje EU–a i Rusije jesu ona u energetskom sektoru pri kojem ima usuglašen Akcijski plan do 2050. godine te suradnja u području znanosti, tehnologije i inovacija što je među glavnim prioritetima Europe 2020 te je Rusiji bitno i jačanje razvoja istraživačke infrastrukture. ; Cooperation between European Union and Russia offers plenty opportunities to European continent and beyond its boundaries. Eastern Partnership is the main connection but also a barrier of Russia and EU because of their common neighbourhood with countries which are not members of the EU, and also do not want to be under continuous Russian influence. For countries that are not members of the EU, European Union developed European Neighbourhood Policy which cooperates with South and East neighbours so it could achieve close and sustainable political community and the highest possible level of economic integration. Russia is not a member of this instrument but instead it developed four common spaces with EU, economic space, freedom, security and justice, external security and research and education, including cultural aspects. The most important areas of cooperation between the two sides are the one in energy sector with established Roadmap until 2050, cooperation in science, technology and ...
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This article will explain why Russia annexed Crimea and is destabilizing eastern Ukraine. To do this, three different theoretical approaches on various levels of analysis will be used. It will be examined how far the expansion of NATO, as well as that of the European Union (Theory of Neorealism), was a motive for Russia's action. NATO's enlargement is analysed predominantly. In addition, politicalpsychological motivations of the Russian leadership are considered. But it is also analysed whether Russia's pure power interests have played a role (Theory of Realism). The focus here is on the Russian naval base in Crimea. It is necessary to examine whether preserving its fleet in the Black Sea was a motive for Moscow to annex the Crimean peninsula. ; This article will explain why Russia annexed Crimea and is destabilizing eastern Ukraine. To do this, three different theoretical approaches on various levels of analysis will be used. It will be examined how far the expansion of NATO, as well as that of the European Union (Theory of Neorealism), was a motive for Russia's action. NATO's enlargement is analysed predominantly. In addition, politicalpsychological motivations of the Russian leadership are considered. But it is also analysed whether Russia's pure power interests have played a role (Theory of Realism). The focus here is on the Russian naval base in Crimea. It is necessary to examine whether preserving its fleet in the Black Sea was a motive for Moscow to annex the Crimean peninsula.
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Uspostava novih političkih sustava u Srednjoj i Istočnoj Europi nakon pada komunističkih režima značila je i izbor novog sustava vlasti umjesto dotad proklamiranog skupštinskog. Stajalište ustavotvoraca o potrebi snažne institucije predsjednika države tijekom procesa tranzicije, te odnos snaga između različitih aktera u političkoj areni, rezultirali su uspostavom polupredsjedničkog sustava u mnogima od tih zemalja. U Rusiji i Poljskoj su s prvim promjenama ustava prihvaćeni neki elementi, a zatim i čitav koncept semiprezidencijalizma. Ustavni modeli u te dvije zemlje u skladu su s kriterijima polupredsjedničkih sustava – posjeduju dualnu strukturu izvršne vlasti, te fi ksni mandat predsjednika države izabranog na općim izborima i politički neodgovornog parlamentu. Politička je praksa u njima u posljednjih petnaestak godina pokazivala različite učinke uspostavljenog sustava. U Rusiji je predsjednik države dominirao političkim sustavom u tolikoj mjeri da je sustav u praksi bio predsjednički, dok su u Poljskoj ustavne promjene iz 1990., 1992. i 1997. godine rezultirale promjenom odnosa snaga unutar dualne strukture izvršne vlasti. ; The establishment of new political systems in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of communist regimes implied a decision on a new system of government instead of the earlier proclaimed assembly system. The position of the framers of the Constitution on the need for a strong institution of state presidency during the transition process, and the correlation of forces between diff erent actors in the political arena, have resulted in the establishment of the semi-presidential system in many of these countries. In Russia and Poland, with the fi rst modifi cations of their Constitutions, some elements of semi-presidentialism were adopted, and then the whole concept of semi-presidentialism has been accepted. The constitutional models in the two countries are compatible with the criteria of semi-presidential systems – they have a dual structure of the executive branch of government ...
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Odnosi Rusije i Srbije od raspada Sovjetskog Saveza i SFR Jugoslavije aktualno je pitanje ne samo o budućnosti Srbije nego dometa i intenziteta utjecaja zapadnih integracija i/ili Rusije na Zapadnom Balkanu i JI Europi. Odnosi između Srbije i Rusije analizirani su s obzirom na pitanje smetaju li oni ulasku Srbije u EU i NATO. Analiza je podijeljena na razdoblje od 1991. do 2000. i poslije 2000. godine pri čemu su posebno izdvojene teme oko kojih se najintenzivnije razvijao odnos koji je u pitanju. Intenzitet odnosa između dvije zemlje promatran je prvenstveno kao posljedica pojedinačnih odnosa obje zemlje sa Zapadom, prvenstveno sa Sjedinjenim Državama i EU, pa se i oni analiziraju. Iako se kroz literaturu i pojedinačne događaje ne pokazuju jedinstvena mišljenja i informacije, zajedno pružaju temelj za zaključak da je ulazak Srbije u zapadne integracije, osim ulazak u NATO u određenom stupnju, prvenstveno određen pragmatičnim interesima Srbije, a ne Rusije kojoj je Srbija jednako tako interesna zona samo u pogledu aktualnih pragmatičnih pitanja, a ne nekog iracionalnog, sudbinskog savezništva. ; The relationship between Serbia and Russia since the break-up of Yugoslavia and the dissolution of the Soviet Union is a very timely topic of discussion: Beyond the political and economic future of Serbia, it bears on the scope and intensity of Western integration throughout the Balkans and SE Europe. To this end, contemporary Serbo-Russian relations are analyzed in terms of their potential impact on Serbia joining the EU and NATO. The analysis is divided into two periods, 1991-2000 and post-2000. The more critical issues in bilateral relations are emphasized. Understanding each country's separate relationship with the West -- particularly the USA and EU -- is an essential part of this analysis. Contradictory conclusions may be reached when arguments advanced in the literature or individual geo-political events are considered in isolation; but when available information is combined, there is a basis for concluding that ...
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The post-communist NATO member states from Central and South-Eastern Europe (CSEE) comprise a group of 11 NATO/EU member states, from the Baltic to the Adriatic and Black Sea. The twelfth and thirteenth NATO member states from the region are Albania and Montenegro. The afore-mentioned NATO/EU member states have mostly shown a similar stance towards the Eastern Partnership Policy. However, since 2014, these states have shown more diverse stances, albeit declaratively supporting the anti-Russian sanctions. Due to the difference in stances towards Russia, the "New Cold Warriors" (Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania) and the "Pragmatics" (Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Bulgaria), will maintain a mostly common course towards Russia and the Eastern Partnership states because they have to. The Czech Republic, although hosting a part of the US anti-ballistic missile shield, is not a genuine "New Cold Warrior", while in 2016 Croatia effectively became one. ; The post-communist NATO member states from Central and South-Eastern Europe (CSEE) comprise a group of 11 NATO/EU member states, from the Baltic to the Adriatic and Black Sea. The twelfth and thirteenth NATO member states from the region are Albania and Montenegro. The afore-mentioned NATO/EU member states have mostly shown a similar stance towards the Eastern Partnership Policy. However, since 2014, these states have shown more diverse stances, albeit declaratively supporting the anti-Russian sanctions. Due to the difference in stances towards Russia, the "New Cold Warriors" (Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania) and the "Pragmatics" (Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Bulgaria), will maintain a mostly common course towards Russia and the Eastern Partnership states because they have to. The Czech Republic, although hosting a part of the US anti-ballistic missile shield, is not a genuine "New Cold Warrior", while in 2016 Croatia effectively became one.
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The post-communist NATO member states from Central and South-Eastern Europe (CSEE) comprise a group of 11 NATO/EU member states, from the Baltic to the Adriatic and Black Sea. The twelfth and thirteenth NATO member states from the region are Albania and Montenegro. The afore-mentioned NATO/EU member states have mostly shown a similar stance towards the Eastern Partnership Policy. However, since 2014, these states have shown more diverse stances, albeit declaratively supporting the anti-Russian sanctions. Due to the difference in stances towards Russia, the "New Cold Warriors" (Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania) and the "Pragmatics" (Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Bulgaria), will maintain a mostly common course towards Russia and the Eastern Partnership states because they have to. The Czech Republic, although hosting a part of the US anti-ballistic missile shield, is not a genuine "New Cold Warrior", while in 2016 Croatia effectively became one. ; The post-communist NATO member states from Central and South-Eastern Europe (CSEE) comprise a group of 11 NATO/EU member states, from the Baltic to the Adriatic and Black Sea. The twelfth and thirteenth NATO member states from the region are Albania and Montenegro. The afore-mentioned NATO/EU member states have mostly shown a similar stance towards the Eastern Partnership Policy. However, since 2014, these states have shown more diverse stances, albeit declaratively supporting the anti-Russian sanctions. Due to the difference in stances towards Russia, the "New Cold Warriors" (Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania) and the "Pragmatics" (Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Bulgaria), will maintain a mostly common course towards Russia and the Eastern Partnership states because they have to. The Czech Republic, although hosting a part of the US anti-ballistic missile shield, is not a genuine "New Cold Warrior", while in 2016 Croatia effectively became one.
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After the collapse of the bipolar international order, NATO has been focused on its desire to eradicate Cold War divisions and to build good relations with Russia. However, the security environment, especially in Europe, is still dramatically changing. The NATO Warsaw Summit was focused especially on NATO's deteriorated relations with Russia that affect Europe's security. At the same time, it looked at bolstering deterrence and defence due to many concerns coming from eastern European allies about Russia's new attitude in international relations. The Allies agreed that a dialogue with Russia rebuilding mutual trust needs to start. In the times when Europe faces major crisis from its southern and south-eastern neighbourhood - Western Balkan countries, Syria, Libya and Iraq - and other threats, such as terrorism, coming from the so-called Islamic State, causing migration crises, it is necessary to calm down relations with Russia. The article brings out the main purpose of NATO in a transformed world, with the accent on Europe, that is constantly developing new security conditions while tackling new challenges and threats. ; After the collapse of the bipolar international order, NATO has been focused on its desire to eradicate Cold War divisions and to build good relations with Russia. However, the security environment, especially in Europe, is still dramatically changing. The NATO Warsaw Summit was focused especially on NATO's deteriorated relations with Russia that affect Europe's security. At the same time, it looked at bolstering deterrence and defence due to many concerns coming from eastern European allies about Russia's new attitude in international relations. The Allies agreed that a dialogue with Russia rebuilding mutual trust needs to start. In the times when Europe faces major crisis from its southern and south-eastern neighbourhood - Western Balkan countries, Syria, Libya and Iraq - and other threats, such as terrorism, coming from the so-called Islamic State, causing migration crises, it is necessary to calm down relations with Russia. The article brings out the main purpose of NATO in a transformed world, with the accent on Europe, that is constantly developing new security conditions while tackling new challenges and threats.
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In: Međunarodni problemi: Meždunarodnye problemy, Band 57, Heft 3, S. 284-318
ISSN: 0025-8555
The author firstly examines cultural & historical potentials of Russia, analyzing them in their positive & negative aspects. Western ability to fully confront contemporary problems is then challenged through a brief account of the cultural crisis in its society in order to establish, through an analysis of the specific reception of that crisis in Russia, whether it can offer new, fresh &/or different solutions to global problems. Finally, basic Russian cultural & political values are depicted through the history of their actions globally & the power & significance of those values is defended as exceptionally fruitful for appliance to the contemporary socio-political situation, as to the challenges that lay before the global society in the future. References. Adapted from the source document.
In: Politicka misao, Band 35, Heft 2, S. 79-93
The disintegration of the socialist regime in Europe did away with the bipolar model of world order & inaugurated a new phase in seeking a new structure & model of international relations. This new world order, only broadly outlined & characterized by (mostly) unilateral leadership, has already been challenged. Two superpowers -- the People's Republic of China & Russia -- condemn the hegemony, unilateralism, & attempts at dictating international relations. China & Russia are supported by a group of disgruntled countries who also think that a broadly based multipolarity is the direction that international relations & the new world order should take. Judging by these challenges & criticisms, it might be said that only multilateral cooperativeness can guarantee validity to the nascent world order. 15 References. Adapted from the source document.
In: Politicka misao, Band 33, Heft 2-3, S. 152-167
The dissolution of the great Soviet empire & the demise of the socialist system in the Soviet Union & Eastern Europe has undoubtedly been one of the most significant political developments at the turn of the 20th century. Whether this was brought about by international factors or by the internal cave-in of the system has been the subject of numerous & extensive analyses. It is obvious that the geostrategic shifts & the completely altered position of the new state (the Russian Federation) have made it necessary to look into the political aspects of the problem. That Russia is not faced with an imminent threat from abroad is certainly an extraordinary change, unprecedented in the long Russian history. This particularly applies to the western Russian borders, which used to be almost continually threatened. Political relations that have been developing between Russia & the West, despite all the obstacles, have been improving, & both sides demonstrate a willingness to continue with this trend. Adapted from the source document.
In: Međunarodne studije: časopis za međunarodne odnose, vanjsku politiku i diplomaciju, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 18-38
ISSN: 1332-4756
World Affairs Online
In: Politicka misao, Band 36, Heft 4, S. 100-117
Although it is not the primary reason for Russian economic collapse in Aug 1998, the permanent crisis of the Russian political system after 1991 had contributed to this breakdown. A major role in all this was played by the process of privatization by which Russian natural & economic resources remained in the hands of the political/economic elite. The crisis of the political system in Russia has another consequence -- bringing into question not only the attained degree of democratic development but also the future of democracy in Russia. 34 References. Adapted from the source document.
In: Politicka misao, Band 36, Heft 3, S. 45-59
Due to their strategic position, the Baltic states, throughout their history, have always been a kind of buffer zone, which has to a large extent affected their development. In the new European environment, the Baltic region is today somewhat marginalized, but because of its proximity to Russia, it has an important strategic position. The Baltic states want to join NATO & the EU because they in this see a guarantee of their security & stability. This may also be an opportunity for solving the very delicate relationship with Russia, still an important actor influencing the Baltic states. 15 References. Adapted from the source document.