Following the collapse of Communist regimes across Eurasia, ecuritization became a pressing problem for newly emerging democracies as ruling elites in many post-Soviet states used securitization as a shield for retaining power. This study is based on case study analyses and has two objectives: to highlight the dynamics of Georgia's securitization process, and to show how this process corresponds to existing theoretical and empirical experience. It is evident that the formulation of threat perceptions and the decision making process in Georgia have been constructed and dominated by the elite of the United National Movement(UNM). Georgia's move under Saakashvili's regime on securitization has been fairly controversial – it has been responsible for both the rise and then the fall of his regime. During the last decade, Georgia under Saakashvili's rule has represented a bright illustration of the beginning of a successful and then failed securitization process. Research shows thatsecuritization can be successful in the short run and is particularly likely to succeed in post-communist and Eurocentric countries, ruled by authoritarian or "competitive authoritarian regimes". However, in the long run, securitization leads to the curbing of basic freedoms and the introduction of far-reaching extraordinary measures in the name of security cannot sustain itself and inevitably fails.
This paper aims to further investigate hybrid regimes, which are becoming a more and more analysed topic in political studies. After the pathbreaking article by Thomas Carothers (Carothers, 2002) where he claims that many of the regimes that were considered usually in "transition" were actually proved highly durable and did not move neither toward autocracy nor democracy, other scholars started to be interested in this particular phenomenon as such. In this paper I stem from the definition of Hybrid regimes provided by Leonardo Morlino: "A hybrid regime is always a set of ambiguous institutions […] lacking as it does one or more essential characteristics of that regimebut also failing to acquire other characteristics that would make it fully democratic or authoritarian" (Morlino, 2008:7), in order to investigate how incumbents hold and strengthen power in this peculiar political and institutional environment, without forcefully becoming neither fully authoritarian or fully democratic.
This paper aims to further investigate hybrid regimes, which are becoming a more and more analysed topic in political studies. After the pathbreaking article by Thomas Carothers (Carothers, 2002) where he claims that many of the regimes that were considered usually in "transition" were actually proved highly durable and did not move neither toward autocracy nor democracy, other scholars started to be interested in this particular phenomenon as such. In this paper I stem from the definition of Hybrid regimes provided by Leonardo Morlino: "A hybrid regime is always a set of ambiguous institutions […] lacking as it does one or more essential characteristics of that regimebut also failing to acquire other characteristics that would make it fully democratic or authoritarian" (Morlino, 2008:7), in order to investigate how incumbents hold and strengthen power in this peculiar political and institutional environment, without forcefully becoming neither fully authoritarian or fully democratic.
Since the 2003 Rose Revolution, the Georgian government implemented a number of major institutional reforms which have succeeded in modernising Georgia's state institutions, reducing corruption and 'formalising' the public sector. While the effects of Saakashvili's reforms on state and institution-building, corruption and the rule of law have been examined by a large and growing body of academic literature, there has been little discussion about the impact of institutional changes on the previously widespread culture of informality in Georgia. This article explores the effects of Georgian institution-building from such aspects of informality as the use of informal networks and connections in exchanges of favours, gift-giving and other types of informal activities. The findings of this study, based on the analysis of recent surveys and in-depth interviews, conclude that the reforms succeeded in undermining the overall importance of informal practices in dealings with state bureaucracy, education system, healthcare, law enforcement, judiciary and some other areas previously dominated by informality. However, the reliance on informality did not disappear, and informal networks are still employed as coping mechanisms and as social safety nets.
Since the 2003 Rose Revolution, the Georgian government implemented a number of major institutional reforms which have succeeded in modernising Georgia's state institutions, reducing corruption and 'formalising' the public sector. While the effects of Saakashvili's reforms on state and institution-building, corruption and the rule of law have been examined by a large and growing body of academic literature, there has been little discussion about the impact of institutional changes on the previously widespread culture of informality in Georgia. This article explores the effects of Georgian institution-building from such aspects of informality as the use of informal networks and connections in exchanges of favours, gift-giving and other types of informal activities. The findings of this study, based on the analysis of recent surveys and in-depth interviews, conclude that the reforms succeeded in undermining the overall importance of informal practices in dealings with state bureaucracy, education system, healthcare, law enforcement, judiciary and some other areas previously dominated by informality. However, the reliance on informality did not disappear, and informal networks are still employed as coping mechanisms and as social safety nets.
В статье рассматриваются метафорические портреты грузинских политиков Э. Шеварднадзе и М. Саакашвили на материале британских СМИ. ; This paper presents a study of metaphorical portraits of political leaders: it analyzes the metaphorical images of Georgian politicians E. Shevardnadze and M. Saakashvili. The re-search material consists of publications in the British media
The August 2008 events in South Ossetia marked an important stage in the recent history of the Southern Caucasus: they changed the course of the region's sociopolitical life and have become the axis of the very complicated relations among the biggest international players. The conflict settlement was achieved through a fairly long diplomatic struggle, which faithfully reflected the relations among Russia, the United States, and the European Union. Below I offer an analysis of the diplomatic aspect of the South Ossetian settlement.
The article is devoted to the study of diplomatic relations between Georgia and the United States during the first period of the presidency of Mikhail Saakashvili in Georgia in 2004-2007. The history of the formation, strengthening and deepening of diplomatic relations between the countries, developments in domestic and foreign policy, as well as diplomatic successes achieved as a result of frequent meetings of high-ranking officials of the two countries have been highlighted in details. The foreign policy approaches of the US President George W. Bush's administration to Georgia, in particular, from the Rose Revolution to the end of 2007, as well as the problems that arose for Armenia as a result of the changes that took place in Georgia, have been identified and studied. The specifics of President Bush's visit to Tbilisi (May 2005), expected changes in the region and Georgia's tendencies to become an "exporter" of democracy have been comprehensively considered. The role and significance of bilateral documents signed by the parties have been analyzed. Various facts have been considered that have contributed to the development of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relations between Georgia and the United States. Particular attention has been paid to identifying the real reasons for the deterioration of diplomatic relations between Georgia and the Russian Federation. A special attention has been paid in the article to the study of the goals of the US financial and active support for holding fair and transparent snap elections in Georgia. ; Հոդվածը նվիրված է Վրաստանում Միխեիլ Սաակաշվիլիի նախագահության առաջին շրջանում՝ 2004-2007 թթ., Վրաստան-ԱՄՆ դիվանագիտական հարաբերությունների ուսումնասիրությանը: Մանրամասնորեն լուսաբանված են կողմերի միջև դիվանագիտական հարաբերությունների ձևավորման, խորացման և ամրապնդման պատմությունը, ներքին ու արտաքին քաղաքական զարգացումները, ինչպես նաև երկու երկրների բարձրաստիճան պաշտոնյաների հաճախակի հանդիպումների արդյունքում ձեռքբերված դիվանագիտական հաջողությունները: Վերհանվել և ուսումնասիրվել են ԱՄՆ նախագահ Ջորջ Բուշ Կրտսեր վարչակազմի արտաքին քաղաքական մոտեցումները Վրաստանի նկատմամբ, մասնավորապես Վարդերի հեղափոխությունից մինչև 2007 թ. վերջերը, ինչպես նաև Վրաստանում կատարվող փոփոխությունների հետևանքով ՀՀ-ի համար առաջացած խնդիրները: Ամբողջապես քննության առարկա են դարձել նախագահ Բուշի (2005 թ. մայիսին)՝ Թբիլիսի կատարած այցի առանձնահատկությունները, տարածաշրջանում սպասվող փոփոխությունները և Վրաստանը ժողովրդավարություն «արտահանող» երկրի վերածման միտումները: Վերլուծվել են կողմերի միջև ստորագրված երկկողմ փաստաթղթերի դերն ու նշանակությունը: Դիտարկվել են տարաբնույթ փաստեր, որոնք նպաստել են Վրաստանի և Միացյալ Նահանգների միջև երկկողմ ու բազմակողմ դիվանագիտական հարաբերությունների զարգացմանը: Առանձնակի ուշադրություն է դարձված Վրաստանի և Ռուսաստանի Դաշնության միջև դիվանագիտական հարաբերությունների վատթարացման իրական պատճառների բացահայտմանը: Հոդվածում կարևոր տեղ է հատկացված նաև Վրաստանում արտահերթ ընտրությունների արդար ու թափանցիկ կազմակերպման համար ԱՄՆ ֆինանսական և գործուն աջակցության նպատակների ուսումնասիրությանը: ; Статья посвящена исследованию дипломатических отношений между Грузией и США в первый период президентства Михаила Саакашвили в Грузии в 2004-2007 гг. Подробно освещена история формирования, укрепления и углубления дипломатических отношений между странами, развития во внутренней и внешней политике, а также дипломатические успехи, достигнутые в результате частых встреч высокопоставленных официальных лиц двух стран. Выявлены и изучены внешнеполитические подходы администрации президента США Джорджа Буша к Грузии, в частности, от «революции роз» до конца 2007 года, а также проблемы, которые возникли для Армении в результате изменений, имевших место в Грузии. Были всесторонне рассмотрены особенности визита президента Буша в Тбилиси (май 2005 г.), ожидаемые изменения в регионе и тенденции Грузии стать «экспортером» демократии. Проанализированы роль и значение двусторонних документов, подписанных сторонами. Были рассмотрены различные факты, способствовавшие развитию двусторонних и многосторонних дипломатических отношений между Грузией и США. Особое внимание было уделено выявлению реальных причин ухудшения дипломатических отношений между Грузией и Российской Федерацией. Особое место в статье отведено изучению целей финансовой и активной поддержки США для проведения справедливых и прозрачных внеочередных выборов в Грузии.
In the days of the Soviet Union, Georgia was one of the most flourishing Soviet republics due to its protected tea and wine market and its attractive Black Sea resorts. The breakup of the U.S.S.R., the opening by the FSU republics of their borders to broad imports following the "parade of sovereignties," and wars within the country led to a sharp decline in Georgia's economic indicators, but in recent years the situation has begun to improve Nevertheless, living standards in Georgia remain low. Official unemployment is around 13% of the working age population. But independent experts believe that from 2003 to the beginning of 2005 unemployment rose by 20% to around 47% of the working age population. Most large industrial enterprises remain at a standstill or operate at less than full capacity. During the years of independence, over 1 million people -the most employable and active part of the population-have left the country. A significant proportion of Georgia's population subsists, for the most part, on remittances from relatives working abroad. Experts estimate the annual amount of remittances from Georgian "guest workers" living in Russia alone at $1-2 billion. According to an IMF analytical report on the economic prospects of the Middle East and Central Asia, remittances from abroad in 2005 accounted for over 5% of Georgian GDP. The country's Minister of State Kakha Bendukidze estimates this amount at 4% of GDP. In the opinion of analysts, the business environment in Georgia is not conducive to a reduction or elimination of existing investment risks, while the political situation impedes socioeconomic development. Thus, although small and medium enterprises make up 97% of all active companies, their share of Georgia's GNP is only around 10% (compared to 60% in EU countries). The government has taken some steps to improve the country's regulation and auditing systems: health inspectors no longer "cruise" around cafes and restaurants, and it is possible to start a business even without prior registration. Nevertheless, international standards are still a long way off, which is why small business is mostly concentrated in trade.
The 5 January, 2008 snap poll was the first ever truly competitive presidential election in Georgia. The incumbent, Mikhail Saakashvili, just managed to retain his seat, narrowly avoiding a run-off with the main opposition candidate, Levan Gachechiladze. According to the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) of Georgia, and the exit polls commissioned by government controlled television companies, Saakashvili received between 50.8 and 54 percent of votes, while Gachechiladze stayed below 30 percent. Local and international observers have noted numerous irregularities, but overall they have endorsed the elections as democratic. Opposition parties, however, have been less than convinced in fairness of the results as they have insisted that the current outcome is, indeed, a result of the noted irregularities. The snap presidential poll is a step forward for Georgian democracy, with credible opposition now emerging in the country. Both Saakashvili and the main opposition camps have made some gains. The main set-back for democracy was the suppression of Imedi TV, the only nongovernment controlled nationwide television channel. The January 2008 poll was the culmination of a very tense stand-off between the government and the opposition, which started in September 2007 with shocking revelations from a former defense minister Okruashvili. The stand-off reached its climax on 7 November, 2007, when the special forces of the Ministry of Interior brutally dispersed a mass rally in the center of Tbilisi, and the government imposed the state of emergency, suspending all news broadcast by TV and radio media, and closing down all but a couple television and radio channels. The November 2007 events demonstrated a huge erosion of popular support to once widely admired Georgian President Saakashvili. The latter, who was swept into power by similar mass rallies four years earlier, won his previous poll with more than 90 percent of the vote. The 2003 mass rallies, which was subsequently dubbed as the Rose Revolution, saw the resignation of then President Shevardnadze, followed by the snap January 2004 presidential elections, which Saakashvili won with overwhelming popular support. Since then, U.S.-educated Saakashvili has been billed a revolutionary pro-Western reformer, whose fiery anti-Russian rhetoric has appealed to many in Georgia. To save his regime from a complete isolation and collapse, Saakashvili had no other logical choice but to call for a snap poll, either presidential or parliamentary. He opted for the former, as his National Movement, which currently holds majority of seats in the parliament is even less popular than him, and besides, it was the spring parliamentary elections the organizers of the mass rallies in Tbilisi were calling for in the first place. Saakashvili's gamble has won him a short respite and some credibility, but in the long run he will likely be a lame duck of Georgian politics.
Many things have changed in Georgia after the Rose Revolution of November 2003. Certain changes are very positive and praiseworthy, such as the abolition of deeply corrupt and universally hated traffic police, and its replacement with the Western style patrol police. Reforms in the armed forces are also heading toward a positive direction. However, the economy does not seem to be the new government's priority. The leader of the Rose Revolution and the current president of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili has made it clear a number of times that he was not interested in solving economic problems of the country as much he was interested in dealing with security and defense issues. When presenting a newly composed government in February 2005, Saakashvili was quoted by saying: "I can build the army, I can build the police, but development of the economy is up to the entire society." Prior to that President of Georgia voiced similar sentiments at his address to the country's parliament. Indeed, compared to reforms in the military and law enforcement agencies economic reforms in Georgia have fallen far behind. This was partially acknowledged by Saakashvili in his above-mentioned address to the Parliament. According to Mr. Demur Giorkhelidze, a Georgian economist, no one in the Georgian government has an idea whether the country has a general program dealing with the economy or not. Instead, some government officials have "fragmented" views about certain issues related to the economy. The government of Georgia has no master plan for economic development and rehabilitation. In any case, it has no published plan or program whatsoever.
Search for Geopolitical Strategy for Georgia means finding a special road to a civilized future that will be in line with the country's historical and cultural specificity and uniqueness. After the unfavorable conditions, there was created a short but very profitable term implementing its geopolitical and geostrategic interests. Everything depended on the ability of the Georgian politicians, how much they would you be able to determine, understand and mobilize the situation. In this case Georgian diplomacy was appropriate. The government which was in a very difficult position soon clarified the situation and was able to use this chance as much as possible. Accordingly, the country received an impressive geopolitical dividend. Georgian diplomacy achieved great success in the geopolitical context. The factor of the President of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, played a major role, he created a desirable background for Western politics in Georgia with his authority in world politics and great political activity. ; Search for Geopolitical Strategy for Georgia means finding a special road to a civilized future that will be in line with the country's historical and cultural specificity and uniqueness. After the unfavorable conditions, there was created a short but very profitable term implementing its geopolitical and geostrategic interests. Everything depended on the ability of the Georgian politicians, how much they would you be able to determine, understand and mobilize the situation. In this case Georgian diplomacy was appropriate. The government which was in a very difficult position soon clarified the situation and was able to use this chance as much as possible. Accordingly, the country received an impressive geopolitical dividend. Georgian diplomacy achieved great success in the geopolitical context. The factor of the President of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, played a major role, he created a desirable background for Western politics in Georgia with his authority in world politics and great political activity.
Сегодняшние средства массовой информации, с одной стороны, предоставляют индивиду огромный выбор в информационном пространстве, с другой - этот выбор ограничивают. СМИ сегодня являются основным инструментом формирования общественного мнения и пропаганды. Говоря о пропаганде на территории постсоветского пространства, нельзя обойти стороной Грузию, где в силу экономических проблем население имеет постоянный доступ только к одному источнику информации - национальному телевидению, контролируемому местными властями. Кроме того, политические лидеры страны различными способами ограничивают доступ к альтернативным источникам информации. Каналы национального телевидения используются исключительно как инструмент пропаганды. Тем временем, анализируя грузинские и российские СМИ, мы наблюдаем два диаметрально противоположных образа грузинского народа. В силу этого я обратилась к данной теме, пытаясь найти ответ на вопрос, насколько изменился грузинский народ под влиянием политических процессов, происходящих в Грузии, и информационного пространства. В этой работе я постаралась отразить основные вехи, с чего все начиналось и к чему мы все пришли. ; Contemporary mass-media on the one hand provides a huge choice in the media space, but on the other hand this choice is limited. Nowadays mass-media is one of the fundamental instruments of the public opinion and propaganda management. Speaking about propaganda on the territory of the former Soviet Union Republics one cant skip Georgia, where due to economic problems; citizens can only have one source of information the national television, which is being controlled by the local administration. Moreover, political leaders of the country try to limit access to any alternative sources of information. Channels of national television are being used only as an instrument of propaganda. Meanwhile, while analyzing Georgian and Russian mass-media we can see two absolutely different images of Georgian people. I have appealed to this topic hopefully to find out, how much has the Georgian people changed under the influence of political process which takes place in Georgia? In this article I tried to display all the basics of what was the beginning and where we are now.
The article analysis foreign policy of Georgia towards EU integration since 2003. Georgia's EU integration policy was activated after the "Rose Revolution". New President of Georgia M. Saakashvili enjoyed strong support of the West, but Russia-Georgia war in 2008, unsuccessful reforms, high level of unemployment made his policy unpopular within Georgians and in October 2012, people voted against the ruling party. Defeat in parliamentary elections was a negative turning point for Saakashvili and his supporters. They started discreditation of the new coalition government policy (especially foreign policy) claiming that aim of Georgia's foreign policy is not European and Euro-Atlantic integration anymore, that representatives of the new government are agents of the Kremlin. An analysis of Georgia's foreign policy in the context of EU integration shows that the priorities of Georgia's foreign policy are unchanged. The goal of Georgia's foreign policy is membership of the EU. ; У статті аналізується зовнішня політика Грузії щодо інтеграції в ЄС з 2003 року. Політика інтеграції Грузії в ЄС була активізована після «революції троянд». Новий президент Грузії М. Саакашвілі користувався сильною підтримкою Заходу, але російсько-грузинська війна в 2008 році, невдалі реформи, високий рівень безробіття зробили його непопулярним серед грузин, а в жовтні 2012 року люди проголосували проти правлячої партії. Поразка на парламентських виборах в 2012 р стала величезним ударом для Саакашвілі та його прихильників. Вони почали дискредитувати політику нового коаліційного уряду (особливо зовнішньої політики), стверджуючи, що метою зовнішньої політики Грузії більше не є європейська і євроатлантична інтеграція, й що представники нового уряду є агентами Кремля. Аналіз зовнішньої політики Грузії в контексті інтеграції в ЄС показує, що пріоритети зовнішньої політики Грузії не змінилися. Метою зовнішньої політики Грузії й надалі залишається подальша інтеграція в ЄС. ; В статье анализируется внешняя политика Грузии по интеграции в ЕС с 2003 года. Показано, что политика интеграции Грузии в ЕС была активизирована после «Революции роз». Новый президент Грузии М. Саакашвили пользовался солидной поддержкой Запада, но российско-грузинская война в 2008 году, неудачные реформы, высокий уровень безработицы сделали его непопулярным среди грузин, и в октябре 2012 года люди проголосовали против правящей партии. Поражение на парламентских выборах в 2012 г. стала огромным ударом для Саакашвили и его сторонников. Они начали дискредитировать политику нового коалиционного правительства (особенно внешнюю), утверждая, что целью внешней политики Грузии больше не является европейская и евроатлантическая интеграция, и что представители нового правительства являются агентами Кремля. Анализ внешней политики Грузии в контексте интеграции в ЕС показывает, что приоритеты внешней политики Грузии не изменились. Целью внешней политики Грузии и в дальнейшем остается дальнейшая интеграция в ЕС.
The article analysis foreign policy of Georgia towards EU integration since 2003. Georgia's EU integration policy was activated after the "Rose Revolution". New President of Georgia M. Saakashvili enjoyed strong support of the West, but Russia-Georgia war in 2008, unsuccessful reforms, high level of unemployment made his policy unpopular within Georgians and in October 2012, people voted against the ruling party. Defeat in parliamentary elections was a negative turning point for Saakashvili and his supporters. They started discreditation of the new coalition government policy (especially foreign policy) claiming that aim of Georgia's foreign policy is not European and Euro-Atlantic integration anymore, that representatives of the new government are agents of the Kremlin. An analysis of Georgia's foreign policy in the context of EU integration shows that the priorities of Georgia's foreign policy are unchanged. The goal of Georgia's foreign policy is membership of the EU. ; У статті аналізується зовнішня політика Грузії щодо інтеграції в ЄС з 2003 року. Політика інтеграції Грузії в ЄС була активізована після «революції троянд». Новий президент Грузії М. Саакашвілі користувався сильною підтримкою Заходу, але російсько-грузинська війна в 2008 році, невдалі реформи, високий рівень безробіття зробили його непопулярним серед грузин, а в жовтні 2012 року люди проголосували проти правлячої партії. Поразка на парламентських виборах в 2012 р стала величезним ударом для Саакашвілі та його прихильників. Вони почали дискредитувати політику нового коаліційного уряду (особливо зовнішньої політики), стверджуючи, що метою зовнішньої політики Грузії більше не є європейська і євроатлантична інтеграція, й що представники нового уряду є агентами Кремля. Аналіз зовнішньої політики Грузії в контексті інтеграції в ЄС показує, що пріоритети зовнішньої політики Грузії не змінилися. Метою зовнішньої політики Грузії й надалі залишається подальша інтеграція в ЄС. ; В статье анализируется внешняя политика Грузии по интеграции в ЕС с 2003 года. Показано, что политика интеграции Грузии в ЕС была активизирована после «Революции роз». Новый президент Грузии М. Саакашвили пользовался солидной поддержкой Запада, но российско-грузинская война в 2008 году, неудачные реформы, высокий уровень безработицы сделали его непопулярным среди грузин, и в октябре 2012 года люди проголосовали против правящей партии. Поражение на парламентских выборах в 2012 г. стала огромным ударом для Саакашвили и его сторонников. Они начали дискредитировать политику нового коалиционного правительства (особенно внешнюю), утверждая, что целью внешней политики Грузии больше не является европейская и евроатлантическая интеграция, и что представители нового правительства являются агентами Кремля. Анализ внешней политики Грузии в контексте интеграции в ЕС показывает, что приоритеты внешней политики Грузии не изменились. Целью внешней политики Грузии и в дальнейшем остается дальнейшая интеграция в ЕС.