Suchergebnisse

Alienated fragmented identity in case of the state and nation is analyzed through cultural identity, selfidentification in historical, geopolitical, and political contexts. The main question is how a nation should stay as it was when all around there are huge political, economic, and social changes? What is the influence of internal and extern al structures in shaping the relationship between perceptions of national identity, culture, "foreign"? And what are the manifestations and consequences of real policy (that is based on mythical thinking) on the process of state and nation formation? One of the most interesting and important objects of analysis of alienated identity in the context of states and nations is Russia. This multicultural, multireligious giant constructed by coincidences, wars and aggression and having a unique cultural and historical heritage lacks only one thing – clear autoidentification.

Alienated fragmented identity in case of the state and nation is analyzed through cultural identity, selfidentification in historical, geopolitical, and political contexts. The main question is how a nation should stay as it was when all around there are huge political, economic, and social changes? What is the influence of internal and extern al structures in shaping the relationship between perceptions of national identity, culture, "foreign"? And what are the manifestations and consequences of real policy (that is based on mythical thinking) on the process of state and nation formation? One of the most interesting and important objects of analysis of alienated identity in the context of states and nations is Russia. This multicultural, multireligious giant constructed by coincidences, wars and aggression and having a unique cultural and historical heritage lacks only one thing – clear autoidentification.

Since the demise of FSU, about one million Russian speakers from all republics of the FSU have moved to Israel. Today Russian Jews amount to 20 % of Israeli society. This aliyah doesn't integrate into Israeli society and forms Russian speakers' subculture (externalized through particular cultural identity, Russian language community formation and no integration process) in Israel. This segregation determines complex Russian Jews relationship with Israel and Russia: in Israel this community functions like separate ethnic group and creates diasporic ties with Russia. As a result of the demise of the FSU Russia-Israel relations take a new form. Russia renounced it's entirely proarabic politics and started developing friendly ties with Israel. The aim of the work is to determine the role of Israeli Russian Jews community in Israel-Russia relations, keeping in mind that Israeli Russian speakers in Israel society act like the separate ethnic group with strong diasporic ties with Russia. The hypothesis of the work – Israeli Russian Jews community is one of the factors, affecting Israel-Russia relations transformation in positive way. In order to verify the hypothesis there are formed four goals: 1) to define the term "diaspora"and theoretical model of diaspora's action between hostland and homeland; 2) to analyze Israeli Russian Jews community's identification with Russian culture and evaluate the disintegration into Israeli society process; 3) to evaluate Israel, Russia and community's interests in respect of each other; 4) to identify the role of Russian Jews in political, economical and cultural area. The analysis enables to come to these conclusions: 1) Israeli Russian Jews act like the bridge between Israel and Russia. Dual cultural identification and non-integration process capacitates hostland to obtain homeland features (and vice versa) and creates proper conditions for Russian Jews to act like the mediator. 2) Russian Jews community was one of the main factors for changing Russia's perception of Israel – new perception determines new political courses and opens new possibilities; 3) Israeli Russian Jews is one of the main initiator of Israel-Russia economical cooperation; 4) Russian Jews community is the main actor in cultural each other (Israel-Russia) knowledge. Nevertheless, dual identification on certain conditions operates like community's motivation reducing factor. On the one hand, dual identification capacitates community to act like influential political and economic group in Israel, retain dual citizenship, property and operation freedom in Russia. On the other hand, dual identification is the barrier for active lobby. Dual identification prevents community from political agenda in regard to Israel-Russia relations formation. Thus even disposing of powerful political influence means Israeli Russian Jews don't manage to use it. Eventually, by playing "dual identity" card Russian Jews community may become the mean of influence in the relationship of two states. Dual identity suppresses political consciousness and diasporic community can't be active player in regard to partly hostland/partly homeland - Russia. Because of this passivity Russian Jews community-reversed diaspora becomes potential object of manipulation. The analysis of literature enables to come to the conclusion that Israel government doesn't use the community as the mean of influence. It can be explained by the fact that Israel government, despite dual Russian Jews community's identity, doesn't consider Russian Jews as diaspora, conversely it is considered integral part of Israel society. Whereas Russia is trying to ensure for itself possible means of manipulation through financial support for Russian Jews parties and provided permission to use Russia's mass media for Russian Jews community's purposes. It means that in prospect Russian Jews may become significant Russia's mean of influence to Israel.

Since the demise of FSU, about one million Russian speakers from all republics of the FSU have moved to Israel. Today Russian Jews amount to 20 % of Israeli society. This aliyah doesn't integrate into Israeli society and forms Russian speakers' subculture (externalized through particular cultural identity, Russian language community formation and no integration process) in Israel. This segregation determines complex Russian Jews relationship with Israel and Russia: in Israel this community functions like separate ethnic group and creates diasporic ties with Russia. As a result of the demise of the FSU Russia-Israel relations take a new form. Russia renounced it's entirely proarabic politics and started developing friendly ties with Israel. The aim of the work is to determine the role of Israeli Russian Jews community in Israel-Russia relations, keeping in mind that Israeli Russian speakers in Israel society act like the separate ethnic group with strong diasporic ties with Russia. The hypothesis of the work – Israeli Russian Jews community is one of the factors, affecting Israel-Russia relations transformation in positive way. In order to verify the hypothesis there are formed four goals: 1) to define the term "diaspora"and theoretical model of diaspora's action between hostland and homeland; 2) to analyze Israeli Russian Jews community's identification with Russian culture and evaluate the disintegration into Israeli society process; 3) to evaluate Israel, Russia and community's interests in respect of each other; 4) to identify the role of Russian Jews in political, economical and cultural area. The analysis enables to come to these conclusions: 1) Israeli Russian Jews act like the bridge between Israel and Russia. Dual cultural identification and non-integration process capacitates hostland to obtain homeland features (and vice versa) and creates proper conditions for Russian Jews to act like the mediator. 2) Russian Jews community was one of the main factors for changing Russia's perception of Israel – new perception determines new political courses and opens new possibilities; 3) Israeli Russian Jews is one of the main initiator of Israel-Russia economical cooperation; 4) Russian Jews community is the main actor in cultural each other (Israel-Russia) knowledge. Nevertheless, dual identification on certain conditions operates like community's motivation reducing factor. On the one hand, dual identification capacitates community to act like influential political and economic group in Israel, retain dual citizenship, property and operation freedom in Russia. On the other hand, dual identification is the barrier for active lobby. Dual identification prevents community from political agenda in regard to Israel-Russia relations formation. Thus even disposing of powerful political influence means Israeli Russian Jews don't manage to use it. Eventually, by playing "dual identity" card Russian Jews community may become the mean of influence in the relationship of two states. Dual identity suppresses political consciousness and diasporic community can't be active player in regard to partly hostland/partly homeland - Russia. Because of this passivity Russian Jews community-reversed diaspora becomes potential object of manipulation. The analysis of literature enables to come to the conclusion that Israel government doesn't use the community as the mean of influence. It can be explained by the fact that Israel government, despite dual Russian Jews community's identity, doesn't consider Russian Jews as diaspora, conversely it is considered integral part of Israel society. Whereas Russia is trying to ensure for itself possible means of manipulation through financial support for Russian Jews parties and provided permission to use Russia's mass media for Russian Jews community's purposes. It means that in prospect Russian Jews may become significant Russia's mean of influence to Israel.

In this study, titled "Intersection of US-Russia interests in Central Asia region", the author analyses the strategies of the United States of America and the Russian Federation towards Central Asia region and the main strategic interests in the security policy and economical level. The study pays a lot of attention to the analysis of the democratization aspect, especially in the U.S. foreign policy course, and its impact on the relations between U.S., Russia and the states of the Central Asia. The study is based on the academic concept of "imperialism", which becomes an orient in the analysis of intersection of US Russia interests in Central Asia region and opportunities for cooperation. The study has been divided into four chapters. In the first chapter author introduces a theoretical foundation of "imperialism". The second chapter is dedicated to the analysis of US strategic interests in Central Asia and the role and meaning of democratization process. The geopolitical spread of Russia's influence is analyzed in the third chapter of the study, where the author underscores the importance of rally points in the relations between Russia and Central Asia states. The fourth chapter analyzes the prospects of future cooperation and competition between US and Russia. The study concludes, that US strategy towards Central Asia is discontinuous, and because of underestimation of specific situation in this region and lack of rally points (short common historical experience, differences in culture and value systems etc.), US fails to establish in this region. In addition, attempting to pass a "democratization message" to the authoritarian regimes and misjudging their reaction, US harms its other strategic interests. However, US cannot abandon "democratization" message because of it gives an ideological ground for its foreign policy course and legitimizes its actions worldwide. Therefore the study confirms the first hypothesis, that excessively underscoring the democratization aspect and forgetting the specifics of Central Asia region, US reduces the effectiveness of these relations as well as its abilities to reach other strategic goals. Russia, otherwise, does not underline "democratization" issue and avoids the rise of such tension in its relations with Central Asia states. Russia makes use of the bridging cultural connections, common historical experience, and, mostly important, common infrastructure that facilitates economical cooperation. Therefore, study concludes, that Russia manages to make use of Central Asia states' apathy towards US offered democratization model, and increases its opportunities to strengthen the instruments of economical pressure in the region. Central Asia can be seen as a testing area for the competition of US and Russia imperial ambitions. In consideration of US attempts to implement its domination policy goals and Russia's desire to see multipolar international relations system instead of unipolar, cooperation perspectives remain highly questionable.

In this study, titled "Intersection of US-Russia interests in Central Asia region", the author analyses the strategies of the United States of America and the Russian Federation towards Central Asia region and the main strategic interests in the security policy and economical level. The study pays a lot of attention to the analysis of the democratization aspect, especially in the U.S. foreign policy course, and its impact on the relations between U.S., Russia and the states of the Central Asia. The study is based on the academic concept of "imperialism", which becomes an orient in the analysis of intersection of US Russia interests in Central Asia region and opportunities for cooperation. The study has been divided into four chapters. In the first chapter author introduces a theoretical foundation of "imperialism". The second chapter is dedicated to the analysis of US strategic interests in Central Asia and the role and meaning of democratization process. The geopolitical spread of Russia's influence is analyzed in the third chapter of the study, where the author underscores the importance of rally points in the relations between Russia and Central Asia states. The fourth chapter analyzes the prospects of future cooperation and competition between US and Russia. The study concludes, that US strategy towards Central Asia is discontinuous, and because of underestimation of specific situation in this region and lack of rally points (short common historical experience, differences in culture and value systems etc.), US fails to establish in this region. In addition, attempting to pass a "democratization message" to the authoritarian regimes and misjudging their reaction, US harms its other strategic interests. However, US cannot abandon "democratization" message because of it gives an ideological ground for its foreign policy course and legitimizes its actions worldwide. Therefore the study confirms the first hypothesis, that excessively underscoring the democratization aspect and forgetting the specifics of Central Asia region, US reduces the effectiveness of these relations as well as its abilities to reach other strategic goals. Russia, otherwise, does not underline "democratization" issue and avoids the rise of such tension in its relations with Central Asia states. Russia makes use of the bridging cultural connections, common historical experience, and, mostly important, common infrastructure that facilitates economical cooperation. Therefore, study concludes, that Russia manages to make use of Central Asia states' apathy towards US offered democratization model, and increases its opportunities to strengthen the instruments of economical pressure in the region. Central Asia can be seen as a testing area for the competition of US and Russia imperial ambitions. In consideration of US attempts to implement its domination policy goals and Russia's desire to see multipolar international relations system instead of unipolar, cooperation perspectives remain highly questionable.

First time name of certification were mentioned 1990s concerning a problems with bad forest practices, hard improvement of governmental regulations especial in tropics. Later this concern were growing to 1992 Rio de Janeiro conference. And so, need of strict forest system in 1993 established Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). Main activities started later 1996 in Canada with small group of people which started developing countries regional standards (Claros, 2009). Now FSC program is one of the biggest forest certification and accreditation providing company providing wood and their products and certification service. This program supports LEED Lumber, IKEA, biggest companies buying wood in the world, non governamental organisations World wild Fund (WWF), Green peace (www.fsc.org). The curiosity of how FSC forest certification impact forest management in Lithuania and Russia and lack of FSC standard studies with national law encouraged to create such study. We want to analyze FSC certification annual public reports raised CAR's (Corrective action request) from Forest Management Units (FMU) - enterprises, leaseholders in Lithuania and Russia. The first aim was to find, what main CAR's in Lithuania, Russia and distribute CAR's to environmental, economical, social type aspects. In later stages analyze Lithuanian and Russian FSC standards Smart Wood, SGS Qualifor and Russian national. In the last step to compare FSC standards with state law for each country. Analysis of Lithuanian and Russian FSC CAR indicators from Forest Management Units (FMU) showed, that biggest amount of violations from violation distribution in countries is environmental. Violation distribution by FSC principles in the countries proved that both countries had main ecological violations 6, 8 principle. Lithuanian Smart Wood and SGS Qualifor not differ much. Lithuanian with Russian standards was most similar by social context indicators. Study showed most important violated indicators in Lithuania from economical type are 8.3.3 problems with FSC logo use and certificate number on invoices; social: 8.5.1 summary of FMU (Forest management unit) management for public not sufficient; ecological: 6.3.8 problem leaving enough dead wood or trees for natural biodiversity. Analysis of most important indicators in Russia from economical part: 7.1.1 long term forest management goal creation; social: 4.2.11 FMU safety and protection problems; ecological: 6.1.1 environment impact assessment of FMU management activities. Comparison of Smart Wood, SGS Qualifor and Russian standards by both countries violated indicators showed that Lithuanian standards ware most similar, most detailed was Russian national. Lower requirements were mostly found in SGS Qualifor and Russian national. Most strict was Smart Wood and Russian national Analyzing standards and state law in both countries by each country standard violations was found that FSC standards were higher than state requirements.

First time name of certification were mentioned 1990s concerning a problems with bad forest practices, hard improvement of governmental regulations especial in tropics. Later this concern were growing to 1992 Rio de Janeiro conference. And so, need of strict forest system in 1993 established Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). Main activities started later 1996 in Canada with small group of people which started developing countries regional standards (Claros, 2009). Now FSC program is one of the biggest forest certification and accreditation providing company providing wood and their products and certification service. This program supports LEED Lumber, IKEA, biggest companies buying wood in the world, non governamental organisations World wild Fund (WWF), Green peace (www.fsc.org). The curiosity of how FSC forest certification impact forest management in Lithuania and Russia and lack of FSC standard studies with national law encouraged to create such study. We want to analyze FSC certification annual public reports raised CAR's (Corrective action request) from Forest Management Units (FMU) - enterprises, leaseholders in Lithuania and Russia. The first aim was to find, what main CAR's in Lithuania, Russia and distribute CAR's to environmental, economical, social type aspects. In later stages analyze Lithuanian and Russian FSC standards Smart Wood, SGS Qualifor and Russian national. In the last step to compare FSC standards with state law for each country. Analysis of Lithuanian and Russian FSC CAR indicators from Forest Management Units (FMU) showed, that biggest amount of violations from violation distribution in countries is environmental. Violation distribution by FSC principles in the countries proved that both countries had main ecological violations 6, 8 principle. Lithuanian Smart Wood and SGS Qualifor not differ much. Lithuanian with Russian standards was most similar by social context indicators. Study showed most important violated indicators in Lithuania from economical type are 8.3.3 problems with FSC logo use and certificate number on invoices; social: 8.5.1 summary of FMU (Forest management unit) management for public not sufficient; ecological: 6.3.8 problem leaving enough dead wood or trees for natural biodiversity. Analysis of most important indicators in Russia from economical part: 7.1.1 long term forest management goal creation; social: 4.2.11 FMU safety and protection problems; ecological: 6.1.1 environment impact assessment of FMU management activities. Comparison of Smart Wood, SGS Qualifor and Russian standards by both countries violated indicators showed that Lithuanian standards ware most similar, most detailed was Russian national. Lower requirements were mostly found in SGS Qualifor and Russian national. Most strict was Smart Wood and Russian national Analyzing standards and state law in both countries by each country standard violations was found that FSC standards were higher than state requirements.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.