Suchergebnisse

In the days of the Soviet Union, Georgia was one of the most flourishing Soviet republics due to its protected tea and wine market and its attractive Black Sea resorts. The breakup of the U.S.S.R., the opening by the FSU republics of their borders to broad imports following the "parade of sovereignties," and wars within the country led to a sharp decline in Georgia's economic indicators, but in recent years the situation has begun to improve Nevertheless, living standards in Georgia remain low. Official unemployment is around 13% of the working age population. But independent experts believe that from 2003 to the beginning of 2005 unemployment rose by 20% to around 47% of the working age population. Most large industrial enterprises remain at a standstill or operate at less than full capacity. During the years of independence, over 1 million people -the most employable and active part of the population-have left the country. A significant proportion of Georgia's population subsists, for the most part, on remittances from relatives working abroad. Experts estimate the annual amount of remittances from Georgian "guest workers" living in Russia alone at $1-2 billion. According to an IMF analytical report on the economic prospects of the Middle East and Central Asia, remittances from abroad in 2005 accounted for over 5% of Georgian GDP. The country's Minister of State Kakha Bendukidze estimates this amount at 4% of GDP. In the opinion of analysts, the business environment in Georgia is not conducive to a reduction or elimination of existing investment risks, while the political situation impedes socioeconomic development. Thus, although small and medium enterprises make up 97% of all active companies, their share of Georgia's GNP is only around 10% (compared to 60% in EU countries). The government has taken some steps to improve the country's regulation and auditing systems: health inspectors no longer "cruise" around cafes and restaurants, and it is possible to start a business even without prior registration. Nevertheless, international standards are still a long way off, which is why small business is mostly concentrated in trade.

Discusses resignation of President Shevardnadze following "revolution of the roses" in Nov. 2003, political prospects of opposition party leader and reformer Mikhail Saakashvili, and US assistance to the new government.

Interview with President Mikhail Saakashvili on Georgia's economic difficulties since its independence in 1991, the country's unity threatened by secessionist regions of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia, and geopolitical implications of its strategic location at the crossroads of the Russian, Turkish, and Iranian worlds and on the route of oil pipes running from the Caspian Sea. Summaries in English and Spanish p. 471 and 485.

Many things have changed in Georgia after the Rose Revolution of November 2003. Certain changes are very positive and praiseworthy, such as the abolition of deeply corrupt and universally hated traffic police, and its replacement with the Western style patrol police. Reforms in the armed forces are also heading toward a positive direction. However, the economy does not seem to be the new government's priority. The leader of the Rose Revolution and the current president of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili has made it clear a number of times that he was not interested in solving economic problems of the country as much he was interested in dealing with security and defense issues. When presenting a newly composed government in February 2005, Saakashvili was quoted by saying: "I can build the army, I can build the police, but development of the economy is up to the entire society." Prior to that President of Georgia voiced similar sentiments at his address to the country's parliament. Indeed, compared to reforms in the military and law enforcement agencies economic reforms in Georgia have fallen far behind. This was partially acknowledged by Saakashvili in his above-mentioned address to the Parliament. According to Mr. Demur Giorkhelidze, a Georgian economist, no one in the Georgian government has an idea whether the country has a general program dealing with the economy or not. Instead, some government officials have "fragmented" views about certain issues related to the economy. The government of Georgia has no master plan for economic development and rehabilitation. In any case, it has no published plan or program whatsoever.

Three revolutions, one after another, replaced the three post-communist leaders of Georgia: (1) the Round Table and Zviad Gamsakhurdia replaced the communists; (2) Gamsakhurdia's cabinet was replaced by Eduard Shevardnadze, and (3) Mikhail Saakashvili removed Shevardnadze from his post. Each of them changed the fortunes of the country and the nation, but only the last event was tagged as a "revolution." It is obviously viewed as the most important among the three and prompts us to ask whether it is absolutely correct to describe Saakashvili's coming to power as a revolution. Is it not a ploy designed to boost the importance of the regime change in the eyes of the world community and the local population? To answer these questions we should answer another, broader, question: Did the regime change that removed Eduard Shevardnadze and became known as the Rose Revolution have the characteristics of a revolution? By revolution we mean the very specific and profound impact a regime exerts on social order-it is much more than a conflict that replaces the government. A revolution brings about changes in the political, economic, spiritual, and social spheres of the nation's life, which take some time to become obvious and are never immediately manifest the very day after forces come to power which choose to call themselves "revolutionary." The events of November 2003 in Georgia were called a revolution immediately after the coup was completed. During the three years that separate us from that time enough material has been accumulated to assess the nature of the changes that have taken place and were brought about by Mikhail Saakashvili's coming to power. The Rose Revolution is a term prompted by the immediate impressions of the non-constitutional power change in Georgia. A revolution is not merely a particular method of regime change-it is an event of profound importance for the country's economic, social, and political life. Those Western authors who have devoted much time to the theory of revolution and who have written extensively on the subject 1 interpret it as a particular method of regime change that brings more radical results than other seemingly similar actions. A revolution means replacement of the top leaders accomplished by a mass illegitimate movement that results in deep-cutting changes.

The Rose Revolution in November 2003 created a setting characterized by major new challenges as well as major new opportunities for Georgia. After presenting the forces that gave rise to the Rose Revolution (emerging civil society, vibrant free press, weak state authority, and national memory and unity), several issues that will shape the future of Georgia are examined. The first of these is economic growth, which provides some reason for optimism, though the picture remains tenuous. The second is the struggle over Georgia's territory, in particular the challenges facing the state when it comes to breakaway territories. Frustration on this front remains to the present time. The third is the development of a strong state, something that provides particular challenges in light of the failing state inherited by the Saakashvili government, but something that showed some promising signs in the wake of the Rose Revolution. After a promising start, the Saakashvili government has recently drifted in the direction of over-centralization of power in the president's office, and this is cause for concern as the government continues to struggle to find its way.

After coming to power in the "Rose Revolution" of 2003, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili announced that he would resolve the conflict in South Ossetia. However, he did not have in mind a new offer for the local rulers. In fact, he wanted to strengthen Georgia's central government. To that end, he sought backing from the West, in particular the United States. South Ossetia, however, is still supported by Russia. What followed was an escalation of violence. Adapted from the source document.

There is the opinion that the method by which a political leader is replaced, or his own attitude to his possible loss of power, is part of his political heritage and affects the country's democratic development. If the first leader of a newly formed political system is replaced, this heritage becomes even more important. The point is amply illustrated by fifteen years of Georgia's political independence. It changed its political leaders twice, each time with violence and violations of the Constitution. Each time the change was carried out under democratic banners, and each time authoritarian trends in the country's political system became more pronounced: after coming to power each of the new leaders wanted to preserve it. To achieve this, they sought for economic domination to get a grip on badly needed material and financial resources. So each of the new leaders tried to place private business under his political control. The Georgian Constitution, however, guarantees protection of private property; the new leaders are also limited by the liberal Constitution in many other respects, the country's financial and political dependence on the West, and its desire to integrate into the European structures. This forces each of the new leaders to use methods which will not damage the country's democratic image. Political pressure on the business community became especially obvious after the Rose Revolution; today it is barely concealed and rather harsh.

Der Beitrag untersucht den Zusammenhang zwischen Korruption und einer vermeintlich schwachen Staatsmacht in Georgien. Dabei wird entgegen der Annahme von der Machtlosigkeit georgischer Politiker mit Führungskompetenzen die Hypothese erörtert, wonach die staatliche Führung die Korruption aufgrund spezifischer Gründe bzw. Zwecke institutionalisiert. Somit präsentiert sich Korruption im Bereich der Staatsführung als eine wunschgemäße Strategie, welche in einigen Situationen den Einfluss des Staates eher ausweitet und nicht unterminiert. Die Erklärung dieser Position umfasst folgende Aspekte: (1) die Gesellschaftsordnung Georgiens, (2) die Arrangement-Strategien mit der Korruption, (3) die Durchsetzung korrupten Verhaltens sowie (4) die Verhinderung des Aufkommens von Vertrauen und Legitimität. Aufgrund der weiten Verbreitung korrupter Praktiken in Georgien, insbesondere durch das entsprechende Verhalten auf der politischen Machtebene, steht der neue Präsident Saakashvili mit der Schaffung eines normativen Fundaments, der Bildung von Vertrauen in die staatlichen Institutionen und der Ausweitung von Integrität in der Verwaltung vor einer großen Aufgabe, die wohl als langfristiges Ziel formuliert werden muss. (ICG2)

The political and economic challenges facing the nation of Georgia, as well as its relationships with the US and Russia, are detailed. Attempts by Georgia's government to cultivate close relations with both the US and Russia are discussed. However, it is noted that Georgia's leaders have displeased Russia and the US. It is argued that Georgia has displeased the US by attacking rebels in the Georgian region of South Ossetia, thereby destabilizing the southern Caucasus region and an important oil pipeline. Meanwhile, Georgia has failed to resolve several issues affecting its relationship with Russia, including the problem of international terrorists using Georgia as a safe haven and the future of Russian military bases in Georgia. Attempts by Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili to create and solve crises in South Ossetia and the republic of Adjaria are described as unhelpful for Georgia. Saakashvili's actions towards Adjaria and South Ossetia are portrayed as threatening to US and Russian interests. It is suggested that Russia should seek to defuse the conflicts. Georgia's economy is described as deteriorating and in need of additional Russian investment.