This article examines the December 2, 2007 State Duma elections in Russia in terms of their significance and implications for Russian politics. The article argues that the success of the United Russia party in the State Duma elections created the most conducive conditions for Vladimir Putin's handling of the presidential succession problem in 2008. By keeping the State Duma under the control of his Tarty of Power: Vladimir Putin became able to nominate his close ally Dmitry Medvedev to the Presidency since the election results enabled him to use the State Duma to counterbalance the overwhelming presidential power which will be transferred to Dmitry Medvedev in 2008. The article begins by examining the significance and the actual organization of the December 2, 2007 State Duma elections in Russia. On the basis of the analysis of the election results, the article goes on to discuss the implications of the December 2, 2007 State Duma elections for Russian politics.
Be it for the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the intervention in Syria or the alleged interference in the US presidential election, Russia has been increasingly under the spotlight over the last years. In 2018, the world's eyes will be upon two events: the presidential elections taking place on March 18, and the World Cup, which will kick off in June. While the outcomes of the latter are still uncertain, President Vladimir Putin's victory looks like a safe bet. Even so, these elections bear important consequences for both Russia's domestic and foreign policy, since they will affect Putin's ability to both cement his power at home and pursue his objectives abroad. What are the main domestic and international challenges facing Russia? Will Putin continue to question the Western-championed liberal order or seek reconciliation with the West? The authors of this Report address these key issues, offering in-depth analyses of Russia's political system, economy and society, as well as tracing their evolution and pointing at future scenarios for the EU-Russia relations.
Be it for the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the intervention in Syria or the alleged interference in the US presidential election, Russia has been increasingly under the spotlight over the last years. In 2018, the world's eyes will be upon two events: the presidential elections taking place on March 18, and the World Cup, which will kick off in June. While the outcomes of the latter are still uncertain, President Vladimir Putin's victory looks like a safe bet. Even so, these elections bear important consequences for both Russia's domestic and foreign policy, since they will affect Putin's ability to both cement his power at home and pursue his objectives abroad. What are the main domestic and international challenges facing Russia? Will Putin continue to question the Western-championed liberal order or seek reconciliation with the West? The authors of this Report address these key issues, offering in-depth analyses of Russia's political system, economy and society, as well as tracing their evolution and pointing at future scenarios for the EU-Russia relations.
On 18 March 2018, Vladimir Putin was reelected for a fourth term as president of Russia, receiving 77 per cent of the votes. He will remain in office for another six years, up to 2024. While this result did not come as a surprise, political events in the run-up to the election require more attention. Not only did protests take place in cities all over Russia; liberal elites were also strikingly present in both political and economic discussions, occasionally openly challenging the existing system. At the same time, the regime demonstrated a high level of tolerance vis-à-vis such challengers. These observations appear surprising in the context of Russia's authoritarian political system. The paper analyzes two cases of political confrontation in the context of the 2018 elections: Xenia Sobchak's presidential campaign and the competition between the economic groupings around the liberal Kudrin and the statist "Stolypin Club". It can be shown that in both cases, the roots of the seemingly independent political debates can be traced back to initiatives of the existing regime. On the basis of this observation, the paper comes to the following two conclusions: First, a certain level of political controversy is regarded as important for legitimizing the regime. This shows, secondly, that the "electoral authoritarian" regime in Russia has to respond to expectations of its citizens, which include the demand for political options. Overall, this paper suggests that despite its turn to increased authoritarianism and repression in the last years, the Russian government attempts to manage political stability by applying a mix of certain freedoms as well as restrictions.
Russia is experiencing a wave of state repression ahead of parliamentary elections on 19 September 2021. The crackdown is unusually harsh and broad, extending into previously unaffected areas and increasingly penetrating the private sphere of Russian citizens. For years the Russian state had largely relied on the so-called "power vertical" and on controlling the information space through propaganda and marginalisation of independent media. The political leadership, so it would appear, no longer regards such measures as sufficient to secure its power and is increasingly resorting to repression. The upshot is a further hardening of autocracy. Even German NGOs are experiencing growing pressure from the Russian state. This trend cannot be expected to slow, still less reverse in the foreseeable future.
How do flawed elections and post-election protest shape political attitudes? Taking advantage of the largely exogenous variation in the timing of a survey conducted in Moscow, we examine the short-term impact of the parliamentary election of December 4th, and the large protest of December 10th on trust in the Russian government. The fraud-marred parliamentary election had little effect on attitudes toward government, perhaps because allegations of vote improprieties were not new information. In contrast, the large protest of December 10th increased trust in government. Heightened trust arises largely from non-supporters of the ruling party updating their beliefs rather than from social desirability bias, a perceived improvement in government performance, or a "halo" effect. This finding is consistent with the view that autocrats can increase trust in government by unexpectedly allowing protest without repression. It also suggests that when evaluating trust in government citizens may cue not off the content of the protest, but off the holding of the protest itself.
Under the system of appointing regional governors by the president, which existed in Russia between 2005-2012, governors' loyalty to the central government and particularly their ability to deliver satisfactory results to the ruling party in national-level elections were crucial to their likelihood of being re-appointed for the next term. In this paper, we show that governors, anticipating the relationship between loyalty and re-appointments, attempted to increase their likelihood of being re-appointed by delivering additional votes to the ruling party, and that these attempts were subject to regional political cycles. We argue that delivering satisfactory results may have different importance to a governor depending on the stage of his term at which elections are held. If elections are held close to the expiration of a governor's current term, the results are likely to be pivotal to his further political career. Exploiting variation in the starting and expiry dates of Russian regional governors' terms of office, we find that the winning margins for a pro-government party across Russian regions in national-level elections held between 2007-2012 were substantially higher when elections were closer to the expiration of a regional governor's term. However, for elections held between 1999-2004, when governors were subject to a direct vote by the regional population, no similar effect is found. We then implement several exercises to identify the source of the additional votes for the ruling party and demonstrate that governors, while unlikely using the means of electoral fraud, exerted efforts to stimulate turnout among ruling party supporters.
The December 2011 legislative election was among the most fraudulent national elections in Russia since the communist period. The fraud, however, was not evenly spread across the country. Precinct-level election returns from the 83 regions of the Russian Federation suggest that the level of fraud ranged from minimal or small in some regions to extreme in some others, with moderate to high fraud levels in many regions in between. We argue that in an electoral authoritarian context like Russia, regional variation in fraud can be explained by differences in (a) the perceived need by regional authorities to signal loyalty to the center by "delivering" desired election results; (b) the capacity of regional authorities to organize fraud; and (c) the vulnerability of citizens to political pressure and manipulation. We test the effect of signaling, capacity, and vulnerability on electoral fraud in the 2011 legislative elections with data on the 83 regions of the Russian Federation. We find evidence for all three mechanisms, finding that the tenure of governors in office, United Russia's dominance in regional legislatures, and the ethnic composition of regions are most important for explaining regional variation in electoral fraud.
The thesis examines the motives of people in Arkhangelsk (Russia) to take part in the 10 December 2011 protest which emerged after the Duma elections. The objective of the research is to find out what motivated people in Arkhangelsk to take part in the protest (i.e. what kind of drivers triggered them to participate). The study draws on theory of spatial analyses of protest under the Russia's hybrid regime, which emphasizes local socioeconomic and political conditions as influential factors in formation of nature of protest. The results of the qualitative research indicate that protestors in Arkhangelsk were not only concerned with possible falsifications of Duma election results when they engaged into the protest. Due to specific local environments, protesters might also put forward demands based on discontent with socioeconomic and political situation in Arkhangelsk. The findings suggest that protest in Arkhangelsk was not purely political but combined traits of social and economic protest as well.
The 2016 presidential election was a historical event, politically and culturally. In front of cameras at rallies in every city, candidates were competing for the most powerful position in the United Sates: Commander in Chief. We later found out some were playing dirtier than others. Ad and campaign videos splashed across T.V.s, hoping to sway voters their way. Un-suspecting Americans trusted the process and had no reason to think foreign entities were secretly at work.
In March 2018, another presidential election took place in the Russian Federation. For the fourth time Vladimir Putin won the election by a large majority of votes. Alexei Navalny – an oppositioncandidate who had been preparing his election campaign since the end of 2016 – was not allowed to stand in the election. Regardless of his elimination from the election, Navalny remained an active member of Russian political life before and after the election; he carried out a boycott of the election, and organized post-election protests. Without a doubt, despite the ban on running in the election, Navalny was one of the main figures in the electoral process. Thus, the aim of this article is a detailed analysis of Navalny's preparations for the campaign – the authors focused not only on the candidate's opposition activity, but also on his unique measures and methods of running a campaign (Internet, social media, crowdfunding). The article examines the campaign preparations, as well as the reasons for the rejection of Navalny's registration as an election candidate, social support index, relationships with other candidates and the change of strategy after the Central Election Commission's decision. The analysis is based on Russian law, Central Election Commission's decisions, opinion poll results and information from the Russian and international media.
The article is devoted to the study of the tax reforms in modern Russia. Tax reforms carried out since the beginning of the 1990s are analyzed in connection with the cyclical repetition of the stages of the electoral process, or the so-called electoral cycle. The research methodology includes the calculation of indicators characterizing the change in the tax system and the analysis of their dynamics at various stages of the electoral cycle. The main quantitative and qualitative indicators are: the tax burden on the economy as a whole (nominal and real); the tax burden on individual elements of GDP (on wages, on gross profit, on actual final consumption); the number of changes made to tax legislation; terms and procedure of tax amnesty. Three stages of tax reforms have been identified (1993–1996, 1997–2000, 2001–present) for research in modern history of Russia. The first two stages of tax reforms directly coincided with the electoral cycles. The third modern stage of tax reforms is implemented during several electoral cycles. The revealed influence of elections on the tax system of Russia results in a cyclical increase of the tax burden on the main elements of GDP in the first years of cycles and lowering of the tax burden in the final years of electoral cycles. In the elective period for elections to the State Duma, the nominal tax burden on the economy is always reduced. In the election year and next year of the electoral cycle, there is an increase in effective rates for profit, consumption and labor. In the final years of the electoral cycle, there is a decrease in effective rates for profit, consumption and labor. Thus, the results of the study confirmed the assumption on the existence of a relationship between tax reforms and elections in Russia and the possibility of increasing the tax burden in the short termHighlights 1. The relationship between tax reforms and electoral cycles in Russia is unambiguously present. The intensity of the relationship is determined by the degree of competition in the elections2. The electoral cycles for the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation have a stronger impact on tax reforms in Russia3. Legislative activity on reforming the tax system of the Russian Federation is associated with the stages of the electoral cycle (declining in the election year in the State Duma and increasing in the pre-election period)4. Tax amnesties are unambiguously connected with the electoral process and their conduct is confined to the elective periodFor citationMayburov I. A., Kireenko A. P. Tax reforms and elections in modern Russia. Journal of Tax Reform, 2018, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 73–94. DOI:10.15826/jtr.2018.4.1.046Article infoReceived March 12, 2018; accepted April 15, 2018 ; Статья посвящена исследованию налоговых реформ в современной России. Проведенные с начала 1990-х гг. налоговые преобразования анализируются во взаимосвязи с циклическим повторением этапов выборного процесса, или так называемым электоральным циклом. Методика исследования включает в себя расчет показателей, характеризующих изменение налоговой системы и анализ их динамики на разных этапах электорального цикла. В качестве основных количественных и качественных показателей выбраны: налоговое бремя на экономику в целом (номинальное и реальное); налоговое бремя на отдельные элементы ВВП (на оплату труда, на валовую прибыль, на фактическое конечное потребление); количество изменении, внесенных в налоговое законодательство; сроки и порядок проведения налоговых амнистий. Для исследования в современной истории России выделены три этапа налоговых реформ (1993–1996 гг.; 1997–2000 гг.; 2001 г. — настоящее время). Первые два этапа налоговых реформ прямо совпадали с электоральными циклами. Третий современный этап налоговых реформ реализуется в течение нескольких электоральных циклов. Выявленное влияние выборов на налоговую систему России заключается в циклическом повышении налоговой нагрузки на основные элементы ВВП в первые годы циклов и понижении налоговой нагрузки в завершающие годы электоральных циклов. В выборный период по выборам в ГД РФ всегда снижается номинальное налоговое бремя на экономику. В год выборов и следующий год электорального цикла наблюдается повышение эффективных ставок на прибыль, потребление и труд. В завершающие годы электорального цикла отмечается понижение эффективных ставок на прибыль, потребление и труд. Таким образом, результаты исследования подтвердили предположение о существовании взаимосвязи между налоговыми преобразованиями и выборами в России и возможность повышения налоговой нагрузки в ближайшей перспективеОсновные положения 1. Взаимосвязь между налоговыми преобразованиями и электоральными циклами в России однозначно присутствует. Интенсивность взаимосвязи определяется степенью конкуренции на выборах2. Более сильное влияние на налоговые реформы в России оказывают электоральные циклы по выборам в Государственную Думу РФ3. Законодательная активность по реформированию налоговой системы РФ связана с этапами электорального цикла (снижается в год выборов в ГД и возрастает в предвыборном периоде)4. Налоговые амнистии однозначно связаны с электоральным процессом и их проведение приурочено к выборному периодуДля цитирования Майбуров И. А. Налоговые реформы и выборы в современной России / И. А. Майбуров, А. П. Киреенко // Journal of Tax Reform. — 2018. — Т. 4, № 1. — С. 73–94. — DOI:10.15826/jtr.2018.4.1.046Информация о статьеДата поступления 12 марта 2018 г.; дата принятия к печати 15 апреля 2018 г.
Previous studies on "youtubification" of political communication (May, 2010) have largely focused on democratic contexts. This study aims at exploring the role of the global video-sharing platform in non-democratic political communication, using the example of the Russian presidential election of 2018. It draws on the qualitative content analysis of 169 political videos collected from the "Popular" section of Russian YouTube during the last 2 months of the presidential campaign. The results show that oppositional discourse dominated the most popular political videos of Russian YouTube and that pro-state actors tried to co-opt the platform, publishing videos made in amateur and semi-professional styles that imitated user-generated content. Drawing on the findings, I discuss the risks and benefits of YouTube publics for the Russian authoritarian regime and the role of social media platforms in consultative authoritarianism.
Is electoral support related to the quality of public goods provision? Does the dictum to deliver votes to the federal center harm local governance, or do better outcomes result in better opportunities to improve quality of governance? Our research contributes to the existing literature in the following ways: 1) we explore the variety of governance patterns on the understudied level of Russian municipalities, using the dataset of local statistical indicators for all municipalities starting from 2012 to 2018; 2) we estimate the effects of budget autonomy and electoral loyalty at the federal elections on public goods provision; 3) we explore whether elected heads provide local services. Our findings suggest that electoral loyalty does not uniformly improve public goods provision in municipalities, while elected heads also have limited capacity to provide better services. ; Peer reviewed
