Scepticism
In: The Problems of philosophy
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In: The Problems of philosophy
In: Routledge library editions: Epistemology v. 8
In: Routledge Library Editions: Epistemology Ser.
Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Original Title Page -- Original Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- FOREWORD -- I PYRRHO'S SCEPTICISM ACCORDING TO SEXTUS EMPIRICUS -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. SHORT ACCOUNT OF SEXTUS'S PYRRHONISM -- 3. THE SCEPTICAL WAYS OF ANNOUNCEMENT -- 4· THE DOGMATIC WAYS OF ANNOUNCEMENT -- 5. NEUTRALITY TOWARDS SUBJECTIVIST PHENOMENALISM -- 6. THE SCEPTIC'S REFERENCE TO THE EXISTENCE OF OPPOSITE VIEWS -- 7. THE MATURE SCEPTIC, A MODERATELY KEEN SEEKER AND DOUBTER? -- 8. THE SCEPTIC, A PHILOSOPHER? -- 9· DEFINING SCEPTICISM -- II THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POSSIBILITY OF SCEPTICISM -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. IS SCEPTICISM MORE LOGICALLY THAN PSYCHOLOGICALLY IMPECCABLE? -- 3. DO THE SCEPTIC'S ACTIONS BETRAY HIS DOGMATISM? -- 4. CAN THE SCEPTIC BELIEVE? -- 5. MUST THE SCEPTIC BE A DOUBTER? -- 6. IS THE SCEPTIC UNPERTURBED BY MODERN SCIENCE? -- 7. IS THE SCEPTIC SENSITIVE TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REAL AND APPARENT? -- 8. GENERAL OUTLOOKS GENERATE SCEPTICISM -- 9. CAN WE ASSUME THAT SEXTUS AND HIS LESS ARTICULATE FRIENDS FULFIL THE REQUIREMENTS? -- III SCEPTICISM AND POSITIVE MENTAL HEALTH -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. CONFRONTATION WITH SIX CRITERIA OF POSITIVE MENTAL HEALTH -- 3, ALLEGED SCEPTICISM OF ST. AUGUSTINE AND OTHERS -- 4· MODERATE OR FRAGMENTARY SCEPTICISM OF THE UNPHILOSOPHICAL -- 5. ENCOURAGING A SCEPTICAL BENT OF MIND: CAN IT EVER BE RIGHT? -- IV CONCEPTUAL COMPLEMENTARITY OF EVIDENCE AND TRUTH REQUIREMENTS -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. RESTRICTIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS -- 3. SHIFT FROM PLAIN ANNOUNCEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE TO JUSTIFYING CLAIM TO SAY ONE KNOWS -- 4. REQUIREMENTS OF 'KNOWING' INVOLVING THREE QUESTIONS. CORRESPONDING QUESTIONNAIRES -- 5. THE 'THIRD-PERSON' AND 'FIRST-PERSON' QUESTIONNAIRES -- 6. CONCLUSION ON 'REACHING' KNOWLEDGE -- 7. CONCEPTS OF KNOWING WITHOUT A SEPARATELY SATISFIED TRUTH REQUIREMENT.
In: Central problems of philosophy
Cover; Half Title; Title; Dedication; Copyright; Contents; Acknowledgements; Introduction: The whimsical condition of mankind; 1 Scepticism and knowledge; 2 The legacy of Socrates; 3 Demons, doubt and common life; 4 Transcendental meditations; 5 Un/natural doubts; 6 Internalisms and externalisms; Notes; Bibliography; Index
In: N/a
Front cover -- Title page -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Foreword by Stanley Hauerwas -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Part One: The Exclusive Disjunction of Objectivism or Relativism -- 1. Religious Language, Reference, and Autonomy -- 2. Revelation, Imagination, and Arbitrariness -- Part Two: A Hermeneutical Model of Rationality -- 3. Rationality, Relativism, and Scepticism -- 4. Tradition, Worldviews, and Conflict -- 5. Science, Rationality, and Theology -- Part Three: A Kierkegaardian Perspective on Religious Knowledge -- 6. Faith, Knowledge, and Belief -- 7. Faith, Knowledge, and Truth -- 8. Faith, Knowledge, and Suffering -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Back cover.
In: Raison publique, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 37-57
In: Boston University Law Review, Band 72, Heft 4
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In: The women's review of books, Band 12, Heft 12, S. 17
In: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11794/44757
Dans ce mémoire, nous cherchons à comprendre la nature et le mouvement du scepticisme de Montaigne en dégageant la métaphysique et l'anthropologie qui sont à l'œuvre dans les Essais . Premièrement, nous examinons les discours sur le savoir, sur l'être et sur le bien qui se trouvent dans l'"Apologie de Raymond Sebond" et nous montrons qu'ils sont articulés selon une même structure tripartite-dogme, doute et réflexivité-qui constitue une métaphysique sceptique. Secondement, nous examinons, à travers une série d'essais, le rapport de Montaigne à la politique, à la sociabilité et à la peinture de soi et nous signalons que son approche est similaire dans chacun des cas: son attitude à la fois confiante, méfiante et inquisitrice est l'expression d'une anthropologie sceptique. Articulation de sa métaphysique et de son anthropologie, le scepticisme de Montaigne se veut une philosophie qui s'essaie sur le monde et l'homme qui l'habite.
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In: Archives internationales d'histoire des idées 199
Wittgenstein is arguably the greatest philosopher of the last hundred years and scepticism is one of the central problems that modern philosophy faces. This collection is the first to be devoted to an examination of how that great philosopher's work bears on this fundamental philosophical problem. Wittgenstein's reaction to scepticism is complex, articulating both a sense that sceptical problems are ultimately unreal and a sense that scepticism teaches us something about the fundamental character of the human predicament. The essays, specially written for this collection by distinguished philosophers and commentators on Wittgenstein, explore that reaction, addressing, in particular, scepticism about the existence of the external world and of other minds. In doing so, it explores issues not only in theory of knowledge but also in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, language, perception and literature, as well as raising questions about the nature of philosophy itself. Several of the papers address the work of Stanley Cavell, perhaps the most influential commentator on the work of Wittgenstein, and Cavell replies in the final pieces to four of those papers. This collection is essential reading for students and scholars of Wittgenstein and anyone interested in the debate surrounding scepticism.
This report examines explanations for scepticism towards economic globalization within and across countries, focusing on factors that help to situate the extent of globalization scepticism in Denmark alongside experiences in France and Germany. The report is based on a review of academic literature dealing with attitudes towards globalization and the linkages between globalization and national politics. Globalization is an umbrella term for a broad range of phenomena and has economic, political and cultural dimensions. The diverse expressions of globalization present a challenge when it comes to identifying sources of globalization scepticism because the latter may be directed at different targets, including multinational corporations or the national governments that influence how international economic integration is managed. In addition, perceived consequences of globalization may reflect other changes that are difficult to isolate from globalization, with technological development providing a prominent example. Many studies of individual attitudes towards economic globalization take the distribution of economic gains or losses due to free trade within societies as a starting point. In economies where highly skilled labour is abundant, benefits from free trade are likely to flow towards workers with a higher level of education while low-skilled workers may be disadvantaged. Certain sectors of economic activity may also be more exposed to competition from increasing international economic integration, leaving workers more vulnerable. Employment-related categories are not the only way of distinguishing winners and losers of globalization. For example, low-income consumers may benefit more from free trade than highincome consumers. Gains or losses from globalization may also vary by geographical location, depending on the nature of economic activity in different regions.
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In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 199, Heft 1-2, S. 927-947
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractIn this paper, we develop a novel response to counterfactual scepticism, the thesis that most ordinary counterfactual claims are false. In the process we aim to shed light on the relationship between debates in the philosophy of science and debates concerning the semantics and pragmatics of counterfactuals. We argue that science is concerned with many domains of inquiry, each with its own characteristic entities and regularities; moreover, statements of scientific law often include an implicit ceteris paribus clause that restricts the scope of the associated regularity to circumstances that are 'fitting' to the domain in question. This observation reveals a way of responding to scepticism while, at the same time, doing justice both to the role of counterfactuals in science and to the complexities inherent in ordinary counterfactual discourse and reasoning.