On 24 May 1915, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, through its embassy in Washington asked the United States, through its embassy in Constantinople, to convey a message to the Sublime Porte. He condemned 'these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilization' and warned 'all members of the Ottoman government' that the Allied governments would hold personally responsible for 'such massacres' committed against the Armenians. The statement was co-signed by the British and Russian governments. At the end of hostilities, under Article 230 of the Treaty of Sevres, the Turkish government has committed to deliver 'responsible for the massacres that, during the state of war, have been committed in any territory doing, August 1st 1914, part of the Ottoman Empire.'. Adapted from the source document.
Long considered a technocrat, but a serious economist shy and lacking charisma, Arseny Yatsenyuk has gained stature as a state since he became Prime Minister of Ukraine, February 27, 2014, after the events of Euromaidan and the flight of former President Viktor Yanukovych. At 40, the man already has experience of power - experience gained as a result of the Orange Revolution that brought him to power in Kiev in early 2005, a pro-European team led by Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko. Under President Yushchenko, Mr. Yatsenyuk was Minister of the Economy 2005 to 2006, then briefly foreign minister in 2007 before presiding Parliament until the end of 2008. It has, in particular, worked hard for the entry of Ukraine into the WTO, effective in 2008. Adapted from the source document.
Economic stagnation, growing terrorism, and spreading violent, domestic opposition to the interim government tops the list of internal and external challenges facing Egypt. In contrast to the pre-1979 peace agreement, when Israel was considered the foremost threat, Cairo needs to address the menace posed by organizations associated with global jihad-especially those that operate in the Sinai Peninsula-by means of a new strategic view that encompasses the appropriate means to combat it. The age of classic war in the region, involving large scale air-supported tank maneuvers, is apparently over and there is no longer any need to keep accumulating massive quantities of heavy weapons. The threats posed by Islamist terrorist organizations operating in the Sinai require a new strategy focused on low-intensity counterinsurgency measures. On the other hand, opening the Egyptian gates to the Russians, Saudis, and others would win these countries power and influence that over the long run could distance Egypt from its US patron. Adapted from the source document.
This article analyses the LiveJournal blog of the well-known Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny during the period from 2006 to 2012. The blog is analysed through the prism of nationalism and identity construction. The analysis shows that Navalny advocates a 'normal' nationalism, which he contrasts with abnormal, radical, and marginal nationalism. He underlines the importance of national rebirth and constructs Russian national identity in connection to a history of victory and greatness. The national identity that Navalny constructs is ethnically Russian. Other ethnic groups, Chechens in particular, are constructed as 'Others' who belong outside the boundaries of the Russian imagined community. Adapted from the source document.
This essay brings attention to the recent discursive turn in Russian politics that is reflected in the Kremlin's turn to issues of traditional values and morality. Expressed in Russia's domestic and foreign policies, this new "morality politics" is dated by the Pussy Riot trial in 2012 that the Kremlin used to advance its new discursive frame in the public sphere. Although not entirely new in its orientation, this new stage of "morality politics" differs from the earlier policy initiatives in its intensity, scope and political significance for the regime. The moralizing stance taken by the regime is accompanied by a divide and rule political tactic, whereby the establishment has tried to marginalize the protesters from the rest of the Russian public that the regime is attempting to reconsolidate based on traditional, conservative values. The essay interprets this recent morality turn as a strategy selected by the Kremlin to restore the regime's legitimacy that has been shaken by the protests of 2011–2012 and looks at the social and political consequences of the selected strategy.
The memory of the First World War in Germany is strongly informed by the western theatre of operations, by the bloody battles of materiel in Verdun and on the Somme. Even the myth surrounding the Battle of Langemarck continues to have an effect. Forgotten, however, is the fact that war, occupation, flight, deportation, and widespread destruction belonged to the collective experience of an entire province in the eastern part of Germany in 1914-15. The First World War was a turning point for East Prussia. In the Reich's east, the war helped an all-German identity achieve a breakthrough. Adapted from the source document.
Much of the political science literature suggests that a cohesive political community is advantageous-if not a precondition-for a stable democracy. Forging a cohesive community is obviously a more complex matter in a multi-ethnic setting. This article will consider the prospects of building political communities in the Baltic countries-three countries that, to various extents, struggle to balance ethnic pluralism, nation building, and democracy. The article examines the relationship between political community and democracy from a theoretical perspective, followed by an outline of the nation-building strategies taken by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania after re-establishing independence in the early 1990s. Drawing on survey data, we use territorial attachment to tap the sense of political community in the three countries. Notably, our figures disclose that most of the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia identify themselves as 'Russians,' and not at all with the country they reside in. This suggests that the contested issue of citizenship rights in the two countries has not been particularly conducive for creating cohesive political communities. We then move to the political regime and set out to examine the character of regime support in the three countries. Can we envisage solid support for democracy and its institutions in the absence of a cohesive political community? As it appears, regime support is not contingent on territorial identity. Our data disclose that many Baltic inhabitants draw a clear distinction between their own experiences with different political systems and what they perceive as relevant regime options today. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright the American Council of Learned Societies.]
Discourse analysis in both its theory and practice is traditionally concerned with politics. The sphere of the non-political rarely attracts attention of the researchers. It appears to be invisible to discourse theorists and unprivileged in empirical studies of discourse. This article aims at filling this gap. With the example of a Russian village it dwells on the discursive organisation of rural communities whose radically "personalised" world resists traditional approaches to political logic and suggests different modes of relations, agency, and power.