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The paper presents an overview of M. Weber's modelling paradigm assessing it against the opportunities of using the models in modern science of public policy and administration. Two types of research problems requiring modelling of different levels are identified. The paper defines the static and the dialectic methods of modelling, the limits and possibilities of their application are defined. The novelty and relevance of the paper lies in the substantiation of advantages and drawbacks of static modelling and in the proving of the importance of normative character of science, which contradicts the traditional Weber's methodology. In public administration one may not rely only upon formal procedures, forms and rules, because this will not reveal the functions of the State and the interests underlying them. A public administration model must be characterised by normative content. Models of social processes must not necessarily reflect the reality exactly, however, they may serve as a tool for simplifying the mechanisms of social reality and for attempting to understand its mechanisms. Modelling may be static or dialectic. Static modelling is simpler since the number of variables it takes account of is smaller. In certain cases static modelling may be presented or desirable due to value considerations raised by the idealistic world. Idealistic philosophy gives rise to relevant phenomena, which can be neither confirmed nor rejected. Such models may be desirable as the given required by a peculiar belief and as components of the given. As far as social science is a value and "humanitarian" science, to such extent metaphysics, the static given and static modelling may yield results. Philosophical idealism is often presented as a source of political and economic liberalism, or a sign of equality Is placed between them. This is not entirely correct since state and social policy studies in the liberal social sciences are based on formal concepts without any normative content. Liberal sociological definitions designed for a parliamentary-democratic constitutional state usually cover only procedures, forms, rules and state activity instruments, avoiding a definition of the State's functions completely or partially. Not only the functions of the State remain unsubstantiated; possible consequences of manifestation of these functions or the interests of those who defend them or any backstairs interests behind the declared interests arc not explained. The Weberian methodological concept of democracy turns liberal democracy and pluralist theory into a sheer arsenal of technical means, which is unpredictable and incapable of explaining the deep phenomena of public administration and the more so - of social policy. It is not only in the West, but also in Eastern Europe including Lithuania, individual politicians and public administration experts wish to reduce the principle of social welfare to the constitutional and legal level, absolutising the legal aspect. Dialectic modelling is a kind of opposite to static modelling, or modelling that may supplement the latter substantially. And this is not just because it is able to "see the context". Using the dialectic relationship one may examine such historical dichotomies as belief and science, nationality and globalism, central and local government, private and public interest etc. In the most general sense, dialectic modelling is focussed on the determination of the content, form, contradiction between content and form, and finding of the place of this relationship in the world's development process. The methodology of dialectic modelling asserts that the dialectic relationship is a universal means of modelling of qualitative processes and may be used for the modelling of the processes for which sufficient qualitative exceptionality may be determined as compared with the previous qualitative stage. Eastern Europe encounters difficulties in social modelling due to a distinct transformational nature of social systems of these countries as well as due to frequent changes in the laws governing social security and tax policy. The latter factor also poses problems for Eastern European social scientists in processing the material and in modelling socio-economic development on its basis.

The paper presents an overview of M. Weber's modelling paradigm assessing it against the opportunities of using the models in modern science of public policy and administration. Two types of research problems requiring modelling of different levels are identified. The paper defines the static and the dialectic methods of modelling, the limits and possibilities of their application are defined. The novelty and relevance of the paper lies in the substantiation of advantages and drawbacks of static modelling and in the proving of the importance of normative character of science, which contradicts the traditional Weber's methodology. In public administration one may not rely only upon formal procedures, forms and rules, because this will not reveal the functions of the State and the interests underlying them. A public administration model must be characterised by normative content. Models of social processes must not necessarily reflect the reality exactly, however, they may serve as a tool for simplifying the mechanisms of social reality and for attempting to understand its mechanisms. Modelling may be static or dialectic. Static modelling is simpler since the number of variables it takes account of is smaller. In certain cases static modelling may be presented or desirable due to value considerations raised by the idealistic world. Idealistic philosophy gives rise to relevant phenomena, which can be neither confirmed nor rejected. Such models may be desirable as the given required by a peculiar belief and as components of the given. As far as social science is a value and "humanitarian" science, to such extent metaphysics, the static given and static modelling may yield results. Philosophical idealism is often presented as a source of political and economic liberalism, or a sign of equality Is placed between them. This is not entirely correct since state and social policy studies in the liberal social sciences are based on formal concepts without any normative content. Liberal sociological definitions designed for a parliamentary-democratic constitutional state usually cover only procedures, forms, rules and state activity instruments, avoiding a definition of the State's functions completely or partially. Not only the functions of the State remain unsubstantiated; possible consequences of manifestation of these functions or the interests of those who defend them or any backstairs interests behind the declared interests arc not explained. The Weberian methodological concept of democracy turns liberal democracy and pluralist theory into a sheer arsenal of technical means, which is unpredictable and incapable of explaining the deep phenomena of public administration and the more so - of social policy. It is not only in the West, but also in Eastern Europe including Lithuania, individual politicians and public administration experts wish to reduce the principle of social welfare to the constitutional and legal level, absolutising the legal aspect. Dialectic modelling is a kind of opposite to static modelling, or modelling that may supplement the latter substantially. And this is not just because it is able to "see the context". Using the dialectic relationship one may examine such historical dichotomies as belief and science, nationality and globalism, central and local government, private and public interest etc. In the most general sense, dialectic modelling is focussed on the determination of the content, form, contradiction between content and form, and finding of the place of this relationship in the world's development process. The methodology of dialectic modelling asserts that the dialectic relationship is a universal means of modelling of qualitative processes and may be used for the modelling of the processes for which sufficient qualitative exceptionality may be determined as compared with the previous qualitative stage. Eastern Europe encounters difficulties in social modelling due to a distinct transformational nature of social systems of these countries as well as due to frequent changes in the laws governing social security and tax policy. The latter factor also poses problems for Eastern European social scientists in processing the material and in modelling socio-economic development on its basis.

The article explores positivism-postpositivism debate in social sciences that has been lasting already for many years. The author does not suppose this debate will end soon since it raises fundamental questions concerning the aims, tasks and methods of social sciences. Though representatives of these sciences differ significantly in views on these questions, the most of them and, in particular, evident majority of representatives of political science virtually holds positivist views. Such questions, which may be called conceptual, are essentially disputable, so they can not be resolved by any empirical research. When examining positivism-postpositivism debate the author singles out, paying tribute to tradition, three aspects of debate: (1) ontological, (2) epistemological, and (3) methodological. Yet he presents the arguments to support his claim that because of its antimetaphysical character positivism can have no ontology at all. Therefore an ontological dispute between positivists and postpositivists is simply impossible. Postpositivists, in discussing epistemological questions, would be inclined to reject positivist viewpoint that our statements and theories about social life can be true (though according to modern positivists, we can never know it for sure). They also would reject the positivist distinction between facts and values, which likewise can be considered as epistemological. But the most serious dispute that is taking place in social sciences concerns methodological questions. The author, in analyzing it, pays most attention to two most influential forms of postpositivism, namely to critical theory and postmodernism. Having discussed genealogy and deconstruction which, though with serious reservations, may be considered as postpositivist methods, the author claims that postpositivism lacks the main part of methodology, i.e. rules of accepting scientific statements and theories. And that is why postpositivism can not win the methodological debate over positivism which has such rules.

The article explores positivism-postpositivism debate in social sciences that has been lasting already for many years. The author does not suppose this debate will end soon since it raises fundamental questions concerning the aims, tasks and methods of social sciences. Though representatives of these sciences differ significantly in views on these questions, the most of them and, in particular, evident majority of representatives of political science virtually holds positivist views. Such questions, which may be called conceptual, are essentially disputable, so they can not be resolved by any empirical research. When examining positivism-postpositivism debate the author singles out, paying tribute to tradition, three aspects of debate: (1) ontological, (2) epistemological, and (3) methodological. Yet he presents the arguments to support his claim that because of its antimetaphysical character positivism can have no ontology at all. Therefore an ontological dispute between positivists and postpositivists is simply impossible. Postpositivists, in discussing epistemological questions, would be inclined to reject positivist viewpoint that our statements and theories about social life can be true (though according to modern positivists, we can never know it for sure). They also would reject the positivist distinction between facts and values, which likewise can be considered as epistemological. But the most serious dispute that is taking place in social sciences concerns methodological questions. The author, in analyzing it, pays most attention to two most influential forms of postpositivism, namely to critical theory and postmodernism. Having discussed genealogy and deconstruction which, though with serious reservations, may be considered as postpositivist methods, the author claims that postpositivism lacks the main part of methodology, i.e. rules of accepting scientific statements and theories. And that is why postpositivism can not win the methodological debate over positivism which has such rules.

The article explores positivism-postpositivism debate in social sciences that has been lasting already for many years. The author does not suppose this debate will end soon since it raises fundamental questions concerning the aims, tasks and methods of social sciences. Though representatives of these sciences differ significantly in views on these questions, the most of them and, in particular, evident majority of representatives of political science virtually holds positivist views. Such questions, which may be called conceptual, are essentially disputable, so they can not be resolved by any empirical research. When examining positivism-postpositivism debate the author singles out, paying tribute to tradition, three aspects of debate: (1) ontological, (2) epistemological, and (3) methodological. Yet he presents the arguments to support his claim that because of its antimetaphysical character positivism can have no ontology at all. Therefore an ontological dispute between positivists and postpositivists is simply impossible. Postpositivists, in discussing epistemological questions, would be inclined to reject positivist viewpoint that our statements and theories about social life can be true (though according to modern positivists, we can never know it for sure). They also would reject the positivist distinction between facts and values, which likewise can be considered as epistemological. But the most serious dispute that is taking place in social sciences concerns methodological questions. The author, in analyzing it, pays most attention to two most influential forms of postpositivism, namely to critical theory and postmodernism. Having discussed genealogy and deconstruction which, though with serious reservations, may be considered as postpositivist methods, the author claims that postpositivism lacks the main part of methodology, i.e. rules of accepting scientific statements and theories. And that is why postpositivism can not win the methodological debate over positivism which has such rules.

The article explores positivism-postpositivism debate in social sciences that has been lasting already for many years. The author does not suppose this debate will end soon since it raises fundamental questions concerning the aims, tasks and methods of social sciences. Though representatives of these sciences differ significantly in views on these questions, the most of them and, in particular, evident majority of representatives of political science virtually holds positivist views. Such questions, which may be called conceptual, are essentially disputable, so they can not be resolved by any empirical research. When examining positivism-postpositivism debate the author singles out, paying tribute to tradition, three aspects of debate: (1) ontological, (2) epistemological, and (3) methodological. Yet he presents the arguments to support his claim that because of its antimetaphysical character positivism can have no ontology at all. Therefore an ontological dispute between positivists and postpositivists is simply impossible. Postpositivists, in discussing epistemological questions, would be inclined to reject positivist viewpoint that our statements and theories about social life can be true (though according to modern positivists, we can never know it for sure). They also would reject the positivist distinction between facts and values, which likewise can be considered as epistemological. But the most serious dispute that is taking place in social sciences concerns methodological questions. The author, in analyzing it, pays most attention to two most influential forms of postpositivism, namely to critical theory and postmodernism. Having discussed genealogy and deconstruction which, though with serious reservations, may be considered as postpositivist methods, the author claims that postpositivism lacks the main part of methodology, i.e. rules of accepting scientific statements and theories. And that is why postpositivism can not win the methodological debate over positivism which has such rules.

Globalization and evolving knowledge society are the major fundamental challenge to the social science. Diversification of social life on the all levels of reality - individual, family, community, state, mankind - opens new opportunities and give birth to the new threats. To grasp these two - positive and negative - sides of our life the more precise, relevant cognitive means are needed. Better conceptualized, free of ideological and political influences.

Globalization and evolving knowledge society are the major fundamental challenge to the social science. Diversification of social life on the all levels of reality - individual, family, community, state, mankind - opens new opportunities and give birth to the new threats. To grasp these two - positive and negative - sides of our life the more precise, relevant cognitive means are needed. Better conceptualized, free of ideological and political influences.

Globalization and evolving knowledge society are the major fundamental challenge to the social science. Diversification of social life on the all levels of reality - individual, family, community, state, mankind - opens new opportunities and give birth to the new threats. To grasp these two - positive and negative - sides of our life the more precise, relevant cognitive means are needed. Better conceptualized, free of ideological and political influences.

Globalization and evolving knowledge society are the major fundamental challenge to the social science. Diversification of social life on the all levels of reality - individual, family, community, state, mankind - opens new opportunities and give birth to the new threats. To grasp these two - positive and negative - sides of our life the more precise, relevant cognitive means are needed. Better conceptualized, free of ideological and political influences.

This article continues the investigation on the relationships between science and social engineering. We inquire and critically analyze the ideas of P. Feyerabend on the social possibilities of science, political role of scientific experts and social engineers. The objective of the article is the reconstruction of Feyerabend's reception of science and its socio-political role, then, the presentation of Feyerabend's counter-arguments against Popper's rationalism and the project of social engineering. According to Feyerabend, an open and free society is the society where every (cultural, religious, epistemological etc.) tradition is provided with equal rights and equal possibilities. Any attempt to impose the standards of one tradition on the others rejects the idea of freedom and liberty. Science is only one epistemological traditions among others, therefore, in a free society scientific standard cannot dominate over the standards of the other traditions. Thus, Feyerabend interprets Popper's idea of scientifically grounded social engineering as politically harmful, misleading and incompatible with the requirements of a free society.

This article continues the investigation on the relationships between science and social engineering. We inquire and critically analyze the ideas of P. Feyerabend on the social possibilities of science, political role of scientific experts and social engineers. The objective of the article is the reconstruction of Feyerabend's reception of science and its socio-political role, then, the presentation of Feyerabend's counter-arguments against Popper's rationalism and the project of social engineering. According to Feyerabend, an open and free society is the society where every (cultural, religious, epistemological etc.) tradition is provided with equal rights and equal possibilities. Any attempt to impose the standards of one tradition on the others rejects the idea of freedom and liberty. Science is only one epistemological traditions among others, therefore, in a free society scientific standard cannot dominate over the standards of the other traditions. Thus, Feyerabend interprets Popper's idea of scientifically grounded social engineering as politically harmful, misleading and incompatible with the requirements of a free society.