Suchergebnisse

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This paper analyses the theoretical approaches of the concept of "identity", which refers to the "historisation" of public life. It is argued that throughout the history people can recognize and interpret social life and people's behaviour is affected by the projections, expectations and memories arising from a broad and defined social, cultural, and historical field in which they are available. While studying the identity of Russian society, the Soviet period is analyzed, in which a national identification was characterized by vertical interaction (human – Soviet government) by levelling down horizontal identity types like ethnic, religious, regional. It is believed that the transformation of Russian to Soviet identity in the nineteenth century overcame the crisis of imperial Russian identity, but almost completely destroyed week ethnic identity layer. The main representatives of the Eurasian concept that had a huge influence in forming the theoretical background to Russian identity were Nicholas Danilevsky (1822-1885), Nicholas Trubeckoi (1890-1938), and Lev Gumiliov (1912-1992). This article emphasizes the ideas of Trubeckoi and his opinion that Western civilization is the greatest enemy of all mankind and the greatest obstacle for the formation of other civilizations and cultures identity. Finally the real, contemporary Russian political steps are analysed which reflected the answers of the Russian identity issue. Vladimir Putin re-established the czarist and Soviet eras' symbols in this way searching for "useful history" that would unite the nation by appealing to the nostalgia. A key trend that is followed is Russia's desire to emphasize that it manages its own affairs and that the West has no right to dictate the direction of democracy or Russia identity development.

This paper analyses the theoretical approaches of the concept of "identity", which refers to the "historisation" of public life. It is argued that throughout the history people can recognize and interpret social life and people's behaviour is affected by the projections, expectations and memories arising from a broad and defined social, cultural, and historical field in which they are available. While studying the identity of Russian society, the Soviet period is analyzed, in which a national identification was characterized by vertical interaction (human – Soviet government) by levelling down horizontal identity types like ethnic, religious, regional. It is believed that the transformation of Russian to Soviet identity in the nineteenth century overcame the crisis of imperial Russian identity, but almost completely destroyed week ethnic identity layer. The main representatives of the Eurasian concept that had a huge influence in forming the theoretical background to Russian identity were Nicholas Danilevsky (1822-1885), Nicholas Trubeckoi (1890-1938), and Lev Gumiliov (1912-1992). This article emphasizes the ideas of Trubeckoi and his opinion that Western civilization is the greatest enemy of all mankind and the greatest obstacle for the formation of other civilizations and cultures identity. Finally the real, contemporary Russian political steps are analysed which reflected the answers of the Russian identity issue. Vladimir Putin re-established the czarist and Soviet eras' symbols in this way searching for "useful history" that would unite the nation by appealing to the nostalgia. A key trend that is followed is Russia's desire to emphasize that it manages its own affairs and that the West has no right to dictate the direction of democracy or Russia identity development.

In order to protect certain sectors, Russia has introduced some new protectionist measures for EU agricultural products such as meat and dairy products. Russia is a member of WTO for four years, but is still not respecting its WTO commitments concerning the liberalisation of trade regime. The research was conducted in order to measure the level of competitiveness of Lithuanian dairy products in trade with Russia and in alternative markets. Measuring the competitiveness, International competitiveness index in the specific (local) region (LIIC) was used. The research has found an increase in the competitiveness of export of dairy products in EU-28 countries and countries outside the EU markets. The results differed by level of competitiveness among two groups of countries. In the period of analysis, LIIC index was higher in the first group than in the second group of EU countries.

In order to protect certain sectors, Russia has introduced some new protectionist measures for EU agricultural products such as meat and dairy products. Russia is a member of WTO for four years, but is still not respecting its WTO commitments concerning the liberalisation of trade regime. The research was conducted in order to measure the level of competitiveness of Lithuanian dairy products in trade with Russia and in alternative markets. Measuring the competitiveness, International competitiveness index in the specific (local) region (LIIC) was used. The research has found an increase in the competitiveness of export of dairy products in EU-28 countries and countries outside the EU markets. The results differed by level of competitiveness among two groups of countries. In the period of analysis, LIIC index was higher in the first group than in the second group of EU countries.

In recent years, the European Union's restrictive measures against the Russian Federation in response to the conflict in Ukraine have been the subject of many wide-ranging analyses, in the fields of political science, international relations and economics. Nevertheless, in the field of law, there is still a lack of efforts in assessing them. This work is an attempt to look at this topic through the prism of European Union law. The first part of the paper examines the legal regulation of the European Union restrictive measures (sanctions). Beginning with the origins of the European Union, the issue of the origins of Common Foreign and Security Policy is examined. As well as the manner in which economic sanctions were adopted in those times. The paper goes on to examine the effects of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon as regards the analysis of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The author examines the unique position of this policy in the Treaty on European Union and in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, further consistently assessing the role of its actors: the Member States and Union institutions The next part outlines the implementing measures for this policy area (for example, the nature of the Council decisions). Finally, it focuses on one of the instruments of the Common Foreign and Security Policy - the legal mechanism for restrictive measures. The paper describes their goals, principles, as well as procedural aspects: adoption, implementation, monitoring processes. Following this, the second part of the work first briefly describes the events of 2014, from the mass demonstrations of Ukrainian citizens against the non-signature of the Association Agreement with the European Union, to the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia - an unprecedented act of aggression against another sovereign state (the first since the end of the second world war ), finally leading to the European Union adopting the above-mentioned measures aimed at correcting the behavior of the Russian regime. The third part deals with the specific restrictive measures concerning the Russian Federation and the actions taken by its leadership: (a) in response to actions that directly harm Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence; (b) trade restrictions regarding Crimea and Sevastopol; (c) and finally the sectoral / economic measures against Russia. The fourth part examines the first cases brought before the General Court of the European Union and the Court of Justice of the European Union

In recent years, the European Union's restrictive measures against the Russian Federation in response to the conflict in Ukraine have been the subject of many wide-ranging analyses, in the fields of political science, international relations and economics. Nevertheless, in the field of law, there is still a lack of efforts in assessing them. This work is an attempt to look at this topic through the prism of European Union law. The first part of the paper examines the legal regulation of the European Union restrictive measures (sanctions). Beginning with the origins of the European Union, the issue of the origins of Common Foreign and Security Policy is examined. As well as the manner in which economic sanctions were adopted in those times. The paper goes on to examine the effects of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon as regards the analysis of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The author examines the unique position of this policy in the Treaty on European Union and in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, further consistently assessing the role of its actors: the Member States and Union institutions The next part outlines the implementing measures for this policy area (for example, the nature of the Council decisions). Finally, it focuses on one of the instruments of the Common Foreign and Security Policy - the legal mechanism for restrictive measures. The paper describes their goals, principles, as well as procedural aspects: adoption, implementation, monitoring processes. Following this, the second part of the work first briefly describes the events of 2014, from the mass demonstrations of Ukrainian citizens against the non-signature of the Association Agreement with the European Union, to the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia - an unprecedented act of aggression against another sovereign state (the first since the end of the second world war ), finally leading to the European Union adopting the above-mentioned measures aimed at correcting the behavior of the Russian regime. The third part deals with the specific restrictive measures concerning the Russian Federation and the actions taken by its leadership: (a) in response to actions that directly harm Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence; (b) trade restrictions regarding Crimea and Sevastopol; (c) and finally the sectoral / economic measures against Russia. The fourth part examines the first cases brought before the General Court of the European Union and the Court of Justice of the European Union

In recent years, the European Union's restrictive measures against the Russian Federation in response to the conflict in Ukraine have been the subject of many wide-ranging analyses, in the fields of political science, international relations and economics. Nevertheless, in the field of law, there is still a lack of efforts in assessing them. This work is an attempt to look at this topic through the prism of European Union law. The first part of the paper examines the legal regulation of the European Union restrictive measures (sanctions). Beginning with the origins of the European Union, the issue of the origins of Common Foreign and Security Policy is examined. As well as the manner in which economic sanctions were adopted in those times. The paper goes on to examine the effects of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon as regards the analysis of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The author examines the unique position of this policy in the Treaty on European Union and in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, further consistently assessing the role of its actors: the Member States and Union institutions The next part outlines the implementing measures for this policy area (for example, the nature of the Council decisions). Finally, it focuses on one of the instruments of the Common Foreign and Security Policy - the legal mechanism for restrictive measures. The paper describes their goals, principles, as well as procedural aspects: adoption, implementation, monitoring processes. Following this, the second part of the work first briefly describes the events of 2014, from the mass demonstrations of Ukrainian citizens against the non-signature of the Association Agreement with the European Union, to the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia - an unprecedented act of aggression against another sovereign state (the first since the end of the second world war ), finally leading to the European Union adopting the above-mentioned measures aimed at correcting the behavior of the Russian regime. The third part deals with the specific restrictive measures concerning the Russian Federation and the actions taken by its leadership: (a) in response to actions that directly harm Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence; (b) trade restrictions regarding Crimea and Sevastopol; (c) and finally the sectoral / economic measures against Russia. The fourth part examines the first cases brought before the General Court of the European Union and the Court of Justice of the European Union

In recent years, the European Union's restrictive measures against the Russian Federation in response to the conflict in Ukraine have been the subject of many wide-ranging analyses, in the fields of political science, international relations and economics. Nevertheless, in the field of law, there is still a lack of efforts in assessing them. This work is an attempt to look at this topic through the prism of European Union law. The first part of the paper examines the legal regulation of the European Union restrictive measures (sanctions). Beginning with the origins of the European Union, the issue of the origins of Common Foreign and Security Policy is examined. As well as the manner in which economic sanctions were adopted in those times. The paper goes on to examine the effects of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon as regards the analysis of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The author examines the unique position of this policy in the Treaty on European Union and in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, further consistently assessing the role of its actors: the Member States and Union institutions The next part outlines the implementing measures for this policy area (for example, the nature of the Council decisions). Finally, it focuses on one of the instruments of the Common Foreign and Security Policy - the legal mechanism for restrictive measures. The paper describes their goals, principles, as well as procedural aspects: adoption, implementation, monitoring processes. Following this, the second part of the work first briefly describes the events of 2014, from the mass demonstrations of Ukrainian citizens against the non-signature of the Association Agreement with the European Union, to the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia - an unprecedented act of aggression against another sovereign state (the first since the end of the second world war ), finally leading to the European Union adopting the above-mentioned measures aimed at correcting the behavior of the Russian regime. The third part deals with the specific restrictive measures concerning the Russian Federation and the actions taken by its leadership: (a) in response to actions that directly harm Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence; (b) trade restrictions regarding Crimea and Sevastopol; (c) and finally the sectoral / economic measures against Russia. The fourth part examines the first cases brought before the General Court of the European Union and the Court of Justice of the European Union

The master thesis "Reform of the Civil Procedure law in Russia 1990 – 2010" is aimed at analysing the assumptions for the civil procedure law reform, identifying the steps according to which the reform has been carried out, their trends and essential features. Even before the entry into force of the Code of Civil Procedure of Russian Federation, major changes and additions were made in the Code of Civil Procedure that was in force in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. After entry into force of the Code of Civil Procedure of Russian Federation became effective in 2003, the law reform of the civil procedure is continued in accordance with the concept mixed (liberal civil procedure law and schools of the social civil law). Despite the fact that the Russians are a form of civil procedure extended through several stages, the differentiation of the forms of procedure was established, disposition and adversarial principles were developed, there was an active court and the activation of the parties – these are the main trends according to which the reform was carried out. The paper attempts to assess the legislator's position, based on the analysis only got at, as well as to highlight the assumed problems.

The master thesis "Reform of the Civil Procedure law in Russia 1990 – 2010" is aimed at analysing the assumptions for the civil procedure law reform, identifying the steps according to which the reform has been carried out, their trends and essential features. Even before the entry into force of the Code of Civil Procedure of Russian Federation, major changes and additions were made in the Code of Civil Procedure that was in force in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. After entry into force of the Code of Civil Procedure of Russian Federation became effective in 2003, the law reform of the civil procedure is continued in accordance with the concept mixed (liberal civil procedure law and schools of the social civil law). Despite the fact that the Russians are a form of civil procedure extended through several stages, the differentiation of the forms of procedure was established, disposition and adversarial principles were developed, there was an active court and the activation of the parties – these are the main trends according to which the reform was carried out. The paper attempts to assess the legislator's position, based on the analysis only got at, as well as to highlight the assumed problems.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the development of relations between Russia and the two Western power centres, the United States of America and the European Union, in 2003 – 2004. It goes without saying that it would be quite problematic and risky to formulate an unequivocal evaluation of this dynamic phenomenon. The author, however, sought to identify and determine the key trends of development. This was done through a search for answers to more specific questions: what was the strategy of Russia's foreign policy, how did it interact with the goals and aspirations of the USA and EU, and, finally, toward what – convergence or alienation – did evolve the dialogue between the global power centres that are of greatest importance for the Central and Eastern European countries. These tasks have dictated the trinomial structure of the paper. The first part deals with the changes in the Russian foreign policy strategy in recent years. It shows how, upon sensible assessment of its opportunities, Russia abandoned its former rush-about and concentrated on the inclusion of the CIS states (the Ukraine in particular) in its political orbit. The second and the third part of the paper analyse the peculiarities and ups and downs of Russia's relations with the USA and the EU respectively. Despite certain variations, the development of these relations increasingly shows signs of alienation and cooling, which were partly masked by the intention of the EU larger Member States, in particular of the Germany, to maintain good relations with Russia at any cost. Finally, a brief overview of the culminating event in the Russian–Western relations – the Ukrainian "orange revolution" – is presented at the end of the paper, supplemented by a broader summarisation of the period under consideration. The underlying idea of the summary is that the so-called "value gap" has been widening in the Russian-Western relations in recent years.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the development of relations between Russia and the two Western power centres, the United States of America and the European Union, in 2003 – 2004. It goes without saying that it would be quite problematic and risky to formulate an unequivocal evaluation of this dynamic phenomenon. The author, however, sought to identify and determine the key trends of development. This was done through a search for answers to more specific questions: what was the strategy of Russia's foreign policy, how did it interact with the goals and aspirations of the USA and EU, and, finally, toward what – convergence or alienation – did evolve the dialogue between the global power centres that are of greatest importance for the Central and Eastern European countries. These tasks have dictated the trinomial structure of the paper. The first part deals with the changes in the Russian foreign policy strategy in recent years. It shows how, upon sensible assessment of its opportunities, Russia abandoned its former rush-about and concentrated on the inclusion of the CIS states (the Ukraine in particular) in its political orbit. The second and the third part of the paper analyse the peculiarities and ups and downs of Russia's relations with the USA and the EU respectively. Despite certain variations, the development of these relations increasingly shows signs of alienation and cooling, which were partly masked by the intention of the EU larger Member States, in particular of the Germany, to maintain good relations with Russia at any cost. Finally, a brief overview of the culminating event in the Russian–Western relations – the Ukrainian "orange revolution" – is presented at the end of the paper, supplemented by a broader summarisation of the period under consideration. The underlying idea of the summary is that the so-called "value gap" has been widening in the Russian-Western relations in recent years.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the development of relations between Russia and the two Western power centres, the United States of America and the European Union, in 2003 – 2004. It goes without saying that it would be quite problematic and risky to formulate an unequivocal evaluation of this dynamic phenomenon. The author, however, sought to identify and determine the key trends of development. This was done through a search for answers to more specific questions: what was the strategy of Russia's foreign policy, how did it interact with the goals and aspirations of the USA and EU, and, finally, toward what – convergence or alienation – did evolve the dialogue between the global power centres that are of greatest importance for the Central and Eastern European countries. These tasks have dictated the trinomial structure of the paper. The first part deals with the changes in the Russian foreign policy strategy in recent years. It shows how, upon sensible assessment of its opportunities, Russia abandoned its former rush-about and concentrated on the inclusion of the CIS states (the Ukraine in particular) in its political orbit. The second and the third part of the paper analyse the peculiarities and ups and downs of Russia's relations with the USA and the EU respectively. Despite certain variations, the development of these relations increasingly shows signs of alienation and cooling, which were partly masked by the intention of the EU larger Member States, in particular of the Germany, to maintain good relations with Russia at any cost. Finally, a brief overview of the culminating event in the Russian–Western relations – the Ukrainian "orange revolution" – is presented at the end of the paper, supplemented by a broader summarisation of the period under consideration. The underlying idea of the summary is that the so-called "value gap" has been widening in the Russian-Western relations in recent years.