This one of a series of regular rapports on Russia for European Public Law summarises recent developments: 1. increase in the terms of office of the President and the State Duma; 2. resolution of a jurisdictional dispute between the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court over powers to declare legislation unconstitutional; 3. creation of a new Supreme Court of the Russian Federation; 4. changes to election rules for State Duma deputies; and 5. expansion of the Russian Federation by the inclusion of two new Federation subjects.
Mode of access: Internet. ; Official organ of the Russian Soviet Government Bureau, June 1919-Jan. 1921; of the Friends of Soviet Russia, Feb. 1922-Oct. 1924. ; "Replaced . . . 'The Weekly bulletin of the Bureau of Information of Soviet Russia' . . . first published on March 3, 1919 . . . the last issue (number 13) appearing on the 26th of May.
Set of 44 color slides in 1 box labeled "Russia." Part of the Cal R. Fremling collection. Slides are unlabeled and not numbered consecutively. Exact location and creation dates are unknown. Slides show Russian trip and landmarks photographs including: St Basil's Cathedral (Moscow, Red Square), Spasskaya Tower (Moscow Kremlin), Luzhniki Stadium (Moscow), fruit and market stands, homes and farms, Moyka River/Green Bridge in St. Petersburg, Palace Square and the Hermitage Museum (St. Petersburg), Kaendler silver wine-cooler (Hermitage Museum), Church of the Savior on Spilled Blood and St. Isaac's Cathedral (St. Petersburg), Peterhof Palace (St. Petersburg), and various streets, buildings, and people. Also included are a few pictures of London and Picadilly Circus. Slide print date is 1971. ; https://openriver.winona.edu/calfremlingslidesall/1024/thumbnail.jpg
Analyzing law enforcement data on corruption incidents for a panel of 79 Russian regions for the period 2004-2007, we find that the relative salaries of bureaucrats determine corruption levels: Corruption declines as relative salaries rise up to a turning point, beyond which corruption rises again. Other important determinants are the strength of law enforcement, available rents through government budgets and natural resources, education levels, unemployment rates, and income inequality.
Issues for 1920-1922 published in New York; issues for 1923-1924 published in Chicago, Ill. ; Title from caption. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Official organ of: Russian Soviet Government Bureau, June 1919-Jan. 1921; Friends of Soviet Russia, Feb. 1922-Oct. 1924. ; Absorbed by: Workers monthly, which later became: Political affairs.
It is widely recognized that broadband is of fundamental importance to the social and economic development of a nation. The focus of the paper is on infrastructure-related actions; measures to stimulate demand for broadband are, therefore, only marginally addressed. This paper aims to provide a platform for debate with the Russian counterparts in the sector, and to discuss the measures needed to develop broadband in support of actions aimed at economic growth. This paper examines the broadband market in Russia and preconditions for its sustainable development. It begins by presenting arguments demonstrating the importance of broadband to the overall economic development of Russia, including from the perspective of diversification of the economy and new job creation. The paper benchmarks Russia s broadband performance with Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) comparators, as well as with other nations leading the way in broadband diffusion. The paper takes stock of the existing broadband market structure in Russia and its main players as they stand today, including the regulatory and legal environment of the market for both fixed and mobile broadband. Finally, the paper provides a set of recommendations that addresses the issue of sustainability in Russian broadband delivery, and how it can continue its acceleration in the years to come.
One of the Cold War's commonplaces about Russia was its abiding embrace of authoritarianism. Across the centuries, successive regimes, whether Tsarist or Communist, have been characterised by Western scholars as highly centralised, personalised power structures, with an intolerance of dissidence that too easily descended into barbaric brutality. Living on Europe's farthest edge, Russia's peoples are said to have been bypassed by Enlightenment modernity, the rise of liberal constitutionalism and the gradual entrenchment of individual rights and democratic freedoms. For those commentators inspired by such Cold War thinking, it is a legacy that continues to shape contemporary politics. The assumption is that Putin's reclaiming of the presidency in 2012 is emblematic of an inevitable reversion to authoritarianism. Drawing on research in Russia during the March 2012 election, this article takes a critical look at the plethora of global statistical surveys that point to authoritarian trends under the current regime. It concludes that the conceptual framework underpinning the West's revelations about the descent into authoritarianism in contemporary Russia is neither clear nor convincing.
One of the Cold War's commonplaces about Russia was its abiding embrace of authoritarianism. Across the centuries, successive regimes, whether Tsarist or Communist, have been characterised by Western scholars as highly centralised, personalised power structures, with an intolerance of dissidence that too easily descended into barbaric brutality. Living on Europe's farthest edge, Russia's peoples are said to have been bypassed by Enlightenment modernity, the rise of liberal constitutionalism and the gradual entrenchment of individual rights and democratic freedoms. For those commentators inspired by such Cold War thinking, it is a legacy that continues to shape contemporary politics. The assumption is that Putin's reclaiming of the presidency in 2012 is emblematic of an inevitable reversion to authoritarianism. Drawing on research in Russia during the March 2012 election, this article takes a critical look at the plethora of global statistical surveys that point to authoritarian trends under the current regime. It concludes that the conceptual framework underpinning the West's revelations about the descent into authoritarianism in contemporary Russia is neither clear nor convincing.
The paper discusses aid operations in Russia, which are implemented in different ways, depending on the degree of development of democratic stmctures. In the papefs initial part, the relationships between the State and the civic society in the Soviet Union are described. Their specific naturę was due to the lack of any genuine involvement of individuals in the social sphere. Further, chan- ges taking place after the collapse of the Soviet Union are discussed by sectors of activity, including voluntary sector initiatives at the local, regional and national levels. Also, certain aid organisations are described, such as the Helsinki Group in Moscow and the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia. In addition, the paper discusses forms of organising assistance in Siberia and the Russian Far East. Finally, prospects for assistance activities in Russia are outlined. ; Tomasz Wites
Russia currently has the world's third largest fleet of nuclear power plants with 33 reactors in operation. To supply the country's growing energy demand, Russia plans to double its nuclear energy output by 2035 with ten reactors currently under construction and a number of existing ones being upgraded to extend service life. Russia is also one of the world's leading nuclear exporters, delivering nuclear fuel to ten countries. Additional 19 new power reactors will be launched in foreign countries by 2024 with negotiations under way for building another 27. If these targets are achieved, Russia's annual demand for natural uranium will rise three-fold to 30,000 tonnes by 2035. At the same time, Russia's uranium mines have supplied no more than 20% of the national nuclear industry's requirement for natural uranium over the past decade. Russia therefore relies heavily on its uranium mining assets abroad, securing new sources of supply and drawing down its existing stockpiles of secondary sources. This trend, as well as Russia's increased presence on the global market for nuclear fuel cycle services, is driving an increase in the Russian nuclear industry's transparency in order to comply with domestic legislation of the partner countries, including the producers of natural uranium. This country report analyses the Russian nuclear industry's demand for natural uranium, its sources of supply and the legal framework that regulates the use of nuclear materials in Russia. It is part of the global Governing Uranium project, led by DIIS, which seeks to identify governance gaps in uranium accountability and control and to provide policy recommendations for improving front end transparency, security and regulation.
It would seem expedient to discuss the topic "Russia and GUAM" in the context of the integration unions existing in the post-Soviet space, that is, with respect to the CIS and, to some extent, its alternative organizations. It is very evident that the activity of the CIS, despite the obvious need, in our opinion, for its further existence, at least as a negotiation platform, does not fully meet the functions of an integration structure. There are many different reasons for this, such as the Commonwealth's diversity and the ineptness of its bureaucratic machinery, as well as the outmoded ambitions and phobias that are prevalent in some cases. So it was inevitable that integration organizations emerged that posed as alternatives to the CIS and singled out a few of the stronger nuclei within the Commonwealth. It is another matter that this demand could be and was used by external forces interested in forming all kinds of counterbalances to Russia or simply in weakening Russia as the CIS's only driving force due to its potential. At the same time, Russia's rather bumpy relations with some of the Commonwealth states prompted the latter to step up their participation in these alternative structures. Subsequently, normalization of the relations between the Russian Federation and any given CIS country led, as a rule, to the withdrawal of that state from the alternative integration union. It is worth noting that Uzbekistan, which joined GUAM in 1999, left it in May 2005 after its relations with Russia cardinally improved. Moldova, which has essentially curtailed its participation in GUAM due the normalization of relations between Chisinau and Moscow, is currently heading in the same direction. Correspondingly, the Russian factor has a way of exerting very tangible pressure both on the emergence and on the further existence of alternative unions. So the vision we offer of the GUAM's past and present will be based on our understanding of Moscow's viewpoint on this issue, as well as on Russia's national interests. GUAM's formation on 10 October, 1997 was essentially tantamount to an attempt to turn the CIS into a bipolar structure. It was presumed that the GUAM countries, as equal states with similar political and economic interests, would form one pole. While the other pole would consist of the countries in Russia's sphere of influence and members of the Collective Security Treaty, as well as the Customs Union, which was later transformed into the Eurasian Economic Community. The development of relations within GUAM/GUUAM was based on the conception of new regionalism, according to which special partnership relations are built keeping in mind the innate nature of relations between states, common economic interests (primarily energy and transport), and similar interests in regional security and stability. Common economic interests imply joint participation in the transportation of Caspian energy resources and the laying of new transit routes through the Caucasus and the Black Sea. The same political goals predetermined the creation of joint sub-regional security structures. In 1999, the presidents of the GUUAM countries signed a declaration which was to define the main vectors of cooperation within the Organization. The GUUAM member states viewed the creation and existence of this union as a positive alternative to the integration processes in the post-Soviet expanse.
Folded maps in pocket. ; --v.1. pt. 1. Physical geography. pt. 2. Russian occupation.--v.2. pt. 2. Russian occupation (continued) pt. 3. Political divisions. pt. 4. Social, economic and political conditions. pt. 5. Natural history. ; Mode of access: Internet.
The EU's current policy towards Russia assumes that the Kremlin is interested in a comprehensive national modernisation programme and has the power to put this into practice. But what if this assumption turns out to be incorrect? Numerous structural obstacles give grounds for scepticism that Russia will manage to implement such an endeavour. Without modernisation Russia will weaken, but will be unwilling to relinquish its international aspirations. The EU needs to prepare for a situation where the premises of its Russia policy no longer apply, and should lose no time in preparing a Plan B
Scholars of Russian culture have always paid close attention to texts and their authors, but they have often forgotten about the readers. These volumes illuminate encounters between the Russians and their favorite texts, a centuries-long and continent-spanning "love story" that shaped the way people think, feel, and communicate. The fruit of thirty-one specialists' research, Reading Russia represents the first attempt to systematically depict the evolution of reading in Russia from the eighteenth century to the present day. The third volume of Reading Russia considers more recent (and rapid) changes to reading, and focuses on two profoundly transformative moments: the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, and the digital revolution of the 1990s. This volume investigates how the political transformations of the early twentieth century and the technological ones from the turn of the twenty-first impacted the tastes, habits, and reading practices of the Russian public. It closely observes how Russian readers adapted to and/or resisted their eras' paradigm-shifting crises in communication and interpretation.
This volume is the result of the co-operation between the Moscow Diplomatic Academy and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. It has been produced on the basis of a conference held in Moscow in October 2001. Faculty members and researchers of the two training institutions reinforced by experts of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation met to exchange views at a round-table discussion and to contribute to the studies of future generations of international relations experts. Three weeks after a major formative moment in international security - the terrorist attacks against the United States - it was particularly exciting to compare notes, listen to arguments and see the concerns we share and also the distinct ones we don't. The book contains the updated papers of the conference and the summary of the discussions. We believe that rather than fighting old myths it is better to pay attention to the views represented in the book.
